

F.O.

406

N
8

45

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

Printed for the use of the Foreign Office.

CONFIDENTIAL.

(11835)

F.O.

F.O. 406/45

406

PART VI.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS.

45

January to March 1921.

[This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.]

Printed for the use of the Foreign Office.

CONFIDENTIAL.

(11835)

PART VI.

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

EASTERN AFFAIRS.

January to March 1921.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
Chapter I.—THE CAUCASUS.			
1 Colonel Stokes No. 132. Secret	1920 Dec. 6	Georgia. General situation report. Foreign relations. Internal affairs. Cabinet. Financial affairs. Communications	1
2 Sir H. Rumbold No. 1668	" 20	Armenia. Transmits report by Rev. H. W. Harcourt on the present situation in Armenia. The problems of Government since the organisation of the State. The military situation. Financial position. Transport. Immediate prospects	4
3 Petroleum Department Memo- randum	1921 Jan. 13	Azerbaijan, Baku. Report on the conditions of the Baku oil industry since September 1918, its fall in production and drilling, also the state of the outlying fields at Grosny, Emba and Maikop	11
4 Colonel Stokes No. 21. Tel.	Jan. 20	Georgia. Gives the military requirements for Georgia, and states that Georgian Government desire to obtain one-third immediately. States that he is convinced Georgians will fight	17
5 Sir H. Rumbold No. 52. Tel.	" 23	Georgia. Refers to Tiflis Tel. No. 19. States that Georgians have received certain quantities of kerosene and crude oil. Senior Naval Officer informs him that crude oil could be supplied from naval stocks	18
6 Admiralty Conf.	Mar. 14	Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia. Transmits report from Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, on general situation in Southern Caucasus, the relations of the republic with each other and their neighbours, and Communist activities in the Caucasus	18
7 To Colonel Stokes No. 22	" 17	Georgia. Reports conversation of Secretary of State with M. Tchenkeli on the subject of present position in Georgia	25

Chapter II.—TURKEY.

8 Sir H. Rumbold No. 1339. Tel.	1920 Dec. 29	Mission to Anatolia. Grand Vizier stated that he has instructed mission to return to Constantinople	27
9 Sir H. Rumbold No. 1679. Secret	" 21	General intelligence report. Transmits copy for week ending 9th December	27
10 Sir H. Rumbold No. 1688. Secret	" 24	General intelligence report. Transmits copy for week ending 2nd December	32
11 Lord Hardinge No. 3882	" 30	Revision of treaty. Gives substance of an interview granted by member of Senatorial Commission for Foreign Affairs to correspondent of "Echo de Paris" regarding supposed discrepancies between statements regarding Eastern affairs by Mr. Lloyd George and President of Council in the Chamber	37
12 Lord Hardinge No. 4. Tel.	1921 Jan.	Revision of treaty. Reports that General Townshend has granted interview to press, in which he advocates revision of treaty	38
13 Sir H. Rumbold No. 1708	1920 Dec. 31	General situation. Gives report of, in Turkey at the close of the year	38

432 [6668]

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

iii

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
14 Sir H. Rumbold No. 1707. Secret	1920 Dec. 31	General intelligence. Transmits copy for week ending 16th December	39
15 To Sir G. Buchanan No. 27	1921 Jan. 10	Ratification of treaty. Italian Chargé enquired of Sir Eyre Crowe whether His Majesty's Government had any information regarding report that Mustapha Kemal wished the Sultan to ratify, which he considered would be detrimental to Allies; Sir Eyre Crowe replied that rumours had been received, but that he did not consider ratification would be detrimental to Allies	44
16 To Sir H. Rumbold No. 39	" 13	Ratification of treaty. Reports substance of conversation between Sir Eyre Crowe and Mustafa Reshed Pasha, the newly-appointed unofficial representative for Turkey in London	44
17 Mr. Davis	" 13	Mandated territories. Requests views of His Majesty's Government regarding desire of United States Government to publish certain notes exchanged on subject of mandated territories	45
18 Sir H. Rumbold No. 25. Tel.	" 12	Mission to Angora and general situation. Reports that no official news has been received from mission. That Turkish Government are spreading report that Financial Controllers are responsible for distress prevailing among Turkish officials	45
19 Sir H. Rumbold No. 10	" 4	Heads of foreign missions. Report on	46
20 Sir H. Rumbold No. 31	" 8	Intelligence report. Transmits copy for fortnight ended 30th December	47
21 Sir H. Rumbold No. 40	" 8	Mission to Anatolia. Transmits extract from "Agency of Anatolia" of 6th December, and an extract from the "Yeni Kirasun" of 16th December, dealing with activities of the mission	54
22 To Mr. Davis	" 20	Mandated territories. His Majesty's Government would prefer to delay publication of correspondence until their answer to Mr. Colby's note of 20th November has been delivered	56
23 Sir H. Rumbold No. 43. Tel.	" 20	General situation. Gives statement of his views regarding Nationalist movement and situation in Turkey. Considers situation inextricable if Treaty of Sèvres is to remain as a basis for the future	56
24 To Lord Hardinge No. 243	" 24	Negotiations with Nationalists. French Chargé d'Affaires in London states that certain Nationalist Turks have arrived in Rome and are anxious to negotiate as intermediaries between Allies and Mustapha Kemal	58
25 Lord Hardinge to Sir W. Tyrrell No. 59. Tel.	" 25	Negotiations with Nationalists. States that Conference discussed Turkish and Greek questions. Italian representative produced proposal made by Turkish representatives in Rome regarding the reconstruction of treaty	59
26 Sir H. Rumbold No. 57. Tel.	" 26	Negotiations with Nationalists. Has received communication from French High Commissioner concerning decision of Supreme Council regarding summoning of a conference in London to discuss Eastern affairs	59
27 Lord Hardinge to Sir H. Rumbold and Earl Granville (repeated to Foreign Office No. 60. Tel.)	" 26	Negotiations with Nationalists. Gives decisions of Supreme Council regarding summoning of Conference in London at which Greek and Turkish representatives shall be present to discuss Eastern questions	59

[6668]

a 2

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
28 Sir H. Rumbold No. 59. Tel.	1921 Jan. 27	Negotiations with Nationalists. Refers to No. 26. States that tenor of note in reply to Allied note has been communicated to French High Commissioner ...	60
29 Earl Granville No. 36. Tel.	" 26	Negotiations with Nationalists. Acknowledges receipt of decision of Supreme Council, and states that President of Council appeared delighted with decisions and announced his intention of personally proceeding to Paris and London ...	60
30 Earl Granville No. 37. Tel.	" 27	Negotiations with Nationalists. President has notified his acceptance of invitation to London Conference, but expresses surprise that invitation has been extended to Kemal ...	60
31 Earl Granville No. 39. Tel.	" 27	Negotiations with Nationalists. States that Greek Government are not likely to allow President of Council to represent press. M. Calogeropoulos informed journalist that if M. Rhalys were allowed to go alone to London or M. Gounaris was sent he himself would resign ...	61
32 Sir H. Rumbold No. 62. Tel.	" 28	Negotiations with Nationalists. Transmits translation of reply to joint note received from Porte ...	61
33 Sir H. Rumbold No. 64. Tel.	" 29	Negotiations with Nationalists. Gives review of opinions of press in Greece and Turkey regarding decision to call London Conference ...	61
34 Sir H. Rumbold No. 70. Tel.	" 31	Negotiations with Nationalists. States that Mustapha Kemal, elated by invitation to attend conference, is becoming intractable. Doubts, if proposal were made to Turkish Government to establish financial commission, whether they would agree, as they hope for modification of financial clauses ...	62
35 Sir H. Rumbold No. 71. Tel.	Feb. 1	Negotiations with Kemalists. Transmits translation of telegram from Angora to Allied representative denying the right of Constantinople to represent Turkey at conference, and requesting a direct invitation from Allies to Grand National Assembly ...	62
36 Earl Granville No. 48. Tel.	" 1	Greek activities. Reports conversation between British military attaché and Colonel Pallis, of Greek army. Latter states that offensive should be postponed until April, but political situation may force offensive at any moment ...	63
37 Sir H. Rumbold No. 93	Jan. 25	Financial control. Transmits copy of letter from Sir A. Block regarding steps taken by Provisional Financial Commission and letters exchanged between that commission and Minister of Finance, and relating the steps taken by High Commissioners ...	63
38 Sir H. Rumbold No. 108	" 29	Negotiations with Nationalists. Reports conversation with Sefa Bey, the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs, who stated his views regarding a modification of the Treaty of Sèvres ...	67
39 Sir H. Rumbold No. 76. Tel.	Feb. 4	Negotiations with Nationalists. States that Italian High Commissioner has shown him a telegram from Angora to the European Powers which repeats that it is the only Government entitled to represent the Turkish nation ...	69

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
40 Sir H. Rumbold No. 81. Tel.	1921 Feb. 6	Negotiations with Nationalists. States that Grand Vizier reports that Angora had not yet come into line, but that he still hoped they would do so. Whether they did or not, Central Government proposed to despatch delegation to London. Request views on this possibility ...	70
41 Sir H. Rumbold No. 82. Tel.	" 6	Negotiations with Nationalists. Transmits text of telegram received from Angora stating that delegation will leave Angora on 7th February ...	71
42 Sir H. Rumbold No. 84. Tel.	" 7	Negotiations with Nationalists. States that Government delegation will leave Constantinople on 12th February, and gives its probable composition ...	71
43 Sir H. Rumbold No. 88. Tel.	" 8	Negotiations with Nationalists. Grand Vizier intimated that he would personally go as head of delegation and discuss views of His Majesty's Government ...	71
44 To Sir H. Rumbold No. 87. Tel.	" 10	Negotiations with Nationalists. Requests information of persons forming Angora delegation and attitude of Constantinople Government towards it ...	72
45 Sir H. Rumbold No. 91. Tel.	" 11	Greek activities. States that Greek offensive is imminent and is obviously intended to influence proceedings of the London Conference ...	72
46 To Sir H. Rumbold No. 91. Tel.	" 11	Negotiations with Nationalists. His Majesty's Government are unable to postpone conference to meet the Angora delegation, which can only be received as a part of Constantinople delegation ...	72
47 Sir H. Rumbold No. 93. Tel.	" 11	Negotiations with Nationalists. States that Constantinople delegation leaves on 12th February. Gives information as to its composition. Adds that no certain information as to composition of Angora delegation is available ...	72
48 Sir H. Rumbold No. 139	" 7	General situation. States that His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome has forwarded him copy of his despatch No. 67 dealing with conference at Rome between Moderate Nationalists and Kemal. Also describes general conditions at Constantinople ...	73
49 Sir H. Rumbold No. 146	" 7	General situation and negotiations with Nationalists. Transmits a translation of interview given by Mustapha Kemal to "United Telegram" Press Agency. A translation of speech by Mukhtar Bey before Grand National Assembly and translation of telegram to Grand Vizier from Angora Government ...	74
50 Sir H. Rumbold No. 100. Tel.	" 14	Negotiations with Nationalists. Gives composition of Nationalist delegation to London Conference ...	77
51 Sir H. Rumbold No. 101. Tel.	" 14	Negotiations with Nationalists. Gives information regarding persons composing the Nationalist delegation and date of its departure ...	78
52 Sir G. Buchanan No. 45. Tel.	" 17	Negotiations with Nationalists. Transmits telegram from Sir M. Hankey giving summary of an interview with Count Sforza regarding attitude of Angora delegation ...	78
53 Sir G. Buchanan No. 46. Tel.	" 17	Negotiations with Nationalists. Transmits telegram from Sir M. Hankey regarding Count Sforza's general idea as to procedure of London Conference ...	79

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
54 Sir G. Buchanan No. 47. Tel.	1921 Feb. 17	Negotiations with Nationalists. States that Osman Nizami, Turkish Ambassador, intimated that he would attend conference, and foresaw no possibility of merging the two Turkish delegations into one	79
55 Colonel Stokes No. 43. Tel.	" 12	Negotiations with Nationalists. Gives substance of telegram addressed to Chicherin by Bekir Sami Bey regarding objects of Nationalist delegation to London conference	79
56 Sir H. Rumbold No. 178	" 16	Financial control and situation. Transmits copy of note prepared by Sir A. Block giving short summary of financial situation of Turkish Government	80
57 Sir H. Rumbold No. 151	" 9	Negotiations with Nationalists. Comments on publication of correspondence between Constantinople and Angora regarding the London Conference, and transmits French translation of the first three telegrams	82
58 Sir H. Rumbold No. 165	" 12	Negotiations with Nationalists. Gives date of departure of Constantinople delegation, and comments on the general situation and its possible influence on attitude of both delegations	85
59 Sir H. Rumbold No. 140. Tel.	" 27	Revision of treaty. Gives substance of conversation with Minister for Foreign Affairs on subject of Eastern Thrace and Smyrna	86
60 To Mr. Davis	" 28	Mandated territories. States that note on subject of economic rights in mandated territories will be presented on 28th February, and agrees to simultaneous publication in England and United States of America of all correspondence	86
61 To Sir H. Rumbold No. 206	Mar. 2	Negotiations with Nationalists and financial situation. Gives substance of conversation at interview granted to Tewfik Pasha by Lord Curzon	86
62 To Mr. Balfour	" 2	Mandated territories. Transmits copy of reply to United States Ambassador in answer to Mr. Colby's note of 20th November, regarding economic rights in the mandated territories	87
63 Sir H. Rumbold No. 249	" 8	Local foreign post offices. Transmits copies of identic notes by French, Italian and British High Commissioners to Polish, Roumanian and Russian representatives and Greek High Commissioner, regarding closing of local post offices other than for powers provided for under article 262 of Treaty of Sèvres	88
64 Sir H. Rumbold No. 260	" 9	Greek activities in Thrace. Transmits copy of memorial by two delegates regarding alleged persecution of Moslem population in Thrace by occupying Greek forces	90
65 To Sir H. Rumbold No. 240	" 15	General, and negotiations with the Nationalists. Gives account of farewell visit to Lord Curzon of Tewfik Pasha, Grand Vizier	90
66 Sir H. Rumbold No. 250	" 8	Situation in Caucasus. Gives information regarding general situation in Georgia and Armenia received from Rev. H. Harcourt, representative of Lord Mayor's Fund	91
67 Earl Granville No. 118	" 10	Revision of treaty. States that since news has reached Athens that London Conference may revise treaty as regards Thrace and Smyrna, protests have been received from Greeks all over the country	92

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
68 Earl Granville No. 126	1921 Mar. 17	Negotiations with Nationalists. Greek comments. Submits Greek comments and criticisms on the proposals of the London Conference	98
69 Lord Hardinge No. 918	" 24	Revision of Turkish Treaty. Gives M. Briand's views regarding the attitude of Turkey over the questions of Smyrna, Thrace and Cilicia	94
70 Sir H. Rumbold No. 292	" 23	Negotiations with the Nationalists. Reports conversation with the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs on the subject of the proposals made by the London Conference for a modification of the treaty	95
71 Sir H. Rumbold No. 300	" 23	General situation. Gives account of interview accorded by Sultan, and transmits copy of memorandum left with His Majesty	96
Chapter III.—PALESTINE AND SYRIA.			
72 Sir R. Graham No. 5	1921 Jan. 3	Zionists. Political activities of. Gives account of first great meeting of Zionists and of enthusiastic reception accorded to His Majesty's representative	100
73 Sir H. Samuel No. 218	1920 Dec. 17	Immigration into Palestine. Details of Jewish immigrants for November	101
74 Sir H. Samuel No. 219	" 21	Zionists. Political activities of. Refers to Part V, No. 294. Gives corrected version of Article VIII of the Resolutions of the Elected Assembly	101
75 Sir H. Samuel No. 220	" 24	Officials in Palestine. Submits lists showing proportion of British and Palestinian officials in the Administration	102
76 Sir H. Samuel No. 229	" 27	Privileges, religious, in Palestine. Describes Christmas ceremonies at Bethlehem and privileges accorded to the French consul	103
77 Sir H. Samuel No. 243	1921 Jan. 1	Finance in Palestine. Reports unsatisfactory state of municipal finances, and encloses report of Municipal Tax Commission for Jerusalem	104
78 Sir H. Samuel No. 244	" 1	Palestine. Situation report. Transmits report for December enclosing a memorandum presented by Kasim-el-Husseini and reply thereto; a communiqué issued by the Government regarding a movement aiming at a change in His Majesty's Government's policy; enclosing also the text of the Statutes of a Workmen's Conference held at Haifa, and of a note from the Greek consul relative to hoisting of a flag on arrival of King Constantine at Phaleron	144
79 To Lord Hardinge No. 87	" 10	Mandates. Confirms refusal to accept Italian attitude towards conferment of mandates. Instructs to inform French Government and at same time express agreement that certain provisional administrative measures should be put into operation	148
80 To Sir M. Hankey	" 10	Mandates. Transmits copies of correspondence referred to in No. 79, and requests that views contained therein may be brought to the attention of Mr. Balfour	148
81 War Office	" 10	Communication between French and British in Middle East. Expresses opinion that the system of communication by liaison officers at Cairo and Beirut respectively should be maintained	149

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
82 Sir H. Samuel to Sir J. Tilley	1920 Dec. 24	Council. Economic, in Palestine. Encloses correspondence with Sir A. Mond relative to formation of the Council and requests transmission of a letter to Sir A. Mond	149
83 To Sir H. Samuel	1921 Jan. 12	Holidays. Official, in Palestine. Approves eight holidays each for Moslems, Christians and Jews. The King's birthday to be a holiday for all creeds	151
84 Consul Fontana	1920 Dec. 21	Syria. Situation report. Deals with situation in the Grand Lebanon and Aleppo. Reports country to be devastated and deserted, villages desolate and trade at a standstill	152
85 To Sir G. Buchanan	1921 Jan. 13	Holy Places. Guard at. Instructs Sir G. Buchanan to urge the Italian Government to withdraw their guard detachment	155
86 To Sir H. Samuel	" 13	Council. Economic, in Palestine. Refers to No. 82. Approves proposals for formation, provided Zionist organisation agree and co-operate closely	155
87 Sir H. Samuel	" 4	Palestine. Administrative report. Transmits report for December, dealing with agriculture, antiquities, commerce, finance, legal, and medical work, postal telegraphs, public security and public works	155
88 Sir H. Samuel	" 17	Wakf. Refers to Part V, No. 318, and submits proposals	158
89 To French Ambassador	" 19	Holy Places. Guard at. Urges that French detachment be withdrawn, and points out that Italian Government have undertaken to withdraw their detachment simultaneously	158
90 To Sir H. Samuel	" 19	Extradition. Refers to Part V, No. 332. Outlines situation after mandates are in force, and approves draft proposals submitted as a temporary measure	159
91 To Sir H. Samuel	" 19	Legislation and jurisdiction. Discusses question of rights of Palestinians to jurisdiction of Egyptian Mixed Courts. Prefers maintenance of <i>status quo</i> pending modifications introduced by terms of mandate	160
92 To Sir H. Samuel	" 22	Wakf. Refers to No. 88. Approves proposals, and requests reply to question in Part V, No. 318	160
93 Sir H. Samuel	" 7	Wakf. Refers to Part V, No. 308. Transmits copy of resolution reached on 2nd December, 1920. Outlines form of administration of Wakf prior to the war	160
94 Sir H. Samuel	" 8	Finance. In Palestine. Submits appreciation of finances of country with particular relation to cost of defence	163
95 Sir H. Samuel	" 7	Transjordan. Situation report. Outlines administrative and political situation in Ajlun and Belka districts	168
96 To Sir H. Samuel	" 27	Wakf. Acknowledges receipt of No. 93, and refers to No. 92. Approves resolutions of the committee	173
97 To Sir H. Samuel	" 29	Officials. In Palestine. Refers to Part V, No. 293. Comments on proposals it contained, and gives instructions as to scales of pay and allowances which have been sanctioned	173
98 Board of Trade	" 29	Preference, Imperial. Extension to Palestine. Refers to Foreign Office letter of 15th January. Concurs generally in terms of the draft letter which Lord Curzon proposes to address to the Law Officers of the Crown. Suggests addition to the draft	174

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
99 To Lord Hardinge	1921 Jan. 31	Communication between French and British in Middle East. Outlines proposals for regulating inter-communication, and instructs Lord Hardinge to enquire whether the French Government approve them	175
100 Sir H. Samuel	" 16	Magistrates. In Palestine. Submits ordinance dealing with the constitution and functions of benches of local magistrates. Considers institution of honorary magistrates will be popular	175
101 Sir H. Samuel	" 12	Advisory Council. In Palestine. Transmits minutes of fourth meeting, dealing with the abolition of the tobacco monopoly, village water supply, port dues, Commission of Enquiry Ordinance, Mawat lands, roadwork, Palestinians and Government posts, law of evidence, police wage, mortgages on property, land and property in cities, need of a credit bank, registration of properties in English language, prison labour gangs, weights and measures, and cotton	177
102 Sir H. Samuel	" 30	Tobacco. Turkish Régie monopoly. Reports warm reception of news of abolition of the monopoly by Advisory Council. Points out that if the concession can be shown to be invalid Palestine will not have to pay compensation. States steps will be taken to prevent smuggling	189
103 Sir H. Samuel	" 25	Immigration. Into Palestine. States numbers of Jewish immigrants for December	191
104 To Sir H. Samuel	Feb. 7	Magistrates. In Palestine. Refers to No. 100. Comments on Sir H. Samuel's proposals, and invites his views as to position of foreigners in relation to magistrates' courts	191
105 To Colonial Office	" 8	Magistrates. In Palestine. Invites comments on Sir H. Samuel's proposals	191
106 League of Nations	1920 Dec. 1	Mandates. Syria. Communicates letter from French delegate containing the text of the French mandate for Syria and Lebanon as approved by the French Government, expressing the hope that the Council will approve it, and inviting attention to the desirability of putting an end to the existing temporary régime	192
107 Sir H. Samuel	1921 Feb. 1	Palestine. Situation report for January. Refers to No. 4, and reports interview with Musa Kasim Husseini, anti-Jewish attitude of people of Nablus, and arrival of Sir Alfred Mond. Discusses progress of commission of enquiry into affairs of the Orthodox Patriarchate and deals with the political situation in Transjordan which is on the whole satisfactory, but would improve if there were less uncertainty as to its future administration	195
108 Sir H. Samuel	" 4	Palestine. Administrative reports. Transmits report for month of January	198
109 Sir H. Samuel	" 4	Finance. In Palestine. Refers to No. 94, and outlines financial requirements of the country, and describes economic and commercial development, e.g., harbours at Haifa and Jaffa, railways, posts and telegraphs	202
110 Law Officers	" 18	Imperial preference. In Palestine. Expresses opinion that it cannot be extended to Palestine	210
111 Sir H. Samuel	" 7	European subjects. Refers to despatch No. 46, and encloses draft copy of Rules of Criminal Procedure, with particular reference to the rights of European subjects. Invites approval	211

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
112 Sir H. Samuel No. 81	1921 Feb. 12	Advisory Council. In Palestine. Transmits minutes of meeting on 9th February, at which a message of thanks from Imperial War Graves Commission was read and a statement on position of Palestine railways was made ...	218
113 Sir H. Samuel No. 83	" 12	Hadi, Auni Abdul. Reports interview with. Sir H. Samuel stated that the British Government would be opposed to any anti-French aggression and urged that Sherif Ali should withdraw to Maan ...	219
114 Consul Palmer No. 4	" 19	Syria. Unification of. Reports that the French Administration appear to be considering a modified unification of Syria ...	221
115 Consul Palmer No. 7. Conf.	" 21	Syria. Situation report. Transmits copy of a report by the military liaison officer, Damascus, dealing principally with arms traffic, and pointing out that the fall of Aintab did not have any great moral effect in Syria ...	221
116 Consul Palmer No. 10	" 23	Syria. Situation report. Refers to No. 115. States that bridge destroyed was between Zeizun and Makarin, and that it is reported to be the work of Abdulla's followers ...	224
117 Consul-General Satow No. 33	" 24	Syria. Unification of. Refers to No. 114, and points out that the component elements of Syria are so dissimilar that it is hard to see upon what a serious unity could be based ...	224
118 Consul Palmer No. 11	" 25	Syria. Situation report. Refers to No. 116. States that bridge is said to have been blown up by Ahmed Mureiwed and his followers ...	225
119 Consul Palmer No. 12	" 28	Syria. Situation report. Refers to No. 118. States that Mureiwed was accompanied by Mahmoud Faour with about 150 horsemen. Mureiwed has since attacked Shagara in Kuneitra district and the French have dispatched a force to that district ...	225
120 Consul Palmer No. 15	Mar. 2	Syria. Situation report. Refers to No. 119, and gives further details of Mureiwed's raid ...	225
121 Consul Palmer No. 16	" 2	Druses. Constitutional Government for. Reports progress made in this direction, and encloses copy of memorandum drawn up by Farhan Sharaf ...	226
122 Consul Palmer No. 17	" 3	Syria. Situation report. Explains present boundaries of Damascus State ...	227
123 Consul Palmer No. 18	" 5	Syria. Situation report. Refers to No. 119, and gives further details of the raid and of French reprisals ...	228
124 Consul Palmer No. 19	" 7	Syria. Situation report. Report that Assad Attrash and others have joined Abdulla at Maan and that an attack is considered imminent. Refers also to No. 115, and states that consignments of arms are likely to be picked up at Duma and Adra ...	228
125 To General Haddad Pasha	" 22	Feisal. Negotiations with. Refers to No. 153. Points out that the frontier between Turkey and Syria is defined in the Treaty of Sèvres, which is not yet in force; and that, when it is in force, France will be responsible for the integrity of her mandated territory ...	228
126 French Ambassador	" 25	Transjordan. Draws attention to the anti-French activities of Abdulla, and points out that His Majesty's Government's efforts to restrain them have not achieved appreciable results (see also No. 155) ...	229

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
127 Consul Palmer No. 21	1921 Mar. 9	Syria. Situation report. Explains the system of administration of Damascus State ...	229
128 Consul Palmer No. 24	" 10	Syria. Situation report. Refers to No. 123. Gives further details of the attack on the village of Shagara, and adds that Tadmor (Palmyra) is a likely collecting place for those engaged in arms traffic to Mesopotamia ...	232
129 Consul Palmer No. 26	" 14	Syria. Situation report. Reports movements of Abdulla in Transjordan. Emir Zeid with guns and aeroplanes is said to be moving up to support him. Abdulla has addressed letter to Damascus notables asking them to send him volunteers as officers ...	232
130 French Ambassador	" 29	Tobacco. Turkish Régie monopoly. Protests against the suspension of the monopoly, and requests that the matter be laid before a tribunal ...	233

Chapters IV, V and VI.—MESOPOTAMIA, ADEN AND ARABIA, AND GENERAL.

131 To American Ambassador	1921 Feb. 28	Oil rights. In Mesopotamia. Points out that Anglo-French Petroleum Agreement, as far as it relates to Mesopotamia, is in fact merely an adaptation of pre-war arrangements to existing arrangements ...	234
132 British Agent, Jeddah Secret	1920 Dec. 21	Jeddah. Situation report. Reports on Hussein's attitude regarding the status of British Indians. Reports his increasing secret adherence to Wahabism. Attention of Government has been drawn to increase of customs duties. Reports departure of El Kaderi ...	237
133 Political Resident, Aden No. 60	" 23	Aden. News letter. Reports conflicting news regarding Ibn Saud's movements. Reviews situation in the Yemen, where Mahmud Nadhim exercises considerable influence. Discusses activities of the Zeidis ...	241
134 Minute by Earl Curzon	1921 Jan. 13	Feisal. Negotiations with. Records conversation with Emir Feisal. The Emir complained that Ibn Saud was receiving a subsidy, while his father's subsidy was suspended. He laid stress on the menace of Wahabism and appealed for material aid in the shape of aeroplanes and armoured cars in addition to financial assistance ...	242
135 British Agent, Jeddah Secret	1920 Dec. 31	Jeddah. Situation report. Reports Hussein's suspicions of intrigues against him by Ali Haïdar and his general complaints regarding the insecurity of the Hedjaz, especially vis-à-vis Ibn Saud. States Hussein also complains of shortage of supplies and maltreatment of Arab prisoners by the French. Discusses possibility of arms traffic through the Red Sea ...	244
136 Foreign Office Minute	1921 Jan. 20	Feisal. Negotiations with. Refers to No. 134. Reports conversation between Mr. Lindsay and the Emir Feisal, in the course of which the McMahon correspondence was discussed. It was made clear to the Emir that the renewed subsidy which it was hoped to pay to King Hussein could not be comparable with that paid to him during the war ...	248

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
137 To Lord Hardinge No. 244	1921 Jan. 24	Feisal. French opposition to. Reports conversation between the French Ambassador and Sir E. Crowe. The former urged that His Majesty's Government should drop Feisal, who was not to be trusted. Sir E. Crowe pointed out that we were bound to redeem our pledges to the Arabs, and that if Feisal were chosen by the people of Mesopotamia it would be hard for us to deny him support ...	251
138 British Agent, Jeddah No. 4	" 10	Jeddah. Situation report. Comments on fighting around Taif, which does not appear in any way to confirm Hussein's fears of an attack on Mecca. He appears to be using these events as a lever to compel assistance from His Majesty's Government. Reports virtual independence of Medina. Discusses Capitulations, pilgrimage matters, &c. ...	252
139 Political Resident, Aden No. 2	" 12	Aden. News letter. Discusses the situation as regards the Imam and the Idrisi, and recent events in the Yemen and the protectorate ...	257
140 Political Resident, Aden No. 5. Conf.	" 20	Yemen. Political situation of. Forwards copy of a letter from Captain Fazluddin, who considers that the Imam does want a peaceful settlement with His Majesty's Government and the Idrisi, but is surrounded by Turcophiles. Reports despatch of two Yemenite representatives to the Ottoman Parliament, and urges the desirability of evacuating the Turks, still remaining in the Yemen ...	259
141 British Agent, Jeddah No. 9. Secret	" 20	Jeddah. Situation report. Reports abatement of fighting around Taif and negotiations between the Emirs Ali and Khalid. Discusses difficulties of Indian pilgrims. Contains Mecca report, hinting, <i>inter alia</i> , at Hushimite-Kemalists intrigues ...	261
142 Field-Marshal Vis- count Allenby No. 66	" 21	Pilgrimage and quarantine arrangements. Transmits a letter from the Quarantine Board submitting observations on the Jeddah pilgrimage report. Points out inacceptability of suggestion that the Tor station should in future years be left closed ...	265
143 Political Resident, Aden No. 6. Secret	" 27	Aden. News letter. Reports continued friction between the Imam and the Idrisi and desire of the people of Hodeida to be ruled by the latter. Discusses events in the Yemen and the protectorate ...	266
144 Emir Feisal ...	Feb. 15	Feisal. Negotiations with. Requests to be informed of date on which he may attend the conference on the Near and Middle East ...	268
145 British Agent, Jeddah No. 13	Jan. 29	Capitulations. In Hedjaz. Reports that passports issued since 1914 are not accepted as evidence of British nationality or protection. Patni Indians are recognised as British subjects, but the claim of other British or British-protected residents are contested by King Hussein. Estimates number of British and British-protected residents of Mecca at 20,000 ...	269
146 British Agent, Jeddah No. 14	" 30	Jeddah. Situation report. Reports cessation of hostilities with Khalid, and that King Hussein is rumoured to have offered to confirm him in Emirate of Khurma. States that Emir Ali may be leaving to join his brother Abdulla at Maan ...	272
147 To Emir Feisal ...	Feb. 18	Feisal. Negotiations with. Replies to No. 144. Informs Feisal that conference to be held in London shortly was to consider modifications of the Turkish Treaty, but if questions affecting the interests of Arab countries arise His Majesty's Government will support a proposal that he should be heard ...	275

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
148 Emir Feisal to the Prime Minister Confidential	1921 Feb. 21	Feisal. Negotiations with. Sets out the wishes of King Hussein and the consideration on which they are based. Requests that he may be allowed to attend the conference, and transmits copy of a telegram from Hussein addressed to Haddad Pasha stating that the decision of the conference will be a barometer for the Maan movement ...	276
149 To Lord Hardinge No. 588	" 25	Feisal. French opposition to. Transmits memorandum of a conversation between Sir E. Crowe and the French Ambassador, who made it clear that his Government were quite determined in their opposition to Feisal. Sir E. Crowe repeated that for the present the candidate for the rulership of Mesopotamia was Abdulla, and urged that the French should adopt a more conciliatory policy towards the Arabs ...	277
150 Colonial Office ...	Mar. 1	Palestine. Situation report. Transmits report for month of February, indicating that the publication of text of the mandate has had but little effect, and that there is a tendency among Christians in Haifa to entertain idea of fusion of Syria and Palestine. Deals with opposition of Hapoel Hazair to Maflage Poale Socialim and withdrawal of French and Italian guard detachments. States Abdulla wishes to remain on good terms with Palestine Administration ...	278
151 British Agent, Jeddah No. 15. Secret	Feb. 20	Jeddah. Situation report. Gives account of Hussein's visit to Jeddah and of interviews with him. Describes commercial difficulties in that town due to Hussein's arbitrary attitude. Deals also with quarantine matters, Capitulations, the question of the Hedjaz Railway, &c. ...	281
152 British Agent, Jeddah No. 19	" 21	Jeddah. Situation report. Transmits summary of events in the Hedjaz for the period July-December 1920 ...	294
153 To British Agent, Jeddah No. 24	Mar. 17	Feisal. Negotiations with. Reports conversation between General Haddad and Mr. Lindsay. Haddad protested against the alleged cession by the French of Urfa and Aintab to the Turks. Mr. Lindsay discouraged the idea of Arab diplomatic representation in Europe. General Haddad stated that he felt sure that the report that Emir Abdulla had taken Deraa was incorrect ...	299
154 To Lord Hardinge No. 818	" 19	Feisal. French opposition to. Refers to reception of General Haddad by Prime Minister, M. Briand and Secretary of State. States that General Haddad's request for an interview with M. Berthelot, which M. Briand promised to support, has received no reply. Instructs Lord Hardinge to point out to the French the lack of wisdom in such behaviour ...	299
155 Note by Sir E. Crowe	" 26	Transjordan. Report of conversation between Sir E. Crowe and the French Ambassador, who suggested a joint pronouncement by the local British and French authorities that their policy was identical. Sir E. Crowe replied that such declarations lost much of their value so long as the French-inspired local press remained the source of a constant and systematic anti-British propaganda ...	300
156 To British Agent, Jeddah No. 28. Tel.	" 28	Feisal. Negotiations with. Transmits message for King Hussein from Feisal which embodies a message from Colonel Lawrence urging Feisal to start at once for Mecca, leaving Haddad in London to represent him ...	300

No. and Name.	Date.	SUBJECT.	Page.
157 British Agent, Jeddah No. 21. Secret	1921 Mar. 11	Jeddah reports. Reports fruitless efforts to induce Hussein to adopt the solution of fixing an inclusive rate for quarantine dues. Explains reason for Hussein's attitude. Also encloses Jeddah report for period 3rd-11th March and reports further quarantine difficulties and fracas between Hussein and Messrs. Holt	301
158 To Sir G. Buchanan No. 154	Feb. 12	Tripartite Agreement and the Turkish Treaty. Records conversation with Italian Ambassador	312
159 To Lord Hardinge No. 515	" 16	Conference on Treaty of Sèvres. Records conversation with French Ambassador, who asks His Majesty's Government not to agree to any postponement of. Suggests release of Turkish prisoners at Malta to create favourable atmosphere	313
160 To Lord Hardinge No. 887	Mar. 23	Mustapha Kemal, Emir Feisal and Mesopotamia. Records conversation with French Ambassador respecting latest developments...	314

SUBJECT INDEX.

[The figures denote the serial numbers of documents.]

Chapter I.—THE CAUCASUS.

ARMENIA—		GEORGIA—	
General situation. Report by Rev. H. W. Harcourt	2	General situation. Report	1, 6
General situation	6	M. Tchenkeli. Interview with Secretary of State	7
		Supplies of oil fuel	5
		Military requirements	4
AZERBAIJAN—		MISCELLANEOUS—	
Baku oil industry	3	Report on conditions of oil industry in Caucasus	3
General situation	6		

Chapter II.—TURKEY.

REVISION OF TREATY	11, 12, 15, 16, 59, 67, 69	FOREIGN REPRESENTATIVES	19
GREEK ACTIVITIES...	36, 45, 64, 67	NEGOTIATIONS WITH NATIONALISTS, MODIFICATION OF TREATY AND LONDON CONFERENCE	24, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 57, 58, 59, 61, 65, 68, 70
INTELLIGENCE REPORTS	9, 10, 14, 20		
SITUATION IN CAUCASUS	66		
MISSION TO ANATOLIA	8, 18, 21		
GENERAL SITUATION AND INTERVIEW WITH SULTAN	13, 23, 48, 49, 71	FINANCIAL CONTROL AND FINANCIAL SITUATION	37, 56, 61
MANDATED TERRITORIES	17, 22, 60, 62	LOCAL FOREIGN POST OFFICES	63

Chapters III-VI.—MESOPOTAMIA, ADEN AND ARABIA, AND GENERAL.

ABDULLA. Emir	113, 124, 126, 129, 141, 146, 150, 151, 152, 153, 155	ANTIQUITIES. In Palestine	87, 108
ADEN NEWS LETTERS	133, 139, 143	ARMS TRAFFIC—	
AGRICULTURE. In Palestine	87, 101, 108	In the Hedjaz	135, 138
AKHWAN MOVEMENT	135, 141, 152	In Syria	115, 124, 128
ALIX. Emir...	113, 135, 138, 141, 146, 151, 152	AWKAF. See "Wakf."	
		CAPITULATIONS IN HEDJAZ	132, 135, 138, 145, 151, 152
		CEMETERY. Non-Moslem, in the Hedjaz	135

Chapters III-VI.—MESOPOTAMIA, ADEN AND ARABIA, AND GENERAL—(continued).

COMMERCE IN PALESTINE	87, 108	LEGISLATION. In Palestine	87, 91, 101, 108, 111
COMMUNICATIONS. Between British and French in the Middle East	81, 99	LOTFALLAH. HANIB	157
COTTON. In Palestine	101	MAGISTRATES. In Palestine	100, 104, 105
COUNCILS IN PALESTINE—		MANDATES—	
Advisory	101, 112	General	79, 80
Economic	82, 86	Palestine	150
		Syrian	106, 150
CURRENCY—		MECCA, &c. British representative at	152, 157
In the Hedjaz	132, 157	MEDINA, &c. Status of	138, 151
In Palestine	97, 108	MEREIWI. AHMED	118, 120
CUSTOMS—		NADHIM. MAHMUD	133, 139, 140, 143
In the Hedjaz	132, 151		
In Palestine	87, 108	NEJD PILGRIMAGE	151, 152
DAMASCUS. State of	120, 127	OFFICIALS. In Palestine	75, 97
DEFENCE. See under "Palestine."		OIL RIGHTS. In Mesopotamia	131
DRUSES. Constitutional Government for	121	PALESTINE—	
EDUCATION. In Palestine	108	Administrative reports	87, 108
EMIGRATION. From the Hedjaz	138	Defence of	94
EXTRADITION. From Palestine	90	Situation reports	78, 107, 150
EUROPEAN SUBJECTS. Rights in criminal procedures	111	PASSPORTS. In the Hedjaz. See "Capitulations."	
FEISAL—		PILGRIMAGE AND QUARANTINE	135, 138, 141, 142, 146, 151, 152, 157
Negotiations with	125, 134, 136, 144, 147, 148, 153, 156, 160	POSTS AND TELEGRAPHS. In Palestine	87, 108, 109
French opposition to	137, 149, 154	PORTS. Administration of, in Palestine	101, 108, 109
FINANCE. In Palestine	77, 94, 109	PREFERENCE. Imperial, in Palestine	98, 110
FISHERY.	108	PRESS. Jeddah. See "Jeddah. Situation reports."	
FORESTRY.	87, 108	PRIVILEGES. Religious, in Palestine	76
GOURAUD, GENERAL. Hussein's complaint against	135	QUARANTINE. See under "Pilgrimage and Quarantine."	
HADI, AUST ABDUL	113	RAILWAYS—	
HAIDAR, ALI	135	In the Hedjaz	151
HARBOURS. In Palestine	109	In Palestine	108, 109, 112
HEALTH. Public, in Palestine	87, 108	SAUD. Ibn	132, 133, 135, 138, 141, 146, 151, 152, 157
HOLIDAYS. Official, in Palestine	83	SECURITY—	
HOLY PLACES. Guard at	85, 89, 150	Lack of, in the Hedjaz	134, 135, 138, 151
HUSSEIN—		Public, in Palestine	87
Relations with Ibn Saud	132, 135, 138, 141, 146, 151, 152, 157	SHIPPING. To and from the Hedjaz. See "Jeddah. Situation reports."	
Visit to Jeddah	151, 152	SUAKIM CABLE	138, 146, 151
Difficulties with	152, 157	SUBSIDY. Hussein's urgent request for	134, 136, 152
IBN SAUD. See "Saud."		SUPPLIES. For the Hedjaz	135, 151, 152
IDRISI	133, 139, 140, 143	SYRIA—	
IMAM—		Situation reports	84, 115, 116, 118, 119, 120, 122, 123, 124, 127, 128, 129
Relations with Idrisi. See "Idrisi."		Unification of	114, 117
Relations with His Majesty's Government	133, 140	TAIF. Fighting around	135, 138, 141, 146, 151, 152
IMMIGRATION. Into Palestine	73, 103, 108	TRANSJORDANIA	95, 107, 126, 129, 155
JEDDAH. Situation reports	132, 135, 138, 141, 146, 151, 152, 157	TIRAMA. Events in. See "Aden News Letters."	
JURISDICTION. In Palestine	87, 91		
KADERI. SADIK EL	132, 138		
KEMAL. Reported intrigues of Hussein with	141, 152		
KHALIFATE	151		
KHALID. Emir	132, 135, 138, 141, 146, 151		

Chapters III-VI.—MESOPOTAMIA, ADEN AND ARABIA, AND GENERAL—(continued).

TOBACCO. Turkish Régie monopoly ...	101, 102, 108, 130	WORKS. Public, in Palestine ...	87, 108
TRIPARTITE AGREEMENT ...	158	YEMEN—	
VETERINARY REPORTS. From Palestine ...	87, 108	Events in. See "Aden News Letters."	
WAHABISM ...	132, 134, 138, 141	Political situation of ...	140
WAKF ...	88, 92, 93, 96, 150	ZEID. Emir ...	138, 151, 152
		ZIONISTS. Political activities of	72, 74, 150

Printed for the use of the Foreign Office.

CONFIDENTIAL.

Further Correspondence respecting Eastern Affairs.

PART VI.

CHAPTER I.—THE CAUCASUS.

[E 55/55/58]

No. 1.

Colonel Stokes to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 3, 1921.)

(No. 132. Secret.)

Tiflis, December 6, 1920.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to submit the following observations on the situation in Georgia:—

Foreign Relations.

The main object of the foreign policy of Georgia is to safeguard its newly-gained independence. The chief threat to that independence comes from Russia, whatever be the form of government that may exist in that country. Georgia cannot hope to withstand unaided an attack by Russia. She is therefore obliged to seek support. Until April 1920 neither of the two conflicting parties in Russia, the Bolsheviks and General Denikin's followers, was in a position to attack her. After the disappearance of General Denikin and the Bolshevik occupation of Azerbaijan, Georgia was attacked by the Bolsheviks, but fought and concluded on the 7th May a treaty of peace with Soviet Russia. That treaty is still in force, but Georgia is well aware that it exists only until the Bolsheviks feel themselves strong enough to attack her. Meanwhile, the Bolsheviks are endeavouring by propaganda to facilitate the attainment of their object to incorporate Georgia in Soviet Russia. Their propaganda has so far made but little headway. The reasons for this comparative failure are not far to seek. Firstly, the idea of independence and the spirit of nationality have undoubtedly taken deep root in the minds of the Georgian people. Secondly, the Georgian people have watched at close quarters the working of the Soviet régime in Azerbaijan, and have found nothing in it to make Bolshevism attractive to them. Indeed, it may well be doubted that Bolshevism would have secured a single convert in Georgia but for the economic distress from which Georgia, in company with many other countries, is at the present moment suffering. The depreciation of Georgian money and the lack of manufactured goods, not articles of luxury but those of necessity, such as clothes and boots, combined with the high price of living, have rendered it impossible for all except the rich to make both ends meet. The resulting discontent has alone enabled Bolshevism to gain any footing at all in Georgia. That footing is still small; the policy of the Georgian Government and the spirit of the Georgian people remain anti-Bolshevik.

Situated, as Georgia is, in direct contact with Soviet Russia and dependent for oil supplies, essential to her existence, on Soviet Russia, it is not surprising that she should endeavour to keep on friendly terms and should further conclude a commercial agreement with the latter, by the terms of which she receives oil supplies in return for merchandise.

Until October 1920 the sole menace to Georgia was from Soviet Russia, but in

that month the Turkish Nationalists began their invasion of Armenia. Their advance brought them dangerously near to the frontiers of Georgia and, in view of the well-known claims of Turkey to the provinces of Batoum and Andahan, produced a feeling of uneasiness in the mind of the Georgian Government as to Turkish intentions towards Georgia. This feeling of uneasiness was increased by the knowledge that the Turkish Nationalists were acting in conjunction with the Bolsheviks. At this moment the Georgian Government received from the Armenian Government a request to enter into a defensive military alliance. The Georgian Government was by this request placed in a position of great difficulty, and called upon to take a decision of great moment.

By throwing in her lot with Armenia, Georgia would have been safeguarding herself, and, provided that the armed forces of both countries proved reliable, the twofold danger from Bolsheviks and Turks could probably have been met and warded off for a time. On the other hand, Georgia would by such action have incurred the hostility of the Bolsheviks, who would have refused to sign the agreement by which Georgia hopes to get oil supplies. She would also have incurred the hostility of the Turks, who would have retaliated by instigating risings amongst the Mahomedans of Georgia.

Another factor which carried great weight was the deep-seated mistrust existing between Georgia and Armenia.

In 1919, when threatened by General Denikin, Georgia proposed to Armenia a defensive military alliance, but Armenia negatived the proposal, after consulting the British military authorities at Tiflis, who, according to M. Khatissian, informed the Armenian Government that such an alliance, being anti-Denikin, would also be anti-Entente. Again, Georgia watched anxiously to see what assistance would be forthcoming from the Allies for Armenia. Georgia accordingly prolonged negotiations regarding a defensive military alliance with Armenia, and meanwhile Armenia collapsed.

The collapse of Armenia before the Nationalists, and the establishment of a Soviet Government in Armenia, has created a new situation, not less difficult than that described above for Georgia. On the one hand, the Bolsheviks undoubtedly intended to bring Georgia into their net, by propaganda or by force, although for the moment certain considerations induce them to refrain from any decisive action. On the other hand, the Turks not only covet the province of Batoum, but are bent upon securing the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres by damaging the prestige of the Entente as much as possible, and are therefore urging Georgia to sever all connection with the Entente. The Bolsheviks and Nationalists are, in name at least, allies, but now that direct contact between them has been established in Armenia, the inevitable conflict of interests is beginning to make itself felt. So long as relations between them continue in their present uncertain state, it is probable that neither side will take any decisive action in furtherance of its aims in Georgia. Georgia has, therefore, a breathing space of uncertain duration in which to decide upon her future course of action. She may come to some arrangement with one or other of her two neighbours, and thereby endeavour to frustrate the aims of the other, but such a course is bound to imperil her relations with the Allies, who are hostile to both Bolsheviks and Nationalists. It is imperative, therefore, for Georgia to know to what extent the Allies are willing and able to assist her. Failing such assistance, Georgia has to consider what European Power, apart from the Allies, can help her. Germany saved her from the Turks in 1918 after the Allies had expressed their inability to do so, and, as Germany is in close touch with the Bolsheviks and is also on good terms with the Nationalists, she may well be prepared to save Georgia once more.

If the Allies, in particular His Majesty's Government, attach sufficient importance to the continued existence of Georgia as an independent State to make them wish to save her, two main alternatives appear to be open to them. The Allies can decide to assist Georgia against the Bolsheviks and Nationalists combined or to come to terms with either the Bolsheviks or Nationalists and employ their new ally to support Georgia against the other.

If, on the other hand, the Allies either attach no importance to the fate of Georgia, or while anxious to save her, can find no means of doing so, it is only just to Georgia that she should be informed that this is the case and be allowed complete freedom to make any arrangements she can to preserve her independence.

As time is of the utmost importance, I have already, in my telegram No. 551, dated the 5th December, 1920, telegraphed to this effect to your Lordship.

(a.) *Internal Affairs.*—The Government of Georgia claims to be a Socialist Government, and it has endeavoured to model its legislation on advanced Socialistic principles. For example, it has nationalised various industries and has confiscated the land of large landowners and allotted it to peasants.

At the present moment the defects of such measures are more apparent than their merits. If we take, for instance, the land laws: these have created discontent amongst all the former landowners, while the contentment of the new peasant owners has not been secured owing to the institution of "zemstvos." These local councils, to whom is given the monopoly of the sale of surplus produce of the peasants, generally abuse their powers by paying the peasant at a much lower rate than that at which they sell the produce. To aggravate matters, the Government has failed to import the articles of necessity of which the peasant stands in need, viz., clothes, boots and agricultural implements. The peasants are, therefore, equally with the landowners, discontented.

In the various industries a similar state of discontent prevails, for while the Government monopolises the right of export of the produce and receives payment for its exports in foreign currency, it pays to the mineowner or tobacco grower or silk producer a sum in Georgian roubles on the basis of 3,000 roubles for 1*l.*, when the market rate may be 15,000 roubles for 1*l.* This amount is insufficient to enable the owner or producer to pay his workmen a living wage. The result is that the industry is brought to a standstill. Nearly all the Greeks engaged in the tobacco industry have emigrated, and I understand that little or no work is being done at the manganese mines. In fact, the Government has been living on the proceeds of produce already prepared for export before it introduced nationalisation. Again, it may be said with truth that no employee of the Government receives a living wage. The Government has neither the money with which to increase wages nor the ability to control ever-rising prices. The result is not only discontent, but inevitably widespread corruption. It may be of interest to state here that the foreign Socialists who recently visited Georgia are reported without exception to have told the Georgian Government that, while Socialism is suited to Western countries, capitalism is essential to Georgia.

Until the Georgian Government can secure a foreign loan there does not appear to me to be any likelihood of an amelioration in the state of affairs described above.

This state of general discontent is calculated to provide a fertile field for Bolshevik propaganda; nevertheless, that propaganda has not up to the present time made any great progress. At the same time, it is clear that the longer the Georgian Government is unable to improve the condition of the working classes the more converts Bolshevism is likely to make.

The other form of foreign propaganda which constitutes a menace to the internal peace of Georgia is that of the Turkish Nationalists. This is always rife, but up to the present time has led to no serious results, and it is improbable that any serious trouble, as for example, a rising, will occur unless Turkish troops actually invade Georgian territory.

(b.) *The Cabinet.*—There has been considerable discontent with the methods and alleged incapacity of certain of the Ministers, and a prolonged Cabinet crisis has resulted in a reshuffling of portfolios, intended to curtail the powers of the Ministers of Finance and Supplies. The Minister of Interior, M. Ramishvili, is now also Minister of Communications. M. Lordkipanidze, formerly Minister of War, has become Minister of Public Instruction, a newly-created post. The real object of this is to add to the Cabinet a Minister who shall relieve the President of the greater part of his work. M. Jordania enjoys but poor health, and experience has shown that his work is rather too heavy for him. It is probable that he personally would not be unwilling to withdraw into private life, but his undoubted influence with the people at large is an asset with which the Government cannot at present afford to part. M. Chichanadze, formerly Assistant Minister of the Interior, has become Minister of War.

The result of these changes is to place practically all power in the hands of MM. Ramishvili and Lordkipanidze, and is accordingly to be commended.

(c.) *Financial Affairs.*—The Government has no fixed sources of income, and the continually diminishing value of its paper money, the rate to-day is 15,000 roubles to 1*l.*, places it in a very difficult position. Practically all foreign money which comes into Georgia finds its way into the hands of the Government, but this money has not in the past always been wisely utilised, much of it having been spent on the despatch of special missions to foreign countries, which have given no return for

the expenditure incurred on them. It is difficult to see how, unless she can obtain a loan abroad, Georgia can stabilise her currency.

(d.) *Communications*.—The lack of suitable combustibles, *e.g.*, fuel oil, has greatly hampered the railway, the services on which have been much curtailed. Some oil has now been received from Baku, under the recently-signed commercial agreement with Azerbaijan and Soviet Russia. If oil continues to be received regularly, it is possible that the normal railway services will be restored.

Conclusion.

An attempt has been made in the above paragraphs to give a brief description of the present state of affairs in Georgia. It is obvious that in many respects there is considerable room for improvement. But, having regard to the difficulties with which so young a State has been, and continues to be, beset, there is, in my opinion, no reason yet to despair of Georgia eventually emerging successfully from her present difficult and somewhat dangerous situation.

I have, &c.

C. B. STOKES, *Lieut.-Colonel,*
Chief British Commissioner for Transcaucasia.

[E 46/23/58]

No. 2.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 3, 1921.)

(No. 1668.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, December 20, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, copy of a report on the Armenian situation which I have received from the Rev. H. W. Harcourt, who has been in Erivan for the greater part of this year on behalf of the Lord Mayor of London's Relief Committee.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD, *High Commissioner.*

Enclosure in No. 2.

Report on the Situation in Armenia.

TO understand the present situation in Armenia and the various changes in its political orientation, it is necessary to realise that this confusion of currents and change of outlook which has lately puzzled Western observers is due to two things—its geographical situation and its political history. These have made it very difficult since its establishment as an independent State to build up a national life, to overcome sectionalism and the partisan spirit, and have prevented the homogeneity of thought and outlook that are the outward signs of a united nation. Armenia—the Turkish provinces as well as the Republic of Erivan—consists of stretches of habitable area widely differentiated in climate and fertility, some mountain and some plain, some containing woods and streams and permanent pasture, others cultivated only in patches where water for irrigation allows it, patches of cultivation on plain and hillside that are as oases amid barren rock and dry, brown wastes. These stretches of habitable area are themselves separated by wide areas of barren and desolate country, by wide mountain ranges impassable in winter by the present roads, and as in the cases of Karabagh and Zanguezur, whose lines of communication with the outside world lead out into non-Armenian territory, and which are themselves the natural summer pastures of this same territory. At the same time alien peoples—Tatars and Kurds—often occupy a belt of land, river, valley or range of hills, separating sections of land inhabited by Armenians from each other.

Again the people have been under different Governments, Russian, Turkish and Persian, and subjected to the influence of their differing cultures. The war and the chaos that followed the break up of the Russian army resulted in a general crowding of these people of the same race and religion, but of differing cultures and social habits, on the land which had been Russian Armenia and which became the Republic of Erivan. Even here, though mixed together to a certain degree, they still remained in sections, sections in which a mingling of culture and opinion certainly took place,

but a mingling which resulted, not in the emergence of a solid national outlook and will, but in the development of divergent tendencies in the different sections, which, as the section was at the moment important or not, influenced more or less the Erivan Government in its internal and external policy.

It is not necessary to discuss internal politics; to the outsider it appears that the work at hand was so evident and the choice of method so circumscribed that the outlook of the men in power would have made little difference to the work done so far, unless it had been possible to choose Ministers for their honesty alone.

But in external politics this sectionalism, the result of geography and the war, explains much that was puzzling in the veering and changing orientation of the Armenian Government and people, and the confused and contradictory reports reaching the Western press. This sectionalism has been aggravated greatly during the time since the armistice by the pressure of external politics and propaganda. No decisions having been made by the Allies, territorial disputes were continuous and on all sides, and amicable relations and the opening up of trade with the surrounding peoples rendered impossible because everybody in regard to the disputed areas was trying to create *faits accomplis*. The neutral zones—that between Georgia and Armenia with Karabagh and Zanguezur—and the districts which refused to recognise the authority of the Erivan Government, as Zangabasar, Sharuar and Nachetchevan, were the subjects of endless intrigue and dispute and the scenes of fighting and often of massacre by one party or another. An added source of disturbance was the quarrel between the Allied and the Soviet Government, and the miserable state of the people gave a chance for active propaganda to bring Armenia once more into the sphere of Russian influence, propaganda carried on not only by real Bolsheviks, but by all classes of Russians, who one and all sympathise with the Soviet attempts to restore the old boundaries.

There were three possible orientations for Armenian external politics, and one immediate need recognised by the most thoughtful men. The need of the moment was peace for the recuperating and the organising of the nation. The desire to attain this as soon as possible explains the tendency to depart from one orientation to another. The three orientations were as follows:—

1. The Nationalist and pro-Ally, especially pro-British, with its goal complete independence. This has been the dominant policy till now. Of course, it has been to a great extent that they think this to be the true path of self-interest that has kept the Armenians so consistently pro-Ally as a whole, and this pro-Ally policy has been linked with exaggerated national claims. But so far as their claims are just, this loyalty to the Allied cause, in spite of delays and disappointments, exhibited by them alone among the Caucasian peoples, places upon Britain and France a responsibility to see that those who have incurred the hostility of their neighbours by this loyalty get justice done them. This loyalty has been shown at various times since the armistice, as in the accepting of Allied advice in regard to Karabagh, Zanguezur and the neutral zone, and again in the refusal of the Soviet terms when it was made clear by Allied authorities that such acceptance would displease Britain and France. (It should be understood that the arrangement of August, so misinterpreted in the West, was not a treaty or agreement but an armistice, an armistice made by the Government of a very small State who realised, what was patent to anyone who knew the country and its resources, that nothing but bloodshed and bitterness would result from challenging in warfare the reviving strength of Russia, in hope that the negotiations then going on in London with the Soviet representatives would be brought to successful issue, would define the relations between Armenia and Russia, and ensure from the first security from attack on her eastern border.) But though the Nationalist and pro-Ally policy seemed at one time to be the one that would give the largest area of territory to the nation and the best security for future progress, yet with the long delay on the part of the Allies in settling affairs with Turkey and Russia, it has proved a means of holding up peace for Armenia and of preventing the energies of the people being turned into the channels of reconstruction. There have been moments, therefore, when sections of the people—especially those inhabiting the area nearest the point where attack was threatening—have shown a desire to seek an immediate peace by a new orientation and by the sacrifice of some of the territorial ambitions and ideas of independence that have inspired the Nationalist movement.

The alternatives have been:—

2. Russia, with the ultimate aim of becoming a federated State of the Russian Republic. There are few real Bolsheviks in Armenia, but many pro-Russians. And

these are of the merchant and one time wealthy class as well as of the peasantry. There has been always present among the bulk of the Armenians, besides a pro-Ally feeling (and it is a real off-set against the bad qualities of the race), a deep and sincere gratitude to Russia and the Russians for what they have done in past years for Armenians, a realisation that the pre-war prosperity of Russian Armenia and the protection of its inhabitants from the miseries endured by their co-nationals over the Turkish border was due to Russia alone; a knowledge that if the Russian plan of occupying the whole of Armenia had not been thwarted by British opposition, the nation might to-day have been in a condition of prosperity and numerical importance which would have enabled the transition to complete independence at the revolution to have been successfully effected, and left the country in a position easily able to defend itself against external enemies. The wider realisation of this, coupled with the memory of the comparative happiness of former years as contrasted with the misery of to-day, accounts for the spasmodic and sudden swerving towards a Russian orientation (often pseudo-Bolshevik), seen from time to time in certain sectors, as all hope of assistance from the Allies seemed disappointed, and for the expression of violently anti-British sentiment to be found at times in the Armenian press.

So the withdrawal of the American relief officers and the American and British political missions at the beginning of May 1920 being interpreted as a final withdrawing of the Allies from Armenia, there arose simultaneously pseudo-Bolshevik but really pro-Russian and anti-Government movements in Sarakemish, Kars, Alexandropol and Novobayazid. Movements joined not only by the very true Bolsheviks, but also by ex-officers of the volunteer army (Deniken's), Russianised Armenians, and the pure Russian inhabitants of the districts. These people had no real sympathy with the Soviet Government as such, but saw here the chance of bringing Armenia back into the Russian orbit as a step to realising in Transcaucasia the ultimate aim of all Russians, the restoration of the 1913-14 frontier. So the inhabitants of Karabagh and Zanguezur, tired of the interminable skirmishes and massacres in those areas and hoping for immediate peace and security, admitted the Soviet troops later in the year. And now, in the midst of the present terrible troubles many Armenians are looking, seeing no hope of assistance from the West, to their ancient deliverers, the Russians, to save them from the hands of their age-long enemies, the Turks. They believe that the evils of Bolshevik rule are but a passing phase, and that, bad as they are, they are better than those to be expected from the Turks. They believe that the federal State of Russia will last, and that their existence as a federal State of the Russian Republic will be better than the insecurity of their present farcical independence; that Russia is bound to rise again to prosperity, and that Armenia will share that revival to an extent far greater as a unit of the larger State than can be hoped if it remains independent. The Turkish invasion has rapidly crystallized opinion towards reconciliation with Russia on whatever terms are possible.

3. Turkish, to the immediate end of an autonomous State under Turkish suzerainty. It seems strange to find this current of thought after the happenings of the war, and it has had but a vague currency and expression, and could have no more with the memory so recent. Nevertheless it exists, perhaps most strongly among Turkish-Armenians, and especially among those whose trade operations were widespread in Turkey before the war. They believe that whatever happens so large a measure of control will be exercised by the Western Powers in the Turkish dominions in future years as will protect their people effectively from the danger of massacre. They remember that thus most of the Balkan States took their first step to freedom. They realise that the immediate need is to consolidate in peace some territory even if it be quite small which has a compact Armenian population, and believe that this can only be effected by some arrangement with the Nationalist Turks. But they hope that once this is done and a national life developed and population increased, not only would it afford the best measure of protection to Armenians living in Turkish areas, but that it would be bound in years to come to enable an extension of the prolific Armenian race in the now empty areas across the border, and as in other cases, at the right moment to the eventual drawing of the Armenian boundary somewhere near the line the Nationalists are at present demanding.

This movement for an arrangement with the Turks has received certain impetus lately in the presence of the defeat of the Armenian army from Turkish propaganda among the soldiers and people, offering peace and announcing that they have the support of the British in their desire to pass through to Baku and turn out the Bolsheviks. Indeed this belief in English support to the Turks explains to some

degree the very half-hearted resistance offered at Kars and Alexandropol, the soldiers asking their officers why, if the British desired the Turks to go to Baku, their own Government was opposing them; if England had made peace with the Kemalists they should do it too.

(Note.—This current of propaganda was not the only one. There was also a current from purely Russian sources, and another from Turco-Russian, and the promises and suggestion were often contradictory, but they all strengthened the anti-war feeling of the badly led and dispirited soldiery. At the same time, it shows the presence of what is in Transcaucasia the very general belief, that the Turkish-Russian liaison of to-day is a very temporary thing, the result not of common aims but of common opposition to the *Entente*; that sooner or later it will pass, and that Russians and Turks will once more be found disputing for the country in open warfare.)

From the above it is possible to gather some idea of the extraordinarily difficult and almost impossible position the Government has been in with a country so completely surrounded as it is. It is difficult to give an impartial judgment as to what is really the best policy for Armenia to pursue. Her past pro-Ally policy has brought her neither peace nor security; it has involved her in hostility to Russia, and has brought upon her now a war which with her defeat is likely to cost her half her population. Her Government must think of the interests of Armenia before anything else. And now it seems that, in the absence of any material aid, she must choose finally between Russia and Turkey, and, to one observer at least, it seems that she would be wise as the lesser of evils to throw in her lot with Russia, her least barbarous of neighbours, and thus ultimately share in the revival that must come.

Problems of the Government since the organisation of the State.

The first need in a State now formed is to build up a sense of union and loyalty—of national consciousness. This is the more difficult in a country like Armenia, which contains people of widely different race and religion. Hindrances among the Armenian people have been mentioned above. There were others, and the most important the emaciated and demoralised state of the people whose first need and only interest was food. And this state of famine or general underfeeding gave the opportunity to propaganda against the State, to Bolshevik among the Armenians and to pan-Turanian and pan-Moslem among the Tatars and Kurds. This propaganda was assisted by the excesses of the Armenian volunteer bands, who since the revolution had lost discipline and degenerated into bands of brigands and assassins. Unfortunately most of these bands were connected with the party which seized the power, and their leaders wielded such influence in the party organisation that Ministers were afraid of suppressing them. Certain attempts were made, but led only to the murder of the man who made the attempt.

The second need is the reorganising of economic and industrial life. In the case of Armenia this meant rebuilding from the foundation, for the country was utterly stripped of resources by the war-time requisitions, and by the destruction and pillage of the Russian retreat and the Turkish invasion. It was necessary to concentrate all attention at first on the ploughing of the land and the sowing of the seed corn.

The organisation of this alone demanded great skill, and the authorities had no administrators for the work, and for the whole civil service, but those trained under Russian influence in habits of idleness, procrastination, graft and petty officiousness. The task laid upon the Ministers of organising this sowing, of restarting trade, of arranging for the necessary imports, and at the same time meeting the military necessities of the situation was a superhuman one. As one lived in contact with the confusion of effort and the perversity, corruption and stupidity of the officials, one despaired often of any good result. Yet on looking round on the country at the end of eight months one realised that the worst was behind, that in spite of all some order and progress was emerging. Thanks to the flour placed at the disposal of the Government by the Near East Relief which freed the seed wheat, the sowing was admirably done and generally complete—where no animals were available for the plough men and women often took their place; already, in spite of the almost complete closing of the railway for two months or so for lack of mazout, trade was reviving, schools were opened again, noticeable improvement had been made in medical provision, in dealing with malaria, in the cleaning of the town and in the organisation of hospitals. There were indeed in

early September every hope that, given six months of peace, rapid strides would have been made in the coming year towards a stable economic life and general cultural progress. It might be well to illustrate the progress made from work done, in spite of the lack of materials, in the town of Erivan: the railway was brought up from the outskirts of the town to the centre, the new seminary building—a mere shell in April—had been almost completed and glazed by September for use as Parliament House, the second storey of the city hospital—also just a shell—was completed and in use, and some stretches of the main roads had been well repaired.

Behind this work and alone making what was done possible, there was, of course, the work of the Near East Relief, which by the supplies of food and clothing it brought into the country probably saved the lives of half the people.

This work accomplished and this progress has now, of course, been nearly wiped out by the present disaster, and future work will have to be done with a remnant of the present population, and cope with a deeper apathy of that remainder of survivors.

Military Situation.

The Armenian soldiery shared the demoralisation of the Russian armies consequent on the revolution. This demoralisation spread even into the bands of volunteers who already, though stout fighters, had been guilty of many acts of oppression and massacre against the Kurds and Tatars in conquered Turkish territory. The immediate necessity when the Russian forces withdrew was to build up a new national army, but this would take time. Meanwhile the Armenian Government had to rely on the bands very largely for the defence of the country against the advancing Turks and the enemies within the country, and to place responsibility in the hands of the leaders of these bands, responsibility which many of them were not worthy of having. This led to some of the disasters of the early days caused by the refusal of one band to co-operate with another, and to regrettable and disgraceful attacks on Tatar villages and massacres of Tatar people (there was, it must be said, often much provocation). At the same time it was not only the non-Armenian who suffered, and one of the sources of alienation from the central Government of Erivan of the people of Zanguezur and Karabagh, which led to the admission of the Russian forces, was the exactions and excesses of one of the bands under an unprincipled scoundrel who was at the same time a brave fighter, and has recently with his band done good service against the Turks.

In addition to this difficulty in the way of the organisation of an efficient and disciplined army, there were others:—

1. Lack of munitions and equipment. The Armenians accuse the British authorities of having removed and given to Denikin from the Kars stores enough munitions and equipment to have supplied the whole Armenian army for some time: it is difficult to get at the true facts about this. However, the Allies later on promised to supply what was needed, but nothing was forthcoming till the late summer of this year (1920), when a cargo was received—on promise of payment in two years—from the British Government. Of this the Georgians took 27½ per cent. for transport facilities. The Prime Minister, M. Chanjanian, said at the time that he was afraid it had arrived six months too late. At the same time the utility of the shipment was largely destroyed by the fact that the War Office took this opportunity to unload on the Armenians the Canadian Ross rifles—marksman's rifles—which had been tried in France and proved useless for general field service. This rifle is heavy, difficult to manipulate, and the mechanism is of a complicated type, easily thrown out of order—and no straps for carrying them were sent out with those that came to Armenia: it has also an almost useless bayonet which, on all the examples examined at Erivan, did not fit properly, but wobbled about. It is scarcely to be expected that a weapon that proved useless to trained British troops could be of much service to the ignorant peasants of Armenia, yet they, called up in September, had in October to face the Turks with the weapons in their hands. In the rain and snow of the exposed positions in the region of Kars these rifles rapidly became jammed, and with an unworkable weapon in their hands the soldiers lost all confidence. It is not too much to say that the Ross rifle had much to do with the degeneration of the Armenian army in three weeks from what appeared to British and French military observers a stout and well-disciplined force to the disorganised rabble which gave up one position after another with very little fighting. It is noticeable that the demoralisation did not take place to any large degree in the artillery, where the men had good guns and knew how to handle them.

2. Lack of trained officers, field and staff, and instructors. The officers available for the organisation of the army were too few; all were trained on the Russian system and were poor examples even of that—except in the artillery. The generals are often men who either did quite well about 1870 and still think in the military ideas of that era or men of very second-rate ability. They are often vain, touchy, quarrelsome and unwilling to co-operate with their colleagues. Most of the staff officers are of very mediocre ability, slaves of the text book and Russian military tradition. The favourite expression on their lips when suggestions had been made for the solving of strategic and tactical problems in accord with the lessons learnt on the Western front is "The Russians did not do this." Their plans—made with the assistance of the text-book—would be drawn as if the masses of troops of the old days were available. The junior officers to a large degree are vain, half-trained men, slack in carriage and appearance, idle and utterly careless of the discipline and welfare of their men. Corruption is rife from top to bottom, general and lieutenant combining to get what they can from military stores and pillaging for themselves districts under military administration.

3. Paramount necessity last autumn and spring of using man-power for sowing the crops. No real attempt could be made in calling up the men in any number for training till the corn had been sown; and also

4. Till the harvest of 1920 had been reaped, for until then it would have been impossible to feed them if called up.

5. The continual fighting and threats of fighting on almost all frontiers. Those with the colours were engaged continuously in guarding the frontier, in scrapping with one enemy or another and being moved—with very slow and inadequate transport—from one point to another of the circle as danger threatened from a new direction. This made steady further training impossible.

The result was that when the Turkish invasion, so long threatened, suddenly matured, recruits were called up in droves, and the army, with incompetent officers and unaccustomed weapons, overloaded with untrained men, after the first defeats rapidly became a disorganised mob without confidence, cohesion or discipline.

A force much smaller than that put into the field, if well trained and disciplined and under good leaders, could easily have defeated the Turks. For where there is confidence and experience the men fight well, as witness the stubborn defence of the Igdir salient and the counter-attack which drove back the Turks from Sardarabad station, and probably saved Erivan. Even a vigorous offensive policy which would have retained the initiative for the Armenians might probably have been successful. But with a front which could not possibly be held on its entire length the Armenian staff adopted a negative and defensive attitude—"playing for time" (and snow) they called it. The result was that the Turks attacked where and when they liked, and the Armenian troops were kept scurrying about from place to place to meet the new attacks. For most of these Oriental peoples a merely defensive policy seems to be fatal, and it certainly was for the Armenian troops.

But there is certainly not the talent in the country itself to build up such a force quickly, even if peace gave a chance to do it. If Armenia remains within the orbit of the Allies, the sending of a military mission of staff and regimental officers with non-commissioned officers from one of the Allied Powers is the only way to give Armenia a force capable of defending her territory, and one that may be relied on not to commit excesses on the non-Armenian population.

Financial.

Armenia after the armistice was left a land utterly devastated. Unlike Georgia she had been laid waste not only by the requisitions of the Russian army, but by the pillage and destruction of the Russian retreat, with its accompanying fights with the Tatar population and by the Turkish invasion. She was left without resources: potentially rich—in mineral wealth and possibilities of cotton culture—yet with no means of developing her riches. She needed more than any country the assistance of financial credits and she has received none. Her agriculture even could not make so rapid a recovery as that of other countries, for, to a large extent, it is artificial and depends on irrigation. Seed corn was wanting, and indeed seeds of all sorts. This and other necessary things, as oil and mazoot, &c., had to be got from outside, but she had nothing of consequence at the moment to export in return. Much assistance was given by various relief agencies, and especially by the Near East Relief, in bringing foodstuffs and clothing to the country. But the American

policy of taking receipts from the Government—at Batoum—for most of the stuff brought in, promising payment within ten years, depressed the credit of the country and assisted the rapid fall of exchange.

Two things have hindered the financing of the republic from loans raised from Armenians outside the boundaries of the republic. The first is insecurity. The wealthy Armenians would have been of a higher type than the rich people of most countries to have been willing to lend even to their native land large amounts of money when her political and financial position was so unstable and insecure. Distrust of the ability of the Government to spend well and without corruption was the second. As we have said before, the Russian system of spoils was the only one the administrators of the new republic had known and naturally all officials carried over this bad custom from the old régime to the new.

Yet it is essential if the country is to become prosperous the financial means of securing certain basal necessities is provided—railway engines and rolling-stock, repair and reconstruction of the roads, the carrying out of projected schemes of irrigation to bring further areas under cotton. This can only be done by a loan from the Allies, and to insure wise spending should be under control of a Financial Commission appointed by the lending Powers. Once political security and some financial stability are established it will not be long before private capital will flow in to develop the potential resources of the country, and to establish such an amount of prosperity that the refunding of the loan will be amply assured.

Transport.

The country being so divided by nature into disconnected sections, it follows that unity of economic life can only be developed in the country by the breaking down of these natural barriers to easy intercourse; and this means that the first attention should be paid to the improvement of the roads and railways.

On the railways at present the greatest difficulty in the way of its regular and efficient running is the impossibility of getting fuel. But the harnessing of the water-power at present unused would enable the generation of enough electrical power to run all the lines at present working, others that might be built, and leave energy to spare for industrial undertakings.

No transport system will, however, be satisfactory until an easier means of ingress and egress for the country is provided than across Georgia. At present the mental outlook of neither the Georgian nor Armenian is developed sufficiently to realise the true meaning, the justice or the utility of "free transit." No agreement is likely to be properly carried out by either side. And Armenia's natural position causes her to be the chief sufferer. No large scale development can take place till she has access to the sea through her own territory, either by means of the projected railway from Batoum to Kars or another to some other port.

Immediate Prospect.

The immediate outlook for Armenia and her people is very bad. The Turkish invasion has coincided with a spell of unusually early and heavy snowfall. Whether the Turks commit massacres or not, the whole economic life has been upset and the food supplies—hardly enough for the people before—reduced far below the necessary level. Besides this, thousands of people—men, women and children—from fear have left their villages on the approach of the Turks with but about a week's supply of food, and are now wandering and dying by thousands in the snow. At the same time the villages, many of the them lately rebuilt, being left deserted, have been plundered and burnt by the Turkish soldiers or their Kurd and Tatar allies. However immediate and large, therefore, may be the relief measures taken by Western Europe and America, a large proportion of the people seems certain to die of exposure and starvation before any aid can reach them. If relief is provided it must be in the nature of supplies of food and clothing, for there is no surplus to buy in the whole of Transcaucasia, and distributing staff and transport should accompany it.

H. W. HARCOURT.

[E 1017/1017/58]

No. 3.

Memorandum by the Petroleum Department on the Baku Oil Industry in 1920.—
(Received January 21.)

THE year 1919 for the Baku oil industry was one of gradual restoration, when the production of oil and the amount of boring done on the Baku oil-fields increased month by month.

In September 1918, *i.e.*, immediately after the creation of the Azerbaijan Government, the production on the Baku oil-fields was barely 10,000,000 to 11,000,000 poods (160,000 to 170,000 tons), but in 1919 it gradually rose and reached 19,000,000 poods (over 300,000 tons) a month. Considering the state which the oil-fields were in during the period described here, this production of oil seems to have been the possible maximum that could be attained.

To explain matters, it must be said that in 1919, owing to many well-known circumstances, the supply of the most essential technical materials, which were necessary for the adequate maintenance of the oil industry, did not correspond to the usual demand for same, and it is mainly due to the lack of materials that the production of oil was comparatively small; nor could boring work, for the same reason, be carried out on as large a scale as in pre-war days.

The amount of boring work executed monthly in 1919, however, gradually increased. As, for example, in the first months of that year only 1,800 to 2,100 feet were bored monthly, but towards the end of the same year the boring reached 5,000 feet monthly. Even this figure for the Baku oil-fields was certainly not great, as in pre-war times the monthly boring was 35,000 to 40,000 feet. But this only proves that after the great fall in boring it gradually began to revive.

Great hopes were entertained for a continuous increase of production in 1920, as, owing to the gradually improving conditions of transport and to the renewal of communication with Batoum, the export of oil and oil products to this port reached 3,000,000 to 3,500,000 poods monthly, and the import to Baku via Batoum of technical materials (caustic soda, baler iron, wire ropes, machinery, &c.) was daily increasing.

The production of oil in the first three months of 1920 was 57,000,000 poods, *i.e.*, on an average, about 19,000,000 poods a month, and 1,600 wells were then already in exploitation—in other words, producing oil. Boring work also reached the figure of 5,000 feet monthly and 130 boring rigs were then in use; these should have actually given about 15,000 feet a month minimum had it only been possible to get sufficient screwed casing, good boring tools and cement.

Great hopes were also centred at that time on the trade negotiations which were being carried on in March 1920 between the Soviet and Azerbaijan Governments. The latter was willing to accept any trade agreement, if only to preserve its political independence. The Baku oil producers were also ready to make every concession, and agreed to sell their oil to the Soviet Government at a price hardly covering their self cost, *viz.*, 50 roubles per pood. They were urged to do this by a whole chain of circumstances; first of all by the ever-increasing stocks of oil and oil products, which had accumulated owing to the most insignificant export, which stocks could hardly be stored any longer, as all possible available storage was already taken up. These stocks reached in April 1920 the unheard-of figure (in the annals of the Baku oil industry) of 300,000,000 poods (5,000,000 tons). Even old, and for the last fifteen to twenty years discarded, earthen, open ambars (tanks) were filled up with these large stocks of oil.

Several oil-producing firms were compelled by force of dire necessity to erect new earthen ambars.

It will also be fully understood that such large accumulated stocks of oil were a great danger as regards fire, and, secondly, the political situation itself in Azerbaijan was such that every delay on the part of the Azerbaijan Government in signing the trade arrangement with the Soviet representative, could lead to a serious revolt of the working classes, who were being treated to severe propaganda by the Russian Bolsheviks. The fear of an internal revolution in Azerbaijan was very great, while on the other hand no fear at all was entertained of external complications on the boundary of Soviet Russia.

Bolshevism appeared in Baku, not as a result of some internal political complications, but was brought by the eleventh Bolshevik army, which suddenly and quite unexpectedly occupied Baku on the eve of the 28th April, 1920. This day has a vast and historical importance for the Baku oil industry, and it may be said that from that

day the entire oil industry of the Apsheron peninsula was seized by the Moscow commissars.

Immediately after the 28th April the export of oil and oil products began from Baku to Astrakhan, at the order and under the personal supervision of the special authorised Soviet representative, Solovief. This same representative was, prior to the seizure of Baku by the eleventh army, carrying on negotiations in Baku with the Azerbaijan Government *re* the purchase of oil for the Soviet Government.

At the expiration of one month from the above date the entire Baku oil industry was officially "nationalised" (the 28th May, 1920), and during this intervening month the late administration and staff remained at their posts, but their position was more than unbearable. *De facto* the entire management of the oil-fields and refineries was in the hands of the so-called "Oil-fields and Refineries Committees," composed entirely of workmen belonging to the Communist Party. The behaviour of these committees towards the old administration and staff was, on the whole, prudent, with the exception of the requisitioning of their flats, quarters, house furniture and fittings. But this requisitioning was effected on a wide scale towards almost the entire Baku population, excluding only members of the Communist Party and labourers (proletariats).

Immediately after the "nationalisation" of the oil-fields and refineries, everything belonging to these firms and companies was seized by the Bolsheviks, such as cash in hand, money in banks, bills, bonds, securities, trading books, office furniture and fittings—in fact, all that they possessed on that date.

The export of oil to Batoum, of course, ceased from the 28th April, communication with Georgia and Western Europe via Batoum was also interrupted.

The amount of oil and oil products which the Bolsheviks managed to export from Baku to Astrakhan in May was 16,000,000 poods.

Their preliminary plans *re* export were rather modest. They supposed that the "12-foot roads" (at the mouth of the River Volga) would hardly be able to accept more than 15,000,000 poods of oil monthly, as the "12-foot roads" fleet and the whole of the Volga oil-carrying fleet, consisting of tugs, iron and wooden barges, had no fuel and had undergone no repairs for nearly two years, hence they would be incompetent to cope with a larger monthly quantity of oil.

The Bolsheviks were then so badly off for fuel that in order to run the first tug from Astrakhan to the "12-foot roads" they had first to despatch a sailing ship loaded with crude oil in barrels from Baku to Astrakhan, and only after this had reached its destination could empty barges be tugged to the "12-foot roads" to receive the oil that arrived from Baku in oil tankers.

Later on various stringent and energetic measures were assumed by the Bolsheviks in order to raise the monthly export to the "12-foot roads" to 30,000,000 to 35,000,000 poods of oil. For the Caspian fleet of oil tankers such a monthly export represented in normal times no difficulty at all, as in 1916 the monthly export was at least 45,000,000. It must not, however, be forgotten that the Bolsheviks could not make use to the full extent of the Caspian fleet of oil tankers, as a certain number of the largest oil tankers were, at the beginning of navigation, in the hands of the volunteer army (Denikin). These had been armed and turned into armed vessels as the nucleus of a volunteer navy. These ships were evacuated in March 1920 from Petrovsk to Enzeli.

On the occupation of Enzeli by the Bolsheviks in May 1920 the whole of this fleet fell into their hands and was brought back to Baku. These, together with several large oil tankers which were formerly in the Bolshevik Astrakhan fleet, were all disarmed and again turned into oil tankers, and have considerably increased the total of tonnage engaged in the transport of oil. The total amount of tonnage was 5,000,000 to 6,000,000 poods, and the amount of voyages made monthly—Baku—Astrakhan and back—was 6.2, hence the maximum monthly export of oil to the "12-foot roads" reached about 31,000,000 poods.

On the whole, the fleet at the "12-foot roads" coped satisfactorily with its work, and was able to tranship all that was brought from Baku. It is not known what actual measures were assumed by the Bolsheviks to increase export from Astrakhan up the River Volga; it evidently was carried out on a smaller scale, but the transport was also more or less satisfactory, and part of the total quantity of oil arrived as far as Nijni-Novgorod during the summer.

The total quantity of oil exported from Baku during the navigation was 150,000,000 poods, of which 16,000,000 poods kerosene, 5,000,000 poods lubricating oils, 500,000 poods various solar oils and the rest was crude oil and residuals.

It was mentioned here before that on the day of the Bolshevik occupation of Baku, the stocks of oil and oil products were about 300,000,000 poods. During the months of navigation (the 28th April to beginning of November) about 65,000,000 poods net of crude oil was produced. Thus the stocks of oil at the close of navigation were about 205,000,000 to 210,000,000 poods. Taking into consideration that the net monthly production of oil at present (after deducting about 15 per cent. for fuel used on the oil-fields) is 10,000,000 poods, the stocks of oil thus accumulated by the 1st April, 1921, *i.e.*, beginning of navigation, should be approximately 255,000,000 to 260,000,000 poods.

This quantity of oil the Chief Moscow Oil Committee intends to export to Astrakhan in the current navigation, provided no unforeseen obstacles arise; if so, then towards November 1921 all stocks of oil will be cleared out in Baku. Of all the oil products exported to Central Russia in 1920, the greatest attention was paid to crude oil and residuals, *i.e.*, which serve as fuel.

The production of crude oil on the Baku oil-fields in 1920 was approximately as follows:—

	Poods.
January, February, March	57,000,000
April	18,000,000
May and June	29,000,000
July	14,000,000
August	13,000,000
September	10,800,000
October	11,700,000
November	11,500,000
December	11,000,000
Total	176,000,000 gross.

Deducting from this 15 per cent. for fuel used on the oil-fields (26,000,000), the net production of oil in 1920 was about 150,000,000 poods.

In the programme of exports for 1921 laid out by the Bolsheviks, refined products, *i.e.*, kerosene and lubricating oil, occupy one-fifth of the total exports, crude oil one-sixth, and the rest (63 per cent.) residuals.

Parallel with the production and export of oil comes the question of the work of the refineries.

As practically all stocks of refined oils (kerosene and lubricating oils) which were held on the 28th April, 1920, were exported during the navigation of 1920, the amount of oil now to be refined at the refineries should be something like 50,000,000 poods, of which 40,000,000 poods petroleum (kerosene), 9,000,000 lubricating oil, and 1,000,000 benzine and solar oils, besides the refining for mazout (residuals).

The main work of the refineries will not be in refining for mazout, but petroleum, as at the close of navigation in 1920 a stock of 95,000,000 poods of unexported mazout (residuals) was carried over, and as the requirements of mazout in 1921 are estimated at 155,000,000 poods, an additional 60,000,000 will be required, which will be refined without any difficulty. Great difficulties will, however, be encountered in preparing the 40,000,000 poods of petroleum, for reasons given below.

Taking into consideration the lamentable state in which the oil-fields and refineries are at present situated, owing to the lack of the essential technical materials, it can be fully affirmed that the proposed programme of work for 1921 will hardly be carried out. As an example of the lack of materials, in November already there was absolutely no bailer iron, and the stocks of other materials, excepting only sheet iron for riveted casing (tubes), which amounted in the aggregate to 1,500,000 poods, were in a most critical state. There was also an entire absence of asbestos, cardboard, various stuffing-box packing materials, electro-technical materials, &c. Over the entire oil industry only about 800 electrical lamps were in stock.

The Baku (Azerbaijan) Naphtha Committee repeatedly applied to the Chief Moscow Naphtha Committee to urgently supply the Baku oil industry with the necessary materials, but received only a promise that they would be supplied with 10 per cent. of their actual requirements. In other words, the Baku oil-fields could only expect to receive in the best of cases one-tenth of its wants of materials, and even the Bolsheviks were placed in a dilemma as to how to get the other nine-tenths of the necessary materials.

As is well known by now, all questions are decided by the Bolsheviks very simply

and easily. "For the Soviet Government everything and anything is possible," citing the phrase of the chief of the Baku (Azerbaijan) Naphtha Committee, M. Serebrovsky. This phrase is very popular at present in Bolshevik Russia, and sufficient confirmation of it will be found at least in its political display.

It is very problematic whether the Baku refineries will be supplied this winter with caustic soda and sulphuric acid. The latter was usually manufactured in the Baku sulphuric acid factories out of Sicilian sulphur or sulphur pyrite. In November last there was barely any sulphur in Baku, and pyrite was just sufficient for one month's requirements. Delivery of Sicilian sulphur to Baku has, it is rumoured, just begun, but whether in sufficient quantities it is not known. Delivery of pyrite from the Elizvetpol district (near Baku) was so small, that in four months Baku received as much as would just last for ten days' work. Under such conditions of supply it is highly improbable whether the programme of work mentioned above can be carried out.

Attention must also be called to another and a very important factor, that is, the gradual and systematic decrease of labour in general, and of qualified workmen in particular. This decrease of labour had a great influence on the oil-fields. As has been already mentioned, the number of wells bailed in April 1920 was 1,600, but in August the number fell to 840. This means that within three months the number of bailing wells decreased almost half, the main cause of this being the want of bailermen. Besides this, the productiveness of labour by the workmen on the oil-fields and at the refineries also decreased to its utmost degree. The Baku engineers, owing to their many years of observation and experience, define the present low productiveness of labour to one-fifth to one-sixth of its normal state.

As the question of labour has been touched upon, it would not be amiss to describe it here a little more fully.

The desertion of workmen from the Baku oil-fields, stated above, has at the root of it very serious motives.

The question of food supply and wages are often decided by the Soviet Government in a very primitive manner. The lack of foodstuffs is great, and the daily wage very small. Money, the Bolsheviks say, is not wanted by workmen—because money is only an invention of the *bourgeoise* and capitalists. The result of such Bolshevik policy in the matter of labour was that the workmen ran away in hundreds from the oil-fields to their villages, where they manage at least not to die of hunger.

The daily food rations dealt out lately in Baku to a workman consisted of 1½ lbs. of very bad barley bread, and of a ¼-lb. of same to every member of his family. On an average, a family of a Baku workman consisted of wife and one child, therefore such a family would receive daily 2½ lbs. of so-called bread and also about 5 lbs. of rice, 2 lbs. of maize, and 1½ lbs. of sugar monthly.

This is all the Soviet Government dealt out in the way of foodstuffs to every workman and his family. The prices charged for these by the Soviet Government are very low in comparison to those existing on the market. Thus, for bread the Government charged 2 roubles per lb., for rice 7 roubles per lb., sugar 5 roubles per lb., whereas the market prices in November were as follows:—

	Roubles per lb.
Barley bread	400
Wheat bread	750
Granulated sugar	4,000
Loaf sugar	5-6,000
Rice	6-700
Meat	500
Butter	4,000
Potatoes	300

It is hardly necessary to prove that on such a daily ration as stated above a workman with his family cannot exist and work adequately, nor can he afford to buy anything on the market, as his daily wage is insignificant in comparison with the cost of living.

The daily pay of a labourer in October-November last was 96 roubles minimum and 180 roubles maximum; the daily wage of a qualified workman was 200 to 250 roubles maximum. Lately piecework on rather a large scale was introduced by the Soviet Government, when the average daily earnings of a qualified workman reached 400 to 500 roubles. But even this wage was far from sufficient.

Over and above the question of food, the conditions of clothing and boots are

also very heavy. Second-hand coats cost 15,000 to 20,000 roubles, boots of the lowest quality and make 25,000 to 30,000 roubles a pair, and when we recall to memory that for the last years 1918 and 1919 the oil producers could not afford to pay the workmen correspondingly to the cost of living, owing to the depressed state of the oil trade, it becomes clear that the purchasing capability of the workmen was very low, and therefore the lamentable state in which the labouring class is now placed in Baku is clearly understood.

Hunger, cold, followed by epidemic diseases (mainly typhoid) is the usual lot at present of the workmen and employees of the Baku oil industry; yet they quietly and bravely bear their hardships, hoping for a speedy and bright future, and when these hopes leave them they desert and run to the country, or begin speculating in foodstuffs. This illegal trade the people of the West will find difficult to understand, but in Russia it is widely-spread at present, and it has actually become a State necessity, as owing to this illegal foodstuff trade hundreds of thousands, perhaps millions, of lives have been saved from a death of hunger. This trade has become very popular amongst the workmen, and as it gives large profits, which enable them thereby to keep themselves in affluence, the desertion from the oil-fields by the workmen has assumed enormous proportions.

Very few qualified workmen are to be found now in the Russian factories, and the Soviet Government is no longer able to hide this fact. It is expected in Baku that the desertion of workmen from the oil-fields will increase during this winter owing to the critical state of the supply of food.

The state of the administrative and engineering staffs employed on the oil-fields and at the refineries is also very trying, both materially and morally. Officially they are invested with very large rights; all orders given by them must be fulfilled, and only the next higher authority can change or stop their orders. But in reality it is quite different; these staffs have any amount of duties to perform and responsibilities to bear, but are invested with no rights.

At the head of some department, say, stands an engineer; he is responsible for the moral work of his department and its manufacture, but he has no right to dismiss or engage or make any substitution. This can only be done by his assistant, who is a member of the Communist Party. The latter has all the rights, and the manager (engineer) bears all the responsibilities. This is the strange system of management of the nationalised industries created by the Bolsheviks.

In addition to this, another Communistical system has lately been introduced. On all oil-fields and refineries, besides the managing committee, consisting of workmen of the Communist Party, they have what is called Communistical "Yatcheika," in which only members of the Communist Party are allowed.

The part played by these "Yatcheika" in all industrial enterprises and Government offices is very considerable. First of all, it watches over the political fidelity of all persons in that given office, oil-field, refinery, workshop, &c., as well as over their private lives. The main aim of the "Yatcheika" is to propagate Communism amongst the working class and to remove all that is against or unpleasant for, or inimically disposed towards, the Soviet Government. They are in direct communication with all the "Extraordinary Commissions," and owing to their denouncements many a person has been thrown into prison or shot. The existence of this espionage in industrial enterprises acts most oppressively on all, especially on the administrative staff.

This net of espionage embraces almost the whole of Russia. There is hardly a village, a home, or a house, which is not watched by these "Yatcheika."

It will be fully understood that under such conditions the administrative and engineering staffs think very little of their work, but more of the safety of their lives. Such is the moral conditions under which these staffs have to work.

Up till October last the highest salary of an engineer was 9,600 roubles a month. The food rations were the same as those supplied to the workmen. As the prices of necessities, mentioned above, were very high, it is clear that on a salary of 9,600 roubles a month an engineer, especially with a family, could only carry on a half-starved existence. In order to somewhat ameliorate his existence, he was compelled by force of circumstances to sell his old clothes, boots, books, linen, crockery, &c. (if these were not already requisitioned).

Since October the salaries of the said staffs had been increased by a premium scale, and the average monthly pay of an engineer was thereby raised to 30,000 to 35,000 roubles, but even this salary was hardly sufficient for the maintenance of his family and self.

Maxim guns and artillery in sufficient quantities were distributed all over the oil-fields in quiet nooks and corners in case of any outbreak of revolt of the labouring classes. Work under such conditions could only be equalled to slavery, and, of course, the productiveness of labour could not but be very low.

Though it may at first seem somewhat strange, the Bolshevik system of working "nationalised" industries is in the final, more or less, a State-organised sabotage, leading to a fundamental destruction of all those industries that fall into their hands. All the Baku oil-fields are now divided into six administrative regions, and the refineries into five administrative groups. The former being as follows:—

1. Romany.
2. Sabounchy.
3. Balakhany.
4. Bibi-Eibat and Holy Island.
5. Binagady, together with Khourdalan and Shabany.
6. Sourakhany.

At the head of all the oil-fields stands the so-called Oil-field Department of the Azerbaijan (Baku) Naphtha Committee. The managers of each of the above six oil-field regions are engineers, as well as of the Oil-field Department, their nearest assistants are workmen of the Communist Party, appointed by the professional unions with the approval of the Central Communist Party, their second assistants are also engineers, whose duties are purely technical. Thus the management bears in principle a kind of collegiate character, but *de facto* there is no collegiate at all, it is either sole management or chaotic disorder.

All the Baku refineries are divided into five groups:—

- The 1st group embraces all refineries belonging to the Sty., Nobel Brothers.
- The 2nd group embraces all refineries belonging to the Caspian Black Sea Sty., Schibaef Company and Russo-Caucasian Company.
- The 3rd group embraces all refineries belonging to the Caspian Sty. and Rielsky Heirs.
- The 4th group embraces all refineries belonging to the Mantashef Company, Lianosof Company and K. Bikhovsky.
- The 5th group embraces three toluol factories.

At the head of all these five groups again stands the Refinery Department of the Azerbaijan (Baku) Naphtha Committee. Groups 2, 3 and 5 are managed by engineers, whereas groups 1 and 4 are managed by workmen belonging to the Communist Party. The appointment of workmen as managers of refineries is the first trial made by the Soviet Government; in future the Government intends to appoint as managers of all industrial enterprises workmen of the Communist Party, and the engineers will be acting as advisers only.

Most of the refineries were shut up, and work was carried on only at Nobel's, Schibaef's and Caspian Black Sea Sty.'s refineries (the best and largest refineries in Baku), and in December work was to be commenced also at Mantashef's refinery. The construction of this administrative organ is the same as on the oil-fields.

In general, the work on the oil-fields and at the refineries is carried on very negligently, there are not sufficient materials, labour or adequate management.

Repeated mention has been made here of the Azerbaijan (Baku) Naphtha Committee. This committee is actually the fully empowered and managing organ of the entire Baku oil industry; officially it is under the command of the Azerbaijan (Baku) Council of People's Economy, but this submission is only to a certain extent of a visionary character, and it only submits to the orders of the Chief Moscow Committee.

At the head of the Azerbaijan (Baku) Naphtha Committee stands a collegiate consisting of five members, of which one is president-Communist, two engineers, and two workmen, also Communists. Hence the majority is Communistical. The management is in reality, notwithstanding the official collegiate form, entirely in the hands of its president, M. Serebrovsky.

This committee has the following departments: Oil-fields, Refineries, Financial-Economical, Supply, Electro-Mechanical, Structural, Geological, Chemical, Oil Fleet, Oil Storage, and Pipe-lines Departments. The names of these departments speak for themselves.

As stated above, the production of oil in Baku from 19,000,000 dropped to 11,000,000 per month. Boring work decreased also to an unusual degree. As,

for example, in September 1920 only 450 feet were bored and 80 boring rigs in use; with such a number of rigs the very least that should have been bored is 6,500 to 7,000 feet a month (in normal conditions about 12,000 feet).

At the refineries the decrease of production is not quite so perceptible as on the oil-fields, for the simple reason that here the factories are not so much dependent on manual labour, but at the refineries, nevertheless, the decreased productiveness of labour undoubtedly had a great influence on the work in general.

Formerly about 55,000,000 poods of kerosene were refined yearly in Baku, but in 1920 a maximum of 20,000,000 only was refined. On the whole, the work at the refineries has dropped to 50 per cent. For instance, the refinery of the Schibaef Company, considered one of the best, usually refined about 400,000 poods of lubricating oils monthly, at present it barely refines 200,000 to 220,000 poods of the same products, and a similar state of affairs exists at the other refineries. During the summer months of 1920 several refineries had to be stopped for lack of labour.

Yet the Bolsheviks are very sanguine of being able, by their own means, to raise the production of oil, boring work, and the productiveness of the refineries. Very large programmes of work exist regarding new borings, the building of new refineries in Central Russia, and workmen's villages in Binagady and Bibi-Eibat districts, and whenever it is possible electrification of industries is introduced.

In the meantime the Baku oil industry continues to exist on the old stocks of materials. These, however, are already on the eve of exhaustion, and if the condition of affairs, as described in this report, continues for another six months many oil properties and refineries will fall into ruin. The leaders of Bolshevism already fear this approaching future, and this may be said to be one of the chief reasons of their offers of large concessions of the Russian oil-fields to foreign capital.

In conclusion, it must be added that of all the other Russian oil regions Grosny and Maikop were, as far as November 1920, still being exploited, but Emba, Tcheleken and Turkestan were not producing.

The production of Grosny was about 3,000,000 poods a month, and that of Maikop from 250,000 to 300,000 poods a month. The former oil-fields could undoubtedly produce more oil were it only possible to increase its exports. Grosny oil storage is practically full up, and it is a matter of impossibility to increase the rail export, owing to the dilapidated state of the rolling-stock, nor can any use be made now of the pipe-line to Petrovsk, firstly, because of the Petrovsk oil tanks (total capacity about 9,000,000 poods) are full up with Baku oil, and secondly, because the Caspian oil fleet is overburdened with work transporting oil from Baku..

January 13, 1921.

[E 1177/55/58]

No. 4.

Colonel Stokes to Earl Curzon — (Received January 25.)

(No. 21.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tiflis (via Constantinople), January 20, 1921.

REFERENCE my telegram No. 19 of 20th January.

Military requirements of Georgian Government are as follows:—

Complete uniform and equipment for 75,000 men; 75,000 rifles with spare parts, short British rifle if possible; small-arm ammunition, 150,000,000 rounds; Lewis guns, 350; either 200 (three groups undecipherable) or 120 Maxim guns; machine-gun ammunition, 8,000,000 rounds; mountain guns, 40; shells, 200,000; 3-inch field guns, 20; shells, 100,000; 4.8-inch howitzers, 18; shells, 90,000; 6-inch howitzers, 18; shells, 54,000; harness for teams, spare parts, pack equipment for mountain guns, limbers, 2 per gun or howitzer; shells in proportion of 2 shrapnel to 1 high explosive.

Length of sole of boots should be for 60 per cent., 30 centimetres; for 20 per cent., 29 centimetres; for 20 per cent., 28 centimetres; equipment should be for 60 per cent., medium size; for 20 per cent., large size; and for 20 per cent., small size.

Georgian Government urgently desire to obtain third of above immediately, remainder to be kept at Constantinople, ready to be sent when required. Georgian Government is convinced of its power, and they think that I agree. I am convinced that Georgian nation will fight for its independence, and submit that our own interests demand that we should assist it so far as we can.

[6668]

D

Georgia has large reserve of trained soldiers, and national and anti-Bolshevik feeling is strong. If assistance asked for is forthcoming, moral effect and encouragement will be great.

(Sent to India and Constantinople, No. 20.)

[E 1213/55/58]

No. 5.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon. — (Received January 26.)

(No. 52.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, January 23, 1921.

TIFLIS telegram No. 19, penultimate paragraph.

In reply to previous enquiry from Colonel Stokes [group undecypherable], 1,500 tons of crude oil and 1,500 kerosene could be supplied to Georgia from naval and military stocks here. Senior naval officer now informs me that crude oil could be supplied, subject to Admiralty approval, from naval stocks in Constantinople.

(Repeated to Tiflis, No. 4.)

[E 3389/116/58]

No. 6.

Admiralty to Foreign Office. — (Received March 17.)

(Confidential.)

Sir,

Admiralty, March 14, 1921.

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit herewith, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copy of a report, dated the 17th February, 1921, which has been received through the Commander-in-chief, Mediterranean, relative to the general situation in the Southern Caucasus up to the 10th February, 1921.

2. A copy of the above-mentioned report, excepting the portion relating to Russian ships in Georgian ports, has been sent to the War Office.

I am, &c.

V. W. BADDELEY.

Enclosure in No. 6.

Report on General Situation in the Southern Caucasus up to February 10, 1921.

(Confidential.)

1. Activity of the Georgian Communist Party.

THE treacherous activity of the Georgian Communist Party is gradually revealed. Obtained documents throw light on the true designs of the Communists. The protocol of the district conference of the Communist Party is quoted below in full:—

"The protocol of the district conference of the Communist (Bolshevik) Party of Georgia, presided by comrade Petr Bolotnikov, his assistant Sarkis Melkumof, and secretaries Timothy Tarasof and comrade Pavel Azof. Village of Privolnoye—

"1. The order of the day.

"(a.) Report on the present situation.

"(b.) Reports by members.

"(c.) Reports by the province committee.

"(d.) Organisation of propaganda.

"(e.) Elections for the district committee.

"(f.) Elections for the conference of Communists.

"(g.) Current affairs.

"Firstly, comrade Grigoriant and other members reported on the progress of events in Soviet Russia and in other countries.

"The following resolution was passed after hearing the above reports:—

"(a.) We, the comrades Communists, having arrived to the district conference, welcome the movement of Kemalists against Armenia and Georgia, inasmuch as this movement is connected with the establishment of Soviet rule and frustration of treacherous aims of Dashnaks and Social Democrats."

"(b.) The members stated that at present only the Privolninsky organisation is carrying out their work legally, and all the other organisations—Votontsovsky, Akhpatsky, Shipikhsky and Movornaksky—are working secretly. The comrades in our party are gallantly defending the principles of Communism, and will at the first opportunity lend a helping hand to their comrades, who are fighting for Soviet rule.

"(c.) The report of the provincial committee to be noted.

"(d.) Organisation in the country should be carried on. New members should be accepted according to the regulations laid down by the provincial committee. Party Courts of Justice must be established and their sentences must be carried out only on approval of the district committees. A district committee has the right to select the members of the organisation.

"(e.) To request the provincial committee to appoint to village N.Z. there organisers, one of whom must be a Mahomedan, supply them with propaganda literature and various papers in order to raise the activity to a necessary height.

"(f.) The following persons have been elected to the district committee: From Privolnoye, P. Bolotnikov and T. Tarasof; from Vorontsovka, V. Fedorof; from Akhpat: Sarkis Izraeliants; from Shipikh: Grigory Babians. The following have been elected for the Communist conference at Tiflis: From Privolnoye, Luka Gorodkof; from Vorontsovka, Akhpat and Shipikh.

"(g.) The 3rd Region Committee to keep in close touch with the Kemalists and keep the district committee well informed of all proceedings. The comrades who are going to Tiflis are entrusted to order Communist rubber seals for the district organisation. The district conference of Lory express their sympathies to the paper 'Communist,' being the only organ struggling for the unity of the working classes of Georgia.

"(Signed by the President, PETR KOLESNIKOF, his assistant and one secretary.)"

2. Relations between Georgia and Nationalist Turkey.

Declaration made by the Social Democrats, who are the leading party in Georgia:—

"Being Social Democrats, we first of all wrote openly and announced that we sympathise with the Kemalist movement, as with any struggle for the freedom of a nation, in so far as it is really a movement towards freedom. Apart from this we wrote several times that we are definitely opposed to the principles of this movement, so far as it contains elements of Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turkism, connecting itself with the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk and imperialistic designs of Enver Pasha.

"We are opposed in principle to Bolshevism, but we sincerely strive to establish friendly connections with Bolshevik Russia, nor can we sympathise with the aggressive designs of the Allies in any way. But we are making all efforts to establish normal relations with France, Britain and Italy.

"We are not Bolsheviks, but Social Democrats. We therefore do not recognise the right of one nation to interfere with the rights and internal affairs of other nations, or the right of one State to dictate its will to some other State.

"We are Social Democrats, and as such recognise that the only method of action as to the internal affairs of independent nations is through organs of international union, recognised by themselves, and by moral pressure of the Proletarian International Assembly, at which we are represented.

"We approach the mutual relations of Georgia and Angora from this Social Democrat point of view.

"Be the feeling towards Kemal's Government what it may, it must be admitted that it is the only Government recognised and supported by the Turkish nation. Angora is now Turkey, and there is no other Turkey.

"This Turkey has approached our frontiers and we want to be with her, as with all other nations, bearers of principles of peace and solidarity of States.

"We want to be in friendship with the Turkish nation, and do not want to interfere with their interior affairs, but we also demand that their Government shall recognise the sovereignty of our State and respect our frontiers and interest.

"If the Government of Angora will keep to this track honestly and to the end, that is the way of recognition of Georgian sovereignty, then the Georgian authorities will not see any obstacles for the establishment of peace with Turkey, just as well as they did not see any obstacles to the establishment of peace with any other States, willing to recognise the independence of the republic."

3. Handing over of Russian Ships in Georgian Ports to Soviet Russia.

"We, the undersigned, authorised representatives of the (1) Georgian Democratic Republic, G. Z. Andronnikof, and (2) Russian Soviet Republic, V. P. Zveref and A. K. Strakhof, in execution of agreement of the 16th December, 1920, re recognition of all ships belonging and at the disposal of the Soviet Republic, which were in the Georgian ports on the 15th November, 1920, and arriving to these ports after that date, including those that might arrive under the old or new Russian flag, if ship's documents show their nationality and home port under Soviet rule. Having considered the lists of ships which have been examined by the authorised commission on the 20th (26th) December, 1920, in the ports of Poti and Batoum and found them in conformity with the above agreement, the following ships are considered at the disposal of the Soviets:—

"Maria," "Vesta," "Ne Tron Menya," "Anapa," "St. Nikolai," now lying in Poti Harbour; "St. Nikolai," "Nakhimof," "St. Nikolai, No. 664," "Geroi," "Amvrosi," "Bayan," "Ilya Morozof," "Lebed," "Alexander," "Bezymenny," "Risk," "St. Alexey," "Aristo Bashelzi Vasili," "Petr Veliki (Peter the Great)," "Strogi," "Verdun," "Verdun 2," "Mariko," lying in the port of Batoum. From the day of receipt of the above ships by the authorised representative of the Soviet Republic in Georgia, in any case from the 16th January, 1921, the guarantee given by the Georgian Government in communication of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, No. 10541, regarding the detention of ships which arrived in Georgian ports under the old or new Russian flag is cancelled.

"The committee have also found that steamship 'Princip,' escaped from Poti during the night of the 29th December, was also due to be handed over to the Soviets.

"(Signed by the chief of Georgian ports, Engineer ANDRONNIKOF; Soviet consul at Batoum, ZVEREF; Councillor of Naval Affairs of the Soviet Consulate at Batoum, STRAKHOF.)"

The statement of the Batoum Soviet consul:—

"To the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Georgian Republic.

"Having signed this day the protocol of committee re handing over Russian ships lying in Georgian ports to the Soviets, in accordance with instructions received by us from the authorised representative, we have the honour to state that the dredger 'Castor,' steamship 'Donets,' and the ships 'Alexander Nevsky,' 'Svoboda Rossii' and 'Niki' are, according to our information, of Russian origin and belong to the class of ships mentioned in the agreement of the 16th December, 1920, and therefore must be handed over to the Soviets. These ships are trading between Georgian ports, and dredger 'Castor' is in Poti. We have not made a special clause regarding these ships, previously wishing to avoid the delay in the work of the commission, but herewith beg to make arrangements to demand the ships' documents and examine them by the commission in order to establish their nationality and hand them over to the Soviets. We have in view your assurances of the validity of the agreement of the 16th December, 1920, and are convinced that urgent steps will be taken. Apart from this we draw your attention to the fact that the question regarding the ships 'Elena,' 'Youdith' and 'Claudia' was already mentioned in the agreement of the 16th December, and therefore will not be dealt with by this commission.

"(Signed by the members of the Soviet Commission, ZVEREF and STRAKHOF.)"

4. General Situation in Baku.

The following information was obtained from a person who, with great difficulty, escaped from Baku:—

The oil capital gives nowadays the impression of a town suffering from shortage of this commodity. The streets are not lighted at night, and all electric lamps have been taken away for some Government institutions. No trams, and in fact no carriage traffic, may be observed in the streets. The trams are used sometimes for transporting paraffin oil to different suburbs, but the delivery and distribution of same are at a very low level, and the inhabitants are having practically none. It is definitely known that the stock of oil in Baku may be considered as exhausted in comparison to the great demands of Soviet Russia. There is no new production, as over a half of the

oil-wells are not in working order. At the different meetings and in the press the Communists express their alarm at the critical state of the oil industry, but this does not in the least relieve the situation. All branches of industry connected with the oil production have been declared as "storming," which must be understood in the sense that these must get their supplies of materials and labour in the first turn and in full amount. The workmen of the storming branches of the industry must get increased rations, clothing, fuel and best accommodation. This merely remains on paper, and the works are not supplied with the necessary materials, as there are none, nor do the workmen receive their due. In fact, the workmen live under dreadful conditions owing to lack of housing accommodation.

Naturally, the discontent amongst the workmen increases, and to put a stop to it a "robbery week" was arranged, during which all that was possible was taken away from the civil population. Only one or two tables, chairs and stools were left in the houses, according to the number of inhabitants. Counter-revolutionary categories were left with only one change of underwear, other categories two changes and more. All this was intended to be handed over to the workmen, but distribution is being proceeded with on a rather small scale. For instance, the workmen are entitled to have three to six changes of underwear.

Now the workmen are selling back to the inhabitants the underwear and other domestic items. The "robbery week" has not in the least improved the condition of the workmen and made beggars of the other part of the population. Also there is nobody left to be robbed.

The prices in the "free" market of Baku are as follows: white bread, 1,300 roubles per lb.; one egg, 600 roubles; fowl, 7,000 to 10,000 roubles.

The most dreadful thing in the life of Baku inhabitants is their state of constant fear, which cannot be described in words or imagined if not actually experienced. There is no protection or support to be sought from anybody, as there are no lawful means for same. Ransacking, arrests and uncertainty of the fate of prisoners is the topic of daily conversations, limited, of course, to the intimate circles of relatives, as there are many spies and provocateurs.

The housing question is no longer a crisis, but a real nightmare. People are thrown out of their houses at a moment's notice, and are not allowed to take their belongings. These people are generally sent to houses in suburb of Armenikend, outside of the town. All the best houses are occupied by Soviet institutions, which do no work.

5. General Situation in Armenia

The Red Army.

The military commissar of troops in Armenia is a certain Sviridof. The paper of the Revolutionary Committee of Armenia, the "Communist," publishes a long conversation held by the correspondent of "Armavrosta" and Sviridof regarding the organisations of the Red Army of Soviet Armenia.

"At the head of the military organisation of Armenia stands Avis, and the whole of the army, including the district military commissariates, are under his orders. The sovietisation of the army is nearly completed; perhaps the supplies department may be somewhat behindhand owing to the difficulty experienced by the supply officials of the old military school in adapting themselves to the new system of supplies.

"The commanding circles of the Red Soviet Army of Armenia, apart from their direct duties, must also educate the soldiers.

"The institute of commissars in the Red Army of Soviet Armenia was at first opposed to, perhaps owing to the fault of the commissars, who did not rightly understand their functions and duties.

"Our purpose is to teach the army to carry on propaganda. As the Red Army advances, every soldier must act as an instructor to the Revolutionary Committee of every village."

At the end of the interview Sviridof denied the rumours that the army of Soviet Armenia would be considered by the Russian Government as part of the 11th Soviet Army.

The Armenian Army belongs only to Armenia, and the Soviet commanders and commissars came here only to introduce their three years' fighting and organising experience.

General Information.

The prisoners are in a terrible condition, their daily ration being only 1 lb. of bread and nothing else. The cells are closed from 7 P.M. until 9 A.M. The prisoners are massed in small cells, making sanitary conditions unbearable. The members of the Dashnaks Party fill all the prisons.

The Russian Soviet Revolutionary Committee in Armenia, being afraid of the national danger, systematically discharge Armenian officials and soldiers, and wherever possible replace them by Russians, even if illiterate. The Armenians are only given jobs as street scavengers.

The "Chrezvychaika" (the Extraordinary Committee against Counter-revolution in Armenia).

At the head of this committee stands a youth of 18 years of age. His attitude is haughty and he does not condescend to speak to the visitors. His vocabulary is: "Impossible!"; "Get out!"; "Send him to join Romanof's staff in Heaven."

6. Relations between Armenia and Turkish Nationalist Government.

The following is a communication of the Commissar for Foreign Affairs Bekzadian, of Armenia, to the Commissar for Foreign Affairs of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, Ahmed Mukhtar, Angora. Copies of this communication have been sent to Chicherin and Ter Gabrielian, the Commissar for Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan, Husseinof and plenipotentiary representative of Soviet Armenia in Georgia, Shaverdof. Owing to the importance of this communication I am quoting it in full:—

"My Government is observing with a feeling of complete satisfaction the animated interest displayed by the Government of Angora in the future of Soviet Armenia. We watch the progress of development of the revolution in Anatolia with no less interest. From the present time Soviet Armenia may prove to be a reliable background for revolutionary Turkey in her struggle against the Western Imperialism and a firm support in the national liberating movement in Turkey. Soviet Armenia is a creation of Soviet Russia and expresses the principles of the latter, being the bearer of the dictatorship of the Armenian working-classes.

"Being firmly aware of its historical mission, the Communist Government of Armenia is safeguarding the attainments of the revolution in the interior of the country, and will be a watchful sentry of the revolution in the Near East. In carrying out this task as historically unavoidable, our eyes will be turned to the Third Communist International Assembly and to Soviet Russia, whose approval or disapproval will indicate the measure of her success.

"We shall gladly receive criticism on the part of the Orient inasmuch as this criticism will indicate a real and sincere interest of the critics of our revolutionary tasks in and outside of the country.

"The communication of your Government, with reference to the plebiscite carried out in the districts occupied by the Turkish army, resulting in the expression by the population of the desire to unite with Turkey, is not correct, inasmuch as the plebiscite might have been carried out under the conditions of military occupation with a one-sided effect. The result of the plebiscite announced by your Government appears to be extremely odd, if one considers the statistics of the population in this country. The Government of Armenia consider it their duty to point out that the plebiscite, being one of the means of solving territorial discussions, cannot be considered in all cases as correct especially in this case, for the following reasons: The great war and the terrible prosecutions during the last years by the Government of Sultans with regard to Armenians, emigration, &c., make this plebiscite lose its moral and political importance.

"The Government of Armenia cannot understand the object of the Turkish Grand National Assembly in maintaining the Treaty of Alexandropol, regarding the Soviet Armenian restrictions of armament. This tendency could only be understood by Soviet Armenia, if the social and political tasks of the Turkish National Government did not correspond with their assurances.

"The Government of Soviet Armenia do not see the justification for Turkish troops remaining in Alexandropol and the adjoining districts, which are inhabited by Armenians and are under altered conditions owing to the establishment of Soviet rule. The population has to suffer all privations of the military occupation and are deprived

of the possibility to start peaceful work in the country liberated from the Dashnak Nationalists.

"Being convinced that all questions under discussion will receive a satisfactory solution at the forthcoming conference at Moscow, the Armenian Government express their hope that the Turkish Government will prove their friendly intentions towards the Soviet rule in Armenia and Soviet Russia, and will not fail to recall their troops from the district of Alexandropol.

"The Government feel sure that the Government of Angora will not refuse to release and repatriate the prisoners of war, partly deported to unknown destination, and partly concentrated in the district of Erzeroum, where they are compelled to work under most trying conditions.

"The Armenian Government consider that the further detention of these prisoners would be against the friendly assurances given by the Turkish Government."

Wireless Messages from Erivan to Angora Government.

The wireless station at Batoum has intercepted a wireless message from Erivan addressed to Angora Government, copy to Commissar for Foreign Affairs of Azerbaijan.

This wireless clearly shows that the relations established between the unfortunate Armenia after her transformation into "socialistic" and the Angora Government. The Russian Communists who established Soviet rule in Armenia by force, now say "an end has come to all strife," that the proletarian Armenia, in close contact with Soviet Azerbaijan and under the high protection of the workmen and peasants of Soviet Russia, has at last attained peace and that all questions will be settled amicably.

The Communists assure that the Kemalists, their true allies and followers, will act in unison, and "paradise on earth" will reign in Armenia. Of course, nobody believes these promises, knowing by experience what Communism is. The Communists brought no peace to Armenia and the Kemalists continue their atrocities, in spite of the presence of the Russian Red army, towards the Armenian nation, contrary to the promises of Soviets. The pillaging, violence and murders continue, all cattle is driven away and the last food supplies of the population are requisitioned. Practically everything is taken away, agricultural implements, engines, telegraphs and telephones. People are forced to work. Where, then, are the Russian Communists who profess to have benefited Armenia?

Wireless message from Armenian Government to Angora Government:—

(Translation.)

"Erivan. Urgent. Angora, copy to Baku to the Commissar for Foreign Affairs Gusseinof. [Jammed] continuous violence, pillaging and murders of the peaceful population, in places occupied by Turks [jammed]. The private property and households, the cattle of the peasants driven away and the last food supplies of the population requisitioned. Everything is being taken away during the last month from Alexandropol, agricultural machines, engines, telegraphs and telephones, as well as private property. The district has been laid waste and the cattle driven away. Great quantities of grain confiscated from the villages and stored at station Nalbad, therefore condemning the population to starvation. All able men from 18 to 50 years of age have been deported by force from their native country and compelled to work in the districts of Sarakamysh and Erzeroum.

"The Turkish supreme occupation authorities are trying to send trains with refugees arriving from Paraklis to Erzeroum, via Kars, for compulsory work under terrible conditions. After your troops occupied Kars, wholesale pillaging and murders prevailed during the first three days, and is still continued on a smaller scale. All fuel has been requisitioned from the population [atmospherics] of Askers are raiding villages [jammed] after the village of Kantary was occupied by a Turkish detachment of the 36th Turkish volunteer regiment [jammed] group of Askers attacked on the 23rd January without any reason, opened fire on village Ogapiat [jammed] in neutral zone murders amongst peaceful population [jammed] food supplies taken away from population under the pretence of repeated tax collection. Raids by armed detachments [jammed] difficulty of communication with Alexandropol owing to establishment of your control over telegraphs and refusal to our comrades of passports to leave Alexandropol, it is obvious that the authority of the revolutionary committee in the town occupied by your troops is only nominal, the actual control being in the hands of the military command.

"The revolutionary committee repeatedly receives demands from your commanding officers [jammed] these demands have nothing to do with the functions of the revolutionary committee, for instance, mobilisation of men, delivery of 10,000 rifles, delivery of some Turkish soldier killed unknown, where and by whom, &c. [jammed] has brought down the functions of the Alexandropol revolutionary committee to a level of a tool in the hands of the occupationary force stationed in this town. This only makes revolutionary committee recognise that its further existence is completely useless and merely discredits the principles of Soviet rule in the opinion of the working classes. In areas where military occupation prevails using the above methods of serfdom and devastation, no rule of workmen and peasants can exist.

"The impartial analysis of the above-mentioned facts makes it obvious that the Soviet Government of Armenia cannot tolerate Turkish attitude leading to economical ruin of the country which is considered as belonging to Armenia by right [jammed] severe discipline of your troops and their obvious sympathy with the Soviet rule precludes the possibility of presuming the presence of violence [jammed]. I draw the attention to the above facts on behalf of the Armenian nation, who only wish to establish peaceful life conditions and friendship with revolutionary Turkey.

"Being sure that there can be no difference of opinion with regard to the above facts, my Government does not doubt that the Turkish National Government will take urgent steps to stop these atrocities and recall the Turkish occupationary force from the district of Alexandropol. (Signed by People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs of Soviet Armenia. — BEKZADIAN.)"

General Information.

When the Turks were occupying Kars, all the Armenian population left the town and took shelter in a gorge. A Turkish officer went there and commenced to persuade the refugees that there was no danger, and eventually ordered them to return to their homes. The returning people were registered when passing the bridge. After this the men were separated from the women and sent to work. On the same day the Moslems arrived from the vicinity of Kars, including Kurds, and after dark commenced looting and massacring the Armenians. Towards the morning the Tartars joined them.

Great assistance was rendered to the Armenians by the American consular agent, Mr. Fox. He showed the Turks that American orphanages contained not only Christians but also Mahomedans. As the result of this, not a single American institution was touched, and many Armenians found refuge in these buildings. Robberies and murders lasted for two weeks. The American Relief Committee was running short of supplies, and the refugees were compelled to free all the buildings as the Turks demanded them for their troops.

The first commandant of Kars was appointed, Rushtim Bey. He took up his residence in the house of the Governor, but after his promotion to Rushtim Pasha he was transferred to Alexandropol and relieved by Kiazim Pasha. Having occupied Kars, the Turks immediately commenced to take away all objects of value—guns, ammunition, machinery, furniture—and transported this to Erzeroum and Sarakamysch.

Alexandropol.

Alexandropol is in the hands of the local Bolsheviks, and is governed by the Revolutionary Committee. The station and the fortress are in the hands of the Turks. The Turks are trying to take away all that is possible from this town, just as well as from Kars, even taking away parts of old railway engines. A caravan of 200 camels, loaded with requisitioned property, leaves daily for Sarakamysch. The militia in Alexandropol consists of Turks and Bolsheviks.

All shops are closed, and only small grocers' stores are opened, chiefly dealing in food and tobacco, prices being very high. Great shortage of fuel is experienced everywhere, and in many towns the population are pulling down the wooden buildings deserted by inhabitants. The first train from Erivan arrived at Alexandropol on the 7th January and left for Karaklis.

On the Way to Karaklis.

The railway line from Alexandropol to the station Kaltaktchi is in possession of the Turks, and the next station, Amanuel, is in hands of the Armenian troops.

In Karaklis.

About 1,000 Bolshevik Russian troops are stationed here according to information received from the peasants.

A permission must be obtained from the Bolsheviks and the Georgian consul to leave Karaklis for Sanian.

Armenian troops are stationed half-way between Karaklis and station Shagali, after this comes the Georgian sphere of influence.

7. The Russo-Turkish Azerbaijan Conference at Moscow.

The Turkish delegation have already left Tiflis via Baku for Moscow. According to latest information, Ali Kemal Bey is at the head of the Turkish delegation. The delegation of Soviet Armenia consists of three persons—Commissar for Foreign Affairs Bekzadian, Korinian and Ter-Gabrielians. The two latter are already in Moscow; Bekzadian left for Moscow on the 20th January via Baku. The members of the Azerbaijan delegation are not yet known. The permanent representative of the Angora Government in Moscow is Faud Pasha.

8. Ex-Russian Moslem Officers joining Kemalist Army

According to information received, many Mahomedan officers, formerly belonging to the late Russian Volunteer Army, have arrived at Anatolia. Most of these officers are mountaineers of the Northern Caucasus—Ingushes, Circassians, Tchetchrya, Daghestan and Kabarda people. When the Soviet rule was established in the Northern Caucasus, these officers took refuge in the mountain villages. Their properly organised detachments raided these villages and destroyed railway lines in the Kuban district. Their guerilla warfare was no longer of any use after the fall of Crimea, and one by one and in small groups they set out to join Kemal and are willingly received by his troops.

It is through these officers that the Angora military command get their information regarding the situation in the Northern Caucasus and Daghestan, establish their communication with these regions and send their recruiting agents.

[E 3432/55/58]

No. 7.

Earl Curzon to Colonel Stokes (Batoum).

(No. 22.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, March 17, 1921.

M. TCHENKELI, the recently-appointed Georgian representative to the capitals of Paris, London and Rome, called upon me at the Foreign Office this afternoon in order to descant upon the misfortunes of his country, and to ask the advice of the British Government as to the course they had better pursue.

He did not seem to be very well acquainted with the latest position of affairs in Georgia, which, no doubt, is changing from day to day, and was under the impression that the Turks had marched into Batoum, not, as our information went to show, with the knowledge if not at the instigation of the Georgian Government in order to save that place from being seized by the Bolsheviks, but as a movement of aggression on their own part. He was conscious, however, that his Government was in a desperate plight, and was anxious to find in any direction an alleviation for its pains.

I told him that, sorry as I was for the misfortunes of Georgia, who had had no better friend than myself during the events of the last two years, I felt that she had to some extent brought them upon herself. The only barrier that could have been successfully opposed to the Bolshevik advance in the Caucasus was a solid union or confederation of the three Caucasian States. I had impressed this upon the Georgian representatives with all the insistence of which I was capable at San Remo nearly a year ago, and my private secretary, Mr. R. Vansittart, had devoted hours of time to inducing the Georgian, Armenian and Azerbaijan representatives to conclude an agreement. This had broken down owing to the short-sighted obstinacy of the Georgians alone; the point at issue being the facilities to be given for access from Armenia to the sea. For this cardinal mistake the Georgians had since been paying the penalty. Further, she did not seem to me to have utilised the interval to consolidate her armed strength or her national existence in the degree which might

[6668]

E

have been expected, while, from the rapidity with which her forces had dwindled and her Government been submerged, it was clear to me that a large portion of the population must be themselves in sympathy with the Soviet attack. In these circumstances, I did not see what Great Britain or the Powers could do at the moment to save Georgia from a situation which she had to a large extent brought upon herself.

M. Tchenkeli seemed to be very much hurt that he had not been heard at the recent conference, which had given so full a hearing to the Turks, Greeks and other parties.

I told him that I thought this complaint was without justification, since the question of Georgia was not raised by the Treaty of Sèvres.

On the other hand, I informed him that we had done our best for Georgia in our conferences with the Turkish delegates from Angora, and that though we could not in all probability exercise any influence upon what was happening on the northern frontiers of Georgia, or on their relations with the Bolsheviks, we would certainly do our best to secure the recognition of their independent existence and the determination of their frontiers on the southern side by arrangement with the Turks.

We had found, in conversation with Bekir Sami Bey, that the latter himself was strongly in favour of a Caucasian confederation as a barrier between the Turks and the Bolsheviks, and he had indicated that, instead of desiring to retain Batoum, as M. Tchenkeli appeared to be convinced, the Turkish occupation of this town and neighbourhood was intended only to be temporary in character.

I suggested that, in the light of what I had told him, M. Tchenkeli, who was about to leave for Paris, and who was already acquainted with Bekir Sami Bey, should at once reopen conversations with the latter and endeavour to secure from him friendly assurances in this respect. He might then come back to England and inform me of what he had done.

M. Tchenkeli, who had evidently entered the room with no very clear idea, either as to what he was to ask for or what he might expect to receive, expressed almost unbounded relief at this advice, which seemed to hold out for him hopes that he had not anticipated, and he left with the expressed intention of acting immediately upon the advice that I had given.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

CHAPTER II.—TURKEY.

[E 12/1/44]

No. 8.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 1, 1921.)

(No. 1339.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Constantinople, December 29, 1920.

GRAND VIZIER has informed my French colleague that he has instructed mission to Mustapha Kemal by telegraph to return to Constantinople, as he considers mission has been at Angora quite long enough.

Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs told me to-day that Turkish Government had received private information from a person just arrived from Angora that Izzet Pasha had announced to him his intention of starting for Constantinople on 29th December.

[E 52/52/44]

No. 9.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 3, 1921.)

(No. 1679. Secret.)

My Lord.

Constantinople, December 21, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, summary of Intelligence Reports issued by S.I.S. (Constantinople) for the week ending the 9th December, 1920.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,

High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 9.

Summary of Intelligence Reports for the Week ending December 9, 1920.

TOWARDS the end of last week the tedious preliminaries between the Sublime Porte and Angora concerning the commencement of official negotiations were terminated, and on the 3rd December a delegation from the Central Government left Constantinople for Angora. The delegation was expected to arrive in Angora by the 6th or 7th December, but some time must elapse before any definite result can be obtained. Some considerable difficulty seems to have been experienced with regard to the establishment of telegraphic communications between Constantinople and Angora, partly owing to the refusal of the Hellenic military authorities to afford facilities for the transmission of telegrams through the zone occupied by the Greek forces. In addition to the steps which have been taken for the restoration of order in Anatolia, the Government has also been making efforts to reap some benefit from the recent changes in the domain of foreign affairs by the appointment of *Chargés d'Affaires* abroad. In this connection Ghalib Kemali Bey, who recently returned to Constantinople from Rome, submitted a report to the Cabinet, which is summarised below, and which throws some more light both upon his own activities and upon Italian policy. With regard to conditions in Anatolia, it would appear that the Nationalists, in deference to their "allies," are continuing to enact measures for the protection of "workers," but it is improbable that these measures are intended to have any other effect than that of hoodwinking the Bolsheviks. The latter appear to have definitely vetoed the original Nationalist plan for seizing Batoum, and it would now seem that more intricate methods are being pursued with the assistance of the Moslem population of the disputed area.

1. Turkish Affairs.

(a.) The foreign situation was explained to the Council of Ministers held on the 27th November by Sefa Bey, and more especially with regard to the meeting of *Entente* statesmen in London. In Sefa Bey's opinion the London Conference would result in a complete change in the situation, but, as the Allied High Commissions in Constantinople had no information as to the progress of the deliberations, it was impossible for them to

give any reply to the Sublime Porte's overtures regarding certain modifications of the Treaty of Sèvres. He thought, therefore, that it would be as well for the delegation to Anatolia to postpone its departure for a few days until the situation had been cleared up. Mustapha Arif Bey emphasised the necessity of sending a diplomatic agent to London, and proposed that, if it were not possible to send someone to London at once, the mission should be entrusted to someone already in Europe. The Council agreed to this proposal, and Izzet Pasha was requested to sound the Allied representatives with regard to their views on the subject, while Sefa Bey, with the President of the State Council and the Minister of Commerce, would deliberate as to who should be sent to London and what instructions should be given.

(b.) Ghalib Kemali Bey's views on Italian policy were embodied in a report submitted to the Ministerial Council, in which he admitted that, after the advent to power of Damad Ferid Pasha in April, he had acted as the official representative of the Nationalists in Rome. In his opinion, both France and Italy were dissatisfied with the Treaty of Sèvres, but had been unable to take independent action. If, however, unity could be established in the Turkish administration, he felt sure that the two Powers would give all the assistance in their power so far as a benevolent application of the peace conditions was concerned. He had made various communications to the Angora Government to this effect, and had even counselled the latter to make certain sacrifices in the interests of a reconciliation. As a result of his investigations, he was satisfied that Italian public opinion considered that the modification of the Treaty of Sèvres was essential to the re-establishment of peace in the East, and he felt certain that their friends would assist them to obtain every advantage from the situation created by recent developments in Greece. Various highly-placed personages had expressed their confidence that matters would take a turn for the better if Turkey pursued a discreet and firm policy. The Italian Government was anxious that order should be restored in Anatolia in order to deprive Turkey's enemies of any grounds for interference, and he had received assurances from the Italian Government that, if order were restored, it would support Turkey's just cause. He had met Jami Bey and Mubieddin Rushdi Bey in Italy before he left, and they had asked him to communicate the Nationalist point of view to the Italian Government and to the Sublime Porte. These interviews had confirmed the result of his own private investigations to the effect that the National Assembly would not negotiate with the Sublime Porte until the latter had obtained some guarantees that the Peace Treaty would be modified. The Central Government, by acting as a mediator between the Nationalists and the *Entente* Powers, would secure the sincere support of those Powers interested in the maintenance of Turkish independence. He had also had interviews with certain Greek personages in Rome, and had been given to understand that there was some possibility of an understanding between Turkey and Greece now that the Opposition had come to power. He thought it would be of great advantage to establish direct contact with the new Greek Government, and begged to add that no time should be lost. Documentary evidence was attached to the report.

(c.) The negotiations with the Nationalists were the principal concern of the Ministerial Councils held on the 25th November and the 1st December, at the former of which Izzet Pasha stated that the only obstacle to the immediate departure of the official delegation was the reserved attitude of the Allies. He proposed that the instructions drawn up by himself should be immediately submitted to the Sultan for sanction. The Minister for Foreign Affairs, however, opposed this on the ground that it would be advisable to wait until the Allies had defined their attitude. To this the Council agreed. Sefa Bey was instructed to approach the Allied authorities with regard to the difficulties that had arisen in the re-establishment of telegraphic communications by reason of the refusal of the Hellenic military authorities to permit the repair of the wires and other matters in the Ismidt district.

On the 27th November the Council was informed that Zekki Pasha would be unable, for reasons of health, to accompany the delegation to Anatolia, which was therefore composed as follows:—

President.—Izzet Pasha, Minister of the Interior.

Members.—

Hussein Kiazim Bey, Minister of Commerce.

Jevad Bey, newly-appointed Minister to Berne.

Munir Bey, Legal Adviser of the Foreign Ministry.

Fatin Khoja, Astronomer Imperial.

Jevad Bey and Munir Bey were included at the instance of Sefa Bey, who is apparently anticipating complications on account of the foreign engagements made by the Nationalists.

At a later stage of the same deliberations, the Minister for War was asked whether he had any information with regard to an offensive by the Nationalists against the Greeks. The reply was that there was no official information, but that it was believed the Nationalists would transfer some of their troops from the Eastern front for the purpose of a general attack against the Greeks, but nothing was known as to the progress of the operations. Izzet Pasha thought that a success on the part of the Nationalists would facilitate matters between the Central Government and the Allies.

On the 1st December the Council was informed by Sefa Bey that the Allies had no objection to the departure of the delegation, which could therefore leave at once. Izzet Pasha then read a communication, dated the 29th November, from Mustapha Kemal, in which the latter stated that he had received the key to the cypher, and had repeated the orders for the transmission of telegrams from Constantinople addressed to the President of the Assembly; as the Assembly was prepared to meet the Government delegation, it was requested that the date of the latter's departure should be notified forthwith, together with the names of the members of the delegation; it was considered that the inclusion of Izzet and Salih Pashas would be of great advantage.

Salih Pasha signified his willingness to accompany the delegation, and the War Minister stated that Staff-Major Hassan Bey had been selected in place of Zekki Pasha. Finally, it was decided that the delegation should leave on the 3rd December, and Izzet Pasha was requested to communicate with Angora at once in order to settle the route to be followed. A communication to the Sultan was then drawn up and signed by all the members of the Cabinet, in which the attributions and purpose of the delegation were defined and the Imperial approval was requested. With regard to certain foreign personages accompanying the delegation, Izzet Pasha stated that, although they would have no official status, and although he himself saw no obstacle, the matter depended entirely upon the decisions of the Angora administration. At a later stage of the same deliberations a telegram arrived for Izzet Pasha from Fevzi Pasha, the Nationalist Commissioner for War, in which it was stated that, owing to the bad state of the roads between Zungulduk-Ineboli-Samsun, the delegation should travel by the land route by rail and motor-car; all measures had been taken, and two officers had already been sent to Eski Shehir to await the delegation.

A further meeting was held on the same evening at the house of the Grand Vizier, at which the members of the delegation were all present and were given the following instructions:—

- (1.) The principal object of the delegation was to secure the submission of the Nationalists to the Central Government, in order that the latter could adequately represent the entire nation and afford satisfactory guarantees for the execution of engagements made. The utmost efforts were to be made to abolish the dualism which had arisen in the Administration.
- (2.) After having fully explained the political situation and emphasised the disastrous consequences that would ensue if the restoration of order in Anatolia were delayed, the delegation would endeavour to ascertain the final terms of the Nationalists.
- (3.) Replies should be communicated to the Central Government with all speed, and further instructions should be awaited before any engagements were made.
- (4.) The Central Government would not require the abolition of the National forces until the question of peace had assumed a definite form, but during the negotiations of the Central Government with the *Entente* Powers no movement should be undertaken contrary to the Government's policy. Assurances should be requested to this effect.
- (5.) The delegation would require the Nationalist Administration itself to draw up the project for the negotiations with the Allies in order that there might be no subsequent dispute.
- (6.) After a general agreement had been reached, a special commission would be formed including Nationalist members for the purpose of settling other details.
- (7.) In accordance, the Central Government will cite all persons implicated in the Anatolian movement before civil tribunals, but will adopt the principle of non-responsibility of individuals, and, if need be, will proclaim a general amnesty.

(8.) The Government promises neither to approve nor ratify any engagements unendorsed by the National Assembly to be convoked after the conclusion of an agreement.

(9.) The Government will make every endeavour to consolidate the advantages obtained by recent actions on the part of the Nationalists.

(d.) A communication from Mustapha Kemal to the Sultan is said to have been brought to Constantinople by the Government emissary to Angora, Captain Neshet Bey. Mustapha Kemal is said to have protested the absolute loyalty of the Nationalists to the Sultanate and also to the Sultan himself personally; they had never entertained the idea of trying to replace him, and all such stories, circulated by traitors, were the inventions of the enemies of the country; the sole purpose of the Nationalists was the salvation of the nation and the Khalifat; the prestige of the Khalifat would be restored by the union of Islam, for the achievement of which great assistance was being accorded by a Power that was the declared enemy of Imperialism.

(e.) Nationalist measures for the protection of labour was the theme of an article published in the Angora newspaper "Yeni Gun" on the 30th October. After a somewhat bombastic foreword, the article detailed the following conditions which are added by order of the Economy Commissioner to concessions for the exploitation of forests:—

- (1.) The contractor to pay an indemnity of not less than £T. 150 to all workmen incapacitated by malaria, pleurisy, dysentery, or other complaints requiring lengthy treatment, syphilis, or by injuries arising from accidents.
- (2.) Contractors shall submit their wages accounts once a month to the Government Forests Department. Employees are to be regularly paid, and the decision of the Commission of Economy will be binding in all disputes.
- (3.) In the event of a breach of these conditions, the concession will be cancelled and the contractor will not be entitled to any compensation whatever.

It was added that the Economy Commissioner had given orders that concessions were to be divided in such a manner as to permit the small capitalists to participate and to prevent several concessions being obtained by one person.

(f.) The tax for exemption from military service has been very strongly condemned by the "Yeni Gun" newspaper, of Angora, which affirmed that the country was not like the estate of a rich man for whom a crowd of slaves did all the work, &c. "What had vile pelf to do with the spirit of nobility and sublimity?" The exemption tax should be abolished and no payment should be accepted in lieu of service.

(g.) A clue to Nationalist policy in Georgia has been afforded by an article published in the Batoum paper "Islam Gurjistan" on the 19th November. It will be remembered that, according to previous reports, the Nationalists had been very busily agitating in the Batoum region, and it was believed that an attempt was to have been made to attack Batoum. This project now appears to have been abandoned, possibly as a result of Bolshevik pressure, and more oblique methods adopted. On the 13th November a Nationalist mission arrived in Tiflis for the purpose of negotiating with the Georgian Government concerning the Moslem population of Ajaristan. Shortly after the arrival of this mission the Georgian Cabinet was changed and M. Chekengelli came into power. M. Chekengelli was the Transcaucasian delegate in 1918 during the negotiations with the Turks, and agreed to the cession of the three sanjaks of Kars, Ardahan and Batoum to the latter. The article mentioned above concerned the proceedings of a meeting of the General Assembly of Moslems in Georgia held in Batoum on the 16th November, in the course of which the president stated that the independence of Ajaristan would be incorporated in the charter of the Georgian Constitution, which was then being discussed in the Georgian Parliament. It was decided after debate that a constitutional commission would be elected after the constitutional charter, which was being drawn up by the Parliamentary Commission, had been approved by the Council. At a later stage of the proceedings, on the suggestion of the president, it was agreed that the Presidential Committee should be reduced from thirteen to five members. The five members selected, who are all notorious Turkish agents, were as follows:—

Mehmed Abashidze.
Ismet Kadizade.
Suleiman Abashidze.
Suleiman Varshanidze.
Jemal Kikava.

2. Bolshevism in Transcaucasia, &c.

(a.) Interest at present centres in the advance of the Turks into Armenian territory and the fall of Kars. Reports state that the Bolsheviks had not expected such a rapid collapse of the Armenian forces, and had hoped to have effected a *coup d'état* in Armenia before the Turks actually invaded Armenian territory. Failing to achieve this *coup* in time, they are now said to have sent a note to Mustapha Kemal demanding an instant cessation of hostilities. The question of the moment throughout Transcaucasia is whether the Turks will cease the offensive, or whether they will push farther into the Erivan district and reach the Azerbaijan frontier. The general opinion is that in the latter case the whole of Azerbaijan would rise against the Bolsheviks, and that a general conflagration would take place throughout the Caucasus. There is no doubt but that the Moslems of the Caucasus are anxious for a Turkish advance, but the question is whether the Bolsheviks will be able to insist on a cessation of hostilities. Rumour is rife concerning the alleged split between the Bolsheviks and the Nationalists. The general opinion is that the Armenian question may result in an open breach between the two forces, though it is realised that everything possible will be done to prevent such an event occurring.

(b.) The attitude of the Georgian Government towards contemporary events can best be described as that of the reed bending before the storm. Georgia realises that she lies between two forces much more powerful than herself, and she endeavours to prolong her independent existence by keeping on good terms with both of them. She has assimilated so many Bolshevik principles that there is little ground for the Soviet authorities to harbour hostile designs against her. As regards the Turks, on the other hand, she has declared that, as a large proportion of her population is Moslem, Georgia cannot but consider herself a natural friend of Turkey. The Georgian Government have latterly brought forward a proposal to establish Moslem autonomy in Adjara. This step would have the double effect of pacifying the demands of the local Moslems in the Batoum province and also of taking the wind out of the sails of the Turks, who have latterly been showing every sign of taking early measures to occupy the Batoum province.

(c.) Anti-Bolshevik risings are still occurring in Daghestan, but there cannot be said to be any serious movement on foot against the Soviet authorities. Until recently the leading spirit in the revolt was Imam Najm-ud-Din Gotsinsky. The latter has now retired from the scene of active insurrection, and his place has been taken by a grandson of the Imam Shamil. The insurrection should not be considered as being anything very serious. Daghestan is full of discontented elements, most of whom have been compelled to take refuge in the highlands, out of reach of the Bolsheviks. The latter have not many troops in Daghestan, and have no means of defending many of the more isolated towns, which are in consequence at the mercy of the insurgent raiding bands. The Bolsheviks take the view that under present winter conditions it is impossible to conduct operations in the snow-covered highlands, but that in the spring two or three battalions will speedily liquidate the trouble. Turkish agitation is being actively conducted, and finds a fertile field throughout Daghestan, where the population is thoroughly tired of the Bolsheviks and longs for Turkish intervention. In this respect the feeling is the same as in Azerbaijan, and there is little doubt but that, should the Turks show any definite intention of advancing into the Caucasus, the Moslem population would rise in their favour to a man.

3. Egyptian Affairs.

The ex-Khedive is reported to be extremely depressed over the news of the sale of his properties in Egypt, which has been definitely ordered by the British authorities. As he regards this as the death-knell of his hopes of being restored to power in Egypt, he proposes to devote himself in future to a life of pleasure and personal interests in Switzerland. He therefore intends to sever his connections with Constantinople, although he may return here for two or three months in the year to visit his mother, Amina.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 3, 1921.)

(No. 1688. Secret.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, December 24, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, summary of intelligence reports issued by S.I.S. (Constantinople Branch) for the week ended the 2nd December, 1920.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 10.

Summary of Intelligence Reports for the Week Ending December 2, 1920.

SOME further information has come to hand during the past week with regard to the nature of the Nationalist reply to the overtures of the Central Government, and, if this information was accurate, it would not seem that Mustapha Kemal has in any way modified his original attitude with regard to the Treaty of Sèvres, although he was quite accommodating in other respects. The general trend of Turkish public opinion in the capital seems to be in the direction of the belief that recent developments have provided an opportunity for a reconciliation with Great Britain and France, and the resumption by Turkey of the rôle of a buffer against Russia. This was, at all events, the theme of an article which was to have been published by the Reconciliation Committee formed by Lutfi Fikri Bey during the administration of Damad Ferid Pasha (see summary dated the 14th October), but which was suppressed by the censor. With regard to the communications between the Central Government and Angora, it would appear that Captain Neshet Bey, the Government courier, is closely associated with Damad Ismail Hakki Bey on what is known as the "Palace Staff," which consists of four or five officers of the Sultan's entourage. The purpose of this staff is that of a liaison between the sovereign and the Ministry of War. Damad Ismail Hakki Bey, however, is a Nationalist partisan and has always been a fervent Unionist. It is believed that he has always been in constant communication with Angora, and has on more than one occasion served as an intermediary for communications between the Sultan and the Nationalist leaders. Some interesting items of information have also been obtained with regard to certain influences that have been exerted from Europe in regard to the negotiations between the Sublime Porte and Angora. The Italian Government would appear to be anxious for a peaceful settlement of the problem, but Talaat seems to be endeavouring to persuade both the Nationalists and the Central Government to maintain an intransigent attitude towards the Allies. So far as can be judged from the somewhat scanty information available with regard to the situation in Anatolia, the Nationalists are still endeavouring to reconcile their repugnance for undiluted communism with the necessity for making some show of applying revolutionary principles in the administration. The point was illustrated by the article published recently in "Yeni Gun" and by a speech of Mustapha Kemal, summarised respectively in the summaries for the 4th and 11th November. A further interesting illustration is afforded by an article published in the official Nationalist organ "Hakimet-i-Millie," according to which it would appear that the Nationalists are contemplating the division of the electorate according to trades and callings instead of by constituencies. It would nevertheless appear that the plans for military co-operation between the Bolsheviks and the Nationalists are being proceeded with, and that Soviet officials and missions are continuing to arrive in Anatolia. Finally, some indication of the effect upon Caucasian Moslems of the recent Turkish successes in Armenia may be gathered from the tone of an article published in the hitherto anti-Nationalist newspaper of Tiflis, "Yeni Dunya," which was strongly in favour of the Nationalists.

1. Turkish Affairs.

(a.) A Communication from Mustapha Kemal Pasha to the Sultan was said to have been brought to Constantinople by the Government courier, Neshet Bey, and handed to the Sultan by Marshal Fuad Pasha. The object of this communication

was to ensure the Nationalist point of view being placed before the Sultan without any possibility of its being distorted, and to reiterate the expressions of loyalty on behalf of the population of Anatolia. Captain Neshet Bey is attached to the palace staff, formed at Yildiz for purposes of liaison between the sovereign and the Ministry of War. The chief of this staff is Damad Ismail Hakki Bey, a son of Tewfik Pasha and a fervent Unionist and Nationalist partisan.

(b.) Outside influences are being exerted, to a certain extent through the intermediary of Ghalib Kemali Bey, who was sent to Rome on a special mission by Ali Riza Pasha and remained there as an informal representative of the Nationalists. Ghalib Kemali Bey recently returned to Constantinople, but, before leaving Rome, it is said that he had an interview with Talaat, who gave him a message for Izzet Pasha, urging the latter to maintain a firm attitude towards the Allies, and to avoid by every possible means the ratification of the Treaty of Sèvres. It was further reported that after Ghalib Kemali Bey's departure from Italy, Talaat left for Rhodes, where he remained for three days, and met a number of Nationalists who had been sent for the purpose from Angora by Mustapha Kemal. From another source it was reported that the Italian Government is still anxious to bring about a reconciliation between the Central Government and Angora. In a letter from Rome on the 25th October to the Nationalist Commissioner for Foreign Affairs, Ghalib Kemali Bey is reported to have stated that he had been visited by the Italian Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, who intimated that, if the Nationalists would adopt a reasonable attitude, the Italian Government would do its utmost to obtain a modification of the peace terms. This communication is said to have reached Angora on the 3rd November, and a courier was sent to Rome with special instructions for Ghalib Kemali Bey.

(c.) The reply of Mustapha Kemal to the Government overtures, as brought by the Government courier, Neshet Bey, was communicated to the Cabinet by Izzet Pasha on the 22nd November. According to Neshet Bey, the Nationalists were convinced that, as a result of recent developments in Greece, the Crimea and Armenia, the Central Government was in a position to negotiate upon much more favourable terms with the Allies, and could thus obtain considerable concessions. If the Allies were prepared to make certain concessions, the Nationalists would undertake to meet them in every possible way, both as regards the application of the treaty and as to the general policy of the Allies in the East. Izzet Pasha states that the Nationalist point of view had been made sufficiently clear, and that there were only two lines of action open to the Government; either to resign if the Nationalist conditions were regarded as impracticable, or to send a delegation to Angora at once if it was thought that the Nationalists could be persuaded to modify their conditions. He personally did not regard those conditions as impossible, although he admitted that some were exaggerated. At the same time, no practical decision could be taken until the attitude of the Allies had been ascertained in view of recent developments. After a lengthy discussion, it was decided that a note should be sent to the Allies asking them to communicate their views in the name of peace in the Near East. The following is a summary of the letter sent by Mustapha Kemal:—

After a short preface, Mustapha Kemal stated that the following decisions had been approved by a majority in the Great National Assembly:—

- (i.) The Assembly considered it to be its duty to second the efforts of the Central Government in all its efforts to re-establish national unity.
- (ii.) Before negotiations could be commenced with the Central Government, however, the latter must obtain assurances that the Treaty of Sèvres will be modified, in principle if not in detail, in accordance with the principles of Wilson.
- (iii.) After proof had been obtained that the Entente Powers would repair the injustice that had been committed, the Assembly would afford the Government every facility with regard to the negotiations.
- (iv.) The Assembly would thereafter undertake to pursue a policy in conformity with the interests of peace and the interests of the Entente Powers in the East.
- (v.) The organisation of the Nationalists would be retained until normal conditions had been established, when it would either be totally dissolved or transformed into a political party.

- (vi.) The Government of Commissioners had already been authorised to correspond with regard to the arrangements for the negotiations, but for the present cyphered telegrams could only be sent through the intermediary of the President.
- (vii.) Until the conclusion of negotiations, the Government of Commissioners would continue its functions, but, in the event of a favourable issue, affairs of State would be brought under one administration.
- (viii.) After coming to an agreement with the *Entente* Powers, the Central Government will approve wholly, or partly, the political and financial measures taken by the Great National Assembly for the safety of the nation.
- (ix.) A general amnesty without restriction was to be promulgated.

The above points were to form the basis of negotiations, and any delegation arriving to discuss matters on this basis would be gladly welcomed and all facilities would be accorded to it.

The Cabinet then considered the question of the despatch of the delegation, and came to the conclusion that, as it was impossible to send the persons originally chosen, a new delegation would have to be chosen. This was finally agreed upon as follows:—

Izzet Pasha, Minister of the Interior.

Hussein Kiazim Bey, Minister of Commerce and Agriculture.

Fatin Hoja, Astronomer Imperial.

(d.) A declaration of policy, as favoured by the Reconciliation Committee formed by Lutfi Fikri Bey (see summary dated the 14th October), was embodied in an announcement that was to have been published in the press, but which was suppressed by the censor. The following is a digest of the article in question:—

The Reconciliation Committee had been formed for the purpose of terminating the duality that was causing so much harm to the country. Attention was drawn to three important recent developments, viz.: (a) the occupation of Armenia by the National forces; (b) the defeat of Wrangel; and (c) the result of the Greek elections. In consequence of these events, it was considered that the settlement of the great problem was no longer a domestic question, but a matter of foreign policy. If the western Powers would show the same spirit as when they drew up the Treaty of Paris in 1856, the entire nation would desire nothing better than peace. The confidence which has been reposed in Turkey as the guardian of eastern Europe had been lost by the war, but it was hoped that, as a result of recent developments, that confidence might be restored. The "children of the nation" were therefore begged, "at a moment when the star of hope was appearing on the horizon," to maintain the national dignity, and the Allies were begged to accord their powerful aid to restore peace. Turkey, helped by the Great Powers, might become the intermediary between Europe exhausted by war and Russian in revolt. Under such circumstances, discord would spontaneously disappear.

(e.) "Election by Workers" was the title of an article that appeared in the official Nationalist organ at Angora, the "Hakimet-i-Millie," on the 23rd October. The object of the article was to explain a scheme that apparently already had been announced, and which was in some way connected with the electoral system. After a brief preface to this effect, the article stated that the object of representation by workers was "to transfer the whole administration to working men" ("Emekji"). Those who were not workers would not have the right to vote, but in order to ensure the proper exercise of the franchise by the workers, the latter should be organised as in other countries in accordance with the nature of their callings. A law would therefore be enacted ordering the formations of trade unions throughout the country, and all workers would be obliged to join one of these unions. The old guilds ("Esnaf Lonja") really embodied the same principle, and one of the most useful objects of these organisations was to ensure better service. In other countries there had been considerable overlapping of callings and, if the same confusion were produced in Turkey, the organisation of the unions would be difficult. On the other hand, if the organisation were the spontaneous result of certain callings coming into being, there would be no necessity to invent one. The following were the principal callings existing in Turkey: (i) farmers, (ii) merchants, (iii) sailors, (iv) miners, (v) builders, (vi) liberal professions, (vii) bankers, (viii) officials, and (ix) soldiers. Some of these were generally distributed, others were local. An organisation would

be formed wherever the calling existed, and would be represented even though in an electoral minority. Some callings would in time develop in districts where they did not exist at present, as for instance with the miners. Divisions would be made in consideration of the common nature of various callings. Each calling, however, would have its own organisation. Thus the professions of law, medicine, painting, teaching, &c., would each have a separate organisation, and would together form a federation of Liberal professions. In the course of time some callings would be sub-divided and others would disappear. Thus the vocation of railway employees would soon be developed, whilst that of merchant would disappear. With regard to the functions of the organisation, each union would have two duties:—

- (i.) To organise, conduct and administer the special business of the calling.
- (ii.) To perform certain public duties.

The first comprised the ordinary functions of the European trade unions, and in this respect the principles of Bolshevism would be accepted. The second duty would be connected with the conduct of elections, and under this head the following points should be taken into consideration. "As in Russia, the unions would be permitted to concern themselves with politics, but each individual was free as to his personal political creed." Each individual would be registered in the records of his union, and would vote with his comrades in that calling. "The Assembly would be chosen by this means, and would constitute a general federation of workers' unions." The private business of the various callings would not be regulated by one great organisation, but by nine centres, which would fulfil both public and private functions.

(f.) A mixed war council at Angora was to have been held on the 15th November, according to information from a Nationalist source. Besides Nationalist representatives, this council was to have consisted of Bolshevik and Azerbaijan delegates and a delegate of the Executive Council of the Moslem Eastern Committee of Baku. The object of the council, which was said to have been formed at the request of the Bolshevik Commissary for War, was to decide the nature and scope of the assistance to be accorded by the Bolsheviks to the Nationalists. It was also reported that preparations were being made for a general offensive on the western front. From another source it was reported that the Intelligence Department of the Turkish War Office had recently received a communication from Angora, dated the 17th November, to the effect that the Nationalist Government had been informed by Moscow of the departure from Novorossisk for Trebizond of a mission consisting of twenty members. It was further stated that the object of the mission was propaganda, but it is possible that this object was in reality connected with the council mentioned above. According to further information said to have been received by the Turkish Intelligence Department, and dated the 18th November, the Soviet representative Legrand had left Erivan for Baku on the 6th November to obtain further instructions from Moscow in connection with his negotiations with the Armenian Government. During his absence from Erivan one Adesselin was acting Soviet representative. The same report stated that the Nationalists were pursuing their plan of pushing forward to Delijan in order to establish contact with the Moslem Eastern Committee at Baku, of which Enver had been appointed president. Finally, it was stated that in accordance with the agreement with the Soviet Government, Bolshevik consulates were being established in various parts of Anatolia.

(g.) The attitude of the Georgian Moslems towards the Nationalists appears to have undergone a transformation, for the tone of an article, summarised below, which was published in the Tiflis newspaper "Yeni Dunia" on the 5th November, was decidedly favourable to the Nationalists. The article was entitled "The Result of an Enterprise."

Although six months had elapsed since the Greeks had opened fire upon the Turks in Anatolia, there was no sign of an end. M. Veniselos was going to settle the matter in a very short time by means of Greek cartridges, but his words had not been fulfilled. There was also dissatisfaction in Greece regarding the policy of the Greek Government, but the movement against the Veneselist administration had been met by imprisonments and deportations. Matters of life and death cannot be settled by bayonets, and the Greek bayonets could only settle the Turkish problem by annihilating the entire nation, which was more than either M. Veniselos or Mr. Lloyd George could achieve. The problem could only be solved by the Turkish nation itself, and to exert force would only be energy thrown away.

2. Bolshevism in Transcaucasia, &c.

(a.) As was to be expected, the French authorities have been unable to cope with the overwhelming numbers of Russian refugees at Constantinople, and have found it impracticable to enforce their original intention of allowing no military elements on shore. It had been decided that all military must be kept on ships until they could be sent down to one of the two concentration camps at Lemnos or Gallipoli. In practice, however, several thousand Russian officers and other ranks have succeeded in leaving their ships and coming ashore, until the town is packed with them. The great majority of them are penniless, and have no hope of obtaining either employment or shelter. The Russian authorities in Constantinople are helpless to deal with the situation. The danger lies in the fact that large numbers of these men are armed. Cases have already occurred of officers selling their revolvers, and there have even been cases in which machine-guns were similarly disposed of. It is understood that the Allied police authorities intend taking measures to enforce the disarmament of all Russians on shore.

There is a considerable amount of anti-British propaganda being conducted in Constantinople at the present moment, the main object being to disparage Britain in the eyes of all people and cause ill-feeling between the British and French. The source of this propaganda is partly German, though the Bolsheviks are also actively engaged in the work.

(b.) According to an unofficial but reliable Armenian source, interesting developments have taken place in the relations between the Nationalists and the Bolsheviks. The successful advance of the Turks and the fall of Kars caused no little apprehension to the Bolsheviks, who feared that the presence of Turkish troops in the vicinity of the Azerbaijan frontier might quite conceivably cause a Moslem rising in that province. Rumour has it that Chicherin despatched a note to Mustapha Kemal, in which he insisted on a cessation of hostilities against the Armenian Republic, the integrity and independence of which had been recognised by Soviet Russia, and also declared that the Brest-Litovsk Treaty would no longer be considered binding as between the Turks and Bolsheviks.

Whether there be any truth in the above report or not it is impossible to say, but the fact remains that the Turkish advance was watched with enthusiasm by the Moslems of Georgia, Azerbaijan and the North Caucasus, and from all accounts, had the Turks succeeded in pushing right through to Georgia and Azerbaijan, a Moslem rising would have been inevitable on a very large scale.

The fact of the matter is that the Bolsheviks wish to maintain an alliance with the Turkish Nationalists because, firstly, it gives them considerable prestige and a theoretical right to style themselves the friends of Islam, and secondly because it gives them a footing in Turkey with the possibility of eventually establishing their control over the country and attaining their ultimate object of obtaining possession of the Dardanelles.

There have been many unconfirmed reports but little definite information concerning the real state of affairs in Armenia. It is known that the late Government have been replaced by a new one which, at all events, is not Bolshevik, and which, according to some reports, is moderate in policy. The President is said to be Vratsian. It would appear that the Turks have shown no inclination to adopt Bolshevik principles in so far as their occupation of Armenian territory is concerned. They have prevented excesses, and have effected no changes in the internal structure of the existing administration. The general opinion appears to be that the Bolsheviks and Turks are afraid of quarrelling over the Armenian situation, and for the time being Armenia is benefitting thereby.

The attitude of the Georgian Government towards the events going on around her has been one of neutrality. She has throughout maintained an attitude of neutrality towards the events taking place around her. She has adopted the safe policy of bending to a possible coming storm, even though the latter may blow from two directions. In so far as the Bolsheviks are concerned, Georgia may be said to have met them halfway, and, by adopting a régime of extreme socialism which in many ways differs very little from the régime of Soviet Azerbaijan, she has removed all possible grounds for a quarrel with her eastern neighbour. Since the Turkish successes against Armenia, Georgia has shown a marked inclination to curry favour with the winning side, and one has heard much of the strong pro-Turkish sympathies of the Georgian people, a considerable portion of whom are Moslems. Georgia appears fully alive to the possibility of a conflict between the Turkish forces and the

Bolsheviks, and wishes to maintain good relations with both parties until it becomes evident which side is likely to win. For the time being the Turks appear anxious to have the friendship of the Georgians, and have appointed a representative to Tiflis in the person of Kiazim Bey. Georgia fears, of course, that should Turkish ambitions carry the Nationalists further than their present limits, they will endeavour to link up with the North Caucasus—in which case, of course, Georgia would immediately become the theatre of operations. The Georgians are also considerably alarmed at the possibility of a Turkish occupation of the Batoum province, and the draft scheme for the new constitution of Georgia contains a clause providing for the establishment of an autonomous Moslem Georgia.

(c.) Anti-Bolshevik risings are still occurring in Daghestan, but there cannot be said to be any general movement on foot against the Soviet authorities. The two leading spirits in the present revolt are Imam Najm-ud-Din Gotsinsky and a grandson of the Imam Shamil. In the opinion of a responsible individual who was recently in Daghestan, the insurrection should not be considered as being anything very serious. Daghestan is full of discontented elements, most of whom have been compelled to take refuge in the highlands out of reach of the Bolsheviks. The latter have not many troops in Daghestan, and have no means of defending many of the more isolated towns. Thus the town of Khunsakh, some 30 miles south-west of Temir Khan Shura, was besieged by the insurgents, who appeared sufficiently strong to prevent reinforcements being sent from Temir Khan Shura. According to the last reports, the Bolshevik garrison were still holding out after a three weeks' siege. The Bolsheviks take the view that under present winter conditions it is impossible to conduct operations in the snow-covered highlands, but that in the spring two or three battalions will speedily liquidate the trouble. Some reports state that Gotsinsky has given up the struggle and abandoned the leadership to Shamil.

Turkish agitation is being actively conducted, and finds a fertile field throughout Daghestan, where the population is already thoroughly tired of the Bolsheviks, with their endless requisitioning and repression. It is exactly the same story as in the North Caucasus and Azerbaijan, and the general opinion is that the Bolsheviks are laying up very serious trouble for themselves in the not distant future. They are admittedly far too strong to be ousted by anything but a general movement throughout the North Caucasus, and the only impetus for such a movement could come from the Turks. Many of the saner Bolshevik leaders must perceive the danger growing in the distance, but the Bolshevik press has so far been completely silent on the subject.

[E 54/1/44]

No. 11.

Lord Hardinge to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 3, 1921.)

(No. 3882.)

My Lord,

Paris, December 30, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the "Echo de Paris" of to-day publishes an account of an interview granted to one of its correspondents by a member of the Senatorial Commission on Foreign Affairs.

The writer of the article states that he enquired whether it was true that M. de Selves, the president of the commission, had written to M. Leygues a letter calling attention to the discrepancies between the statements regarding Eastern affairs, made by Mr. Lloyd George in the House of Commons, and those of the President of the Council in the Chamber, and asking M. Leygues to explain these differences to the Senatorial Commission. In reply to his question, the writer declares that he was informed that M. Antonin Dubost had on the previous day expressed a wish that M. Leygues should again appear before the commission. As a result, M. Leygues, at the request of M. de Selves, came to the Senate and declared, as he had already done, that there was no disagreement between Mr. Lloyd George and himself regarding Eastern affairs, but that the British Premier did not desire that the question of the revision of the Treaty of Sèvres should be publicly discussed. It would indeed be maladroit, at the moment when negotiations were about to begin, to appear to admit the necessity of an agreement with Kemal Pasha, especially as Izzet, accompanied by a mission, was at present with him.

In these circumstances the commission had considered it better, for the moment, not to enter into a public discussion of Eastern affairs and of the military burden which

they still impose upon France, but, on the contrary, to leave full liberty of action to the Government. M. d'Estournelles de Constant, who had prepared an interpellation, had accordingly consented to put it off until a latter date.

I have, &c.

HARDINGE OF PENSHURST.

[E 157/1/44]

No. 12.

Lord Hardinge to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 3.)

(No. 4.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, January 3, 1921.

THIS evening's newspapers announce that President of the Council this morning received General Townshend and General Achmed Riza, former Resident of Ottoman Chamber.

General Townshend has already given press interview, in which he advocates revision of Treaty of Sèvres, and French will undoubtedly make as much capital as possible out of his views.

The President of the Council impressed upon me again to-day the necessity of effecting a settlement in the Near East owing to the presence of Bolshevik emissaries in Angora.

In reply to my enquiry as to what he would propose, he urged afresh a modification of the Treaty of Sèvres in regard to Smyrna, and necessity of making peace with Turkey on these lines before Greeks had been forced to evacuate that city. I expressed the opinion that no advantage was to be derived from being precipitate, and that whatever the future developments might be we should await them with confidence.

He did not tell me that he had seen General Townshend.

[E 346/1/44]

No. 13.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 7, 1921.)

(No. 1708.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, December 31, 1920.

THE close of the year finds the Turkish Government in a more difficult situation than ever.

2. It now seems practically certain that the mission to Mustapha Kemal has failed, the Nationalists having adopted an unyielding attitude. There are persistent rumours that the mission is on its way back, but, beyond the fact that it has failed, it is unlikely that the Turkish Government will be willing to give detailed information as to what passed at Angora. Matters have therefore, politically speaking, reached a deadlock.

3. The financial situation has gone from bad to worse. A large proportion of the officials have only received 75 per cent. of their salaries for October, and nothing either for November or December. At the present moment the three High Commissioners are engaged in a struggle with the Turkish Government regarding the question of effective control over the Turkish finances, this control being bound up with the disposal of any sum which may be advanced by the banks on the stocks belonging to the Ottoman Government, including the £ T. 252,000 in gold, the release of which our respective Governments have authorised.

4. In reply to the note which the three High Commissioners addressed to the Grand Vizier on the 17th December, the Turkish Government have sent us a long note explaining their view of the nature of the control which they are willing should be exercised by the provisional Financial Commission, and putting forward certain proposals in this connection.

5. I have had two long interviews, separately and alone, with the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Finance on this question, and I have pointed out the flaw in the Turkish proposals. These, as formulated, would enable the Minister of Finance to continue the system of paying a percentage of their salaries to all Government employees impartially, whereas, having regard to the insufficiency of the receipts to meet the monthly expenditure, the provisional Financial Commission is insisting, in the interests of law and order and of the proper collection of the customs revenues, on the necessity of making payments in order of their importance. The

provisional Financial Commission holds, and is supported in that view by the three High Commissioners, that services such as the police, customs, prisons and hospitals should constitute a first charge on the revenues. It is admitted that this system operates with great hardship on the employees of the other administrations. But there is no help for it, and, given the crisis, the three High Commissioners are driven to have recourse to expedients. At the present moment it has not been found possible to reconcile the views of the Finance Minister, who, with his colleague the Minister for Foreign Affairs, is fighting this question, with the view held by the High Commissioners. In the meanwhile the Turkish Government are living mainly on the receipts from the vilayet of Constantinople and on the customs receipts, which show signs of falling off owing to the fact that the fall in the value of the lira has acted as a check on importation of articles of luxury. It may be that financial distress will eventually drive the Turkish Government to agree to the form of control on which we are insisting, and even to ratify the treaty. This remains to be seen.

6. An interesting point of my conversations with both the Minister for Foreign Affairs and the Minister of Finance was the attempt of these two Ministers to enlist my sympathies on their side by agreeing that the police should be paid regularly. This proposal was, in reality, equivalent to a bribe, and I rejected it, as I pointed out that other administrations were almost, if not quite, as important to the State as the police. I informed the two Ministers, in short, that, speaking for myself, I would only raise the embargo on the £ T. 252,000 in gold if, and when, the provisional Financial Commission expressed themselves as satisfied that they had obtained effective control over the Turkish finances. There the matter rests for the moment, pending the examination by the provisional Financial Commission of the latest proposals of the Turkish Government. The controversy over this matter may last for some little time.

7. In the meantime the struggle with the Turkish Government over this question of control is really invested with a political character. It has become evident for some time past that the Turkish Government are pursuing a policy of passive resistance and are almost arrogant. I have had to take up two cases which savoured of political persecution, but I have not troubled your Lordship with these cases. It will be sufficient to say that one of the cases concerned Mustapha Pasha, who, as president of the court-martial which had been set up by the late Government to try Turks who have committed atrocities during the war, had incurred the enmity of the Nationalists and their sympathisers. No sooner had the present Government come into office than they arrested Mustapha Pasha and his three colleagues on a technical charge of contravening judicial procedure in one particular instance. In reality there was every reason to believe that their prosecution was due to motives of revenge. I am hopeful of settling this and the other case in a manner satisfactory to this High Commission, but the attitude of the Turkish Government in these two cases, as well as their attitude in the matter of the control of the Turkish finances, indicate an attempt to see how far they can go in resisting our demands.

8. The general outlook is very obscure and unsatisfactory.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

[E 477/52/44]

No. 14.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 10, 1921.)

(No. 1707. Secret.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, December 31, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, summary of intelligence reports issued by S.I.S. (Constantinople Branch) for the week ended the 16th December, 1920.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 14.

Summary of Intelligence Reports issued by S.I.S. (Constantinople Branch) for week ending December 16, 1920.

(Secret.)

BEYOND a bare statement to the effect that the Government delegation had arrived safely in Angora, the week under review has been practically void of important developments in the local situation. Pending a definite issue of the negotiations now in progress at Angora, all other matters seem to be held in suspense so far as the Central Government is concerned.

Several interesting items of information have come to hand, however, with regard to recent developments in the Anatolian and Pan-Islamic situation. All the evidence goes to show that, whatever may be the consensus of opinion with regard to Bolshevism, the Nationalist Administration is busily drawing up and applying various measures obviously intended to appeal to the Bolsheviks as being based upon the principles of the Third International. The proposed scheme of electoral reform, mentioned in last week's summary and further elucidated below, is a striking illustration of this policy. Further, for the first time, there is a hint to the effect that in certain circles amongst the Nationalists the idea of repudiating all financial liabilities is being entertained.

With regard to Pan-Islamic activities, an interesting account of the speeches recently made by Mustapha Kemal and the Sheikh of the Senussi at Angora has been obtained. Certain passages in Mustapha Kemal's peroration clearly indicate that the sheikh is to be utilised for some scheme in connection with the Pan-Islamic campaign which the Nationalist leaders are directing. The exact nature of the scheme is not clear, but it is worthy of note that the Sheikh of the Senussi was mentioned as a candidate for the Khalifat by a reliable informant who returned from Angora with a valuable report in August of this year (see summary dated the 19th August).

1. Pan-Islamic Affairs.

(a.) The proposed electoral reforms in Anatolia, mentioned in last week's summary, were the subject of further comments in the official Nationalist newspaper, "Hakimet-i-Millie," of the 1st November, which stated that the proposals had been received with general enthusiasm. The article cited arguments in support of the scheme published by the "Euyud" newspaper of Konia, which had previously criticised Mustapha Kemal's proletarian programme (see summary dated the 14th October), and had stated that any changes which resulted in special privileges being granted to one particular class would cause serious harm. A resolution effected by a single class always involved disastrous consequences. The Anatolian people were so docile that just representation could never be obtained, either by the present electoral scheme or by universal suffrage, and representation by callings was therefore the best solution of the difficulty. The effect of such a system would be that the council of the nation would be influenced only by the nation's vital interests and not by party considerations. (Report HC/1559.)

(b.) The official constitution of the Turkish Communist Party in the Great National Assembly was announced in the "Hakimet-i-Millie" of the 1st November. This party is probably a development of the "People's Party" or "Green Army" (see summaries dated the 19th August and the 14th October), and is led by the Nationalist Finance Commissioner, Ahmed Ferid Bey. The announcement stated that the party had recently published its statutes and, although this publication has not yet been seen, it is most probably identical in nature with the statutes of the "People's Association" (see summary dated the 14th October), since it was also stated that the party programme had been modified in conformity with the principles of the Third International. (Report HC/1555.)

(c.) The Repudiation of the Public Debt was stated to be one of the advantages that would accrue from the success of the Nationalist cause in an article devoted to finance, published in the "Yeni Gun" of Angora on the 9th November. After discussing the Treaty of Sèvres, the writer asked why Turkey should contribute to the cost of the European war, and stated that by rights Turkey should be indemnified by Europe. The whole world had been grossly beneath the imperialism and capitalism of England, and both the Russians and all Asiatic nations were in league with the Turks against Western tyranny. Of the many important results that

would ensue from the triumph of the Nationalist cause, two were particularly to be considered—the country would be saved from ruin and slavery, and the debts contracted under the Imperialist régime would be cancelled. The realisation of these ideas, however, was dependent upon the complete destruction of imperialism and capitalism. (Report HC/1551.)

(d.) Commissions in the Nationalist army were recently awarded to 102 officers at Angora. According to the "Yeni Gun" of the 1st November, the form of oath which the officers were required to take began with the usual Moslem formula, "I swear by Allah," and consisted of an undertaking to serve only the Khalifat and Sultanate and the nation; to respect all the military laws and regulations; and to cherish military honour above all personal considerations. (Report HC/1556.)

(e.) A letter from Talaat was recently received by a Unionist agent in Constantinople in which it was stated that Talaat would shortly be proceeding to Moscow or Anatolia; a complete understanding had been established with the Bolsheviks; extensive plans had been devised and were being applied for the development of the Eastern campaign; Jemal in Tashkent and Enver in Baku were in charge of important operations in connection with the Eastern scheme. Informant stated that Talaat seemed to emphasise the cordiality of the agreement with the Bolsheviks. It was also stated that "the same persons would soon be in power again in Germany," but whether this referred to the Hohenzollerns or not was not clear.

It is worthy of note that the above statements have been amply borne out by the contents of recently-intercepted wireless telegrams. Jemal, however, is at present in Kabul. (Report HC/1558.)

(f.) The Bolshevik mission in Angora has already been reported as consisting of Shava Eliava, formerly Bolshevik High Commissioner in Tashkent, as Ambassador, and a certain Obmayil, as principal secretary (see summaries for the 9th and 16th September and the 28th October). It would now appear from an article published in the "Hakimet-i-Millie" of Angora on the 1st November that the full and correct name of the first secretary is Obmal Angarski. The article in question consisted of an account of an interview with this person, who made certain statements concerning regular communications with Russia, the military situation, and economic measures. With regard to communications, Angarski stated that the Embassy had had no courier from Moscow since his departure from Moscow three months before (?). The wireless installations were not working properly and messages were mutilated, but this would shortly be remedied, and there would be direct communication with Moscow. The military situation was satisfactory and, although the armistice with Poland was being violated through capitalist intrigues so that guerilla fighting was still in progress, an army was being prepared for the annihilation of Wrangel's forces. Semianoff's forces in Siberia had been badly defeated and were retreating with the help of the two Japanese divisions in Manchuria. The economic situation was also improving; mines were being worked again at Archangelsk and elsewhere; motor ploughs were being utilised to remedy the shortage of horses. In reply to a question as to the date of the Ambassador's arrival, Angarski said he had no news.

It should be noted that the above statements contain two inaccuracies, wilful or otherwise. Reference to the previous summaries mentioned above will show that Angarski certainly left Moscow more than three months previous to the interview, and Eliava had certainly already arrived in Angora in October. It is possible, however, that the "Ambassador" had left Angora later on some special mission. (Report HC/1554.)

(g.) Further evidence of animosity between Nationalists and Bolsheviks was provided by an announcement published by the official Anatolian News Agency on the 2nd November, emphatically contradicting a statement that had been published in the "Yeni Dunia" on the 26th October to the effect that the Turkish eastern army had been reinforced by a Bolshevik force of Tartars. This statement was denounced as "erroneous and groundless." The "Yeni Dunia" newspaper in question is published at Eski Shehir, and is the special organ of the Turkish Communists led by the notorious Sherif Manatoff. (Report HC/1552.)

(h.) Bolshevik aims in the East were said by the "Yeni Gun" of Angora of the 1st November to be concentrated upon India. Photographs of Enver, Jemal, Comrade ("Yoldash"—lit. travelling companion) Lenin and Mustapha Kemal, were published with statements to the effect that Enver had been given a command in the East, and Jemal had gone to Afghanistan. (Report HC/1552.)

(i.) The Sheikh of the Senussi was entertained to a banquet on the

25th November by the Great National Assembly, upon which occasion Mustapha Kemal made a long, laudatory speech concerning the importance of the sheikh as a leader of the Pan-Islamic movement. The most significant part of the speech, however, consisted of certain passages at the close, in which Mustapha Kemal stated that all the movements of renaissance in Islam would need leaders distinguished for nobility and virtue. "The Sheikh of the Senussi," he said, "is one of the most prominent and sacred figures in Islam, and the services which he has rendered will be crowned by the services which he will render hereafter. By them he will have helped to consolidate the Turkish Empire, which is the fulcrum of the whole Moslem world. I express to his Excellency Seyid Ahmed el Senussi, both in my own name and in that of the Great National Assembly, my thanks for his future services." The sheikh made a short speech in reply, praising the "Jihad," or Holy War, which was being waged by the Turks, and terminated by saying that he was ready at all times to devote himself to one cause—the union of Islam.

It is worthy of note that the Sheikh of the Senussi has been mentioned as a possible candidate for the Khalifat. There is also good reason to believe that the Nationalists are carrying on a careful but energetic campaign against the present Sultan. There is not at present sufficient evidence available, however, to permit the exact nature of the part to be played by the sheikh in the Pan-Islamic schemes of the Nationalists. (Report HC/1567.)

2. Bolshevism in Transcaucasia, &c.

(a.) Statements made to the Georgian press by Kiazim Bey, the representative of the Grand National Assembly in Tiflis, give the impression, as they are doubtless intended to do, that the Turks are sincerely desirous of improving their relations with the Georgians.

Hitherto the attitude of the Tiflis Government towards the Turks has been one of grave mistrust, based, of course, on the fear that the Nationalists were contemplating an attack on the Batoum province. After the collapse of Armenia, the Georgian Government were gravely alarmed at the Turkish advance, and appeared desirous of maintaining friendly relations with Turkey, bearing particularly in mind the fact that a large number of the population of Georgia are Moslems. It is more than probable, however, that the protestations of friendship made by the Turkish representative are merely intended to deceive the Georgians into believing in a false state of security from which they will shortly be awakened by a fresh Bolshevik coup. (Report HC/1553.)

(b.) Details are now to hand concerning the establishment of a Soviet Government in Armenia. Peace between the Turks and Armenians was actually signed at Alexandropol on the 3rd December. The Bolsheviks had been actively organising a coup d'état for some weeks past and commenced to act immediately after the signing of peace. Soviet detachments under the command of a Russian Bolshevik named Silin advanced into Armenia from the north, and their arrival was the signal for the proclamation of a Soviet in each of the larger towns, including Erivan. Revolutionary committees were established, and Armenia was proclaimed an independent Soviet Republic. The movement appears to have been accomplished without any conflict or bloodshed in the earlier stages, and the situation is similar to that in Baku at the end of April last.

The Armenian Revolutionary Committee arrived by train from Baku, and included as President Kassian, and as members Moravian, Gabrelian and others. On arrival, the new authorities observed the usual procedure, and immediately issued an order forbidding all officials to leave their posts "until the arrival of Soviet officials from Russia." The latter will, of course, include the inevitable "Chrezvychaika" and the other usual Bolshevik institutions. The Armenian General Dro has been temporarily placed in command of the Armenian forces. The districts of Nakhichevan and Zangezur have been incorporated in Armenian territory, and as such will enjoy just as much independence as that enjoyed by the "Independent Azerbaijan Republic."

Following the proclamation of the Soviet, Kiazim Kara Bekir is said to have sent a telegram of congratulations to the new Government, declaring that now there could be no further cause for hostilities between the Turks and Armenians, since the two peoples were now as brothers. It is generally believed that, apart from his congratulatory telegram which he could hardly avoid sending under the circumstances, Kiazim Kara Bekir is very far from satisfied with the turn events have taken, and it is reported that he protested strongly against the interference of the

Bolsheviks' emissary Legrand in the peace negotiations at Alexandropol. The latter, in his opinion, were matters which concerned only the combatant parties, and did not call for outside interference. The Turkish commander is now thought to be in a very difficult position from a military point of view. It will be almost impossible for him to maintain his force in the Kars highlands owing to the extreme cold and lack of provisions. The most natural scheme would have been for him to have advanced into the Erivan or Elizavetpol lowlands, and it is generally believed that this was his original plan of campaign. In any case, the fact of Kiazim Kara Bekir's having been thwarted in the continuation of a campaign in which his own personal aims were prominently concerned will scarcely tend to increase his friendship with the Bolsheviks.

The opinion is held by many people that the establishment of a Soviet Government in Armenia must shortly be followed by a similar event in Georgia. The Bolsheviks acted with promptness and decision in Armenia so soon as it became a question of forestalling the Turks. They will in all probability act with equal promptness again should the Turks continue to betray designs on the Batoum province. (Report HC/1562.)

3. Egyptian Affairs.

(a.) A letter has recently been sent by Zaghlul Pasha to Shefik Pasha, dated London, the 11th November, in which he states that a disagreement has arisen between the delegation and Lord Milner over the question of English advisers being retained in the Ministries of Finance and Justice. He therefore proposes to leave the delegation to work out its own plan of action and not to return to Egypt with it, but to remain in Paris. (Report HD/1564.)

(b.) A meeting of Egyptian Nationalists was caused by the receipt of a letter by Dr. Amin, the Egyptian, son-in-law of Dr. Essad Pasha, from his sister in Egypt, in which she stated that the Egyptian cause was being destroyed by their quarrellings. The meeting condemned the behaviour of the Egyptians, whom they regarded as unstable and half-hearted, and proposed to support Zaghlul as being their only hope. A Watanist pamphlet, written in Arabic and sent from Berlin, was circulated during the meeting and contained false statements regarding the Milner-Zaghlul draft agreement. (Report HD/1565.)

(c.) An emissary from the ex-Khedive to Mustapha Kemal recently returned to Constantinople, bringing a letter from the latter in answer to one sent by him by the hand of an Egyptian who left for Angora on the 22nd November, 1920. In this letter the ex-Khedive compliments Mustapha Kemal on his recent victory over the Armenians, and assures him of his whole-hearted collaboration with him. He counsels him to continue his offensive on the Brusa and Smyrna fronts, and assures him that the press of Egypt, Syria and Arabia is being well propagated. With regard to the Government delegation, the ex-Khedive begs him not to receive it or enter into any negotiations with it, as by doing so he would be furthering British policy, and it is only by continued fighting that the Ottoman Empire will be completely freed from the fetters of the occupation. We have no actual proof that the contents of the letter have been accurately reported, though informant's reputation is good. If genuine, the letter indicates that the ex-Khedive is now to be reckoned definitely on the side of our enemies. (Report HD/1569.)

(d.) Information is now to hand that the French Government is thinking of subsidising the Arabic newspaper "El Adel," which is published by Mohamed Safa in Constantinople weekly. Mohamed Safa came to Constantinople after having been prosecuted by the Egyptian Government for writing slightly about Queen Victoria, and about twelve years ago started the publication of "El Adel." It is a paper of pronounced Pan-Islamic tendencies, was used during the war as an organ for propaganda, its paper being supplied by the Germans, and is now said to penetrate all parts of the Moslem world. The Italians have more than once used its columns to publish inspired articles on Tripolitan affairs, and have paid for the distribution of numerous copies in Tripoli. Safa is anxious to secure French support, as he considers England to be the enemy of Mahomedans and France their friend. He has approached Commandant Labonne, Director of the French Bureau du Levant, pointing out the advantage the French would gain from having the support of a paper with such a large circulation. Commandant Labonne has so far confined himself to promising to subscribe for one year to the paper, but has asked for information regarding the paper's connection with India. (Report HD/1563.)

[E 261/1/44]

No. 15.

Earl Curzon to Sir G. Buchanan (Rome).

(No. 27.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 10, 1921.

ON the 5th instant the Italian Chargé d'Affaires enquired of Sir Eyre Crowe whether His Majesty's Government had heard a report that Mustapha Kemal was sending Izzet Pasha back to Constantinople with the advice that the Sultan should now ratify the Treaty of Sèvres. This appeared, if true, advice rather dangerous to the Allies, as it would enable the Sultan at Constantinople to claim all the benefits of the treaty whilst throwing on Kemal the responsibility for preventing the execution of the treaty in respect of all the clauses which the Turks thought objectionable.

2. Sir Eyre Crowe replied that His Majesty's Government had received a somewhat similar report, but not in a form which invested it with a high degree of reliability. He did not, however, share the view that the advice alleged to have been given by Mustapha Kemal was dangerous to the interest of the Allies; it seemed, on the contrary, that the Allies could only gain from that advice being followed. What we all desired was peace and the return to legality in our relations with the Turkish Government. Peace would settle the question of Constantinople, where the Sultan's authority remained established. It would regularise the situation in the mandated territories, as also in the zones established under the tripartite agreement. If, after ratification, Mustapha Kemal continued to oppose the execution of the treaty in those regions to which his material power extended, that would create no worse situation than existed now, without the treaty. Peace would lastly bring into operation the financial clauses to which the Allies were unanimous in attaching great importance, and which would, in the first instance, contribute powerfully to the maintenance of order at Constantinople, where at this moment arrears in the payment of salaries, joined to high prices, threatened to create widespread unrest.

3. Signor Preziosi did not dissent from the views expressed by Sir E. Crowe, with which I myself entirely agree.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 262/1/44]

No. 16.

Earl Curzon to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(No. 39.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 13, 1921.

I HAVE to inform you that on the 5th instant Mustafa Reshid Pasha paid his first call to this Department, and was received by the Under-Secretary of State. He expressed the thanks of the Turkish Government for his being allowed to come to London and to enter into unofficial relations with this Office. Sir Eyre Crowe said that His Majesty's Government would be happy to discuss with him informally any questions which could conveniently be treated without raising the issue of the re-establishment of official relations between the British and Turkish Governments. Sir Eyre Crowe expressed the hope that this re-establishment would not be long delayed and peace definitely realised, which was in the interests not only of both countries but of all the world. From this point of view His Majesty's Government could only hope for the early ratification of the Treaty of Peace. Pending this, Sir Eyre Crowe thought there would be difficulties which Mustafa Reshid Pasha, as an old diplomatist, would readily understand might prevent his being received by the Secretary of State.

2. Reshid Pasha then proceeded to give Sir Eyre Crowe a long account of recent political development at Constantinople. He was apologetic as to Tewfik Pasha's Government not having kept strictly to their promise to ratify the treaty as soon as they had heard of Izzet Pasha's arrival at Angora. But he felt sure that on Izzet's return to Constantinople the situation would rapidly clear. The Sultan and his Government were convinced that their proper policy was to go with the Allies, on whose benevolent support the future of Turkey depended.

3. Mustafa Reshid Pasha then pictured the acute distress prevailing at Constantinople owing to the want of financial resources. He regretted that certain proposals for affording temporary relief by an arrangement with the Ottoman Bank had fallen through. The conditions as to control put forward by the bank were unacceptable;

but whilst the French High Commissioner was ready to meet the Turkish Government on this point, the opposition of the British High Commissioner could not be overcome. Sir Eyre Crowe interrupted Reshid Pasha by observing that there was no advantage in making any attempt to play off the French against the British High Commissioner. This savoured of a diplomatic device which Sir Eyre Crowe begged him to consider as dead, and useless to resuscitate. Reshid Pasha at once disclaimed any intention of adopting these tactics. As he went on to develop in considerable detail the merits of the Turkish proposals relating to an advance, Sir Eyre Crowe requested that if he had any definite plan to put forward he would commit it to writing. Sir Eyre Crowe warned him, however, that this matter would no doubt have to continue to be treated by the High Commissioners at Constantinople, who had all the requisite local knowledge. The Under-Secretary of State further pointed out that the obvious remedy for the financial difficulties of the Turkish Government was, again, the ratification of the Treaty of Peace, in which proper provision was made for dealing with this problem.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 643/576/93]

No. 17.

*Mr. Davis to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 14.)**United States Embassy, London,
January 13, 1921.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that I am in receipt of a telegraphic communication from Washington stating that it is the desire of my Government to publish, in the form of a White Book, the following notes exchanged between His Majesty's Government and that of the United States with regard to rights in mandated territories:—

My note of the 12th May, 1920; my note of the 28th July, 1920; your Lordship's note of the 9th August, 1920, and Mr. Colby's note to your Lordship of the 20th November, 1920 (transmitted under cover of my note of the 6th December, 1920).

Inasmuch as my Government is particularly anxious to ascertain whether publication of the above-mentioned correspondence at this time would be agreeable to His Majesty's Government, I should appreciate at the earliest possible moment an expression of your Lordship's views.

I have, &c.

JOHN W. DAVIS.

[E 714/1/44]

No. 18.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 15.)

(No. 25.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, January 12, 1921.

PRESENT situation may be summarised as follows:—

Government still profess to be without news of return of their mission from Angora. Nothing authoritative has transpired as to what has passed between that mission and Nationalists.

Turkish Government have not yet given way on the question of control of their finances, and £ T. 252,000 gold have therefore not yet been released. Turkish Government are spreading report that in spite of their having control over budget receipts and expenditure, financial controllers are maintaining embargo of £ T. 252,000 gold. Thus Turkish Government wish to make financial controllers responsible in the eyes of the public for acute distress prevailing among Turkish officials. Steps are being taken to counter this mischievous propaganda.

In my view Turkish Government are awaiting results of forthcoming meeting of Supreme Council, and will live on, from hand to mouth, until they hear of the decisions taken at that meeting. It may well be that mission to Kemalists will remain at Angora either voluntarily or because they are obliged to remain until the result of meeting of Supreme Council is known, in order to be in a position to exchange views with Nationalists by light of decisions come to by Supreme Council. New Greek offensive attempts also have a bearing on the movement of mission.

[E 779/779/44]

No. 19.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 17.)

(No. 10.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, January 4, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a report on the heads of foreign missions at this capital, in so far as they are known to me. Having only recently arrived, I fear that the report must be necessarily somewhat incomplete.

2. In view of the fact that I am thrown into especially close contact with my French and Italian colleagues owing to the weekly meetings of the High Commissioners, and to the nature of our work here, good relations with the French and Italian High Commissioners are especially important.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD, *High Commissioner.*

Enclosure in No. 19.

Report on Heads of Foreign Missions in Constantinople, January 1921.

France.—The French High Commissioner, M. DeFrance, came here from Egypt in March 1919. He is the senior of the three Allied High Commissioners, and having been here a considerable time is naturally better acquainted with most of the questions dealt with at the High Commissioners' meetings than either my Italian colleague or myself. His experience is thus valuable to us.

I have found M. DeFrance an excellent colleague, and I regret his approaching departure for Madrid. He is conciliatory in the handling of questions of a controversial character, and, as far as I can judge, has done his utmost to work cordially with us. I have cultivated close relations with him.

Italy.—The Marquis Garroni arrived here in the latter half of November, a week or so after my own arrival. He was Italian Ambassador at Constantinople before the war, and therefore knows this part of the world. He is not a regular member of the Italian Diplomatic Service, his appointment being a political appointment made by Signor Giolitti. He is a senator from Genoa. His appearance is that of an easy-going elderly gentleman, but he is very alert. My impression is that he is determined to push Italian interests to the utmost, *vide* his recent proposal to send an agent to Mustapha Kemal with a view to facilitating the development of interests which Italy has acquired under the Tripartite Agreement. This effort was, however, nipped in the bud. I have found the Marquis Garroni a very pleasant colleague, anxious for close co-operation with my French colleague and myself. So far I have no reason to suspect him of want of loyalty, and he was perfectly frank about his proposal to send an emissary to Mustapha Kemal.

United States.—Admiral Bristol, the United States High Commissioner, came to Constantinople early in 1919. He has therefore been here longer than any of the High Commissioners. Before I arrived here he was described to me by the American naval attaché in London as a man of "transparent candour." I have not had much intercourse with him since my arrival, but I have always found him friendly, and certainly in one case, in which an American subject and the British military authorities were concerned, conciliatory. I am under the impression, however, that he is inclined to be jealous of the fact that the Allied High Commissioners are practically directing the administration of Constantinople. I have dealt with two categories of Americans since the armistice. The one category, whilst deeply regretting that America has, through her own action, renounced participation in the post-war settlement, nevertheless do their best to help their former allies. The other category are jealous of the necessarily preponderant rôle played by England in the settlement of European affairs. I conclude that Admiral Bristol belongs to this latter category. His occasional comments on decisions taken at the High Commissioners' meetings and communicated to him seem to indicate a desire to remind us to be careful of what we are doing.

A trained diplomatist in the shape of Mr. Dulles, a nephew of Mr. Lansing, has recently arrived as First Secretary at the American High Commission, and his influence will no doubt be beneficial.

Greece.—M. Canellopoulos is the Greek High Commissioner. I have seen very little of him as, since my arrival, he has been in a particularly difficult position owing

to the result of the elections in Greece. He is inclined to be a trimmer. We have to address frequent notes to M. Canellopoulos on the proceedings of the Greek troops in the territories which they occupy in Asia Minor. Of late he has shown a desire to be conciliatory and to meet our requests.

Belgium.—M. Michotte de Welle came here in October of last year. He is somewhat garrulous and plays no part.

Sweden.—M. Wallenberg was appointed here from Tokyo, where I knew him in 1909–13. He was very pro-German whilst in Japan, and I understand that this made his position very difficult when Japan entered the war. He has been absent since I arrived, but is now on his way back to his post. He is in charge of German interests at Constantinople.

Denmark.—M. Wandel is the Dutch Minister. I have only met him once.

Spain.—M. Servet y Vest is the Spanish Minister. I am told that he is quite insignificant and rarely appears.

There are also representatives from Jugo-Slavia, Czecho-Slovakia, Poland and Roumania.

[E 840/52/44]

No. 20.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 18.)

(No. 31.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, January 8, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith, for your Lordship's information, summary of intelligence reports issued by S.I.S. (Constantinople Branch) for the fortnight ended the 30th December, 1920.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 20.

Summary of Intelligence Reports Issued by S.I.S. (Constantinople Branch) for the Fortnight ending December 30, 1920.

(Secret.)

DURING the past fortnight interesting information has been obtained with regard to the arrival of the Government Mission in Angora, and the progress of the subsequent negotiations. As foreshadowed in the foreword to the summary for the 25th November, and also for the 2nd December, the Nationalists appear to have adhered practically to their original uncompromising attitude, although the members of the mission were treated with the utmost personal consideration. According to semi-official announcements on the 30th December, Izzet Pasha and the other members of the Government delegation left Angora for Constantinople on Wednesday, the 29th December, at the request of the Central Government, which, it is reported, is under the impression that the Allies are prepared to discuss Mustapha Kemal's proposals. In any case, the negotiations with the Nationalists are terminated. Izzet Pasha is expected back in the course of next week, when it may be possible to obtain full confirmation of the reports hitherto received with regard to the progress of the negotiations.

An interesting item of the general scheme of Nationalist policy is the decision that the Sultan must abdicate in favour of the pro-Nationalist Heir-Apparent, in order that the Nationalists may possess an adequate guarantee against a return of Damad Ferid Pasha, and a return to his policy of ruthless suppression of everything savouring of unionism. In the meanwhile, the Nationalists are taking advantage of the truce between Anatolia and the capital to recruit officers for service with the national forces, and in this respect the inability of the Central Government to pay salaries and pensions is probably a favourable element from the Nationalist point of view.

Ghalib Kemali Bey, whose return to Constantinople from Rome was mentioned in the summary for the 9th December, has now gone back to Rome again, but this time as the special agent of the Sublime Porte.

1. Turkish Affairs.

(a.) The policy of the Nationalist Government was defined before the Grand National Assembly on the 4th December by Mustapha Kemal, Mukhtar, the Foreign Affairs Commissioner, and Colonel Ismet, Chief of the General Staff.

Mustapha Kemal stated that it was impossible to refuse to negotiate with the Constantinople Government, since the Cabinet was composed of Ministers whose patriotism was beyond doubt, and since one of the principal purposes of the Nationalist movement was to unite the nation; he regretted that the Central Government delegates had not been furnished with sufficient powers, but the negotiations would proceed in accordance with the desire of the Assembly; no information would be given, however, until a definite result in one direction or the other had been achieved; there would be not the slightest divergence from the Assembly's original principles; the European situation had become favourable and, although the negotiations would be protracted, there was no need for pessimism; rumours to the effect that the delegation was accompanied by suspected persons were false, and the delegation itself would be unable to communicate with unauthorised persons; in case of necessity, the delegation would be allowed to send a courier to Constantinople under constant surveillance.

Mukhtar Bey's speech concerned foreign relations, which, he said, were limited to certain non-European Powers, although France and Italy had realised the necessity of the good-will of the Nationalists; the fall of Veniselos had given rise to hopes of an agreement, and every effort had been made to assist the anti-Veniselists, but, once in power, the latter party had evinced the same chauvinist spirit as the Veniselists; it would soon be clear whether this was only a manoeuvre, and it would be as well, therefore, to wait before condemning as fruitless the support given to the anti-Veniselist Party; the peace negotiations with Armenia were proceeding, and a treaty in harmony with Turkish interests would shortly be submitted to the Assembly; relations with the Soviet Government were more friendly than ever, and rumours of hostility on the part of the Moscow Government were untrue; the note, which had been received from the Soviet Foreign Commissioner, contained nothing unfriendly; as a matter of fact, the two Governments had long been in agreement with regard to Armenia, and the Angora Government knew that such a communication would be made by the Bolsheviks at a certain moment; Georgia had shown a desire to maintain good relations, and had received an assurance that there was no need to fear an attack; Ismet Bey stated that the army was beginning to move against the principal enemy on the Western front, but, as this movement had not yet developed, little information could be given; he could say that the enemy army was weary and demoralised; the principal action was taking place at Ushaq; Demirji, Simav and Gedis had been recaptured, and the Nationalist forces were advancing against Alashehir; he hoped to give further information shortly, but for military reasons no further details could be given for the moment.

(b.) On the 8th December the Foreign Affairs Commissioner, Mukhtar Bey, made a confidential statement to the Great National Assembly to the effect that before the negotiations with the delegation of the Central Government would proceed, it was essential, in the interests of honour and discretion, to ascertain the views of the Moscow Government with regard to those negotiations, and more especially as the delegation had been unable to provide certain guarantees; the Nationalist Government had sent a communication to the Soviet Government, and only when a reply had been received would the negotiations be proceeded with; the Assembly would be informed of all developments and, if an agreement were concluded, it would be submitted to the Assembly for ratification; rumours concerning the delegation's being prevented from returning to Constantinople were false; whatever the result of the negotiations, the delegation would be free to return.

The above-mentioned communication to the Soviet Government is reported to have been addressed to Chicherin on the 7th December and, after informing the latter of the arrival of the Central Government's delegation, stated that the Nationalists were more than ever resolved to fulfil their engagements; they would only discuss the Central Government's proposals if convinced of the possibility of concluding an honourable peace; although the Nationalists attached the highest importance to the negotiations in question, they considered it essential to ascertain the views of the Soviet Government with regard to the policy to be pursued for the safeguard of their mutual interests.

(c.) Negotiations with the Nationalists were officially commenced on the 7th December, when the Government Mission, under Izzet Pasha, arrived in Angora.

In the telegram which Izzet Pasha despatched to Constantinople immediately after his arrival in Angora, it was stated that the mission had received a tremendous ovation, and that in all the towns and villages the people had cheered the Sultan; at Eski Shehir, Izzet Pasha, after inspecting the 77th regiment, which was said to have been the first to enter Kars, told the commander that he deeply appreciated the sacrifices that were being made by the Turkish army, but he hoped that before long existing evils would be overcome, so that every man could return to his home; at Angora the mission was received by Mustapha Kemal, who subsequently informed Izzet Pasha that the decisions of the Great National Assembly rested irrevocably upon the modification of the Treaty of Sèvres, although the question would be again considered in the light of the proposals brought forward by the mission; Izzet Pasha expected to commence negotiations the following day, and added that success depended upon the result of the overtures that were then being made by the Sublime Porte to the *Entente* Powers; the telegram ended with a message from Mustapha Kemal to the effect that the whole of Anatolia was completely loyal to the Sultan.

(d.) On the 11th December Izzet Pasha addressed another telegram to the Sublime Porte, in which he stated that all the members of the Nationalist Administration with whom he had conversed had told him that, before negotiations could be commenced, they would have to receive a reply to certain communications which they had made in fulfilment of existing agreements; Mustapha Kemal had also informed him that it was hoped that the military action which had been commenced upon the Western front would have a salutary effect, both upon the negotiations and upon the political situation; hitherto, there had been only an exchange of views, and in the meanwhile Jevad Bey and Mukhtar Bey were going to report upon the manner in which the negotiations would be affected by the foreign engagements entered into by the Nationalists. This message was discussed at the Ministerial Council held upon the 18th December, and was considered by the Grand Vizier as not being sufficiently explicit to permit the Government to take any action. Mustapha Arif Bey, interim Minister of the Interior, expressed the opinion that the Nationalists were delaying matters in the hope that successes would be gained upon the Smyrna front, as well as in order to obtain the opinions of the States with whom they had made certain agreements; he suggested that a message should be sent to the mission urging that the Government's final terms should be placed before the Nationalists, and pointing out that the *Entente* representatives were impatiently awaiting the result of the negotiations. It was finally decided by the Cabinet to wait until Monday, the 20th instant, before sending such a communication. At the Council held on the following day, however, two further communications from Izzet Pasha, dated the 13th and 14th December respectively, were submitted to the Council of Ministers. The first communication stated that each member of the mission had been given in writing the terms upon which the Nationalists were prepared to come to an agreement. Those terms were as follows:—

- (i.) An Imperial proclamation and a provisional law whereby the Fetvas against the Nationalists and the decisions of the courts-martial would be annulled.
- (ii.) A Chamber of Deputies to be convoked as soon as possible for the purpose of reconsidering all measures adopted by both the Constantinople and the Angora Administrations, and to decide whether they should continue to be applied or not.
- (iii.) All who have suffered on account of their connection with the Nationalists at the hands of the Constantinople Government to be indemnified.
- (iv.) Assurances to be obtained from the *Entente* Governments with regard to the modification of the Treaty of Sèvres in accordance with Nationalists' claims. Meanwhile the Nationalists will renounce any hostile movement.
- (v.) The modifications of the treaty as desired by the Great National Assembly were:—
 - (a.) The *Entente* Powers to accept the principle of acknowledging complete Turkish independence wherever there was a Turkish majority of population, and to submit differences of opinion to international arbitration.
 - (b.) Claims regarding Smyrna and Thrace to be settled without arbitration.
 - (c.) A certain period to be allotted to the Arbitration Commission for purposes of studying ethnographical and other questions.

- (d.) Districts in Thrace and Anatolia now occupied by the Hellenes to be evacuated immediately; in return those districts where there were non-Turkish minorities would be granted a form of administration to be drawn up by a mixed commission, which would safeguard the rights of those minorities. Once the Hellenic troops had been withdrawn, peace and security would at once be re-established in both Thrace and Anatolia, and the rights and interests of the *Entente* Powers would also be guaranteed.
- (e.) Those clauses dealing with financial control to be modified in conformity with the honour and independence of the Ottoman Government, and the rights of the Ottoman Chamber to elaborate and ratify the budget to the unrestricted.
- (f.) The neutrality of the Straits, while accepted in principle by the Nationalists, to be applied in such a manner as not to interfere with the sovereign independence of the Ottoman Government.
- (vi.) The Government to be free to enter into political and economic relations with any Government it chooses.
- (vii.) The Ottoman Government, so long as its territorial integrity remains intact, will continue to observe a benevolent neutrality towards the Soviet Government and the neighbouring Asiatic Republics, and the Angora Government will be at liberty to revise its engagements in agreement with those States.
- (viii.) Treaties concluded or about to be concluded by the Angora Government not to be revised.
- (ix.) The military clauses of the treaty to be modified in accordance with the necessities of defence.
- (x.) The moral position of the Khalifat as the protector of Moslems in all Islamic countries without exception to be recognised, as also the rights of the populations of Syria and the Iraq to maintain relations with the Khalifat.
- (xi.) A reply to be given to the above proposals within one month.

Izzet Pasha stated in conclusion that as the mission had not been invested with sufficiently extensive powers to permit the discussion of such proposals, he was merely communicating them to the Government and awaiting further instructions. The communication, dated 14th December, gave a short account of a meeting with Jelladdin Arif Bey, who appeared to be the President of the Nationalist delegation, and asked that a further sum should be sent to the mission for travelling expenses.

With regard to these communications, the Grand Vizier expressed the fear that, unless the Nationalists modified their terms, the mission would have to be recalled, and the Government would then have to consider the question of changing its policy or resigning. Other Ministers expressed their regret that the Nationalists should have put forward such exaggerated terms and it was finally decided that a commission of Ministers should draft a reply containing a statement of the Government's views. This reply was read at the Ministerial Council on the 23rd December, and was to the following effect:—

"The conditions imposed by the Nationalists were far from fulfilling the principal object of the negotiations, which was to enable the Government to negotiate with the *Entente* Powers in the name of the entire nation, and the mentality which still persisted at Angora might indeed destroy the very basis of negotiations. There was no doubt that the *Entente* Powers were anxious to put an end to the uncertainty and to safeguard their interests in the Near East, and it was a crime to throw away this opportunity. The Nationalist leaders should be given to understand that even those Powers which were animated by benevolent sentiments would not consent to a return to the *status quo ante bellum*, and no negotiations could be possibly successful on the grounds proposed by the Nationalists. The Mission was therefore authorised to inform the Nationalists that the Central Government had not the power to accept their conditions, but, if those conditions concerned only Thrace, Smyrna and Adana and the means of defence against attack, it would be possible to negotiate with the *Entente* Powers. The conditions of an interior nature proposed by the Nationalists would be accepted by the Central Government."

The letter was approved by the Cabinet, but a further clause was added at the suggestion of the Sheikh-ul-Islam, emphasising the complete responsibility of the Nationalists if the present favourable opportunity were lost.

(e.) The dethronement of the Sultan in favour of the Heir-Apparent, in spite of frequent assurances of loyalty on the part of Mustapha Kemal, is being widely discussed amongst the Nationalists, who regard it as a *sine qua non* of any agreement with the Central Government, because in this manner alone would they possess a guarantee that Damad Ferid Pasha would not be recalled to power and a policy of reprisals reinaugurated. The Heir-Apparent himself is said to be not averse to the idea. It will be remembered that this has already been the subject of former reports based upon reliable information (see summaries for the 19th August, p. 15, and the 26th August, p. 14). In the latter report there was also mention of a proposal on the part of the Soviet Government that a principle of "Evkafs" (pious foundations) should be extended. It is significant that the new Cabinet has been energetically pushing through a scheme whereby the Evkaf Ministry is to become a department of the Sheikh-ul-Islamat. Evkaf properties are of almost incalculable value and the Ottoman Government has made several attempts to convert them to its own use, but has been prevented by the Powers.

(f.) The attitude of the Constantinople press, since the fall of Damad Ferid Pasha, has become rather more interesting. One section, which remains more or less faithful to the ex-Grand Vizier, continues to publish bitter diatribes against the Unionists and Nationalists. This section is also strongly anti-Bolshevik and is represented by the "Peyam Sabah" and the "Alemdar." Another section, of which the evening paper "Aksham" is a notable example, is of pro-Nationalist tendencies, but makes a point of condemning the Unionists, though in milder terms than the first-mentioned journals. A characteristic article was published in the "Aksham" recently, in which a plea was made for an understanding between Great Britain and Turkey on the grounds of their common interests. This understanding, it was stated, could be brought about if Turkey were confirmed in her territorial "integrity," for the Turks would then never think of "casting their eyes" beyond their eastern frontiers, and the pan-Islamic menace would cease to exist. Another section of the Constantinople press, as represented by the "Ikdam," may be regarded as furtively supporting Bolshevism. This paper frequently publishes articles of a subtly questionable nature from the pen of a certain Yakub Kadri, who in private life, makes no secret of his Bolshevik sympathies.

(g.) Nationalist intrigues in Mesopotamia are known to have been at least a partial cause of the unrest in that country. An interesting item of the Nationalist campaign in that direction was revealed by the "Hakimet-i-Millie" of Angora on the 17th November, in which it was stated that a mission from the "provisional government" of the Iraq, said to be located at Nejj, arrived in Diarbekir on the 12th October. The delegation brought a letter from the chief of the "provisional government," El Seyid Muhammad Bedreddin, in which the British were accused of the usual crimes against civilisation, and of setting up a bogus form of popular government with the assistance of their paid agent Talib of Busra, who was described as the Ferid of Iraq. With the help of God, however, the British had been driven from the Euphrates basin, but the assistance of the Nationalists was requested in order that the enemy might be completely destroyed. The epistle terminated with an assurance that "all the chiefs of Iraq" wished "to remain for ever in friendly relations with the Turkish Government." The "Hakimet-i-Millie" at the same time published certain statements said to have been made by members of the mission, which were merely an elaboration of the contents of the above-mentioned letter, but in the opinion of the editor, "Nejj was to the Iraq as Angora was to Turkey."

(h.) The want of officers amongst the National forces is known to be one of the greatest difficulties with which the Nationalists have had to contend, and it would appear that an attempt is being made to take advantage of the advent to power of a Cabinet in sympathy with their ideals, for the purpose of inducing officers in Constantinople to proceed to Anatolia and join the national forces. In this connection, the Nationalist Commissioner for War, Fevzi Pasha, is said to have sent a private communication to the chief of staff of the Central Government requesting the latter to encourage officers to join the Nationalists by giving them indefinite leave during which their pay would be handed to anyone they liked to designate.

(i.) The relations of the Central Government with Italy entered upon a fresh phase with the advent of the present Government to power. The return of Ghalib Kemali Bey to Constantinople from Rome has already been noted previously (see

summary dated the 9th December). He remained in Constantinople only a few days, however, and went back to Rome about the 8th December, after having been charged with special functions by the Turkish Government. He was given instructions which embraced the following points:—

- (a.) He was to proceed to Rome on behalf of the Government, not in an official capacity, but on account of his intimacy with various Italian Government officials.
- (b.) The expenses of the mission would be covered by the secret funds of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs.
- (c.) He would remain in Rome until the return of the Government Mission from Angora and his services would then either be terminated or renewed as the Government thought fit.
- (d.) While in Rome he would maintain constant contact with Italian political personages, particularly to convey the following:—
 - (i.) Turkey was grateful for Italian assistance already afforded.
 - (ii.) Turkey now had more need than ever of Italian support.
 - (iii.) The Turkish Government was doing its utmost to carry out the advice given by the Italians to eliminate the duality which had arisen in Turkey, but begged to point out that this object could not possibly be achieved unless a guarantee were given that the unjust Treaty of Sèvres would be modified.
 - (iv.) Once this guarantee were given, the Turkish Government would faithfully follow all recommendations emanating from the Italian Government or the other *Entente* Powers, for the safeguarding of Italian or *Entente* political and economic interests in the East.
 - (v.) Italy's position in Anatolia as defined by the Treaty of Sèvres was accepted in advance by the Turkish Government, which was also prepared to conclude further agreements as soon as a peace securing Turkish rights had been concluded.
 - (vi.) The Turkish Government would give every material and moral assistance to the Italian Government in return for the latter's friendly support.
- (e.) He would ascertain and inform the Turkish Foreign Office immediately with regard to what immediate economic and financial assistance the Italians were prepared to afford and upon what conditions.
- (f.) He would keep the Turkish Government constantly informed with regard to Italian public and official opinion, and would strive in every way to influence them in a favourable manner.

(j.) The finances of the Turkish Government are becoming constantly more involved, and form one of the principal subjects of the deliberations of nearly every Cabinet Council. At the Council held on the 19th December, the Minister of Finance painted the situation in very gloomy colours and stated that a crisis would become inevitable unless something was done before the end of the month. He was prepared to resign at once if anyone could do better, but the measures that had been taken were insufficient. On the 23rd, both the Minister of Finance and the Minister for Foreign Affairs agreed that the financial situation could not be improved until a definite result had been obtained in the negotiations with the Nationalists, and proposed that the Government Mission in Angora should be informed of the fact. In reply to the Finance Minister's suggestion that the *Entente* Powers should be informed of the grave consequences that would ensue if the present state of affairs were prolonged, the Grand Vizier stated that every possible measure had been taken without success, and there was nothing further that could be done but to put a brave face on the matter until the negotiations begun at Angora had produced a favourable result.

2. Egyptian Affairs.

(a.) It is reported that the ex-Khedive has recently approached the Italian authorities in Constantinople with a view to obtaining permission to settle in Italy under Italian protection, in return for which permission he promises to use his

influence in Italian interests in the Near East generally. It is understood, however, that no definite conclusion has been arrived at regarding this scheme, as the Italian authorities have apparently given the ex-Khedive to understand that they do not wish to offend the British authorities, to whom, they say, he should look for assistance.

Reports have recently been received of meetings which took place in September and November between the Sultan of Turkey and the ex-Khedive, at the first of which the independence of Egypt was discussed and the authority which the Sultan would have over Egypt in his position as Khalif. The ex-Khedive, in a letter communicating the results of the interview to the Sultan of Egypt, is said to have based all his proposals regarding the independence of Egypt on German policy, and a reply has been received both by the Sultan and Abbas Hilmi from the Egyptian Government, expressing complete approval of these proposals. At the meeting in November, the Sultan of Turkey expressed himself as dissatisfied with the British for allowing the formation of a Cabinet opposed to himself, and for being in favour of an understanding between Anatolia and the Central Government, which he understood, would result in loss of prestige to himself. The ex-Khedive apparently expressed the belief that an agreement would be reached with the Central Government, although he is reported to have previously urged Mustapha Kemal to abstain from entering into any proposals coming from Constantinople (see summary dated the 16th December).

(b.) A meeting of Egyptians belonging to the Hizb-el-Watan Party took place on the 29th November at the house of Dr. Muhammad Amin, the son-in-law of Dr. Essad Pasha, in order to discuss the news received from London of the failure of Zaghul Pasha to reach an agreement with Lord Milner. In view of this, it was unanimously decided to write to Sheikh Abdul Aziz Shawish imploring him to work in conjunction with Zaghul Pasha. The Watanists have always been keen advocates of pan-Islamism, and it is significant therefore that the meeting at Dr. Amin's house (he himself being a strong pan-Islamist) should appeal to A. A. Shawish, who is known to be a strong supporter of pan-Islamism, in spite of any veil of politics or Nationalism he may have chosen to throw over his true feelings.

Shawish is reported to have written to Mahmoud Zeki Bey, at one time connected with the production in Constantinople of "El Adel," stating that the Egyptians in Berlin are not in harmony with each other, and that he has therefore left them to live with Shekiß Arslan, the notorious Druse pan-Islamist.

A new club has been formed by Egyptians in Berlin under the title "El Shark" (the Orient) for the purpose of bringing and holding together all Orientals of whatever nationality.

(c.) A representative from the French Levant Bureau in Constantinople, which is of fairly recent institution and is interested in the repatriation of Armenians, is reported to have had an interview with the Armenian delegate from Erivan with regard to the feeling existing amongst Armenians in Constantinople against the French. The representative from the Bureau, Dr. Marquis, endeavoured to persuade the Armenian delegate that the Armenians were making a great mistake in endeavouring to sever their connection with France, as by so doing they were becoming tools of British policy. He assured him that ten ships with munitions had lately been sent to Armenia by the French.

General Gouraud's visit to Paris is reported to have had, as one of its objects, the surrender to the League of Nations of France's mandate in the Near East in so far as Cilicia is concerned.

In spite, however, of the indications of anti-British feeling in the Bureau du Levant, it is reported that one of its aims is to come to an agreement with the British on a basis of non-interference by either side; but at the same time rumours have also been in circulation in the Bureau that the recent troubles in Iraq were mainly provoked by the partisans of the French.

(d.) The anti-British tone of the Tunisian press is of interest in view of the important part played by Tunisians during the war in pan-Islamic affairs from Constantinople. Many of the newspapers are edited by disciples of the late distinguished Tunisian pan-Islamist, Ali Bash Hamba, and many active members of the Tashkilat-i-Makhsusa, of which Ali Bash Hamba was the head, were of Tunisian origin. The fact that the Tunisian press is dominated by the French prevents it from condemning the Christian and *Entente* Powers in general, and therefore its only way of forwarding the pan-Islamic cause is by an attack on that nation which it believes to be France's rival. This anti-British tone of the press

is said by some to be only a pose in order to flatter France and induce her to grant independence to Tunis. The papers are not known to be subsidised by the French Administration of Tunis, but it is believed that the general policy of the papers have the approval of the French local authorities. These journals come into Constantinople through the French post office to about a score of readers, among whom is Muhammad Safa, editor of the notorious Arabic newspaper "El Adel."

(e.) The Arabs of the Hedjaz are now reported to have come to a perfect agreement with their former enemies the Wahabis of Central Arabia, owing to the failure of the British scheme to place the Emir Feisal on the throne of an independent Arabia. For this reason they have turned bitterly against King Hussein whom they regard as responsible for the failure by listening to British proposals.

The tone of the Arabic press still suggests that it is being subsidised by the French Government, and it still expresses the same anti-British sentiments—namely, that England, in order to satisfy her lust for world power, is crushing the small nations of the East and trampling Islam generally. The Islamic-Bolshevik union, however, is causing England to seek terms of her victims at the last moment, and, therefore, the present moment is the time to secure emancipation for Islam and the enslaved nations of the world. France, on the other hand, and occasionally Italy, are regarded as the long-tried friends of Islam and will, it is hoped, aid Turkey by dealing skilful blows at England, the enemy of all right-thinking nations of Europe.

[E 842/1/44]

No. 21.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 18.)

(No. 40.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, January 8, 1921.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 1314 of the 18th December, and other previous correspondence relative to Izzet Pasha's Mission to Angora, I have the honour to transmit herewith translations of two documents which have now come into my possession, namely, a statement issued by the "Anatolian Telegraph Agency," on the 6th December, and a telegram from the headquarters of the Kemalist headquarters in the Eastern front, as published in the newspaper "Yeni Kirasun" of the 16th December, 1920.

2. The "Anatolian Telegraph Agency" is the chief propaganda organ of the *de facto* Angora Government, and anything published by it has the imprimatur of that Government. The two documents enclosed are therefore equally to be regarded as official Kemalist pronouncements, and as such they are of great interest. They not only account for the rumours mentioned in my telegram under reference, but, what is more interesting, they show that the leaders at Angora have considered it advisable to conceal as far as possible from the public in Asia Minor the fact that they were in negotiation with the Central Government. They have preferred to represent the Izzet Pasha Mission as not being a mission at all, but as being a party of eminent patriots, whose position had been rendered so precarious by British action in Constantinople, that they decided to take refuge in Angora and to join the Kemalist movement.

3. It is also interesting to note the recent and present attitude of the Government here regarding the mission. There is some reason to suppose, though I cannot affirm is positively, that important reports have been received from the mission. If the information which reaches me to this effect is correct, the reports of the mission show that the attitude of the Angora Government is most uncompromising, and that the Kemalist leaders stand out for nothing less than the abrogation of the Treaty of Sèvres. According to the same information, the Central Government are said to have instructed Izzet Pasha to urge the Kemalists to take up a less extreme attitude.

4. To all enquiries addressed to them by myself and my colleagues, however, Ministers invariably reply that no news has been received except a bare statement that the mission reached Angora on the 8th December. They have, contrary to a general rule prohibiting any reference in the press to the proceedings of the mission, recently allowed a statement to appear to the effect that the mission was leaving Angora on the 29th December via Ineboli, but even after this the Government continued to declare themselves to be without any official information whatsoever.

5. It is a matter of the utmost difficulty at the present moment to decide what is the balance of probability as regards the mission having really left Angora. On the one hand, I am assured that the statement published here is borne out by state-

ments published in the Angora press as long ago as the 23rd December, to the effect that the mission was leaving Angora, and was bringing with it an "agreement"—which could of course only mean a statement on the Nationalists' minimum demands, for it is quite certain that the mission has not induced the Angora Government to accept the Treaty of Sèvres. On the other hand, much scepticism prevails here as to whether the mission has left, or has any present intention of leaving Angora at all. In support of this theory, it may be said that the Government here certainly want it to be believed that they wish and expect the mission to return, and that they also want to gain all the time they possibly can, in order to see how the cat jumps in Greece, and how the views of the Allied Great Powers develop.

6. At the moment, I am inclined to think that there is some foundation for the report that the mission is coming back, though if it is, it is probably rather as the bearer of Kemalist terms to be proposed to the Allies, than as persons standing for the authority of the Central Government over Angora rebels. At the same time, I should be very sorry to commit myself to any confident statement, and I would observe that, if the tale of the mission's imminent return is merely a time-saving invention, its authors have shown ingenuity in suggesting that it is coming via Ineboli. The selection of that route for the purpose of such a fiction affords the maximum possibility of staving off any definite announcement, as communications between Angora and Ineboli in winter time, and between Ineboli and Constantinople at any time, are very defective.

7. I have impressed upon the Grand Vizier and the Minister for Foreign Affairs the importance which I attach to having the earliest possible news of the mission, and the results that are achieved by it, in view of the approaching meeting of the Allied Premiers.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 21.

Extract from the "Agency of Anatolia" of December 6, 1920.

UNION WITH ANATOLIA.

(Translation.)

IT is a well-known fact that one of the means which our enemies have adopted for some time past, in order to do away with Turkey and everything Turkish, consists in oppressing the intellectual classes and those who have proved their loyalty to the country, and their interest in its welfare, and to exterminate those who do not obey their orders.

Izzet Pasha, Salih Pasha, and Hussein Kiazim Bey, members of the Cabinet in Constantinople, Hodja Feteen Effendi, Munir Bey, and Djevad Bey, intellectuals of Constantinople, have long been the victims of persecution, and have been kept under observation by the English and by those who act as instruments of the English, and they understood that owing to their official position they would be exposed to more active persecution still. They therefore left Constantinople on the plea of entering into relations with the Grand Council of the National Government, and they have gone to Anatolia in order to work more usefully and more efficaciously for the safety and welfare of the country.

The above reached our town this afternoon at 2 o'clock.

Enclosure 2 in No. 21.

Extract from the "Yeni Kirasun" of December 16, 1920.

COPY OF A TELEGRAM RECEIVED FROM HEADQUARTERS ON THE EASTERN FRONT.

(Translation.)

HIS Highness Izzet Pasha and his Highness Salih Pasha, ex-Grand Viziers, Hussein Kiazim Bey, formerly second Vice-President of the Chamber of Deputies, the venerable Ulema Hodja Fetini Bey, Munir Bey, and Djevad Bey, deputies of Constantinople have come to Angora, and have joined the Nationalist forces.

The whole world has been astonished at the heroism shown by our eastern army in the face of hostile attacks.

The English wished to deceive our nation once again by their latest trick. They secured the nomination of honest patriots, such as Izzet Pasha and Salih Pasha, as members of the Cabinet. Now these two venerable personages have joined the self-sacrificing children of Anatolia. The ancestors of our heroic Anatolia declare that this Holy War will save the honour of the whole Mahommedan world and pray for divine assistance.

In the name of the army I have welcomed our beloved Ministers, and I have saluted them in the name of all my comrades.

[E 643/576/93]

No. 22.

Earl Curzon to Mr. Davis.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, January 20, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 13th instant requesting the assent of His Majesty's Government to the publication of certain correspondence specified therein on the subject of mandated territories, and I have observed, not without surprise, that one of the notes, namely that from Mr. Colby to myself of the 20th November, has already been communicated to the American public.

2. It had been the intention of His Majesty's Government, subject to the assent of the United States Government, to publish precisely the correspondence detailed in your note under reply, but not to do so until their answer to Mr. Colby's note of the 20th November had been prepared and delivered to you. His Majesty's Government would therefore prefer to delay publication until this has been done; and I may add that the drafting of the note is now being completed, and that it is hoped to deliver it to you in the course of next week. His Majesty's Government will therefore assent to publication of the whole correspondence on any day that may be mutually agreed on after their reply has been presented to you.

3. His Majesty's Government feel the more justified in proposing this procedure, as it is identical with that put forward on a previous similar occasion by Mr. Butler Wright in his note of the 3rd September last.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 1006/1/44]

No. 23.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 21.)

(No. 43.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, January 20, 1921.

GENERAL HARRINGTON has shown me his recent telegrams to War Office on various aspects of situation in Turkey, including his telegram No. 1.9766 of 14th January.

It may be useful for your Lordship to have connected statement of my own views on other than purely military aspects of situation before meeting of Allied Prime Ministers.

I would beg that this telegram be read in conjunction with my telegram No. 1253 of 27th November, 1920. I still regard objects indicated in third paragraph of that telegram as those which should be kept steadily in view now, though difficulty of securing them seems greater than ever.

It is useless to regard Mustapha Kemal any longer as a brigand chief. Angora Government has tight grip on the whole of Asia Minor not in effective foreign occupation, with probable exception of certain more or less Kurdish areas in the south-east. It exercises all functions of Government with average efficiency as efficiency goes in Turkey. Bulk of population, sheep-like as always, recognised its authority without demur, and majority of Moslem element support it strongly, as standing for best interests of Turkey and individual Turks. It has been strong enough to repress quickly and thoroughly any attempts at local risings by anti-Kemalist Turks. It has strangle hold on native Christians, though they do not fare badly at present except in marginal areas, which are more or less the theatres of war.

Economic situation in Anatolia is, of course, bad. Accounts differ as to financial situation of Angora Government. It must evidently be precarious, but country will stand almost unlimited amount of extortion, and it would be most unwise to count upon collapse of Kemal in the near future from lack of money. Officials are better off than those of Central Government. Prospects held out to military are sufficient to draw many away from Constantinople. Troops appear to be well found.

Foreign orientation of Angora Government still turns mainly on question of relations with Bolsheviks. These are undoubtedly subject to frequent strain, owing, firstly, to frequent differences over Caucasus question and, secondly, to mistrust of Bolsheviks amongst large numbers of Turks, who fear penetration of Bolshevik principles into Asia Minor or who simply see old Russian menace behind present Bolshevik friendship. Nevertheless, all recent indications point to conclusion that guiding spirits on both sides attach utmost value to continued co-operation, and desire to avoid anything in the nature of rupture.

In this connection it is well to bear in mind considerable rôle played by certain members of old Union and Progress gang in Bolshevik councils, as exemplified in use made of Enver and Djemal's Mission to Afghanistan. It is very doubtful how far, even if leaders at Angora now wished to disentangle themselves from Bolsheviks, they would find themselves able to do so. It is not impossible that at given moment Bolsheviks might be in a position to put any squeamish element on one side and impose new leaders who would take Bolsheviks' orders.

I am familiar with theory that Nationalist movement contains sufficiency of moderate element to be capable of being drawn into our orbit by relatively small concessions. There was a time when, if we had been prepared to drive Turkey less hard in the matter of territorial sacrifices, we might have divided moderate Nationalists and irreconcilable extremists. But as things have worked out movement has maintained its cohesion, and extremists are entitled to claim that its present strength justifies their attitude. I do not say it would be impossible even now to make bid for cohesion of more moderate elements to Allied point of view. For this, however, it would be necessary not merely to offer substantial concessions, but to show that Allies disposed of and intended to use force necessary to impose any new settlement.

Whatever their difficulties, leaders of Nationalist movement are now elated and self-confident, and their acts and pronouncements show them to be intensely hostile to Allies with the exception of Italy, whose complaisance is, however, her only recommendation in their eyes. They are especially hostile to Great Britain. That is their chief common ground with Bolsheviks. Many of them still cherish hope of not merely saving Thrace and whole of Asia Minor, but of establishing Turkish hegemony in the East at the expense of Great Britain. Others do not go so far as this, and some of them would even like to revert to traditional friendship with Great Britain if only Great Britain would transfer her affections from Greece to Turkey, but even these would now regard retention of whole "Turkey proper" with complete sovereign rights, subject, perhaps, to mitigation by financial control, as object to be attained.

I do not altogether exclude possibility of attempts at direct rapprochement between Angora and new Greek Government. I should, however, require more evidence than at present exists to believe that any exchange of views is on foot, and, in any case, I cannot conceive any basis on which definite understanding could be reached.

It would be a mistake to regard at present Constantinople Government as submissive to Allied point of view. They regard substantial revision of treaty as now being foregone conclusion. Their rôle is to keep home fires burning until Nationalists win back as much as possible for Turkey. They are compelled to render much lip service to Allies, but their attitude over every important question and some minor ones since they came into power shows strong determination to give nothing away.

Their strongest motives are probably sympathy with moderate Nationalists and fear of extremists.

I cannot believe that Nationalist leaders are indifferent to fate of Constantinople, as is sometimes alleged. It is quite likely, however, that, even if Allies' position here collapsed in next few months, they would continue to govern at Angora until settlement was complete. It is essential that we should keep our hold here and maintain semblance of legitimate Government. This involves maintenance of order. I entirely share General Harrington's views as to extent to which it is menaced by starving condition of officials and by the presence of Russians. It is difficult to see how things can be kept going here unless means are found to finance Turkish Administration and unless someone continues to feed Russians.

[6668]

All this amounts to saying that Turkish situation as a whole has become almost inextricable, it is true—inextricable if Treaty of Sèvres is still to be regarded as basis of future unless Allies are united and are prepared to fight new war on large scale. Assuming that treaty is to be modified, way out may possibly be found by making our displeasure with Greece excuse for new territorial settlement, by giving controls more palatable appearance while sacrificing as little possible of their efficacy, by gradually building up from Constantinople a new position, with Sultan as corner-stone, and by giving him definite and whole-hearted assistance with a view to reconstruction of Administration on sound financial basis, creation of gendarmerie and progressive extension of authority outward from here. Obstacles to realisation of revolutionary programme are enormous, and may be insuperable. They include usual difficulty of adjustment between Allies, difficulty of liquidating Greek complications imported by ourselves into Asia Minor and difficulty of finding elements to form Turkish Government suitable for purpose in view. I nevertheless recommend that [group undecypherable] of some such programme be employed, if only to avoid alternative of being compelled presently to recognise Kemal Government, to which it is certainly not desirable that victorious Allies should go as suitors for peace.

[E 800/800/44]

No. 24.

Earl Curzon to Lord Hardinge (Paris).(No. 243.)
My Lord,*Foreign Office, January 24, 1921.*

I HAVE to inform your Excellency that, on the 15th instant, the French Chargé d'Affaires called on the Under-Secretary of State in order to give the following information:—

2. There are at Rome a number of Nationalist Turks who are anxious to put themselves forward as intermediaries between the Allies and Mustapha Kemal. Their spokesman, M. de Fleuriau explained, is Ahmet Riza Bey, and Djavid Bey is associated with them. They recently approached M. Barrère, the French Ambassador, on the subject of Cilicia, and offered to facilitate an arrangement with Mustapha Kemal for the withdrawal from Cilicia of both Kemalist and French forces, the former beginning the evacuation. A gendarmerie to be established under French officers would keep order in the province.

3. This arrangement, M. de Fleuriau said, would entirely suit the plans of the French Government, and would in fact be in harmony with the provisions of the tripartite agreement. In these circumstances, M. Barrère had been authorised to reply that if Mustapha Kemal were to put forward proposals to the above effect the French Government would be quite prepared to consider them.

4. Sir E. Crowe asked M. de Fleuriau whom these Turks at Rome purported to represent. He replied that he did not know in the least.

5. Sir E. Crowe then enquired whether the French Government contemplated dealing with the problem of Cilicia all by itself, or whether they desired to use an understanding on this subject as a lever for obtaining a general settlement with the Kemalists. It seemed to Sir E. Crowe of advantage to avoid attacking the problem that was confronting the Allies piecemeal.

6. On this point also, M. de Fleuriau had no information, but he said he could at once give an assurance that in no case would the French Government make any decision, or any bargain, except in complete understanding with their Allies.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 1207/1/44]

No. 25.

Lord Hardinge to Sir W. Tyrrell.—(Received January 26.)

(No. 59.)

(Telegraphic.)

Paris, January 25, 1921.

FOLLOWING from Earl Curzon:—

“Following for King and Cabinet:—

“Conference this afternoon discussed Turkish and Greek questions. Italian representative produced, but did not definitely support, proposal which had been made

by representative of Turks in Rome, purposing to represent Kemalist views, effect of which would have been complete reversal of Treaty of Sèvres. Prime Minister and Lord Curzon pointed out uncertainty of any arrangement with Kemal proving permanent, and strong moral objections which existed to our purchasing peace with Turkish Nationalists at exclusive expense of Greeks. French Government did not press for any drastic revision of treaty, and welcomed proposal which was then advanced by Lord Curzon that matter should be discussed by an Allied Conference at which both Greeks and Turks should be represented. After further discussion, the resolutions contained in my immediately following telegram were adopted, and necessary instructions have to-night been sent to High Commissioners at Constantinople and Ministers at Athens.”

(Repeated to Athens and Constantinople.)

[E 1227/1/44]

No. 26.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 26.)

(No. 57.)

(Telegraphic.) D.

Constantinople, January 26, 1921.

MY French colleague has communicated to my Italian colleague and myself decision taken by Supreme Council yesterday with reference to summoning of a conference in London on 21st February to discuss settlement of Eastern question.

We have communicated text of this decision to Grand Vizier to-day in a joint note, and have requested him to let us have before the end of the week answer of Turkish Government to invitation to send representatives to said conference. We have also asked Grand Vizier to get into touch with Angora at once on the same subject.

In view of decision of Supreme Council, which we welcome, it will probably be necessary to help Turkish Government to tide over their financial difficulties at least until end of February if not longer. (Please see my telegram No. 56 of 25th January.)

(Repeated to Paris, No. 3.)

[E 1208/1/44]

No. 27.

Lord Hardinge (unnumbered) to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople) and Earl Granville (Athens).—(Repeated to Foreign Office; Received January 26.)

(No. 60.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Paris, January 26, 1921.

FOLLOWING telegram is being addressed to your French colleague by M. Briand, as president of Conference in Paris. You should at once concert with your French and Italian colleagues in executing instructions therein contained:—

“As president of Conference in Paris, I request you will inform your British and Italian colleagues of the following decisions which have to-day been adopted by Supreme Council, and that you will concert with them in bringing these decisions to the notice of Government to which you are accredited, inviting the latter to furnish an immediate reply in order that Conference may be in possession of their answers before breaking up at the end of the week.

“Text of decisions adopted by Conference of 25th January, 1921:—

“1. Conference of Allied representatives, as well as those of Turkish and Greek Governments, have been summoned to meet in London on 21st February to discuss a settlement of Eastern questions.

“2. Basis of such a conference shall be Treaty of Sèvres already signed by Powers and by Turkey, subject to such modifications as may have been necessitated by passage of events.

“3. The invitation to Turkish Government shall propose as a condition that

[6668]

I 2

Mustapha Kemal or qualified representative of Government at Angora should be included in Turkish delegation.

"4. That Greek Government be similarly invited to attend."

"(To Constantinople only.)

"You should leave to Turkish Government task of notifying Angora of Allied decisions and of eliciting an immediate reply.—BRIAND."

Above is from Prime Minister.

[E 1264/1/44]

No. 28.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 27.)

(No. 59.)

(Telegraphic.) D.

Constantinople, January 27, 1921.

MY telegram No. 57 of 26th January.

Minister for Foreign Affairs called on my French colleague yesterday evening and communicated to him tenor of note which Turkish Government will address to us to-day in reply to our joint note to Grand Vizier of yesterday's date.

Turkish note will end as follows:— (End of D.)

"La Sublime Porte s'empresse de remercier votre Excellence pour communication et de l'informer qu'elle avisera sans retard au nécessaire pour se rendre à l'invitation qui lui sera adressée par la Conférence."

(D.) Minister for Foreign Affairs added that Turkish Government were telegraphing to Angora immediately.

(Repeated to Paris.)

[E 1333/1/44]

No. 29.

Earl Granville to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 36.)

(Telegraphic.) D.

Athens, January 26, 1921.

MY French colleague has communicated to me, under instructions of French Government, copy of note which he has to-day handed to President of the Council containing decision of Supreme Council.

President of the Council thanked him most warmly, appeared delighted with decisions, and announced his intention to proceed himself to Paris and London, arriving at Paris about a week before conference.

[E 1266/1/44]

No. 30.

Earl Granville to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 37.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Athens, January 27, 1921.

PARIS telegram No. 60 of 26th January and my telegram No. 36 of 27th January.

I have called on President of the Council to inform him officially that French Minister's note of yesterday was on behalf of all three Powers, and Italian Minister proposes to do the same. President of the Council asked me to communicate decision of the Conference to him officially in English as usual, so I am doing so.

President asked me to telegraph that Greek Government accept invitation to London Conference and will be represented by himself; he asked me to add that he had expressed unofficially, and not as a [group undecypherable], his surprise at invitation being extended to Kemal. British Prime Minister had stated publicly that it was not possible to negotiate with Kemal, who was a rebel, and Greek Government were convinced, especially after news just received of defection of Etem Bey and desertion of some 2,000 Turks into Greek lines, that Kemal was a mere bogey.

President told me confidentially that he will ask M. Politis to assist him at Conference, hoping that he will accept, as he accepted to represent Greece at Geneva.

(Repeated to Paris and Constantinople.)

[E 1270/1/44]

No. 31.

Earl Granville to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 39.)

(Telegraphic.)

Athens, January 27, 1921.

MY telegram No. 37 of 27th January.

I am informed by Greek journalist that Government are not likely to allow President of the Council to represent them, but will probably send M. Calogeropoulos and possibly MM. Sterratiades and Stratos. Another Greek journalist declares that he showed M. Calogeropoulos yesterday evening text of decisions which he had obtained from French Legation. Although French Minister had handed his note to President of the Council before lunch, M. Calogeropoulos knew nothing of it, and told journalist, who is personal friend of his, that if there was any question of allowing M. Rhallys to go to London alone or of sending M. Gounaris he himself would resign.

(Repeated to Paris.)

[E 1334/1/44]

No. 32.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 28.)

(No. 62.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Constantinople, January 28, 1921.

MY telegram No. 59 of 27th January.

Following is a translation of reply to our joint note received to-day from Porte:—

"I have had the honour to acquaint myself with contents of note which your Excellency addressed yesterday, conjointly with their Excellencies the French and Italian High Commissioners, to His Highness the Grand Vizier, transmitting to him text of decision reached by Supreme Council, sitting at Paris, regarding convocation of Imperial Government to conference which will meet in London on 21st February.

"Sublime Porte hastens to thank your Excellency for this communication, and to inform you that it will without delay take necessary steps to comply with invitation which will be addressed to it by conference."

[E 1417/1/44]

No. 33.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 31.)

(No. 64.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, January 29, 1921.

MY telegram No. 57 of 26th January.

Decision of Conference, which was published here on 27th January, has naturally caused sensation.

Principal Greek papers regard decision as blow to Hellenism, and points moral that it is first disastrous consequence of betrayal of M. Veniselos by Old Greece.

Turkish papers all welcome decision as marking return of Allies to juster attitude towards Turkey. Those with strongest Nationalist leanings are careful not to prejudge attitude of Angora Government. One of them had leading article on 28th January, emphasised [? group undecypherable] decision, however gratifying, was only first step, and published no leading article on 29th January. Another takes for its text "hopefulness and doubt," and, while professing preference for hopeful view of new development, lays stress on doubts which it must suggest to Turkish minds.

Some papers represent your Lordship's initiative in the matter as showing that His Majesty's Government have definitely accepted principle of modification of treaty, thereby coming into line with French and Italians. Great prominence is given to activities of Turkish agents in Europe, arrival of Naby Bey at Paris and numerous politicians now gathered in Rome.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 37.)

[E 1446/1/44]

No. 34.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 1.)

(No. 70.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, January 31, 1921.

MY telegram No. 62 of 28th January.

Present indications show that Mustapha Kemal, elated by invitation to attend forthcoming conference in London, which he no doubt considers a triumph for Nationalist movement, is proving intractable. From information which has reached my colleagues and myself, Mustapha Kemal takes line that his is the only Government in Turkey, and as such should furnish Turkish delegation to conference. He also considers that he should have received an invitation to attend conference direct from Allied Powers, instead of through intermediary of Government of Constantinople. The latter are doing their utmost to persuade him to come into line.

Mustapha Kemal is now at parting of the ways, and must decide whether to grasp the hand held out to him by Allies or throw in his lot with Bolsheviks.

I think it likely that if a proposal were made at present juncture to Turkish Government for immediate constitution of financial commission provided for by treaty that Government would be unwilling to agree, first, because they probably hope for a modification of financial clauses as an outcome of London Conference, and secondly, because acceptance would hopelessly compromise them.

[E 1448/1/44]

No. 35.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 1.)

(No. 71.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Constantinople, February 1, 1921.

MY Italian colleague has communicated to me a translation of telegram from Angora, handed to Italian authorities at Adalia for transmission to British, French and Italian Governments.

Telegram, which is addressed by Achmed Muktar Bey, styling himself Minister for National Defence, to British, French and Italian Foreign Ministers, is as follows:—

"Achmed Bey hastens to communicate to said Ministers text of telegram sent by President of National Assembly to Tewfik Pasha in reply to invitation to take part in conference in London on 21st February which was transmitted by Grand Vizier to Angora Government.

"National Assembly at Angora, which is based on will of people, is sole independent and legal authority having right to discuss [group undecypherable]s of Turkey. That Assembly alone can engage in discussions with foreign Powers in name of nation. Political group established at Constantinople has no legal political situation, and has no right to call itself a Government, for such a claim is entirely contrary to rights of sovereignty of people. It follows all the more that this group cannot discuss interests of country with foreign Powers.

"You have patriotic duty regulating your personal conduct by recognising and proclaiming that only legitimate authority having right to speak in name of nation is Government of Grand National Assembly. Powers are convinced that Angora is seat of only legitimate Government; they are slow to recognise this, in fact, because they consider existence of interior group at Constantinople more useful for their interests.

"Angora Government has declared on several occasions that its most lively desire is re-establishment of peace and of tranquillity, but on condition that rights of people are recognised. With these objects in view it declares its readiness to enter into peace pourparlers. If Powers really intend to settle Eastern question according to principles of justice and of right, they should address themselves direct to Grand National Assembly. An invitation in this sense will have best reception from us."

[E 1479/143/44]

No. 36.

Earl Granville to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 2.)

(No. 48.)

(Telegraphic.)

Athens, February 1, 1921.

COLONEL PALLIS, Army of Asia Minor, who is in Athens till 3rd February, has told military attaché that from military point of view natural and proper course is to put off further offensive until April on account of climatic conditions; he does not know, however, whether Government may order immediate offensive for political reasons; if so, he declares that army is ready both as regards men and munitions of war and can attack Afium Karahissar or Eskişehir, or both; capture of either would cut Kemal's force in two, as Kemal has very little transport and depends on railway; in that case he thinks Turkish troops in Iconium district would collapse and leave [group undecypherable], and Greeks would either leave Kemalists to stew in their own juice at Angora, or they could attack Angora with every chance of success. With loss of Angora, Colonel Pallis thinks that Kemalist movement must collapse altogether for want of supplies, especially munitions of war, and he does not foresee any danger of Kemalists drawing Greeks on and on.

Colonel Pallis states that present actual strength in Asia Minor is 105,000, and there is comparatively little sickness; he declares that *moral* is high, and leave is only stopped because uncertainty of political situation may force offensive at any moment. He says that Turkish inhabitants' one desire is peace, and that many come behind Greek line to live in discomfort in tents, &c., and that when Greeks returned to Brussa from neighbourhood of Eskişehir the other day, some 10,000 inhabitants, partly Turk and partly Greek, went with them. He confirmed Etem surrender with about 1,000 men.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 17.)

[E 1530/201/44]

No. 37.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 93.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, January 25, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of a letter which I have received from Sir Adam Block, recounting the steps taken by the Provisional Financial Commission to obtain the consent of the Turkish Government to the control of the Turkish finances in consideration for the payment to that Government of the balance of the £ T. 2,000,000 (namely, £ T. 1,200,000) authorised on the sale of stocks belonging to this Government. Copies of the letters exchanged between the Provisional Financial Commission and the Minister of Finance are likewise enclosed.

2. In pursuance of the request contained in Sir Adam Block's letter, the three High Commissioners have raised the embargo on the £ T. 252,058 gold at present deposited in the Imperial Ottoman Bank. In the meanwhile, the Provisional Financial Commission have already paid a sum of £ T. 400,000 to the Turkish Government on account, and the balance, namely, £ T. 800,000, will be paid over within the next few days.

3. Sir Adam Block informs me that the Turkish Government will now be able to pay to their officials 75 per cent. of the salaries due for November. This payment will relieve to a certain extent the great distress in which these officials now find themselves. Many of these officials have literally sold all they had in order to provide food for their families. Others, again, had raised loans on the strength of an assurance that a portion of their salaries would be forthcoming.

4. The Minister of Finance proved obstructive and obstinate till the very last moment. It will be seen that in his letter of the 20th instant he laid down that the control would end with the expiry of the financial year, i.e., at the end of next month. The Provisional Financial Commission referred this request to the High Commissioners, who at once rejected it, and maintained their point of view that the control should last until the Financial Commission of Control, provided for by the Treaty of Peace, shall have been constituted and shall have begun to function.

5. The Minister of Finance then had to give way, as the Grand Vizier represented that the position was untenable, and that it was absolutely necessary for the Turkish Government to obtain the £ T. 1,200,000 in question. There is also little doubt that

the Sultan intervened in the same sense. I had sent His Majesty a message three days previously to say that I had heard distressing accounts of the straits to which many officials had been reduced owing to the non-payment of their salaries, and that I would be only too glad, for my part, to facilitate the handing over of the £ T. 1,200,000 to the Turkish Government, provided the Minister of Finance agreed to the form of control demanded. I added that the person of the Minister of Finance seemed to be standing in the way of an arrangement.

6. The Minister of Finance would probably have preferred to resign rather than sign the letter to the Provisional Financial Commission, and thus have been enabled to pose as a hero in the eyes of the Nationalists and of those who sympathise with them. But the Government made him sign the letter, and afterwards accepted his resignation of his post as Finance Minister, transferring him to the Ministry of Public Instruction, which has hitherto been filled by the Turkish Ambassador designate in London. Abdullah Bey, Minister of Public Works, will be in charge of the Finance Ministry.

7. Sir Adam Block informs me that the financial situation of the Turkish Government will be as desperate in ten days' time as it was before the £ T. 1,200,000 were handed over to them. It is difficult to see from what sources the Turkish Government can then make up the monthly deficit in their budget. Their only hope of salvation lies in the immediate constitution of the Financial Commission as provided for by the treaty, but the constitution of this commission has hitherto been made dependent on the ratification by Turkey of the Peace Treaty. Thus, unless the Allied Powers agree to allow the Financial Commission to be constituted without waiting for ratification by Turkey of the treaty, the Turkish Government will, it would seem, have to face the prospect of complete financial collapse or the necessity of ratifying the treaty to enable the Financial Commission to be constituted. Their attitude in the matter of ratification is bound to be influenced by any decisions come to by the Supreme Council now sitting in Paris.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,

High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 37.

Sir A. Block to Sir H. Rumbold.

M. le Haut-Commissaire,

Constantinople, le 24 janvier 1921.

METTANT à profit les dispositions conciliantes manifestées par le Gouvernement de son Altesse Tevfik Pacha à la suite de la note à la Porte du 7 de ce mois de leurs Excellences les Hauts-Commissaires alliés, la Commission provisoire de Contrôle était parvenue quelques jours après à obtenir de son Excellence Rachid Bey, Ministre des Finances, une adhésion qui paraissait définitive aux modalités ci-après du contrôle financier que nous lui avions précédemment suggéré :

"Toutes les recettes du Trésor seraient centralisées à un compte unique ouvert à la Banque impériale. Les prélèvements sur ce compte seraient, d'accord avec la Commission provisoire, effectués au moyen de chèques enregistrés avant paiement par la Mission de Contrôle. Les pièces des dépenses seraient, dans les quarante-huit heures, représentées à nos agents."

Le Ministre acceptait, en outre, pour le règlement des dépenses dont l'état mensuel serait établi d'un commun accord, l'ordre de priorité que, d'accord avec les Hauts-Commissaires, nous lui avions proposé : "Traitements de la police et de la gendarmerie, dépenses des hôpitaux et prisons, pensions des veuves et orphelins, traitements des agents de perception de la douane et des vilayets."

Nous promettions, en retour, à son Excellence Rachid Bey de provoquer immédiatement la levée, à concurrence de 252,058 livres turques or, du séquestre mis en février 1919 par les Hauts-Commissaires sur un montant en or de 446,278 livres turques déposé à la Banque impériale ottomane, ces 252,058 livres turques devant servir de gage subsidiaire à une avance de 1,200,000 livres turques que le Conseil de la Dette publique ottomane se déclarait disposé à faire au Trésor pour une durée de six mois à 5 pour cent l'an, sans commission, aux fins de compléter la somme de 2,000,000 de livres turques que les Puissances alliées ont autorisé le Gouvernement ottoman à se procurer au moyen de la vente des stocks.

Il ne restait plus qu'à obtenir du Ministre la confirmation écrite de cet accord. Je lui adressai dans ce but, au nom de la Commission provisoire de Contrôle, la lettre du 17 janvier, dont vous trouverez ci-joint copie (Annexe 1).

Mais, contrairement à notre attente, son Excellence Rachid Bey nous fit seulement savoir verbalement par un de nos délégués au Malié qu'il devait, avant de nous répondre, en référer à son Altesse le Grand Vizir.

Le lendemain, arguant de la nécessité de sauvegarder ses prérogatives de Ministre, il nous demandait de ne pas insister pour l'enregistrement préalable des chèques par la Mission de Contrôle. Nous ne pouvions renoncer au contrôle des recettes, mais nous avons accepté l'amendement suivant :

"Dans le cas où l'enregistrement d'un chèque d'une valeur maxima de 10,000 livres turques n'aurait pu avoir lieu, la Banque impériale ottomane serait autorisée à l'acquitter, mais tout paiement ultérieur serait suspendu jusqu'à ce qu'une entente soit intervenue entre le Ministre et la Commission provisoire ou, en cas de désaccord, entre le Grand Vizir et les Hauts-Commissaires."

Nous pensions, par cette concession, avoir définitivement raison des hésitations du Ministre.

La lettre que nous recevions de lui le même jour (20 janvier) nous apportait une nouvelle surprise, en faisant suivre (voir ci-joint Annexe 2) le libellé dudit amendement d'une phrase finale ainsi conçue : "Cet accord aura une durée finissant avec l'exercice financier en cours, soit fin février 1921."

En présence de cette restriction nouvelle, que rien dans nos entretiens avec le Ministre ne pouvait faire prévoir, nous avons eu l'honneur de vous en référer et, suivant vos instructions, nous avons protesté auprès du Ministre, nous référant à la lettre adressée le 29 septembre par le commissaire impérial de la Dette publique ottomane, d'ordre du Ministre des Finances, et suivant laquelle l'accord intervenu entre ce dernier et la Commission provisoire doit rester en vigueur "jusqu'à ce que la Commission de Contrôle financier prévue par le Traité de Paix soit constituée et commence à fonctionner."

Son Excellence Rachid Bey, qui devait, d'autre part, tenir compte des réclamations de plus en plus pressantes d'officiers et des fonctionnaires créanciers de plus de deux mois et demi de traitements arriérés, s'est enfin résolu à céder, en acceptant d'échanger avec nous le 22 janvier courant les deux lettres ci-jointes (Annexes 3 et 4).

Comme conclusion de cet accord si laborieusement acquis, la Commission provisoire de Contrôle a l'honneur de prier leurs Excellences les Hauts-Commissaires alliés de vouloir bien lever le séquestre mis sur l'or en dépôt à la Banque impériale ottomane à concurrence des 252,058 livres turques, qui doivent être ultérieurement mises à la disposition de la Commission financière en conformité de l'article 253 du Traité de Sèvres, et dont les Gouvernements de l'Entente ont, en attendant, autorisé l'affectation en gage subsidiaire à la nouvelle avance de 1,200,000 livres turques sollicitée par le Gouvernement ottoman, le gage principal consistant dans le produit de la vente des stocks en liquidation, après prélèvement des 800,000 livres turques à rembourser aux banques du chef de leur avance du 25 octobre 1920.

D'autre part, le Conseil de la Dette publique ottomane, qui a consenti, sur les instances de son Altesse Tevfik Pacha, à faire verser au Trésor dès hier matin un premier montant de 400,000 livres turques sur ses disponibilités à la Banque impériale ottomane, serait très obligé à leurs Excellences les Hauts-Commissaires s'ils voulaient bien signifier à cet établissement financier, dans le plus bref délai possible, la mainlevée du séquestre des 252,058 livres turques susvisées et leur transfert à la Commission provisoire, qui les mettra à la disposition du Conseil de la Dette publique ottomane comme gage de l'avance consentie par lui.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

ADAM BLOCK.

Annex 1.

President of Provisional Financial Commission to Minister of Finance.

M. le Ministre,

Constantinople, le 17 janvier 1921.

Me référant à l'entretien que j'ai eu l'honneur d'avoir hier avec votre Excellence, je suis heureux de constater que nous sommes tombés d'accord sur le mode de contrôle des recettes et des dépenses que nous vous avons suggéré. Toutes les recettes du Trésor seront centralisées à un compte unique, ouvert à la Banque impériale ottomane. Les

[666S]

K

prélèvements sur ce compte seront, d'accord avec la Commission provisoire, effectués au moyen de chèques enregistrés avant paiement par la Mission de Contrôle. Les pièces des dépenses seront, dans les quarante-huit heures, représentées à nos agents.

Votre Excellence a bien voulu m'informer également qu'elle ne voyait pas d'inconvénient à ce que le paiement des dépenses, dont l'état mensuel sera établi d'un commun accord, soit assuré dans l'ordre de priorité suivant : Traitements de la police et de la gendarmerie, dépenses des hôpitaux et prisons, pensions des veuves et orphelins, traitements des agents de perception de la douane et des vilayets.

J'ai l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence que nous faisons d'urgence, auprès des Hauts-Commissaires, des démarches en vue d'obtenir la levée du séquestre mis par les Puissances alliées sur une somme de 252,058 livres turques or déposée à la Banque impériale ottomane. Cette somme serait mise à la disposition de la Dette publique ottomane en garantie d'une avance de 1,200,000 livres turques papier que cette Administration serait disposée à consentir au Trésor pour une durée de six mois, au taux de 5 pour cent par an, sans commission, ladite avance complétant le montant de 2,000,000 de livres turques que les Puissances ont autorisé le Gouvernement ottoman à se procurer au moyen de la vente des stocks. Elle serait remboursée à la Dette publique ottomane sur le produit de ces ventes, à mesure que celles-ci s'effectueraient.

Je serais reconnaissant à votre Excellence de me faire connaître si nous sommes bien d'accord sur ces divers points.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

SALLANDROUZE DE LAMORNAIX.

Annex 2.

Minister of Finance to President of Provisional Financial Commission.

M. le Président,

Constantinople, le 20 janvier 1921.

J'ai l'honneur de vous informer qu'à la suite de notre entretien de ce jour, j'ai été autorisé à accepter les propositions formulées dans votre lettre du 17 courant, avec l'addition du passage suivant que vous aviez proposé :

"Dans le cas où l'enregistrement d'un chèque d'une valeur maxima de 10,000 livres turques n'aurait pas pu avoir lieu, la Banque impériale ottomane serait autorisée à l'acquitter, mais tout paiement ultérieur serait suspendu jusqu'à ce qu'une entente soit intervenue entre le Ministre et la Commission provisoire, ou, en cas de désaccord, entre son Altesse le Grand Vizir et les Hauts-Commissaires alliés."

Cet accord aura une durée finissant avec l'exercice financier en cours, soit fin février 1921.

Je vous prie, &c.

Le Ministre des Finances,
RACHID.

Annex 3.

President of Provisional Financial Commission to Minister of Finance.

M. le Ministre,

Constantinople, le 22 janvier 1921.

J'ai l'honneur de vous accuser réception de votre lettre du 20 janvier courant.

Nous sommes, mes collègues et moi, d'accord avec vous sur l'addition à faire dans les termes suivants :

"Dans le cas où l'enregistrement d'un chèque d'une valeur maxima de 10,000 livres turques n'aurait pas pu avoir lieu, la Banque ottomane serait autorisée à l'acquitter, mais tout paiement ultérieur serait suspendu jusqu'à ce qu'une entente soit intervenue entre le Ministre et la Commission provisoire, ou, en cas de désaccord, entre son Altesse le Grand Vizir et les Hauts-Commissaires alliés."

Mais il est entendu qu'en conformité de la lettre que nous a été adressée le 29 septembre 1920 par le commissaire impérial de la Dette publique ottomane, d'ordre

du Ministre des Finances, l'accord intervenu avec votre Excellence et la Commission provisoire restera en vigueur "jusqu'à ce que la Commission de Contrôle financier prévue par le Traité de Paix soit constituée et commence à fonctionner."

Veuillez agréer, &c.

SALLANDROUZE DE LAMORNAIX.

Annex 4.

Minister of Finance to President of Provisional Financial Commission.

M. le Président,

Constantinople, le 22 janvier 1921.

En réponse à votre lettre d'aujourd'hui, j'ai l'honneur de vous informer que nous sommes d'accord sur son contenu et sur celui de votre lettre du 17 janvier 1921. J'ai donné les ordres, en conséquence, aux fonctionnaires compétents pour toucher la somme de 1,200,000 livres turques que la Dette publique ottomane avancera au Trésor dans les conditions indiquées dans votre lettre précitée du 17 janvier 1921.

Veuillez agréer, &c.

Le Ministre des Finances,
RACHID.

[E 1536/1/44]

No. 38.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 108.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, January 29, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to report that the Minister for Foreign Affairs called on me yesterday evening and we had a long conversation about the conference which it is proposed to hold in London on the 21st proximo.

2. I asked Sefa Bey whether he thought that Mustapha Kemal would be willing to be represented at that conference. I should mention incidentally that I am aware that an active exchange of telegrams is proceeding between Constantinople and Angora on the subject. The Minister for Foreign Affairs would not commit himself to an expression of opinion, and said that he had not seen the Grand Vizier in the course of the day, and therefore was not acquainted with the latest developments.

3. Sefa Bey then proceeded to give me his views as to the way in which the treaty might be modified, and I report them because they are an indication of the spirit in which the Turkish Government will go to the conference.

4. As regards territorial questions, the Minister for Foreign Affairs thought that the southern frontier of Turkey in Asia, as drawn in Map 2 annexed to the Treaty of Sèvres, should be modified in favour of Turkey by the inclusion of districts and towns such as Aintab, Urfa and Mardin, which, according to his Excellency, are inhabited exclusively by an Ottoman population. Sefa Bey said that the wishes of the inhabitants of Smyrna and the surrounding district with regard to the régime under which they wished to come might be ascertained by means of an enquiry. I said I supposed that Sefa Bey meant a plebiscite, but he replied in the negative, and said that he had in mind a commission of enquiry. As far as I could gather this commission would be apparently similar to that at one time contemplated by the Polish Minister for Foreign Affairs in connection with Vilna and the territories in dispute between Poland and Lithuania. With regard to the Turco-Armenian frontier, the Minister for Foreign Affairs was prepared to admit that any districts containing 55 per cent. or more of Armenians should be awarded to Armenia. In order to meet the criticism that the Turks had, by their own actions, purposely diminished the Armenian population in various districts, he was prepared to take as a basis the pre-war statistics of the population in those districts. He thought that it would be manifestly unjust to assign to the Armenian State districts in which there was a majority of Turks. He expressed the opinion that there would be little difficulty about a port for Armenia, and suggested that the railway line leading from Armenia to a Black Sea port should be neutralised, and full facilities given at the port selected as an outlet for Armenian trade. Finally, as regards Thrace, he thought that Turkey should be given the pre-war frontiers, but if this were not possible then, at least, the Enos-Midia line.

5. Sefa Bey then went on to claim that Turkey should not be treated more unfavourably in other matters than the other defeated Powers. By this he meant that

[6668]

K 2

the financial and military clauses, &c., of the treaty should be modified. Thus, as regards the Straits Commission, he pointed out that the object of the Allies presumably was to ensure at all times the free passage of the Straits. This could be attained without the Straits Commission necessarily having jurisdiction over the extent of territory indicated in Map I of the annex to the Treaty of Sèvres. It would be quite sufficient if the Allies were to hold the Gallipoli Peninsula and a strip of territory on the Asiatic coast opposite that peninsula. Moreover, other stipulations of the treaty connected with the Straits Commission, such as the right of requisition in the Straits zone, were unnecessary. As regards the military clauses, he pointed out that the authorised strength of the Turkish army was far too small. Bulgaria, for instance, was, he believed, entitled to an army of 20,000 men, but Turkey, a much larger country with far more extended frontiers, was only entitled to an army of 15,000 men, excluding the Legions, which were to amount to 35,000 men.

6. Sefa Bey then went on to speak of what he called a modification of the Capitulations in an economic sense. By this he meant that the subjects of foreign States domiciled in Turkey should pay exactly similar taxes to those payable by Turkish subjects. I remarked that they already paid taxes on real property. I then told him that as far as I knew the great difficulty of applying either full municipal or Imperial taxation in the case of subjects of foreign States had always been the feeling that the money raised in this way from those subjects would be misapplied and wasted. The question of municipal taxation was an instance in point. This was a question which had formed the subject of discussion for many years past. It has been impossible to obtain from the Municipality of Constantinople a correct statement of the municipal taxes which the municipality levied. The foreign point of view was that there should be no municipal taxation without representation. What guarantee was there that Imperial taxes levied on foreign subjects would be properly applied and the proceeds not wasted? Possibly, however, the Financial Commission provided for by the treaty would, to a certain extent, remedy previous abuses. This led Sefa Bey to remark that the financial clauses were too severe on Turkey and should be modified. Thus the Turkish Government would be prevented from contracting any internal or external loan. Should the Turkish Government require a loan the relevant stipulation would debar them from accepting the lowest tenders. I replied that, in the first place, article 234 of the treaty expressly laid down that the Turkish Government undertakes not to contract any internal or external loan without the consent of the Financial Commission. The financial clauses clearly showed that the Allied Powers wished to relieve and assist Turkey, and the Financial Commission could be trusted to see that if necessary Turkey obtained a loan on the cheapest terms.

7. Sefa Bey then alluded to the appointment of M. Desclosières as French representative on the Financial Commission. He said that this gentleman was mixed up with many banks and would approach his task, as Frenchmen were liable to do, mainly from the point of view of the interest of the banks with which he was concerned, the interests of Turkey coming second. He regretted to make this observation, but it was the truth. No one could cast a stone at the British representatives in this respect; in fact, England inspired confidence. I felt, though I did not say so, that there is much force in what Sefa Bey said in this connection.

8. Finally, Sefa Bey said that he would like to do away with the principle of spheres of influence. This system really meant that what was left of the Ottoman Empire would be, in practice, subject to foreign Powers. The Italians and the French, for instance, would probably, in their respected spheres, control appointments and analogous matters. Some friend of his had even said that it was to be foreseen that the remaining territory outside the spheres of influence would in time become the prey of a reconstituted Russia, and then Turkey would have disappeared for good. He objected also to the system under which there would be Italian gendarmerie in the Italian sphere and French gendarmerie in the French sphere. The officers to be supplied by the Allied or neutral Powers for the organisation and training of the gendarmerie should be employed all over Anatolia without regard to nationality or spheres of influence. In other words, though he did not say so, it was obvious that Sefa Bey would like to do away with the Tripartite Agreement.

9. After listening to the foregoing I told Sefa Bey that it would be a great mistake for Turkey to go into the conference with exaggerated pretensions. I reminded him that the conference was to be held on the basis of the Treaty of Sèvres with such modifications as may have been necessitated by passage of events. It would be bad tactics from the Turkish point of view to antagonise the Allied Powers by putting forward extravagant demands. Sefa Bey replied that he did not think that the

modifications he had just outlined were extravagant. He repeated that he did not see why Turkey should be treated with greater harshness than the other defeated Powers. She had been sufficiently punished by losing what he described as nine-tenths of her territory. He thought that there was a disposition on the part of British statesmen to consider that Turkey was a potential danger in the future. This was a great mistake. If properly handled Turkey could be of considerable use to England in the future. He thought that English statesmen took much too rigid a view of Turkey, and that the misfortunes of the latter left them cold.

10. I replied that he could not in justice say this of your Lordship, who, as he knew, had made a special study of Eastern questions and had spent many years in the East. We had never had a Foreign Minister so conversant with Oriental problems.

11. I pointed out to the Minister for Foreign Affairs that there were two things which the British nation could not forget. One was that Turkey had entered the war on the side of our enemies unmindful of the long-standing friendship which had existed between our two countries. The other was the Armenian massacres. Sefa Bey admitted the folly which had brought Turkey into the war on the side of the Central Empires, but said that this was due to the action of two or three men, and that the country as a whole was not to blame. He sincerely regretted the Armenian massacres, but pointed out that the Armenians had since been perpetrating atrocities at the expense of the Turks. He thought, in fact, that the Armenians had killed even more Turks than the Turks had killed Armenians. I expressed incredulity at this statement, and said that in making it Sefa Bey evidently did not realise the full extent of the atrocities perpetrated on the Armenian nation.

12. Sefa Bey then went into a long disquisition on the origin of massacres of Christians under Turkish rule. He maintained that the Turks had been very liberal in the past towards Christians of every denomination. He traced the misfortunes of Turkey to the action of Russia extending over centuries. Russia had gradually encroached on the Turkish dominions, until finally she had had to fight the Crimean war. As a result she had realised that if she attacked Turkey in the future she would find the Western Powers ranged on the side of Turkey. She had then decided that she must exploit to the fullest extent any grievances which Christians who were subject to Turkish rule might have against the Turkish Government. By means of *agents provocateurs* she had stirred up the Christians and had promoted massacres with a view to alienating the sympathy of the Western Powers for the Turks. Sefa Bey elaborated this theme, but I need not trouble your Lordship with his arguments.

13. The Turkish press has unanimously welcomed the proposed conference, and builds high hopes on it. The local European press, however, sounds a warning note to Turkey not to put forward extravagant demands.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

[E 1622/1/44]

No. 39.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 76.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Constantinople, February 4, 1921.

MY Italian colleague has shown me a telegram addressed by Angora Government to most of European Powers, as well as to some of their legislators, in which that Government, whilst expressing a sincere desire for peace, reaffirms point of view that it is the only Government entitled to represent Turkish nation and to speak on its behalf. Understand Angora Government is sending delegation to London Conference. Delegation is starting immediately furnished with full instructions, and notice will be given of exact date of its departure.

We can only suppose that delegation in question will travel via Adalia and proceed by way of Italy.

[E 1694/1/44]

No. 40.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 81.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, February 6, 1921.

MY telegram No. 57 of 26th January.

High Commissioner sent dragomans yesterday, 5th February, to Grand Vizier to enquire as to present position between Constantinople Government and Angora, and intentions of former regarding London Conference.

Grand Vizier stated that Angora had made proposal of Supreme Council occasion for raising issues which were wholly internal question. He had replied that present was not moment for such discussions, and had asked for plain answer as to whether Angora Government would associate their delegates with those of Central Government as contemplated in decision of Supreme Council. Definite answer had been promised and [group undecipherable]. Latest intimation was that it would be sent on afternoon of 5th February.

Grand Vizier said that, whether Angora came into line or not, Central Government proposed to send delegation to London in compliance with invitation addressed to them.

Grand Vizier admitted that Izzet Pasha, with whom he was now for first time in communication, appeared to support views of Kemalists, but he cast doubt on authenticity of telegrams purporting to be signed by Izzet.

Communications were interrupted at hour fixed for answer by unauthorised action of Greek officer at a point beyond Ismid. General Harington took immediate action and communications were restored, but nothing reached Constantinople last evening except copy of telegram addressed by Angora Minister for Foreign Affairs to Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, France and Italy. Translation of text is given in my immediately following telegram.

Dragomans again saw Minister for Foreign Affairs after receipt of this communication. He said he was still not hopeless of understanding which would enable delegations from Constantinople and Angora to fuse in London and present joint statement of Turkish desiderata. He laid great stress on interests of Bolsheviks in preventing an understanding between Turkey and Allies.

There is evidently much division of opinion at Angora, but position there is obscure. Significant feature is that telegrams are now signed by Bekir Samy Bey, who seems to have replaced firebrand Mukhtar as Minister for Foreign Affairs. Bekir returned only recently from Moscow, and, according to one account, is disillusioned with Bolsheviks. Surface indications are certainly that relatively moderate counsels are gaining ground at Angora. It is [group undecipherable] unlikely that Kemalist delegation to London will present other than inadmissible demands, at any rate in first instance.

Possibilities of surprise must also not be lost sight of. Leaders at Angora may even now be working in accord with Bolsheviks and may be merely playing for time.

They are immovable up to date in their pretension to be regarded as sole Government of Turkey, and they have been remodelling Constitution on their own lines. It is not impossible that they may attempt some bold *coup*, like declaring Ahmed-es-Senussi Caliph. Please understand, however, that this paragraph is conjectural and is based on indications for confident interpretation of which much fuller knowledge of situation in interior would be required.

Central Government have made real effort to effect rapprochement with Angora and have shown much tact and skill in telegrams sent to Mustapha Kemal. Sultan has followed developments closely and is much concerned for his own position in the event of Angora creating impossible situation as between Turkey and Allies.

If Central Government are reduced to necessity of acting independently of Angora, their delegation will obviously not comply with condition laid down in third paragraph of decision of Supreme Council. I presume they should nevertheless be allowed to despatch delegation.

It is urgent that I should know your Lordship's views on this point.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 19.)

[E 1678/1/44]

No. 41.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 82.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Constantinople, February 6, 1921.

FOLLOWING is translation of text of telegram addressed by Angora Government to French, Italian and British Governments signed by Bekirsami, People's Commissary for Foreign Affairs in Government of Great National Assembly, Turkey:—

"Delegation which will represent Government of Great National Assembly of Turkey at conference to be held in London on 21st February will leave Angora at latest on 7th February and will proceed to Europe via Adalia and Brindisi.

"Owing to length and difficulty of journey, we fear lest arrival of our delegation at its destination may be somewhat delayed. In that case we would be grateful if the Great Powers would be willing to postpone for a few days proposed conference in order to enable our delegation to participate therein."

(Repeated to Athens, No. 20.)

[E 1711/1/44]

No. 42.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 7.)

(No. 84.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Constantinople, February 7, 1921.

MINISTER for Foreign Affairs called last night to say Government delegation to London Conference would start on 12th February. Delegation would probably be headed by Grand Vizier, and would include Osman Nizami and Reshid Pashas, respectively Turkish representatives at Rome and London. It was, however, possible that Sultan might not be willing to let Grand Vizier go away at this juncture. Delegation would also include at least one secretary with a perfect knowledge of English.

Minister for Foreign Affairs added if Mustapha Kemal persisted in sending delegation independently of Government delegation, as to which point Turkish Government are still awaiting categorical pronouncement from Angora, he supposed that the two delegations would have to come to some understanding in London.

I reminded Minister for Foreign Affairs of exact terms of paragraph 3, decision of Supreme Council, and said that I had thought it well to refer point to your Lordship in view of attitude of Angora Government.

[E 1795/1/44]

No. 43.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 9.)

(No. 88.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, February 8, 1921.

GRAND VIZIER called to-day to say that Sultan wished him to go as head of Turkish delegation to London Conference. Sultan has instructed Grand Vizier to ask me whether there would be any objection to this, and whether His Majesty's Government would wish to be consulted about composition of delegation from Central Government.

I replied that I did not think that His Majesty's Government would wish to express any views in this matter, and that composition of delegation must be left to Turkish Government. Grand Vizier said that Minister for Foreign Affairs had wished to be included in delegation, but it was felt that he and Grand Vizier could not be away at the same time. Grand Vizier is a sympathetic personality. Grand Vizier then said that if and when he found himself in the presence of Kemalist delegation in London he would maintain position he had taken up towards Nationalists in exchange of telegrams with latter, i.e., he would decline to listen to pretensions which were exaggerated. This refers in particular to Nationalists' demand that Sultan should publicly recognise Angora Government as only legal Government of Turkey.

He indicated that Nationalist pretensions might not only be unacceptable to Allies, but also to Central Government itself.

[E 1840/1/44]

No. 44.

Earl Curzon to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(No. 87.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, February 10, 1921.

PLEASE telegraph any information about the persons forming the Angora delegation.

You should also continue to keep us fully informed as to attitude of Constantinople Government towards it.

[E 1872/143/44]

No. 45.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 11.)

(No. 91.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, February 11, 1921.

GENERAL HARRINGTON has notified War Office of imminent offensive by Greek army on Nationalist forces, alleged object of which is to forestall a Turkish attack. It is a fact, I understand, that Turkish reinforcements have been brought up, perhaps with a view to resisting Greek offensive, which is doubtless known to be coming off.

Military operations undertaken by whichever side on the eve of London Conference must obviously be intended to influence proceedings at that conference, and are calculated still further to complicate already difficult situation.

[E 1678/1/44]

No. 46.

Earl Curzon to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(No. 91.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, February 11, 1921.

YOUR telegram No. 82 of 6th February.

His Majesty's Government are unable to postpone date of meeting of Turkish Conference in order to meet convenience of Angora delegation. Latter can only be received in London as part of the Constantinople delegation, having no independent status or title of their own. If they choose to travel by Adalia and Brindisi that is their concern. Their natural course would appear to be proceed via Constantinople.

(Repeated to Paris, No. 70, and Rome, No. 43.)

[E 1894/1/44]

No. 47.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 13.)

(No. 93.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, February 11, 1921.

MY telegram No. 88 of 8th February.

Delegation of Central Government leaves for London to-morrow night, 12th February, by Simplon express.

Angora maintains its attitude as regards separate delegation. Central Government are sending Grand Vizier and Osmanli Nizami Pasha, now in Rome, as their delegates. Reshid Pasha, being in London, will probably act as third delegate. Large staff of experts includes Shevki Bey, now Minister in Stockholm, who accompanied last delegation and may be expected to play an active rôle. He has great influence with Grand Vizier. Colonel Grogan knows him well. Grand Vizier's son, Ismail Hakki Bey, also goes as expert. He is Sultan's son-in-law. He also has great influence with his father, and has strong Kemalist sympathies. Delegation as a whole may be expected to lean that way.

Ali Riza Pasha, former Grand Vizier, has entered Cabinet as Minister of Public Works in order to become Acting Grand Vizier. He is an old-fashioned soldier, and represents middle policy between Kemalists and the Palace.

I have no certain news of composition of Angora delegation. I appear certain that president will be Bekir Sami Bey, Commissioner of Foreign Affairs, and that it will include Jami Bey, who was recently in Rome. Bekir Sami's position since recent return from Moscow is obscure. As against report that he came back disillusioned, others affirm that he has a perfect understanding with them and is going to play their game.

[E 2016/1/44]

No. 48.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 15.)

(No. 139.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, February 7, 1921.

HIS Majesty's Ambassador at Rome has been so good as to send me a copy of his despatch No. 67 of the 27th ultimo, on the subject of the conferences which have been taking place in Rome between representatives of Moderate Turkish Nationalists and Mustapha Kemal. That despatch also enclosed copy of a *pro-memoria* which certain Turkish politicians who have assembled under Achmed Riza's presidency at Rome had decided to send to the *Entente* Governments, with a view to drawing their attention to the situation in which the unfortunate population of Constantinople finds itself.

2. I have read this *pro-memoria* with interest, and, although some of the statements made in it are exaggerated, it presents, on the whole, a fairly accurate picture of the state of things prevailing in Constantinople at the present day.

3. Amongst the inaccuracies I would draw your Lordship's attention to the fact that over 18,000 Turkish prisoners have been already repatriated to their homes, leaving only a few thousands in this town. Further, it is doubtful whether the British and French troops of occupation number more than 20,000 at the outside.

4. It is an unfortunate fact, for the reasons given in the *pro-memoria*, that large portions of the population of Constantinople are reduced to a state of the utmost distress and misery. I understand from an Englishman who has been here for many years that many Turks are literally dying of starvation. An ordinary visitor would not realise that matters are so bad. The lower classes of the native population whom he sees in the street mostly appear to be well fed, and have not that pinched look which struck me so much at Warsaw during the winter of 1919-1920. But the Turks do not complain, and those who are reduced to the last extremity remain in their hovels and die. Their distress is not patent to the outside world.

5. A local paper, published in French, describes Constantinople as follows: "The town is a sink of vermin, of misery and of perdition. If only a hundredth or even a thousandth part of the happenings here took place elsewhere, the latter would arouse the attention of the whole world, which would hasten to attempt to purify the place morally. But the East is discreet, and covers itself with a veil." These words pretty accurately describe the situation.

6. Constantinople is crammed with refugees of every description, who have added some hundreds of thousands to the normal population, and this at a moment when the town is practically cut off from Anatolia and Thrace, and impediments have been placed in the way of exports from the territories in the occupation of the Greek troops. Thus supplies of certain necessities of life, such as cheese, are very short, and a fall in the purchasing power of the £T. makes it still more difficult for the poorer elements of the population to purchase these necessities. The Turkish officials, numbering many thousands, who only receive their pay greatly in arrear and at irregular intervals, are hard put to it to keep themselves and their families alive.

7. Apart from the great inconvenience caused by the presence of many thousands of Russian refugees, it is now evident that a large number of these refugees should never have left Russia, and are not entitled to any sympathy or relief at all. Many of them are bad characters and gaol-birds who managed to get on board the ships at the last minute, and who, since their arrival here, have contributed still further to lower the already low standard of morality prevailing in this town.

8. It is not easy to see how this state of things can be improved until Anatolia is again opened up, and there can be a steady flow of supplies to Constantinople from that district.

9. I am sending a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's Ambassador at Rome.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,

High Commissioner.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 15.)

(No. 146.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, February 7, 1921.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 81 of the 6th February, I have the honour to transmit herewith certain documents, which contribute to an understanding, however imperfect, of the present political situation at Angora. They are (a) a condensed translation of an interview given by Mustapha Kemal Pasha to a representative of the "United Telegram" press agency; (b) a similar translation of a speech delivered by Mukhtar Bey, Nationalist "Commissioner" for Foreign Affairs, before the Grand National Assembly; and (c) a translation of one of the *en clair* telegrams addressed by the Angora Government to the Grand Vizier in the course of the correspondence arising out of the request of the Supreme Council for a Turkish delegation to take part in the proposed London Conference.

2. The first two documents are unfortunately not dated. I have every reason to suppose that they are comparatively recent, though, of course, prior to the decision taken by the Supreme Council on the 25th January. The statement of Mukhtar Bey is evidently intended mainly for internal consumption, as is shown by the entirely false statement that advances have been made to the Angora Government by agents of the British Government. I cannot understand such a statement, except on the assumption that it was deliberately invented to enhance the prestige of the Kemalist leaders in the eyes of hesitant adherents.

3. Mustapha Kemal's statement is addressed to a wider audience. His references to the United States of America, though doubtless inspired by the fact that his interlocutor appears to have been an American press agent, are interesting as indications of a revival of the hope that America may help to redress the balance between the Turkish Nationalists and the Allies. Mustapha Kemal's allegation that massacres on a large scale have been committed by the Armenians is also worthy of attention. Allegations of this kind against Armenians and Greeks, having perhaps a limited foundation in fact, play a considerable part in Turkish propaganda. There is an increasing tendency to combine condemnation of the anti-Christian policy of the Turks during the war with explanations tending almost to justify it, and to make the most of any atrocities which can be laid to the door of Armenians or Greeks as a counterpoise. I had occasion in reporting a recent conversation with the Minister for Foreign Affairs here to place on record language of the same general tendency used by Sefa Bey.

4. The enclosed telegram from Mustapha Kemal to the Grand Vizier has an interest independent of the general correspondence of which it forms part. Turkish political circles here are more than a little exercised by the alleged recent adoption by the Grand National Assembly of a new Constitutional law. According to the accounts current in Constantinople this law was voted by the Assembly on the 20th January. I have not yet been able to procure the text and cannot therefore say for certain whether a law has been voted or merely submitted to the Assembly. It seems almost certain that either a law or a draft is in existence and that it affirms in explicit terms the sovereignty of the people, and the supremacy of the Grand National Assembly as being the sole emanation of the will of the people. What is still uncertain is whether it attempts any definition of the position of the Sultan in the new order of things. Meanwhile the enclosed telegram puts forward as from the leader of the National movement suggestions which responsible statesmen here, however great their sympathy with the main object of the Nationalists, find disquieting, and which the Sultan justly regards as not only disquieting but insulting.

5. It is noteworthy that the Angora leaders in their recent telegrams have not explicitly rejected the proposal that the Treaty of Sèvres should be made the basis of discussion in London, but have concentrated all their attention on an effort to make good their claims to be recognised as the sole Government of Turkey. They have been at pains to address their telegrams to Tewfik Pasha, not as Grand Vizier, but as "His Highness Tewfik Pasha, Constantinople."

6. The respective positions of leading personages at Angora is also somewhat obscure. The replacement of Mukhtar Bey by Bekir Samy Bey is *prima facie* significant, but one explanation offered is that Bekir Samy, who was certainly Commissioner for Foreign Affairs some months ago, never vacated the post, that Mukhtar was merely acting for him, and that on Bekir Samy's return from Moscow, he resumed the post in the ordinary course. Another matter of uncertainty is the exact position

of Mustapha Kemal himself, in view of the fact that certain telegrams have been signed by Fevzi Pasha, formerly Minister of National Defence, as head of the executive authority, or, as it were, Grand Vizier. There is no reason to suppose that Mustapha Kemal has been superseded, but the fact of his having ceased to be technically head of the executive, while remaining President of the sovereign Grand National Assembly, may be, like the alleged adoption of the new Constitution, a step in the direction of a quasi-republican form of Government.

7. The question of how the Caliphate would be adjusted to any new organisation of the Turkish State is obviously a matter of great interest and importance. I can add little to what I said on this subject in my telegram under reference, except that there appears to be a good deal of discussion as to whether the Caliphate might not be vested in a purely spiritual personage surrounded by representatives from Islamic countries and maintaining touch with them through representatives of an ostensibly ecclesiastic character in those countries. I find it difficult to believe that the Angora leaders would think the present moment opportune to challenge Moslem feeling in Turkey itself on so great an issue, but it would not be safe to dismiss the possibility altogether.

8. These are some of the numerous elements of perturbation and uncertainty which made it necessary for me in my telegram under reference to sound a note of warning as to the possibility of surprises in the near future. The readiness of Angora to send any delegation at all to the London Conference is at first sight an encouraging sign, but it would be an obvious device for gaining time, if there should really be some plan for joint action with the Bolsheviks in the coming spring. It is still true that the relations between the Turkish Nationalists and the Bolsheviks are the crux of the situation, and there are at present no serious signs of a break between them, though causes of tension are not wanting.

9. Some observers go further and suggest that the difference of opinion between Constantinople and Angora is unreal and is merely an elaborate blind intended to conceal complete unity of purpose and plan. I do not share this view. It is possible that some members of the Constantinople Government may be hand in glove with Angora, but I have little doubt that Tewfik Pasha is sincerely anxious to do his best for the Sultan, whose personal and dynastic position is threatened by the extravagances of Angora, and that both Tewfik Pasha and the Sultan see in the proposed London Conference a chance of regaining something for Turkey instead of exposing her to worse wreck than ever.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 49.

Declarations of Mustapha Kemal to the Representative of the "United Telegram."

Smyrna Question.—Smyrna is an indivisible part of Anatolia and an exclusively Turkish area. This country, which has belonged to the Turks for a thousand years, has been occupied by Greek forces under the pretence of the existence of Greeks who arrived from the islands solely for commercial purposes and who are in the minority even in the city of Smyrna itself. The Greeks have committed massacres and oppressions and pursued a policy of extermination towards the Turkish population, as is confirmed by the report drawn up by the International Commission. The Turkish nation will turn them out sooner or later from their country. Meanwhile she is ready to negotiate for peace provided the country will be immediately evacuated. We do not desire to have direct negotiations with the Greek Government, but accept with pleasure the kind mediation of the United States of America.

Thrace Question.—Like Smyrna, Thrace also is an inseparable part of Ottoman territory, in which the Turkish population is also in the majority. The essential point about these questions is the immediate evacuation of both Smyrna and Thrace. Naturally the rights of the Greek minority will be protected in the manner specified in the Treaty of Saint-Germain concerning the protection of minorities.

With regard to Western Thrace, we agree that its destiny should be determined by means of a plebiscite.

Treaty of Sèvres.—We cannot admit the existence of the Treaty of Sèvres which denies our political, juridical, economical and financial independence. Our desire is to conclude a treaty which will assure our independence and sovereignty.

[666S]

L 2

Armenian Question.—Basing ourselves on the principle of the right accorded to the nations to determine their own destinies, we have concluded peace with Armenia. The rumours, according to which massacres have been committed upon the Armenians, are without foundation. We readily agree that neutral commissions should make inquiries freely in our country in order to discover the truth. We recommend also the reading of the reports recently prepared by the American Relief Commission for the Near East.

Massacres and atrocities on a large scale have been committed by the Armenians on the Turkish population. Documents to prove these massacres will be produced.

Constantinople Question.—Conditions for free passage of the Straits and the Bosphorus can be fixed, under which Constantinople will remain without restriction under Turkish sovereignty as before.

Opinions of the United States of America.—The United States of America is known by the Turkish population as benevolent, humanitarian and the protector of liberty. We hope to profit as much as possible from American sources in our efforts to restore our country.

Future Policy.—Our country is destroyed, our population is poor, education is lacking and our economic situation is weak. Our sole desire is to restore peace and tranquillity and to raise the intellectual standard of our country.

Our nation knows its rights and its humanitarian duties and clings to its liberty and independence.

Our nation, which is fighting for its independence and its liberty, leaves its legitimate claims to the appreciation of humanity.

Ahmed Mouhtar, in a speech which he delivered before the National Assembly concerning the relations with the Western Powers, declared that it was naturally not intended to go against the civilised world with their imperfect means. No one with intelligence or wisdom would have such an intention. "For what," he asked, "are we fighting? Why have we decided to resist by force of arms? Naturally there is a limit to all such acts. Our demands are not boundless. We demand only our economic and political independence within our national limits, and we are ready, from henceforth, to offer our hand to any Power which would accept our demands definitely and without rancour. Such a state of affairs does not yet exist. Perhaps it will soon exist, for, slight as it is, a disposition to accept does exist. Our Government, which follows very closely the course of events in Europe, is convinced that there does not exist in Europe any force which would compel us to accept and ratify the Treaty of Sèvres.

"This nation will wait until acceptance of our demands seems probable and will only conclude peace, without injury to her Russian ally, when she is convinced that her national ambitions will be satisfied."

Ahmed Mouhtar added that the nation could not regard favourably the unofficial propositions, which have been and are being made from time to time on behalf of the French, British and United States Governments.

After having informed the Assembly of the French proposals for the exchange of prisoners of war—proposals which the Angora Government were ready to accept and to fulfil in accordance with the Convention of Geneva—Ahmed Mouhtar discussed the peace negotiations and declared that as long as the Treaty of Sèvres remains they cannot conclude peace with any *Entente* Power. Such is the position at present.

The English also are endeavouring by repeatedly sending their men to Kerasund, Trebizond, &c., to establish contact with us.

Their object is to inform the population that they grant means of existence to Turkey and have proposed to her favourable conditions, which, however, a few despots refuse to accept.

Concerning the Georgian question, Ahmed Mouhtar declared that after the defeat of the Armenian army, the Georgian Government hastened to propose peace, but refused to reply before being informed of the point of view of Russia.

As regards Armenia, Ahmed Mouhtar declared that the Russian Soviet Government had proposed a modification of the conditions of peace with Armenia, especially in regard to the delivery of arms, as Armenia had become Bolshevik, but that they are obliged to take their arms in order to prevent possible Armenian attacks in the near future.

In reply to the question put forward by Ahmed Mouhtar regarding the relations of the Russian Soviet Republic with the British Government, Chicherin had replied that the Soviet Government did not even find it necessary to examine the proposals of the British Government, and that he did not know the reply given by the British Government to their refusal.

The only agreement was that reached in July last, whereby the British and Soviet Governments agreed not to carry on propaganda or commit any hostile acts in the country of the other.

With regard to the Commercial Convention, Chicherin declared that a copy of that convention had been sent by post.

As regards Batoum, Ahmed Mouhtar declared that it is essentially Turkish and must belong to Turkey. However, in view of the fact that it is the sole outlet for a population of 13,000,000, he was ready to agree to the internationalisation of the port provided the town itself remained Turkish. The Georgian claims that Batoum and Ardahan should be given to Georgia he characterised as sheer imperialism.

Enclosure 2 in No. 49.

Translation of Telegram from Mustapha Kemal Pasha to Grand Vizier.

WE reproduce the following summary of proposals set forth in our private and official telegrams, and we beg you to take the necessary action, and communicate the result to us:—

1. His Majesty the Sultan will proclaim by a brief Iradé that he recognises the Grand National Assembly of Turkey. This Iradé (Hatti Humayoun) will declare that the Grand National Assembly (which recognises as a principle the maintenance intact of the Caliphate and Sultanate) is constituted, and he will recognise it with all its present powers and faculties. We have no need to add the other details, which would only give rise to confusion of interpretation.

2. Should the proposals made in the preceding paragraph be accepted, we will arrange our internal situation (which is a family question) as follows:—

His Majesty the Sultan will reside, as in the past, at Constantinople. The Grand Assembly of Turkey, which has the responsibility and the power, and which possesses all conditions of independence, will sit, for the present, with the Government at Angora. There will naturally remain no longer at Constantinople a directory body under the name of a Ministry, but a Mission invested with the necessary powers by the Grand Assembly will be present with His Majesty on account of the peculiar situation of the town of Constantinople.

3. The details of administrative organisation of the town of Constantinople and its neighbourhood will be drawn up later.

4. Immediately after the acceptance and application of the above proposals the necessary sums for the Civil List of His Majesty the Sultan and the Imperial House, as well as for the salaries of officials and pensioners in general, sums for which provision is made, in principle, in the budget approved by the Grand National Assembly, will be assured and paid by the Government. Our financial resources guarantee this expenditure.

[E 2025/1/44]

No. 50.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 15.)

(No. 100.)

(Telegraphic.) *En clair.*

Constantinople, February 14, 1921.

PRESIDENT: Bekir Sami, Commissioner for Foreign Affairs. Delegates: Jami; Yunus Nadi, Deputy for Smyrna; Eshref or Khosrev, Deputy for Trebizond; Sezai or Zekai, Deputy for Adana. Experts and Counsellors: Mahmoud Essad, Deputy for Smyrna; Vehbi, Deputy for Karassi; Sirri, Deputy for Ismid; Nedjati, Deputy for Erzeroum; Munir; Niazi or Muwaffak Niazi; and perhaps one other.

[E 2031/1/44]

No. 51.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 15.)

(No. 101.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, February 14, 1921.

MY telegram No. 100 of 14th February gives list of Angora delegation based on statement in local press, which purports to reproduce Kemalist communiqué, and on news just received by my Italian colleague from Adalia. Both versions agree pretty closely.

I have already said what little I can about Bekir Sami. Jami is an intelligent ex-officer who played a rôle in organisation of Smyrna defence movement before occupation of Smyrna. He was for a time member of Angora Government, after which he went to Italy. Yunus Nadi is a particularly poisonous and unscrupulous journalist, whom both we and French wanted arrested. He edits "Yeni Ghazi" newspaper at Angora, and was some months ago too extreme for Government there. He was Socialistic, and stood strongly for Bolshevik alliance, though not for introduction of Bolshevism as such.

Other persons are little known here. Nedjati is suspected in connection with deportation. Same applies to Sirri if he is the man formerly Governor of Amassia, but identification is not certain. Munir may be legal adviser of Sublime Porte who went with Izzet Pasha to Angora, but this is not certain. If so, he has name of being industrious lawyer and not much else.

Selection of Yunus may be due to desire to give representation to Extreme Left in Grand National Assembly. Notable feature of delegation as a whole is inclusion of deputies (presumably in Grand National Assembly) from all occupied areas still held by Turks at time of the armistice.

Delegation left Adalia on 13th February, and is expected to reach Brindisi about 17th February.

Constantinople Government still express hope that two delegations will combine.

Neither Acting Grand Vizier nor Minister for Foreign Affairs sounded really confident of this, however, in conversation to-day, 14th February. I communicated to them substance of your telegram No. 91 of 11th February. They of course profess strongest disapproval of attitude of Angora. Minister for Foreign Affairs, while sympathising with aims of Kemalists, seems genuinely disgusted with their refusal to have anything to do with Central Government, and probably fears they will overreach themselves. Acting Grand Vizier has hardly had time to form views, having been little in touch with affairs for nearly twelve months.

[E 2157/1/44]

No. 52.

Sir G. Buchanan to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 45.)

(Telegraphic.) D.

Rome, February 17, 1921.

FOLLOWING for Prime Minister and Lord Curzon from Hankey:—

"Last night I saw Count Sforza. From sources in touch with Talaat he learns that while latter thinks moment has arrived for settlement, Angora Government is still rather truculent. Sforza's personal impression is that they will begin on Oriental principles by asking far more than they expect to get. He thinks, however, they would ultimately accept some arrangement whereby Greeks would withdraw their troops from Smyrna, but retain administration under some nominal form of Turkish sovereignty. Angora delegates are due here this morning. Italian Government conveyed them in Italian destroyer in order that they might arrive in time for conference.

"Count Sforza has promised to send us advance information as to general attitude [group undecypherable] Angora delegates."

[E 2158/1/44]

No. 53.

Sir G. Buchanan to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 46.)

(Telegraphic.) D.

Rome, February 17, 1921.

FOLLOWING for Prime Minister and Lord Curzon from Hankey:—

"My immediately preceding telegram.

"As regards procedure of conference Count Sforza's general idea is that, following Paris precedent, representatives of Great Powers should first meet to settle procedure and should then hear Greeks and Turks separately. He is inclined to think Turkish Government delegates and Angora delegates should for conference purposes be treated as a single delegation. He is convinced there will be a very close understanding between them."

[E 2159/1/44]

No. 54.

Sir G. Buchanan to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 47.)

(Telegraphic.)

Rome, February 17, 1921.

MY telegram No. 45.

Osman Nizami, Turkish Ambassador designate, called yesterday evening and told me he was leaving for London to-day to attend conference. After criticising at length harshness of terms of Treaty of Sèvres, which would, he declared, reduce Turkey to a state of slavery, he said that Angora Government could never consent to their delegates being merged in Turkish delegation. For them to do so would be tantamount to renouncing all the advantages of their present position. Contrary to views expressed by Count Sforza to Sir M. Hankey, he maintained that were two to be treated with as a single delegation Angora delegates would return home. Withdrawal of Greece from Thrace and Smyrna would be demanded by latter, and on my asking whether there was any hope of a compromise between Greeks and Nationalists, he replied this was objected to as Greeks were systematically exterminating Mussulmans in districts occupied by their troops.

Sir M. Hankey saw President of the Council this morning. Latter takes view that, in spite of above language, there is a close "subterranean" understanding between Angora and Turkish delegates.

[E 2244/1/44]

No. 55.

Colonel Stokes to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 19.)

(No. 43.)

(Telegraphic.)

Tiflis (via Constantinople), February 12, 1921.

IN *en clair* telegram, dated 8th February, from Angora, Bekir Sami Bey, who signs as Commissary for Foreign Affairs, informs Chicherin of impending departure of delegation from Angora Government for London. He states that failure to obtain satisfaction at conference will expose the west [*sic*] of the Allies, while success will make beginning of era of peace by which Russia also will profit. Nationalists will not forget at the conference that Russia is their ally, and latter will be kept informed of the course of negotiations. In return, he requests information regarding Krassin negotiations and decisions taken regarding the East. Telegram concludes with complaint that telegraphic communication between Kars and Baku is hindered by Soviet Armenia and commander of the 11th Army in Karaklis area, also that couriers are arrested and their bags seized.

(Repeated to Constantinople, No. 43, and Commander-in-chief Afloat, No. 15; repeated to India, Bagdad and Tehran.)

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 178.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, February 16, 1921.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 102 of the 14th February, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a copy of a note prepared by Sir Adam Block, giving a short summary of the financial situation of the Turkish Government at the present moment.

2. Sir Adam Block had previously drawn my attention to the critical situation in which the Turkish Government found itself, and his statement on the subject did not cause me any surprise, in view of the fact that I had already reported to your Lordship that the £T. 1,200,000 recently advanced by the Debt Council would soon be exhausted, and that the position would be worse than ever.

3. I accordingly asked my colleagues and the other members of the provisional Financial Commission of Control to come to this High Commission on the 15th instant, and we listened to the explanations furnished by Sir Adam Block and his French colleague. The provisional Financial Control Commission asked the High Commissioners for their intervention in two matters:—

- (1.) To ensure the proper encashment of the land tax and its arrears; and
- (2.) To obtain the return to the system of the 11 per cent. *ad valorem* duties whilst maintaining the consumption taxes. The High Commissioners agreed to both these requests.

4. Sir Adam Block makes a third suggestion in his note, namely, that the Sales Commission, which is a Turkish Commission, and which has proved itself completely incompetent, should be abolished, and that the business of selling the material still belonging to the Turkish Government should be entrusted to the British firm of Messrs. Topliss and Harding. No decision was taken on this question, but I intend to raise it with my colleagues after the meeting of the High Commissioners on the 18th instant.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 56.

Summary of the Financial Situation.

THE Turkish Government can no longer pay the salaries of its civil and military functionaries.

To the 11th February there remained due for salaries:—

	£T.
Balance for the month of November 1920 ...	350,000
Balance for the month of December 1920 ...	1,637,000
Salaries, January 1921 ...	1,862,000

The salaries for December of the police, gendarmerie and the customs have been paid in full (in the month of January).

The £T. 1,200,000 advanced by the Debt Council has been completely utilised.

The situation is even rendered worse by the fact that there will be a further estimated deficit at the end of February of £T. 169,460 arising from the non-payment of general expenses of an urgent character and not including the February salaries, amounting again to £T. 1,862,000.

On the other hand, the receipts of the customs are falling, and taxes collected by the "vilayet" will not this month exceed £T. 300,000, which represents for the most part encashment of arrears.

I enclose a statement of estimated receipts and expenditure for the remaining days of the month of February.

In examining the estimates of expenditure presented by different Departments during the last few days it is quite clear that these Departments refuse to take into consideration the state of penury of the Turkish Treasury. The credits they ask for are as extravagant and exaggerated as heretofore, and there is no serious attempt to reduce expenditure within the limits of the receipts.

The only sources of revenue that I can suggest are to be found in the collection of the "property tax," "temettu," from the inhabitants of Constantinople, and on this point the Provisional Commission will make a proposal to the High Commissioners.

The arrears of the "property tax" amount to about £T. 2,000,000. I enclose a table. The arrears of the "temettu" are also very considerable.

My opinion is that it is of the most urgent necessity to assist the Turkish Government in collecting these arrears, and it is only with the assistance of the High Commissioners that this can be done.

The only other possible source of revenue is the customs. Means should be found to modify the existing system, which is not suitable to the impecunious position of the Turkish Government. Either the system *ad valorem* should be imposed by force or the Turkish Government should be allowed to raise the "specific duties" so as to render them equivalent to a duty of 11 per cent. *ad valorem*.

This latter alternative, I think, deserves the early consideration of the High Commissioners. The more so as the discontent is growing daily greater and there may be a very serious crisis before long. The officials and their families are literally starving.

The last point that I must emphasise is that the Sales Commission is working most unsatisfactorily, and the advances of the banks and the Public Debt Council will not, under the present conditions, be reimbursed for many long months to come. I venture to think that the only method of realising the material still belonging to the Turkish Government is to abolish the Sales Commission, to take over the entire control of the depôts, and to entrust the classification, the valuation and the sale of these goods to expert business men who are accustomed to deal with this class of business. Messrs. Topliss and Harding have already made a survey of the goods in one of the depôts at Makri-Keny, and Mr. Barwell, my secretary, will submit a copy of it as soon as it is typed. I suggest as a beginning that the Turkish Government be informed that Messrs. Topliss and Harding will undertake the sale of these goods with a controller from the Ministry of Finance and a controller from the Provisional Commission of Control, as well as with a controller from the Public Debt Council and the banks who have advanced money.

The two latter have advanced money on these goods, and they are entitled to demand that the security on which they advanced such large sums should be realised at an early date and on the most advantageous terms. Were the Turkish Government sensible they would hand over all their depôts to Messrs. Topliss and Harding and authorise them to sell the material at the best possible prices available, either here where the market is restricted or in countries abroad where purchasers can be found.

The above is an admission of failure on the part of the provisional Commission of Control; but unless the control is perfect and complete with regard to both expenditure and receipts there is no possibility of a balance of receipts and expenditure.

ADAM BLOCK.

Constantinople, February 14, 1921.

DÉPENSES.

	£T.
Solde dernier 1 ^{er} -4 de novembre (Traitement)	300,960
Police et gendarmerie (janvier)	167,000
Donanes (50 pour cent déjà payé pour janvier)	21,500
Vilayet (percepteurs et agents inspecteurs)	18,000
Hôpitaux et prisons	6,000
Ministère de la Guerre (à raison de £T. 4,000 pour dix-neuf jours)	76,000
Ministère de la Marine	9,000
Frais divers (à raison de £T. 40,000 par semaine)	120,000
Frais Mission à Londres	36,000
Imprévu	10,000
Total	764,460

RECETTES.

	£T.
Solde en banque au 10 février	45,000
Encaissements douanes (dix-huit jours à raison de £T. 20,000 par jour)	360,000
Encaissements vilayet (dix-huit jours à raison de £T. 10,000 par jour)	180,000
Recettes extraordinaires	10,000
	595,000
Déficit	169,460

IMPÔT sur la Propriété bâtie.

	Exercice en cours.	Exercices précédents.
	£T.	£T.
Constatations	1,658,077	2,574,879
Perceptions	977,977	349,435
Arriérés reportés.. .. .	680,100	2,225,444
Proportion entre les perceptions et les constatations	58.98 pour cent	13.50 pour cent

TÉMETTU.

	Exercice en cours.	Exercices précédents.
	£T.	£T.
Constatations	351,484	549,199
Perceptions	225,212	13,635
Arriérés reportés.. .. .	126,272	535,564
Proportion entre les perceptions et les constatations	64.07 pour cent	2.45 pour cent

[E 2484/1/44]

No. 57.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 151.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, February 9, 1921.

IMMEDIATELY after my despatch No. 146 of the 7th February was drafted, it was brought to my notice that publicity had been given by the Kemalists to a considerable portion of the telegraphic correspondence between Constantinople and Angora, arising out of the invitation to the Turkish Government to attend the London Conference.

2. A polygraphed broad sheet containing the telegrams so published was distributed in Constantinople through the Turkish post on the morning of the 7th February. The broad sheet is dated from Zumbuldak on the 30th January, and it looks as if it had been sent in bulk to Constantinople with other Kemalist communiqués for distribution here.

3. The same telegrams were printed on the afternoon of the 7th February in the Constantinople paper "Terdjyman-i-Hakikat." The Turkish censor made a special point of their being allowed to appear, and the Allied censors, whose general instructions at present are to allow considerable latitude to the Turkish press, acquiesced.

4. The published telegrams consist of the Grand Vizier's original message to Mustapha Kemal Pasha communicating the Supreme Council's decision of the 25th January, and three telegrams sent by Mustapha Kemal to the Grand Vizier on the 27th and 28th January. I enclose French translations of the first three. The fourth is the telegram enclosed in my despatch No. 146 of the 7th February, referred to above.

5. On the attention of the Minister for Foreign Affairs being informally called to this publication, and to the possible danger of circulating in Constantinople documents of such a nature, especially the telegram requesting the Central Government to efface itself, and presenting terms to the Sultan, Sefa Bey explained that the telegrams were already widely known, and that the Acting Minister of the Interior had thought it well to enlighten public opinion fully regarding the extravagance of the Kemalist pretensions. He said that his colleague was even thinking of publishing the replies of the Government to Angora by way of further enlightenment.

6. I doubt whether the Acting Minister of the Interior will publish anything really calculated to discredit the Nationalists. Unfortunately, Mustapha Arif Bey, a lawyer by profession, and by origin one of the group of Islamised Jews from Salonica, who played so large a rôle in the Committee of Union and Progress, is perhaps the least trustworthy member of the Cabinet. Whatever his motives for instructing the Turkish censor to press for the publication of the telegrams, the publication assumed a form very little calculated to belittle the Kemalists, for it was illustrated by a photograph of Mustapha Kemal Pasha equal in size to and printed opposite a portrait of the Grand Vizier, together with a picture of the opening of the Grand National Assembly at Angora.

7. The telegrams were submitted to the censors at a later hour than usual, and at a moment when only junior Allied representatives were present. The whole incident presents the appearance of a Nationalist coup in the press, such as might be expected to precede an attempt to force the Nationalist point of view on the Sultan and the Central Government. It may seem incredible that the Kemalists should contemplate such an attempt while Constantinople is in Allied occupation, but Constantinople is so full of Kemalist sympathisers, the Allied forces are so reduced, and the occupation has interfered so little with the Turkish administration, that the Angora leaders might hope to succeed in achieving their object, not by a coup d'État, which would bring their supporters here into direct conflict with the Allied authorities, but by bringing extreme pressure to bear on the Sultan to recognise the Grand National Assembly, and on the Constantinople Government to relinquish its task.

8. I need hardly say that this forecast of one of many possible eventualities is in the nature of a pure speculation, and that, if the Kemalists should have conceived such a plan, they would have to reckon with many difficulties. The situation is, however, such that no possible outcome of it should be disregarded.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD, High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 57.

(Traduction.)

Tewfik Pasha to Mustapha Kemal Pasha.

(Télégraphique.)

LA conférence qui s'est réunie à Paris, le 25 janvier 1921, a décidé qu'une nouvelle conférence, composée des délégués des Puissances alliées et des délégués des Gouvernements ottoman et hellénique, sera convoquée à Londres, le 21 février, en vue de discuter la solution de la question d'Orient. Les modifications qui seront jugées inévitables par suite des circonstances, seront apportées au traité existant. L'invitation adressée au Gouvernement impérial stipule que Moustafa Kemal Pacha, ou bien des délégués munis des pouvoirs nécessaires conférés par Angora, doivent faire partie de la délégation ottomane. Ces décisions nous ont été communiquées par les représentants des Puissances alliées à Constantinople. J'attends votre décision et votre réponse, afin que les délégués nommés par vous puissent se joindre aux personnages que nous nommerons nous-mêmes, et partir ensemble.

Enclosure 2 in No. 57.

(Traduction.)

Mustapha Kemal Pasha to Tewfik Pasha.

(Télégraphique.)

LA seule force légitime et indépendante qui, de par la volonté nationale, tient entre les mains les destinées de la Turquie est la Grande Assemblée nationale turque, siégeant à Angora. C'est le Gouvernement issu de cette Assemblée qui, seul, est chargé de résoudre toutes questions intéressant la Turquie et qui peut, seul, entretenir toutes sortes de relations extérieures. A Constantinople, aucun corps constitué n'a

une situation juridique légitime. En conséquence, le fait qu'un pareil corps constitué se soit donné le nom de Gouvernement va explicitement à l'encontre des droits de souveraineté de la nation; il est en outre inadmissible que, sous le couvert de ce nom, ledit corps constitué se soit présenté comme interlocuteur, vis-à-vis de l'étranger, dans des questions touchant l'existence même du pays et de la nation. Le devoir que nous imposent notre conscience et l'intérêt de la patrie, c'est—en nous pénétrant de la réalité des faits—de reconnaître et de proclamer immédiatement que le Gouvernement légitime qui peut parler au nom de la nation et du pays se trouve à Angora. Il est hors de doute que les Puissances alliées apprécient que le Gouvernement qui possède des pouvoirs légitimes au nom de la nation et du pays est actuellement à Angora. Si lesdites Puissances tardent à exprimer leur façon de penser, c'est parce qu'elles croient que l'existence à Constantinople d'un Gouvernement intermédiaire peut leur être avantageuse.

Le Gouvernement issu de la Grande Assemblée nationale turque a maintes fois publié que, mû par le patriotisme, il désire sérieusement la paix; que sa seule condition est de voir reconnaître les droits de sa nation et qu'il est prêt, en cas de reconnaissance de ces droits, d'accepter l'offre d'entrer en négociations.

Si les Puissances alliées ont décidé de résoudre, suivant la justice et l'équité, la question d'Orient à la Conférence de Londres, elles doivent adresser leur invitation directement au Gouvernement issu de la Grande Assemblée nationale turque. Je déclare une nouvelle fois que l'invitation qui serait adressée dans les conditions ci-dessus sera bien accueillie par le Gouvernement issu de la Grande Assemblée nationale turque.

Enclosure 3 in No. 57.

(Traduction.)
(Télégraphique.)
(Privé.)
Excellence,

Mustapha Kemal Pasha to Tefvik Pasha.

VOUS qui avez, dans toute votre carrière sans interruption, rendu des services signalés à ce pays, vous avez maintenant une occasion exceptionnelle et historique pour couronner et parachever tous vos services antérieurs. Nous voulons agir en parfaite union. Nous sommes persuadés que vous voyez, vous-même, tous les inconvénients qu'il y aurait à ce que deux délégations distinctes représentent le pays à la conférence à laquelle nous sommes indirectement convoqués. Les efforts qu'a déployés la nation dans l'unique but de sauvegarder ses droits de souveraineté, le sang qu'elle a versé sans calculer, la fermeté qu'elle a montrée à l'occasion de tant de difficultés tant intérieures qu'extérieures, ont créé la nouvelle situation favorable en présence de laquelle nous nous trouvons aujourd'hui. D'autre part, les événements qui se déroulent dans le monde continuent à se développer de façon à confirmer notre indépendance complète, vers laquelle tendent tous les efforts de la nation.

Alors que nous défendons nos droits nationaux contre les Gouvernements qui ont voulu nous condamner à l'esclavage et à la ruine, il est de toute nécessité que toutes les forces matérielles et morales du pays—à commencer par le Sultanat et le Califat, toujours vénérés par la Grande Assemblée nationale—agissent en parfaite union. A cet effet, il est enfin temps que sa Majesté impériale le Sultan proclame officiellement qu'il reconnaît la Grande Assemblée nationale turque, seule représentation de la volonté nationale dans le pays. C'est de cette façon qu'on pourra mettre un terme à la situation anormale de Constantinople, qui cause des préjudices continuels au pays et qui n'est maintenue qu'au seul profit de l'étranger.

Les communications déjà faites par les représentants des Puissances de l'Entente démontrent que la délégation qui partira de Constantinople ne sera admise à la Conférence de Londres que si elle a parmi ses membres des personnes déléguées avec pleins pouvoirs de la part du Gouvernement d'Angora. Ainsi, les Puissances de l'Entente avouent, avec suffisamment de clarté, que les délégués qui iront assister, en Europe, à la Conférence de la Paix ne pourront être envoyés que par le Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée nationale.

Nous vous proposons, en conséquence, en nous appuyant sur le devoir et le pouvoir que nous avons assumé devant la nation et l'histoire, de reconnaître les principes posés et proclamés par le Gouvernement de la Grande Assemblée nationale, qui est, effectivement et juridiquement, le seul Gouvernement légitime en Turquie, et de rectifier et consolider votre position en vous joignant à nous, afin de faciliter la reconnaissance de

ces mêmes principes par nos ennemis. Ainsi vous aurez hâté la solution heureuse de notre conflit.

Dans le cas où vous accepteriez et exécuteriez ces propositions sincères, que nous vous faisons dans l'unique intention d'agir en commun et de défendre, avec le maximum de nos forces, la volonté de la nation, la situation de sa Majesté le Sultan et le Calife cessera désormais d'être chancelante. Et nous, en notre qualité de Gouvernement investi de tous les pouvoirs effectifs et juridiques conférés par la volonté nationale, nous notons dès maintenant que toute la responsabilité découlant d'un refus éventuel, de votre part, de ces propositions retombera, avec ces innombrables conséquences, directement sur sa Majesté le Sultan.

Nous attendons qu'en présence de cette situation votre Altesse s'acquitte de tout son devoir historique et qu'elle nous informe en termes formels et explicites de ce qui aura été fait.

[E 2490/1/44]

No. 58.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 24.)

(No. 165.)

Constantinople, February 12, 1921.

My Lord,

THE delegation from the Constantinople Government to the London Conference leaves to-night, with the Grand Vizier at its head. I understand that the Sultan was very insistent that Tefvik Pasha should go at the head of the delegation. Tefvik Pasha is a man of eighty, and it is not easy to determine what measure of authority he exercises over his colleagues at Constantinople. He is an agreeable personality and makes a pleasant impression.

2. The Constantinople Government have done their best since they received the invitation to attend the conference in London to bring Mustapha Kemal into line. But they have completely failed, while the attitude taken up by Mustapha Kemal regarding the Sultan and the Caliphate has aroused indignation even amongst Turks who may be supposed to be in sympathy with the Nationalists on other grounds. I am told that the above-mentioned attitude of Mustapha Kemal is likely eventually to react to his detriment in Anatolia.

3. My Italian colleague informs me that the delegation from Angora should have reached Adalia yesterday, the 11th instant, but although he has told his representative at that port to telegraph the arrival and composition of the delegation, he was without news up to last night. There is a persistent rumour that the delegation is headed by Bekir Sami Bey, who only recently returned from Moscow. Reports say that Bekir Sami Bey was thoroughly disgusted with what he saw at the Bolshevik capital.

4. It is to be assumed that the delegation from the Central Government will do its utmost to get into touch and come to some agreement with the Nationalist delegation, should the latter reach London in time for the opening of the conference. I am without indication, however, of the view His Majesty's Government will take of the arrival of an independent delegation from Angora.

5. It has been suggested to me that the Nationalists are speculating on a Bolshevik offensive against Poland and Roumania in the spring. They think that such an offensive will absorb all the attention of the Western Powers, and thus render the latter incapable of dealing with the Turkish situation. It is difficult to appreciate, with any accuracy, the present relations between the Nationalists and the Soviet Government, though indications show that the former are much disturbed by the attitude taken up by the Soviet Government as regards the retention by the Nationalists of Kars and Alexandropol.

6. The necessary funds for the expenses connected with the despatch of the Constantinople delegation to London have been forthcoming with great difficulty, and Sir Adam Block informs me that there will, in consequence, be delay in paying the police, gendarmerie, &c. In fact the Turkish Government are now at the end of their resources, and it will be necessary for the High Commissioners to meet early next week to consider the means of enabling the Administration to continue to function.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

[E 2693/1/44]

No. 59.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 28.)

(No. 140.)

(Telegraphic.)

Constantinople, February 27, 1921.

IN the course of long conversation which I had with Minister for Foreign Affairs yesterday, the latter expressed gratification at proposal for an investigation by Allies with regard to Eastern Thrace and Smyrna. He assumed that every precaution would be taken to ensure impartial and accurate enquiry, and pointed out that Greeks were past-masters at creating majorities in districts by simple expedient of transferring inhabitants from one village or district to another.

Minister for Foreign Affairs stated that he had received short telegram from Grand Vizier with regard to territorial claims of Turkey. Grand Vizier had expressed confidence in a favourable solution of those claims. Speaking generally, there is a feeling of optimism in Turkish circles as a result of reports from London.

(Repeated to Athens, No. 27.)

[E 2611/576/93]

No. 60.

Earl Curzon to Mr. Davis.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, February 28, 1921.

I AM to-day presenting to you a note on the subject of economic rights in mandated territories in reply to the note of the 20th November from Mr. Colby, and I beg leave to express to you my regret that it should have been delayed beyond my expectation.

2. As regards the publication of this note, and of the notes which have preceded it, as detailed in your letter of the 13th January, I beg to state that His Majesty's Government agree to the simultaneous publication of the whole correspondence in America and in this country, and will assent to any date for this purpose named by your Excellency on receiving three days' notice. In view of the interest that the discussion has awakened, I would express the hope that an early date for this publication may be fixed.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 2866/1/44]

No. 61.

Earl Curzon to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(No. 206.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, March 2, 1921.

HIS Excellency Tewfik Pasha, the Grand Vizier and senior Turkish delegate at the Allied Conference now sitting in London, called on me this week. It was intended, as I understood, to be merely a courtesy visit, the more so that his Excellency, who is over 80 years of age, has been in poor health ever since his arrival in England (having suffered, as he told me, very much from his five days' journey), and has presented a very feeble appearance at the few sittings which he has attended.

This did not prevent him, however, from developing a political argument which occupied about twenty minutes, and commenced with the delivery of a special message from the Sultan to the effect that His Imperial Majesty was deeply convinced that the only hope for his country and his throne lay in a revival of the old relations between Turkey and Great Britain, to which he was ready to agree in any manner that might be thought best.

I remarked that, pending the conclusion of peace, we could only proceed in close concert with our Allies, and were precluded from taking any independent action. Moreover it was a pity that these considerations had not been present to the mind of the Turkish Government in 1914, when their action in making war upon us had been of a particularly shameless as well as a suicidal nature.

The Grand Vizier deplored the lamentable errors committed by his countrymen at that time, which he had done his best to avert, and for which they were now paying the penalty.

When I asked him whether he was speaking exclusively for the Constantinople

Government and reminded him that in the present conference the attitude of his delegation had been one of almost complete subservience to the Angora delegates, to whom they had invariably ceded the word, the Pasha replied that this had been done for reasons of expediency, but that really there was quite a good understanding between them, and that, in respect of friendship with Great Britain, the sentiments of Bekir Sami Bey were exactly identical with his own. This, indeed, was the feeling of the entire Turkish people.

When I replied that it was a little difficult to reconcile these inclinations with the known facts—(1) that a representative of the Angora Government was at this moment sitting at Moscow in close consultation with the Soviet leaders; and (2) that the same Government was trying to come to separate arrangements with the French and Italian Governments behind our backs in London—the Grand Vizier did not appear to be in the least disturbed by these symptoms, which he evidently regarded as conventional moves in the diplomatic game.

His second request related to the financial position in Constantinople, which he described (I believe with absolute truth) as desperate. None of the officials or functionaries had been paid their salaries for many weeks; the Treasury was empty; poverty and destitution were widespread; and unless financial aid were forthcoming the entire State would collapse.

His proposal was that the Powers should agree to an increase in the customs duties levied at Constantinople. He seemed to be a little uncertain about his figures, and did not appear to be thoroughly acquainted with the controversy that has recently been going on at Constantinople concerning the revival of the old *ad valorem* system, to which I understand that the High Commissioners have already agreed.

Upon this subject I was non-committal, though sympathetic, and the Grand Vizier, having discharged his task with the courtesy of an old and experienced diplomat and received from me the parting advice to persuade his Angora friends to ratify the treaty as quickly as possible, enveloped himself in a heavy overcoat and withdrew.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 2611/576/93]

No. 62.

Earl Curzon to Mr. Balfour.

Sir,

Foreign Office, March 2, 1921.

WITH reference to your telegram No. 108 of the 24th ultimo relative to the communication addressed to the Council of the League of Nations by the United States Government on the subject of mandates, and also to Sir Cecil Hurst's telegram No. 111 of the same date enquiring whether the answer of His Majesty's Government to the note of the United States Government of the 20th November last concerning oil and the Mesopotamian mandate have been delivered, I transmit to you herewith a copy of reply which has now been sent to the United States Ambassador in answer to Mr. Secretary Colby's note of the 20th November last.*

2. In view of the communication which has been received by the Council of the League from the United States Government, it has been felt desirable to avoid, in the reply, all discussion of the principle and terms of mandates, which will no doubt be dealt with by the Council, and, as you will observe, the answer to the United States Government has therefore been confined to an explanation of the exact position of the Turkish Petroleum Company and of the logical consequences which must follow from a full recognition by the mandatory Power of rights validly acquired from the Turkish Government, as well as the reasons for the conclusion of the San Remo Oil Agreement.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

* See No. 60.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 15.)

(No. 249.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, March 8, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship the accompanying copies of identic notes which my French and Italian colleagues and myself have addressed to the Greek High Commissioner and the Polish, Roumanian and Russian representatives at Constantinople on the subject of the establishment of local post offices in this city.

2. As your Lordship will observe, these communications are based on a protest submitted to the Allied High Commissioners by the Ottoman Government against the creation of other foreign post offices than those provided for under article 262 of the Treaty of Sèvres, which, in admitting the re-establishment in Turkey of post offices by those Allied Powers who possessed them before the war, by implication denies this privilege to other countries.

3. The situation of the Russian post office is not on the same footing as, and has been treated differently to, the Greek, Polish and Roumanian offices. No objection can be taken to the reopening of the Russian post office as soon as that country, on becoming a member of the League of Nations, has acceded to the Treaty of Sèvres. Its present existence, however, in the absence of any recognised Russian authorities in Constantinople, and owing to the danger of its being used as a channel for Bolshevik correspondence, cannot be admitted.

4. At the same time, apart from the fact that there is no justifiable or capitulatory ground therefor, I am firmly opposed to the creation of any new foreign post offices in Turkey. I would refer your Lordship in this connection to my despatch No. 159 of the 9th February, 1921. The abuse of any privilege almost certainly leads to its eventual abolition, and the advantage of a continued British postal service in Turkey is so great that our privileges in this respect should be jealously guarded.

5. In this view I think there is no doubt that my French and Italian colleagues concur, and we have agreed, in the event of any objection being raised by their respective representatives to the closing of these new post offices, to request the Allied police to take steps to enforce our decision to that effect. I anticipate, however, no difficulty in the case of the Russian, Polish and Roumanian offices.

6. The presence of Greek troops in Turkey is, on the other hand, likely to induce the Greek High Commissioner to demur to our request on the ground that these offices are a military necessity. It will be difficult to contest this standpoint, and in that case I fear that it will be impossible to do more than to insist on the restriction of the services of the two Greek post offices to purely military purposes.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,

High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 63.

Allied High Commissioners to Greek High Commissioner.

LES Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie ont l'honneur de faire savoir à son Excellence M. le Haut-Commissaire de Grèce que le Ministre des Affaires étrangères ottoman vient de leur adresser une protestation contre l'établissement de deux bureaux de poste helléniques à Péra et Galata.

L'article 262 du Traité de Sèvres stipule expressément que les Puissances alliées qui avant le 1^{er} août 1914 avaient des bureaux de poste dans l'ancien Empire ottoman auront la faculté de rétablir de tels bureaux en Turquie.

Or, par implication, l'établissement de tels bureaux par des Puissances, autres que celles susvisées, doit être considéré comme étant non moins expressément exclu.

Dans ces circonstances, les Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie ne peuvent que constater le bien-fondé de la réclamation de la Porte à cet égard et ils ont l'honneur en conséquence d'exprimer l'espoir que M. le Haut-Commissaire de Grèce ne verra pas d'objections à ce que les ordres nécessaires soient donnés à qui de droit afin de faire cesser les opérations des bureaux en question.

Ils sauront gré à M. le Haut-Commissaire de Grèce de bien vouloir les aviser en temps utile des mesures prises à cet effet.

Constantinople, le 4 mars 1921.

Allied High Commissioners to Polish Minister, Constantinople.

LES Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie ont l'honneur de faire savoir à M. le Ministre de Pologne que le Ministre des Affaires étrangères ottoman vient de leur adresser une protestation contre l'établissement à Péra d'un bureau de poste polonais.

L'article 262 du Traité de Sèvres stipule expressément que les Puissances alliées qui avant le 1^{er} août 1914 avaient des bureaux de poste dans l'ancien Empire ottoman auront la faculté de rétablir de tels bureaux en Turquie.

Or, par implication, l'établissement de tels bureaux par des Puissances, autres que celles susvisées, doit être considéré comme étant non moins expressément exclu.

Dans ces circonstances, les Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie ne peuvent que constater le bien-fondé de la réclamation de la Porte à cet égard et ils ont l'honneur en conséquence d'exprimer l'espoir que M. le Ministre de Pologne ne verra pas d'objections à ce que les ordres nécessaires soient donnés à qui de droit afin de faire cesser les opérations du bureau en question.

Ils sauront gré à M. le Ministre de Pologne de bien vouloir les aviser en temps utile des mesures prises à cet effet.

Constantinople, le 4 mars 1921.

Enclosure 3 in No. 63.

Allied High Commissioners to Roumanian Minister, Constantinople.

LES Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie ont l'honneur de faire savoir à M. le Ministre de Roumanie que le Ministre des Affaires étrangères ottoman vient de leur adresser une protestation contre l'établissement à Galata d'un bureau de poste roumain.

L'article 262 du Traité de Sèvres stipule expressément que les Puissances alliées qui avant le 1^{er} août 1914 avaient des bureaux de poste dans l'ancien Empire ottoman auront la faculté de rétablir de tels bureaux en Turquie.

Or, par implication, l'établissement de tels bureaux par des Puissances, autres que celles susvisées, doit être considéré comme étant non moins expressément exclu.

Dans ces circonstances, les Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie ne peuvent que constater le bien-fondé de la réclamation de la Porte à cet égard et ils ont l'honneur en conséquence d'exprimer l'espoir que M. le Ministre de Roumanie ne verra pas d'objections à ce que les ordres nécessaires soient donnés à qui de droit afin de faire cesser les opérations du bureau en question.

Ils sauront gré à M. le Ministre de Roumanie de bien vouloir les aviser en temps utile des mesures prises à cet effet.

Constantinople, le 4 mars 1921.

Enclosure 4 in No. 63.

Allied High Commissioners to Russian Representative, Constantinople.

LES Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie ont l'honneur de faire savoir à M. le Représentant diplomatique russe à Constantinople que le Ministre des Affaires étrangères ottoman vient de leur adresser une protestation contre l'établissement d'un bureau de poste russe à Péra.

L'article 262 du Traité de Sèvres stipule que les Puissances alliées qui avant le 1^{er} août 1914 avaient des bureaux de poste dans l'ancien Empire ottoman auront la faculté de les rétablir en Turquie.

Or, d'après l'article 433 du même Traité, la Russie n'est admise à accéder à cet acte que lorsqu'elle sera admise comme membre de la Société des Nations.

Dans ces circonstances, les Hauts-Commissaires de France, de Grande-Bretagne et d'Italie ne peuvent que constater le bien-fondé de la réclamation de la Porte à cet égard.

N

Ils ont l'honneur, par conséquent, d'exprimer l'espoir que M. le Représentant diplomatique russe ne verra pas d'objections à ce que les ordres nécessaires soient donnés à l'effet de faire cesser les opérations du bureau en question.

Ils sauront gré à M. Neratof de bien vouloir les aviser en temps utile des mesures prises à cet effet.

Constantinople, le 4 mars 1921.

[E 3301/50/44]

No. 64.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 15.)

(No. 260.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, March 9, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a memorial addressed to me by the two delegates professing to speak for the Moslems of Thrace regarding the alleged persecution of the Moslem population of that region by the Greek occupying forces,* more especially since the meeting of the London Conference.

2. A Greek gentleman of Constantinople, who held a high position under M. Saktouris, the Greek High Commissioner installed at Adrianople after the occupation of Eastern Thrace, recently assured a member of my staff that the policy of M. Saktouris had been to conciliate Moslem feeling even at the cost of postponing in many cases any attempt to redress the grievances of Greeks dispossessed of their property during the period of hostilities. He said that this policy was being continued under the Constantinist régime.

3. On the other hand, it is freely asserted by the Turks that the Greeks are leaving no stone unturned to terrorise the Moslem populations of the regions of which they took possession after the signature of the Treaty of Sèvres, with a view to influence the result of the further enquiry regarding these regions contemplated by the London Conference. A Turkish informant, a relative of whom recently came from Adrianople to Constantinople, informed Sir Harry Lamb on the 3rd March that the Greeks were collecting "mazbatas," or certificates, from the Moslem population expressive of satisfaction with the new régime, admitting the existence of a Christian majority in their district, and so forth.

4. This procedure is commonly followed by dominant factions in this country, of whatsoever race, on similar occasions. In the present instance it would not be an unnatural corollary of the procedure to see Turks of the better class arrested in consequence of their unwillingness to yield to ordinary inducements to sign such papers. I am, however, unable to vouch in any way for the definite allegations made in the enclosed memorial.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,

High Commissioner.

[E 3343/1/44]

No. 65.

Earl Curzon to Sir H. Rumbold (Constantinople).

(No. 240.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, March 15, 1921.

THE Grand Vizier, in much better health, and in greater spirits than on the occasion of his former visit, called upon me at the Foreign Office this afternoon in order to bid good-bye.

His manner on this occasion was assured and his utterance voluble, and there was no concealment on his part of the fact that he was leaving England in a very good humour at the concessions which had been made.

Following up the advance which he had made to me on the previous occasion at the instance of the Sultan, he told me that the latter was exceedingly anxious to fortify the closer co-operation, which he hoped would exist in the future between Turkey and Great Britain, by a separate alliance or agreement with ourselves. He realised, however, that at a time when we were acting in close concert with the other Great Powers such a solution was impracticable and could not receive favourable consideration

* Not printed.

at our hands. He therefore refrained from putting it forward, but he wished me to know what had been in the mind of his royal master and what was the future situation to which the latter looked forward.

I made no comment upon this suggestion, except to say that the Grand Vizier was quite right in thinking that it was impossible for us to take any step at the present juncture in separation from our allies.

His Excellency, while protesting that he did not want to raise any question of a revision of the Treaty of Sèvres beyond that which had been officially proposed, then proceeded, in contravention of his own assurance, to plead for lighter treatment in respect of Thrace. His argument was really a plea for the Enos-Midia as against the Chatalja line.

I allowed him to develop his case without interruption, but informed him at the end that an essential condition of the modifications that had been proposed was the maintenance of the rest of the Treaty of Sèvres intact, and that it was therefore out of the question that an exception should be made in the case of Thrace. The Turkish Government should bow to the facts of the situation and be grateful for the very substantial concessions that had been made.

The Grand Vizier then went on to give me a rather interesting account of the private relations which had existed between the Angora delegation and himself. He admitted that they had come to the Conference with some suspicion of each other, and that the relations for the first day or two had been strained. At the end of that time, Bekir Sami Bey having shown a very conciliatory spirit, they had acted in close co-operation, and he hoped to have established relations with the Angora delegation which would render co-operation between the two much easier than had at one time been imagined. The "wild cats of Angora" had indeed, according to him, become quite tame under his fatherly care.

Tewfik Pasha then proceeded to develop a long argument about the increase in customs duty to which the High Commissioners had agreed at Constantinople. Apparently this particular concession was not in the least what the Turkish Government desired and would not result to them in the pecuniary advantage which was the only thing to which they really attached importance. They did not want an *ad valorem* duty at all, and the 11 per cent., in practice, would mean a realised duty of not more than one-half.

I did not either interrupt or follow the Grand Vizier in this argument, which he continued until he had exhausted the fertility of the vein.

We then parted with hopes—the realisation of which, considering his advanced age, I cannot but doubt—that we might meet again.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 3296/116/58]

No. 66.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 15.)

(No. 250.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, March 8, 1921.

THE following information regarding the present situation in the Caucasus has been furnished by the Rev. H. W. Harcourt, who has been the representative of the Lord Mayor of London's Armenian Relief Committee in Erivan and Tiflis for more than a year past, and who arrived in Constantinople on the 2nd instant.

2. Mr. Harcourt only left Tiflis on the eve of the occupation of the city by the Soviet forces. Up to the last moment the Georgian Government had been optimistic, and he is of opinion that they had greatly underrated the enemy's strength and efficiency, as well as the scope of his operations. According to Mr. Harcourt the Georgian army never had a chance of successful resistance to the Soviet invasion, which he describes as another step in a far-reaching strategic and political scheme, which aims at the re-establishment of the old Russian Government of the Caucasus, under the disguise of a chain of federated Soviet republics, taking their political and military direction from Moscow.

3. Mr. Harcourt believes that an armed conflict between the Soviet forces and the Kemalists is almost inevitable, in consequence of the continued occupation by the latter of Kars and Alexandropol, and the report that they have occupied Ardahan and Artvin, which have been evacuated by the Georgians and are advancing towards Batum. If such a conflict takes place, he is convinced that the Soviet forces will have

[6668]

N 2

no difficulty in driving the Turks out of all the occupied territory, and even in pushing on to Trebizond and Erzingian, if they are so inclined.

4. The recent revolution, whereby the Dashnak Party overthrew the Soviet Government in Erivan is regarded by Mr. Harcourt as a most unfortunate move for the Armenians, who would have been better advised to remain quiet and wait upon events, as the Soviet forces are almost certain to return in force, and treat the Armenians with far greater severity than before.

5. Economically also he considers the present outlook in Armenia to be most gloomy, as owing to the prevailing anarchy all the arrangements which had been made for feeding the refugees until the end of this winter have completely broken down, and all the relief organisations have had to be withdrawn. Mr. Harcourt, in fact, fears that a large proportion of the surviving Armenians in the Caucasus may now perish by starvation and disease.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

[E 3415/1/44]

No. 67.

Earl Granville to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 18.)

(No. 118.)

My Lord,

Athens, March 10, 1921.

WITH reference to my despatches Nos. 95 and 105 of the 1st and 5th instant, I have the honour to report that, since the news reached Athens that the London Conference might decide to revise the Treaty of Sèvres in certain respects as far as Thrace and Smyrna were concerned, I have received from all over the country a continuous stream of appeals against any such revision, including about 200 telegrams, and I understand that similar messages reached my French, Italian and United States colleagues. Whilst too much importance need not, I submit, be attached to such messages, which are undoubtedly inspired from headquarters, it is nevertheless impossible to ignore the fact that the desire to maintain intact the treaty is the one question upon which all parties in Greece and Greater Greece, with one exception, can be said to be united, and all look to England for salvation.

His Majesty's consular officers at Salonica, Volo, Patras, Corfu, Zante, Canea and Syra have forwarded to me resolutions from various representative bodies in their respective districts. These resolutions are more or less to the following effect:—

1. To manifest the unshakeable resolve to undergo every sacrifice to maintain the struggle of liberation pending the execution of the Treaty of Sèvres.
2. To declare that the army and people have never wearied of the struggle on behalf of their racial ideals and the complete liberation of their brothers.
3. That they are convinced that it is impossible for the Great Powers to surrender the incontrovertible rights of Greece, ratified by their own signatures in the treaty, seeing that Greece, by the mandate of the Allies, has been submitted to such great sacrifices of blood and money ever since the great war ended.

There was, I am informed, a poor attendance at the public meetings at Zante and Volo which adopted the resolutions, but at Volo this may have been due partly to the meeting not having been announced in time and also to the greater excitement caused by the social unrest there (see my despatch No. 94 of the 1st March). At Corfu a crowd of demonstrators with bands played the British National Anthem in front of His Majesty's consulate.

Resolutions of a similar nature have reached me from the Popular Political League (i.e., the Reservist League) of Athens, the Greek League for the Rights of Women, the National Council of Greek Women, the Central Committee of Unredeemed Greeks, the Club of the Dodecanesians, the university students, &c.

In this connection I may mention that I have also received a copy of a telegram sent to the British Prime Minister by a committee representing the inhabitants of Castellorizo, praying that the liberty of their island, which they maintain has been Greek for 3,000 years, may be defended.

Strange as it may seem, the Government press has been daily engaged in trying to

prove that M. Veniselos has been using his influence with the Powers to bring about a revision of the treaty in a spirit hostile to Greece, and any modifications in this sense will no doubt be laid at his door by his enemies.

The one exception, referred to above, to this unity of desire to maintain the treaty is to be found in the Socialist-Communist Party, whose organ, the "Rizospastis," publishes a warning to the following effect:—

"On the occasion of the great war there were people who succeeded by force and by fraud, despite the stubborn resistance of the Greek people, in dragging Greece into war. There are people who, taking advantage of the new crisis, want to put Greece again into war in order to sell their services to the Allies, in the hope that their ambitions will be satisfied by the annexation of territories and that they will secure themselves in office. To them we say clearly that the Greek people will resist in arms any attempt to compel them to take part in a new world-war, and we communists will urge the people to this resistance and will organise them."

I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
(For the Minister),

C. H. BENTINCK.

[E 3741/1/44]

No. 68.

Earl Granville to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 29)

(No. 126.)

My Lord,

Athens, March 17, 1921.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 95 of the 1st instant, I have the honour to report that the news of the proposals which the London Conference has now submitted to the Greek and Turkish delegates for a compromise scheme covering certain modifications in the Treaty of Sèvres, has not been favourably commented upon in the press although it has not created anything like the alarm which was caused a fortnight ago by the suggested Inter-Allied Commission to study ethnical questions in Thrace and Smyrna.

It is pointed out that Turkey was, is, and will always remain the friend of Germany and the enemy of Greece and the *Entente* Powers, and in any future trouble with a resuscitated Germany, she will always be able to count upon Turkish support. Hence everything which may now be done tending to strengthen Turkey will cause trouble in the future, as soon as Germany is sufficiently recovered to revenge herself upon her enemies. Greece and the *Entente* must pull together in the future as in the past.

The hostility of Italy to anything tending to strengthen Greece is fully appreciated in this country. The recent attitude of France, who calls upon Great Britain to support her in forcing upon Germany the fulfilment of all the terms of the Versailles Treaty and at the same time, whilst retaining her own rights in Syria, wants British support to enable her to destroy part of the Treaty of Sèvres, has evoked very severe criticism in the press and elsewhere. France, it is pointed out, was glad enough to get all the help she possibly could from Greece during the war. Now she turns round and makes peace with Greece's enemy—Kemal. This will not only release extra forces for Kemal to use elsewhere, but it is suggested that France may even hand over to Kemal arms and supplies which he will certainly employ against the Greeks—France's late allies!

All look to Great Britain for support and profess great friendship for her, but how far the majority of Royalists are sincere in their professions is open to doubt. All are convinced that it is in England's interests to see a powerful Greece, but disappointment is expressed that England should have allowed herself to act against her better judgment in order to please France, and that she should have joined Italy and France in repudiating a treaty which she had signed. Some Government papers seek to throw the blame on M. Veniselos for having sided against the common enemy with the *Entente*, which now leaves Greece in the lurch.

Greece, it is stated, cannot accept the proposals as they stand. MM. Calogeropoulos and Gounaris would never be able to return with such a treaty to present to the

National Assembly. The Assembly, says the "Athenai" (Independent), would return a unanimous vote against any modifications in the Treaty of Sèvres, and in so doing it would be voicing the sentiments of the entire nation, which demands that the mandate given to Greece in Asia Minor shall remain intact. "Eleftheros Typos" (Veniselist) writes in much the same sense. According to the "Embros" (Veniselist), the whole edifice erected at Sèvres is about to crumble to pieces. The Sultan Sovereign at Smyrna and its hinterland; a Christian Governor whom the Greeks will not appoint; Greek troops confined to the town, means the loss of Smyrna to Greece. The withdrawal of the menace to Turkey contained in article 36 will leave the Turk free to massacre unredeemed Greeks and Armenians to their hearts' content, the one restraining factor having been removed. Greece, according to the "Athenai," will see the dream of Constantinople vanish before her eyes. Greece, who has already suffered so much in the common cause, will be compelled, so the "Embros" says, to make war in the future on two fronts against both Turks and Bulgars. She does not seek war, but will not hesitate to fight if necessity should arise.

The idea of promptly being able to settle matters with Kemal does not seem to worry anyone. All are convinced of the superiority of the Greek forces both in number, arms, discipline, &c., and a rumour is now current, of which I have been unable to obtain confirmation, that Greece is about to advance for this very purpose.

According to some, however, all the Royalist talk of a "last ditch" is mere bluff, and they would be willing to come to an arrangement about Smyrna if they could find some means of putting all the blame on the backs of the Veniselists. M. Gounaris's organ, the "Protevousa," contained an article the other day in quite a different strain to those which usually fill the press. In the course of this article, the following passage occurs:—

"The Conference of London will free the Greek people from the nightmare of the Asia Minor campaign, which has neither beginning nor end and no objective purpose, and which does not promise to lead to the military settlement of our difficulties with Turkey. . . . Those who long after the national achievements of the expelled statesman must not forget that the entanglement of our army in Asia Minor, which threatens to paralyse our natural life, is his work."

In view of criticisms of this paragraph on the part of the Veniselist press, the "Protevousa" endeavoured to explain it away the next day.

I am forwarding a copy of this despatch to His Majesty's High Commissioner at Constantinople.

I have, &c.
(For the Minister),
C. H. BENTINCK.

[E 3739/1/44]

No. 69.

Lord Hardinge to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 29.)

(No. 918.)

My Lord,

Paris, March 24, 1921.

DURING the joint meeting of the Senate of the Foreign Affairs and Finance Commissions, reported in my despatch No. 917 of to-day's date, M. Briand, in referring to the Near Eastern question, declared that he had found the Turks conciliatory and desirous of working with France. He reminded the commissions that the Turks had accepted the procedure of a plebiscite at Smyrna and in Thrace without even requiring as a condition the evacuation of the Greek army.

The attitude of the Greeks was less clear; but as regards Smyrna it appeared that M. Gounaris was disposed to satisfy the Turks.

In their agreement with France, said M. Briand, the Turks obtained all Cilicia with the district of the Gulf of Alexandretta, but not the port. On the other side, the frontier followed a line from Alexandretta to Nizib, leaving the Bagdad railway within French Syria. He added that he expected to bring back to France shortly the troops liberated by the evacuation of Cilicia, while he wished to recall from Syria a certain number of officials and substitute for the present régime there an administration based on an understanding with the local authorities.

I have, &c.
(For the Ambassador),
MILNE CHEETHAM.

[E 3760/1/44]

No. 70.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 30.)

(No. 292.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, March 23, 1921.

I PAID a long visit to the Minister for Foreign Affairs on the 19th instant, and discussed with him the suggestions which have been submitted to the two Turkish delegations in London for certain modifications in the Treaty of Sèvres.

2. I reminded the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the conversation in which he had outlined the modifications of the treaty which the Turkish Government hoped to secure at the London Conference. This conversation was recorded in my despatch No. 108 of the 21st January last. I said that the Turkish Government seemed to have secured the greater part of their desiderata.

3. I then impressed on Sefa Bey the fact that the concessions in question were entirely due to initiative of His Majesty's Government. Their representatives had suggested the concessions in question, and had, indeed, for the most part drafted them. I emphasised the fact that the solution now offered to the Turkish Government was mainly inspired by the sincere desire of His Majesty's Government to satisfy the legitimate claims and susceptibilities of Turkey, in order to facilitate her recovery from the fatal effects of her recent policy.

4. I pointed out that His Majesty's Government had no particular axe to grind in Turkey. They were sincerely anxious to see peace restored in this part of the world, and wanted a unified and prosperous Turkey. I said that Sefa Bey must be under no misapprehension on this point as well as regards the rôle played by the British representatives at the recent conference in London.

5. The Minister for Foreign Affairs said that he was convinced of the truth of the foregoing statements, and declared that the moral and economic support of Great Britain were indispensable to the prosperity of Turkey. The Turkish Government wished to resume their former relations of friendship with England. But we ought not, he said, as in the past, to allow intrigues to prejudice the relations between our two countries. We had not been sufficiently alive in the past to such intrigues which had commenced many years back, long before the Russo-Turkish war. The Russians had then been the principal intriguers against England, and they had been followed by the Germans.

6. As I did not wish Sefa Bey to develop this theme in the sense that we ought to beware of either French or Italian intrigue in the future, I observed that we had been working cordially with our allies, and that I did not see who was going to intrigue against us in the future. I added that intrigue, certainly in the past, seemed to be inherent in the atmosphere of Constantinople.

7. Sefa Bey then alluded to two points in the proposed modifications. These were the nationality of the proposed Governor of Smyrna, and the inclusion of Constantinople in the Straits zone of the Bosphorus.

8. As regards the former of these questions, he said that he hoped that the League of Nations would not choose a Greek Governor of Smyrna town. I replied that it was impossible to forecast the nationality of the person whom the League of Nations would select for this post. In the case of Danzig, the League of Nations had appointed an Englishman.

9. As regards the Bosphorus, Sefa Bey said that, in his opinion, it would be sufficient if the demilitarised zone began at, or in the neighbourhood of, Buyuk-Dere and at a point on the Asiatic shore immediately opposite, leaving Constantinople out of the Straits zone. Sefa Bey made no allusion to Thrace.

10. He then alluded to the arrangement which the Angora delegation is reported to have concluded with the Italians about the Adalia region, and stated that he was afraid the Italians would have been found to have secured a position of such economic preponderance as would seriously hamper the Turks in the development of the region in question. I replied that, whilst I knew nothing whatever about this arrangement, I thought that the Turkish Nationalists would not have given away as much as Sefa Bey feared. He replied that the Nationalist delegation did not include men who were gifted with foresight, but I am inclined to think that Sefa Bey's remarks on this subject are inspired with a certain degree of mortification at the preponderant rôle played by the Angora delegation.

11. Speaking generally, I derive the impression that Sefa Bey is really gratified at the results obtained by the Turkish delegations in London, and he gave no

indication that the Constantinople Government would endeavour to raise the question of Thrace and make difficulties generally about the modifications now submitted to them.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

[E 3765/1/44]

No. 71.

Sir H. Rumbold to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 30.)

(No. 300.)

My Lord,

Constantinople, March 23, 1921.

WITH reference to my telegram No. 199 of the 22nd instant, I have the honour to state that my French and Italian colleagues and myself were received by the Sultan in successive audiences on the 21st March. It had come to my knowledge that the Sultan desired to confer more particularly with myself. I therefore availed myself of the opportunity presented by the close of the London Conference to propose to my colleagues that we should wait on His Majesty with a view to enlist his support in securing the acceptance by Turkey of the settlement now proposed. I desired for my own part also to emphasise the rôle played by His Majesty's Government in the recent negotiations, and the spirit of conciliation which they in particular had shown without seeking any special advantages for themselves.

2. The Sultan kept me for two hours and a quarter. I was accompanied by Mr. Ryan. His Majesty again preferred that no other person should be present. He dismissed his own attendant at the outset of the audience, and asked Mr. Ryan to interpret. The Sultan was even more than usually clear and emphatic in explaining his main ideas, but he repeated himself and interrupted frequently. The present record will therefore give a full account of what passed without attempting to follow the exact order of the conversation.

3. I had prepared a memorandum of what I particularly wished to say to His Majesty. I enclose a copy of this paper, a Turkish version of which was read by Mr. Ryan, after I had stated by way of preface that I considered the moment particularly opportune for an exchange of views with His Majesty, in view of the new turn which events had taken as a result of the London Conference.

4. The Sultan listened attentively to the memorandum, the importance of which he recognised. He asked to be allowed to keep a copy of it for his personal use. He said his memory was defective, and there were points which would require consultation with his Ministers. He assured me that if I left the paper with him I could rely entirely on his secrecy. I said I had no instructions to make any written communication, but I consented to leave the memorandum with His Majesty in full reliance on his discretion, and on the distinct understanding that the communication I had made was still to be regarded as a purely verbal one.

5. Though the Sultan thus showed his sense of the importance of the communication, I found him completely preoccupied with the internal situation and his own position. He said he had expressed a desire to meet me because he realised that matters were entering on a new phase which would react enormously on the situation in Turkey. He had desired the meeting to take place earlier because he thought that events would move very quickly. Definite developments had not come as soon as he expected, and he would still like to give me his personal views of what had happened. He produced three telegrams addressed by Mustapha Kemal to Tewfik Pasha on the 28th and 29th January, in the course of the correspondence arising out of the invitation to the London Conference. I found that the telegrams were among those which had been published, and which I had the honour to forward to your Lordship in translation some little time ago. The Sultan said that they represented, photographically as it were, the mentality of the Angora leaders. They constituted an attempt to compromise the throne and to reduce its authority. The suggestion regarding his civil list in the last telegram was definitely insulting. These telegrams were the answer of Angora to temperate communications from Constantinople. The last was such that no answer could be or had been returned by his Government.

6. I observed that the communication which I had made showed clearly the attitude of His Majesty's Government regarding the Sultan's person and throne. I assured him that the desire of his Majesty's Government was to see Turkey united under him as its sovereign.

7. The Sultan expressed gratitude for the regard shown for himself and his position. He said, however, that the situation in Asia Minor was this. A handful of brigands had established complete ascendancy. They were few in number, but they had got a stranglehold on the people as a whole, profiting by their submissiveness, their timidity or their penury. Their strength lay in the backing of 16,000 military officers who were concerned for their own future personal interests. He admitted that a man like Bekir Sami Bey was reasonable, but those who had sent him to London were entirely Chauvinistic.

8. I expressed the hope that on the new basis created by the London conversations it would be possible to rally all well-disposed elements in the country into a single whole under the guidance of His Majesty.

9. The Sultan said that he agreed as to the main principle, but that he could not agree as regards details. The Angora leaders were men without any real stake in this country, with which they had no connection of blood or anything else. Mustapha Kemal was a Macedonian revolutionary of unknown origin. His blood might be anything—Bulgarian, Greek or Serbian, for instance. He looked rather like a Serbian! Bekir Sami was a Circassian. They were all the same, Albanians, Circassians, anything but Turkish. There was not a real Turk among them. He and his Government were, nevertheless, powerless before them. The hold was such that there was no means of access to the real Turks, even by way of propaganda. The real Turks were loyal to the core, but they were intimidated or they were hoodwinked by fantastic misrepresentations like the story of his own captivity. These brigands were the men who sought his submission. They looked for external support and found it in the Bolsheviks. The Bolsheviks were now close up against the Turkish frontier. The Angora leaders were still playing with them. They might discover and regret too late that they had brought on Turkey the fate of Azerbaijan. Moslem Turks could have nothing to do with Bolshevism, for it was incompatible with their religion, but if it were imposed on them by force, what then?

10. I repeated that His Majesty's Government desired unity in Turkey on the lines I had indicated. Their desire to see representatives from Angora in the Turkish delegation was based on a wish to bring Angora into touch with realities. A man living on the top of a mountain quickly lost touch with the world of fact. His Majesty's Government wished that Angora should see through the eyes of its delegates in a Western milieu what the true situation was.

11. The Sultan said he knew his Mustapha Kemal well. You might set him down in London for twenty or thirty years, replace him on the top of his mountain for twenty-four hours, and he would at once revert to type. His Majesty said there was no hope whatsoever that Angora would accept the London settlement. The leaders there would prefer to carry on their movement. He quoted the Turkish proverb which says that "The wolf loves the air of a fog." Izzet Pasha and his colleagues had returned from the interior. He had seen the three chief members of Izzet Pasha's Mission collectively. They had been a little shy perhaps of talking quite openly before each other. Nevertheless, the general information they gave was most discouraging. He doubted whether if a mission had been sent to Moscow it would have been treated with so much contumely as Izzet Pasha's Mission had been treated in Angora.

12. The Sultan consulted a short memorandum of five numbered points to which he said he wished to draw my particular attention. They were as follows:—

- (1.) The Caliphate was in principle conferred by the procedure called *Be'at* or rendering of homage. It was possible that the Angora leaders would set up a Caliph of their own and compel a semblance of the formal rendering of homage, which was the mark of acceptance by the people.
- (2.) The rule of succession in his dynasty invested all the male descendants of the Imperial House with a right to the reversion of the throne. The Angora leaders were capable of taking advantage of that fact to set up some junior member of his House as Sultan.
- (3.) The connection between the Sultanate and the Caliphate was that of two complementary parts of a single whole. The Caliphate was not like the Papacy. Temporal power was an adjunct essential to its completeness. The pretension of the Angora leaders to transfer all temporal power in Turkey to their own Government was likely to be followed by a transference of the Caliphate. It might be vested in some prince set up as Sultan, or, failing that, some sherif or such like, with a semblance of the qualification of power.

- (4.) The removal of the Caliphate from Constantinople would be fraught with disastrous consequences. He was not speaking now of his own position, but of the general interest of Europe. If the Caliphate were taken eastward from a place in which it was under control, it would become an instrument in the hands of uncontrollable elements, "the wolves who loved the air of a fog."
- (5.) The financial situation of the Constantinople Government rendered it completely powerless. Even here the bulk of the people were under the influence of fear or poverty. Officials were flying to the interior from the destitution to which they had been reduced here. Tewfik Pasha reported that your Lordship had shown a benevolent spirit in regard to the financial situation, but had said that a definite result must depend on his (the Grand Vizier's) further conversations in Paris.

13. I noted the Sultan's first four points without discussion. As regards the fifth, I said that my French colleague and I were exerting ourselves equally to bring about a settlement of certain outstanding questions of money claimed by the Turkish Government, notably those with the Tobacco Régie, with the Eastern Telegraph Company, and with the French Government in respect of moneys obtained from the Turkish Treasury early in the armistice. I agreed with an interpolation of the Sultan that relief from such sources would be transitory, but observed that a settlement of the customs question would give relief of a more lasting kind. I explained briefly the controversy which was delaying this settlement, and intimated that the abandonment of the Allied objection to the maintenance of the consumption duties should facilitate the settlement on a basis which the Allies had throughout proposed, namely, a return to the *ad valorem* system.

14. The Sultan said he was not an expert in finance. There was evidently some misunderstanding about the customs question, which could only be cleared up by the return of Tewfik Pasha. The fact which impressed him was the penury which reigned. The situation was such that his Government had lost its head. The last Government had lost its head completely. The present Government was no better off, and was, moreover, subject to occult influences.

15. The Sultan went on to speak more particularly about matters touching his personal position. He said that a change of Government might have to be faced on Tewfik Pasha's return. He had full confidence in Tewfik Pasha, and had no desire to part with him. Tewfik Pasha was, however, an old man. He might find his position untenable or he might wish to resign for personal reasons. His Majesty referred to his own position as being one of complete helplessness and isolation, and referred to conversations with my predecessor in which he had foreshadowed such a situation. He was asked to make his submission to a handful of rebels. He was prepared to make any personal sacrifice, but he could not sacrifice his honour, imperil his heritage, or compromise the interests of his throne by a submission so shameful. He indeed desired unity, but it could only be on the basis of submission of the rebels to the lawful authority, and yet he found himself completely impotent to assert that authority.

16. In this part of the conversation the Sultan spoke to me with great frankness and intimacy of the situation as it affected his own person. I fear I was able to give him very little comfort. I could only thank him before withdrawing for the great confidence he had reposed in me.

I have, &c.

HORACE RUMBOLD,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 71.

Memorandum.

SINCE I last had the honour of being received by your Majesty the general situation has very much changed. I therefore suggested to my colleagues that we should wait on your Majesty in order to enlighten you on the latest developments. These developments have been favourable to Turkey, and I am glad that the capital of my country should have been the scene of them. Your Majesty yourself did me the honour a short time ago to send me a private message expressing satisfaction at this fact. I did

not fail to inform Lord Curzon of this message. In reply he had authorised me to convey to your Majesty an expression of the great sympathy with which His Majesty's Government regard the person of your Majesty, and with which they have followed your efforts throughout a most difficult period to serve the true interests of your country. His Majesty's Government have great confidence in the will and power of your Majesty to co-operate in the work of pacification of the Near East. They earnestly hope that the proposals elaborated at the London Conference may supply a basis for this pacification and for the re-establishment of unity in Turkey under the wise guidance of your Majesty.

When it was decided that the recent Conference should be held in London, His Majesty's Government felt that a special duty devolved on them of seeking a basis which would satisfy the legitimate aspirations of the Turkish people and enable Turkey to resume a useful place among the nations of the East, in spite of the disasters which had overtaken her owing to the actions of those persons who had involved her in the war. His Majesty's Government knew that this could only be done by working in complete accord with their Allies, as they have done for the last six and a half years. Their duty, therefore, was to submit to their Allies at the Conference proposals which would safeguard the interests of all, including those of the Turkish people, which is primarily concerned. The nature of these proposals is known to your Majesty. They are based on suggestions made at the Conference by the representations of His Majesty's Government. In making these suggestions His Majesty's Government had in mind the frequent appeals which your Majesty and your statesmen have made for British friendship and support, and they were animated by a sincere desire to show that these appeals had not been disregarded.

His Majesty's Government have not sought at any time in the last two and a half years to secure special interests of their own in Turkey. Their only desire has been to bring into existence a new Turkey which will live on good terms with all its neighbours, including the British Empire, and in which all the elements will enjoy the blessings of good government. They are convinced that any special British interests which exist in Turkey itself will be fully secured if those two principal objects of their policy are attained.

The proposals recently formulated provide a most favourable opportunity for Turkey. If all Turks unite under your Majesty to take advantage of this opportunity there is a strong hope that this country will enter on a new era of prosperity, that the ancient relations of friendship between Great Britain and Turkey will be restored. If, on the contrary, owing to the persistence of certain persons in exaggerated pretensions, the opportunity is lost, the situation will enter into a new phase of uncertainty and trouble. His Majesty's Government, confident of the good-will of your Majesty, and knowing the great influence exercised by the Sultanate and the Caliphate, beg that that influence may be used to promote a settlement of the Eastern question on the basis of these proposals.

CHAPTER III.—PALESTINE AND SYRIA.

[E 351/351/88]

No. 72.

Sir R. Graham to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 7.)

(No. 5.)

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to report that the first great Zionist meeting held in this country took place in the concert hall at Amsterdam yesterday afternoon. Dr. Weizmann and M. Jabotinski, who had come over from England for the purpose, were the principal speakers.

I had been invited to be present as the representative of the mandatory Power, and, in accordance with the authority conveyed to me in your Lordship's telegram No. 157 of the 28th ultimo, I attended the meeting.

The great concert hall, where the famous Mengelberg concerts take place, was packed to overflowing. Between 2,000 and 3,000 persons were present, and many were turned away at the doors. The hall was decorated with the Dutch, British and Zionist flags.

M. A. Asscher, President of the Zionist Council of Amsterdam, was in the chair, and in a short speech welcomed the guests present and declared the meeting opened, after which he called upon me to address it.

I received an extremely cordial welcome, and, in thanking the audience, I said that I took it as a demonstration of respect and confidence towards His Majesty's Government, a confidence which they would certainly deserve. The appointment of a High Commissioner of the Jewish faith in the shape of that distinguished statesman and public servant, Sir H. Samuel, was an earnest of the spirit in which they were approaching their task. After a reference to the difficulties confronting the Zionists, which could only be overcome by perseverance, patience and united effort, I paid a tribute to Dr. Weizmann's eminent services to the cause, and made a reference to M. Jabotinski in connection with the Jewish Legion. After expressing pleasure at this opportunity of meeting one of the most venerable and distinguished Jewish communities in the world, I wished all success and prosperity to the Jewish national home. At the conclusion of this brief address, the audience rose and cheered for some minutes.

I was indeed astonished at the cordiality of my reception, and at the enthusiasm which every reference to Great Britain or His Majesty's Government appeared to provoke. A leading Dutch Zionist sitting next to me remarked: "You see that these people really understand how much His Majesty's Government have done, and are doing, for the Zionist cause, and that they are glad to seize an opportunity of showing their gratitude."

M. Jabotinski, in an impassioned speech which was much applauded, appealed for the help of the Dutch Jewish community. His declaration that what the Jews wanted was, not a Jewish national home, but a Jewish State, was loudly cheered.

Dr. Weizmann, who was very warmly received, delivered an extremely eloquent and telling speech in which he enumerated the difficulties confronting the administration in Palestine, referred with discretion to the attitude of the French Government and of the Arabs, and pointed out that the British Government, who had already done so much, could not be expected to bear the entire burden, and that the ultimate success of the venture depended upon the support which it received from the Jews as a whole. He was accorded an ovation at the end of his speech.

The proceedings terminated with a few words from the chairman, and with the singing of the "Hatikvah."

In a conversation this afternoon the Netherlands Minister for Foreign Affairs told me that he had received a full report of the meeting. M. de Karnebeek congratulated me upon the great success that it had been, and said that he thought it rather remarkable that an audience composed of Amsterdam Jews, whose language was generally German and who were supposed to be under German influence, should have accorded such a warm reception to the British representative as he had heard they had given me, and should have cheered all references to His Majesty's Government. I could only agree with his Excellency.

I have, &c.

R. GRAHAM.

[E 440/144/88]

No. 73.

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 10, 1921.)

(No. 218.)

My Lord,

Jerusalem, December 17, 1920.

IN accordance with the instructions contained in your telegram No. 248 of the 16th November, I have the honour to submit the following report on the number of Jewish immigrants that have entered Palestine during the month of November and the system adopted for their absorption into labour:—

2.—(1.) Total immigration of Jews into Palestine	...	1,184
(2.) Number arriving with sanction of the Zionist Commission	...	1,166
(3.) Number arriving without sanction of the Zionist Commission	...	18
(4.) Number endeavouring to enter without passports	...	Nil.

3. All Jewish immigrants entering Palestine under the auspices of the Zionist Organisation are guaranteed by that body for one year from the date of their arrival.

4. Immigrants are absorbed into the labour of the country under the direction of the Zionist Commission, who have evolved two schemes for this purpose:—

(a.) Under the Direct Control of the Zionist Commission.

A certain but as yet small number are employed in agricultural work and in reclaiming the land with a view to establishing new settlements. This work is costly and necessitates considerable capital outlay, and in consequence the number that can be thus employed is for the present small.

(b.) On Contract Work with the Public Works Department, Military Authorities and the Palestine Railway.

There is a considerable demand for skilled labour, and those of the immigrants whose capacity is up to the required standard have no difficulty in finding suitable employment with good wages.

Unskilled labourers are drafted by the Jewish Palestinian Labour Organisation into groups. The organisation becomes the contracting party for the work undertaken, and the Zionist Commission guarantee the fulfilment of the contract. The work mainly consists in the building of roads for Public Works Department and the army, and to a lesser extent on constructional and repair work for the Palestine railways.

It is anticipated that the number employed by the Palestine Railway will shortly be increased as soon as arrangements can be made for the replacement of the Egyptian Labour Corps by immigrant labour.

5. No preferential treatment is shown to immigrant labour, which is paid according to local current rates.

I have, &c.

HERBERT SAMUEL,

High Commissioner.

[E 441/35/88]

No. 74.

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 10, 1921.)

(No. 219.)

My Lord,

Jerusalem, December 21, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to refer to your Lordship's despatch No. 419 regarding Article No. VIII (b) of the Resolutions of the Elected Assembly.

It is very much regretted that an error was made in the translation of this article from the Hebrew into English. It should have read:—

"The Zionist Executive shall give to the Jewish population of Palestine, by means of representatives, a share in the control of the affairs of the Central Zionist Organisation in Palestine and in the institutions appertaining to that organisation."

I have, &c.

HERBERT SAMUEL, High Commissioner.

[E 442/29/88]

No. 75.

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 10, 1921.)

(No. 220.)

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 418 of the 3rd December, 1920, transmitting ten printed copies of my despatch No. 96 and enclosures, which will be of service to me.

In accordance with your Lordship's request, I enclose herewith a tabular statement giving the proportion of British and Palestinian officials in the posts already filled.

I have, &c.
(For High Commissioner),
E. KEITH-ROACH.

Enclosure in No. 75.

Statement giving Proportion of British and Palestinian Officials.

	British.	Natives or locally recruited.			Total.
		Christians.	Jews.	Moslems.	
Secretariat	10	1	11
Jerusalem district	8	3	1	1	13
Galilee	5	4	..	1	10
Jaffa	4	3	1	..	8
Phoenicia	4	3	2	2	11
Samaria	4	2	6
Gaza	2	3	5
Beersheba	2	1	3
Finance—					
Customs and revenue	3	6	..	2	11
Treasury	9	2	11
Public Health	7	2	9
Jerusalem district	2	8	1	1	12
Beersheba	1	1
Jaffa	1	6	2	..	9
Gaza	3	3
Phoenicia	1	8	9
Samaria	1	3	..	1	5
Galilee	1	3	..	2	6
Gaza district (travelling ophthalmic hospital)	1	1
Law and Justice	5	3	2	2	12
Jerusalem—					
District court	1	..	1	2	4
Civil	2	1	1	4
Moslem religious court of appeal	3	3
Sherieh court	2	2
Land registration	2	2	4
Land commission	1	..	1	1	3
Jaffa—					
District court	1	1	..	2	4
Civil	3	3
Sherieh	2	2
Phoenicia—					
District court	1	..	1	2	4
Civil	3	3
Sherieh	2	2
Galilee—					
District court (magistrate and kadi)	2	2
Safed (magistrate)	1	..	1
Tiberias (magistrate and kadi)	2	2
Samaria and Galilee—					
District court	1	3	4
Civil	2	2
Sherieh	1	1
Gaza—					
Civil court	2	2
Sherieh court	1	1
Beersheba: Civil court	1	1

	British.	Natives or locally recruited.			Total.
		Christians.	Jews.	Moslems.	
Education	4	2	..	1	7
Public works	8	..	2	..	10
Public security	5	5
Jerusalem district	1	1	2
Galilee	1	1
Jaffa	1	1	2
Phoenicia	1	..	1
Samaria	1	1
Training school	1	1
Prisons	1	1
Agriculture	3	..	1	1	5
Veterinary section	2	1	..	4	7
Forest	1	..	2	..	3
Commerce and industry	2	..	1	..	3
Survey department	3	3
Antiquities	4	4
Immigration and travel	4	..	1	..	5
Public custodian	1	..	1
Ports and lights	2	2
Posts and telegraphs	11	11
Total	132	74	23	56	285

N.B.—Certain Jews who were in actual fact recruited locally, but who are British, have been included under heading "British."

[E 490/57/88]

No. 76.

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 10, 1921.)

(No. 229.)

My Lord,

Jerusalem, December 27, 1920.

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 319 dated the 22nd December and my telegram No. 444 dated the 21st December, I have the honour to enclose herewith copy of a report forwarded by the Acting District Governor, Jerusalem, giving an account of the Christmas ceremonies at Bethlehem on the night of the 25th-26th December.

I had previously given instructions that no member of my personal staff should attend the ceremony, nor the Acting District Governor, Jerusalem. A few other members of the Government went in a private capacity as spectators.

I have, &c.

HERBERT SAMUEL,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 76.

Report on Christmas Ceremonies at Bethlehem and Privileges accorded French Consul.

THE French consul-general, on arrival in the evening, was received at the Latin Convent with a salute by the French detachment, who were there in strength.

At a few minutes before midnight, the time of commencement of the High Mass, the French consul-general and his wife, accompanied by the vice-consul and his wife, both in uniform, and followed by the two officers of the garrison, entered the Franciscan Church. All the French soldiers, and a number of sailors there as well, rose as they came in.

Special places were put for his party on the balancing right of the gangway, three on the left for the Governor of Jerusalem and Deputy District Governor, Bethlehem, and the Brigadier-General Commanding troops.

He stayed the whole time, and at each Mass was "censed." The Image was also brought him by the Provicar-General to kiss.

At the end candles were given him and his wife, the vice-consul and his wife, and

the two officers of the garrison, and they walked in procession to the grotto immediately behind the Patriarch.

The Spanish and Italian consuls were there unofficially.

There were present in the church three French naval officers and about six military officers other than those of the detachment.

December 26, 1920.

[E 500/500/88]

No. 77.

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 10.)

(No. 243.)

My Lord,

Jerusalem, January 1, 1921.

THE finances of the towns of Palestine are not in a satisfactory state, and their present incomes are not sufficient to enable the many improvements that are necessary and are desired by their inhabitants to be effected.

I therefore appointed a commission, on the 17th September, 1920, to examine the existing sources of revenue of municipalities in Palestine and the methods of collection, and to report what changes, if any, were desirable.

2. The report for the Municipality of Jerusalem has now been received, and a copy is forwarded herewith. It is a comprehensive and lucid document, drafted by Mr. J. B. Barron, assistant financial secretary, the chairman of the commission.

3. Since municipal taxation throughout Palestine is levied in accordance with Ottoman enactments and regulations issued by the late Military Administration of general application throughout the country, this report may be regarded, *mutatis mutandis*, as applicable to all municipalities in Palestine. The special circumstances of each will, however, be made the subject of further investigation, the two Government members of the commission remaining as a permanent nucleus, and the local members being changed as each town is visited in turn.

4. The revenues of municipalities are collected under three authorities, *i.e.* :—

(1.) Ottoman Municipal Tax Law of 1330 (1915).

(2.) Various Ottoman laws and decrees authorising the collection of special fees, *e.g.*, lease fees, shooting licences, &c.

(3.) Proclamations and notices issued by the late Military Administration which sanction the imposition of a house rate, octroi dues, licensing of trade establishments and sanitary dues.

5. The Ottoman Municipal Tax Law of 1330 (1915) was promulgated during the war, and was enforced after the abolition of the Capitulations by the Turkish Government.

It is in part a consolidating enactment, but in so far as it imposes new taxes which had not already been accepted by the Powers prior to the war, I am advised that the law is only legally valid as regards foreigners during the period in which military law is maintained.

It will, therefore, be necessary for the Government to pass an ordinance legalising new municipal taxation imposed after the abolition of the Capitulations and any additional local taxes sanctioned by the late Military Administration.

6. I attach a copy of the Ottoman Municipal Law of 1330, from which it will be observed that local taxes on immovable property provide for an addition of 10 per cent. to the State house tax, the imposition of fees calculated upon the floor space of newly erected buildings, and a tax upon the rental value of public houses and all establishments used for public entertainments. A licence is also required for the occupation of stalls and booths situated on public roads.

Article 25 states that taxes not referred to in the law which are levied in accordance with local custom should continue to be levied as hitherto. In Palestine rates are levied under this article for the purpose of maintaining public security and for watering roads. The late Military Administration in certain towns consolidated these taxes into a house rate, abolishing the 10 per cent. addition to the State house tax. The new rate is not in general application throughout all municipalities, but is levied in Jerusalem, Jaffa, Gaza and Tulkeram only.

Besides these rates the Municipal Tax Law provided for licensing fees levied upon combustible liquids, fuel-driven machinery, road transport, hawkers and pedlars, weights and measures, dogs and advertisements. Auction dues are levied upon sales of animals and movable property; and for all animals slaughtered within the municipal area there are charges for inspection.

Miscellaneous provisions of the law relate to municipal trading, the division between the State and the municipality of profits gained by public companies, and the levy of "betterment" fees.

7. The recommendations of the report of the commission involve a consideration of the immunities enjoyed by ecclesiastical communities under the Capitulations and various foreign treaties.

The commission recommends—

"That the rights of immunity from local taxation now exercised by ecclesiastical and certain civil institutions, and persons, *i.e.*, consuls, be examined and abolished wherever possible."

So far as civil institutions and consuls are concerned I submit that no special exemptions should be maintained.

The question of immunities from the general taxation of the country will no doubt receive the consideration of His Majesty's Government, but as regards local taxation I am inclined to the view that schools, orphanages, and hospitals as well as places of public worship should continue to enjoy immunity, but that other ecclesiastical institutions which are not used exclusively for charitable objects, such as monasteries and hostels, should be rateable for conservancy services carried out by the municipality, *i.e.*, scavenging, street watering, drainage, lighting, water supply and watch and ward. The house rate instituted by the late Military Administration replaced the fees charged under Ottoman regulations for these services, and it is recommended that buildings used by ecclesiastical institutions should be rated at a reduction of 50 per cent. for purposes of the house rate.

The recommendations concerning the house rate propose to place the burden of paying rates upon the landlord. Ecclesiastical institutions are large holders of building property which is leased, and under the system now prevalent the rate is payable by the tenant. The proposal involves that this payment should be assessed upon the ecclesiastical proprietor who at present enjoys immunity. In practice owing to the shortage of house accommodation it may be assumed that the ultimate incidence would be passed on to the occupiers.

Property of this nature may be regarded as revenue producing and not charitable in purpose other than for the provision of funds for the institution concerned, and I am inclined to the view that the owners should be assessed to rates on the same footing as lay proprietors.

It may be observed that after the British Administration was established in Cyprus, Law No. XXI of 1879 abolished all rights of exemption.

8. The late Military Administration authorised the collection of a local octroi duty of 1 per cent. *ad valorem* upon all articles whether imported from abroad or of Palestinian origin. The new tax was imposed to replace the kantar tax levied under Article 17 of the Municipal Tax Law, which allowed goods to be taxed according to a tariff calculated on weight and measurement. In certain instances both octroi and the kantar duties are being levied, the first upon foreign imports and the second upon home products.

It is recognised that in the present insufficiency of municipal revenues, and having regard to the fact that expenditure is likely to increase in the immediate future, it is not possible to advocate the entire abolition of the octroi, though it is a system of taxation which is harmful in its effects and is a hindrance to the free development of commerce. The commission recommends, however, that the local duty on goods brought into a town should be abolished, and that the Government should undertake the collection of the octroi on foreign imports which is now effected by a municipal addition of 1 per cent. to the import duties.

I concur with this proposal which will have the effect of relieving the population of a tax upon agricultural produce. The duty is levied at local control posts and gives rise to abuses in collection, which are a constant source of complaint, but if the recommendation of the report, which involves both the cancellation of the internal octroi duty and the kantar tax, is adopted, a net deficit estimated at £ E. 8,336 will result to the municipal revenues of Palestine. An additional 5 per cent. *ad valorem* customs duty on wines, spirits, liqueurs and other intoxicating drinks, tobacco, cigarettes, cigars, snuff and perfumery is advocated by the commission to make good the loss of revenue. It is pointed out that intoxicating drinks arriving in bottle or barrel from abroad are not subject to excise duty. While concurring in the abolition of interior octroi and kantar dues, I am doubtful whether the second proposal should be adopted, as it would divert to local revenues a source of taxation upon which it may be necessary to draw for the central Exchequer. Moreover, the

increase in the volume of imports, which may be anticipated, may yield a sufficient sum to make good the deficit, without recourse to additional taxation.

9. Under various grants from the Sultans and the Treaty of Mitylene of the 6th November, 1901, ecclesiastical institutions claim to be immune from the payment of customs duties. This immunity has been extended in the practice of the Military Administration to the 1 per cent. additional municipal duty when articles are imported from abroad and consigned to an institution. When goods are purchased locally, however, from a retailer, the duty is absorbed into the price and is therefore paid by the purchaser whether an ecclesiastical person or otherwise.

I agree with the recommendation of the commission that the 1 per cent. additional duty should cover consignments of goods to any person or institution whether in the enjoyment of rights of immunity from customs or not.

10. With respect to other recommendations of the commission, the following modifications are proposed before they are put into operation:—

- (a.) Page 113, paragraph 15 (6). A uniform rate of 5 per cent. to be substituted for the differential rates proposed.
- (b.) Page 113, paragraph 15 (7). The limitation of not more than twenty rooms to be omitted.
- (c.) Page 114, paragraph 19. The valuation of vacant building land and the imposition of a rate upon its capital value to be postponed for further consideration at a later date.
- (d.) Page 121, paragraph 12 (7). This proposal to be omitted.
- (e.) Page 123, paragraphs 13 (3) (b) (i)–(ii). A single licence to be substituted.
- (f.) Page 124, paragraph 14 (5), and Page 125, paragraph 16. To be reconsidered.
- (g.) Page 125, paragraph 18. It is now intended to abolish all tobacco licences and restrictions on sale.
- (h.) Page 126, paragraph 22. Some minor amendments to be made in the title of the regulations and the scale of fees.
- (i.) Page 130, paragraph 4. To be further considered.
- (j.) Page 132, paragraph 10. It is proposed to constitute a Petty Sessional Court, consisting of honorary Justices of the Peace, rather than to constitute the municipality itself as a court to try cases against municipal bye-laws.

11. An ordinance is being prepared to give effect to such recommendations of the commission as call for legislation and to consolidate afresh the Law of Municipal Taxation. I shall submit a draft for the consideration of your Lordship, but, in order to assist in its preparation I should be grateful for your observations on the principal points raised in this despatch.

I would point out that, as many improvements are urgently needed in Jerusalem which can be paid for only by the help of a loan and as a loan, even of the moderate amount that is contemplated, cannot be authorised until it is clear that the municipality enjoys a revenue sufficient to cover the charges for interest and sinking-fund, the matter is one that calls for very early attention.

I have, &c.

HERBERT SAMUEL,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 77.

Report of the Municipal Tax Commission for Jerusalem.

NOTE BY CHAIRMAN OF COMMISSION.

Your Excellency,

ACCORDING to the instructions contained in the terms of reference, the commission assembled and commenced its sittings in Jerusalem on the 20th October, 1920.

The commission in reviewing the revenue of the Municipality of Jerusalem was unable in certain instances to confine its deliberations to local taxation, but has extended the scope of its investigation to include certain Government taxes collected within the municipal area.

At the instance of the District Governor of Jerusalem it was decided to request Mr. C. R. Ashbee, Civic Advisor, Jerusalem, to be in attendance.
The report of the commission is appended.

I have, &c.

J. B. BARRON, *Chairman.*

*Financial Secretary's Office, Jerusalem,
November 20, 1920.*

TERMS OF REFERENCE.

HIS Excellency the High Commissioner has been pleased to appoint the following gentlemen, viz.:—

Mr. J. B. Barron, O.B.E., M.C., Assistant Financial Secretary;
Mr. H. C. Luke, Acting District Governor of Jerusalem;
Mr. E. Keith Roach, Assistant Civil Secretary;
Ragheb Bey Nashasheby, Mayor of Jerusalem;
Mr. D. Yellin, M.B.E., Vice-Mayor of Jerusalem;
Mr. Y. Farradj, Vice-Mayor of Jerusalem; and
Mr. E. Shelley, Secretary of the Chamber of Commerce, Jerusalem,

to be a commission to investigate and report on the following question:—

“To examine the existing sources of revenue of the Municipality of Jerusalem and the methods of collection, and to report what changes, if any, are desirable.”

2. His Excellency has been pleased to appoint Mr. Barron to be chairman of the commission.

3. It is his Excellency's desire that the commission should assemble and begin its sittings in Jerusalem at the earliest possible date.

W. H. DEEDES, *Civil Secretary.*

*Government House, Jerusalem,
September 17, 1920.*

REPORT.

PART I.—PRIVILEGES.

Introductory.

1. The revenues of the Municipality of Jerusalem are collected under powers laid down in the Ottoman Code, and under various public notices, and proclamations issued by the British authorities since the occupation. The different authorities may be summarised as follows:—

- (1.) Ottoman Municipal Tax Law, dated the 15th March, 1330 (see Appendix I) in operation throughout the municipalities of Palestine.
- (2.) Ottoman laws and decrees authorising the collection of:

Lease fees.
Shooting licences.
Offal tax.

- (3.) Proclamations and public notices issued since the occupation of Jerusalem which authorise the collection of:

House rate.
Octroi.
Licensing of unhealthy and dangerous trades.
Sanitary fees.
Advertisement hoarding tax.

2. The estimated receipts for the current financial year are £ E. 36,906 (see Appendix II).

Position of Foreigners.

3. Article 2 of the law permitting foreigners to hold immovable property in the Ottoman Empire (7 Safar, 1284), provides that foreign subjects owning immovable property, are liable to all charges and dues upon such property which Ottoman subjects possessing immovable property, shall be called upon to pay.

Municipal rates and taxes levied on immovable property are thus payable by all persons without regard to their nationality.

The Municipal Tax Law of 1330 was promulgated during the war, and is, therefore, a war measure. It levies certain indirect taxes which cannot be considered as taxes upon immovable property. The law was enacted after the abolition of the Capitulations by the Ottoman Government, and in so far as it imposed new taxes which had not already been accepted by the Powers, it may be assumed that the law is only legally valid as regards foreigners during the period in which military law is maintained.

It may, therefore, be necessary for the Government, as soon as the Mandate is declared, to pass an enactment legalising municipal taxation.

Ecclesiastical Privileges.

4. Since the year 1856 Turkey has been in the position of a State obliged to submit to derogations from the full rights of sovereignty. At various times the Capitulations have been extended by foreign treaties, which were framed to emphasise and increase the fiscal immunities enjoyed by foreign subjects under the Capitulations. The Treaty of Mytilene, dated the 6th November, 1901, gives to all Roman Catholic institutions under the protection of France, immunity from taxes on real estate and from customs dues, which is interpreted by the communities concerned to include the municipal house rate and octroi. The Ottoman Government, however, limited this exemption as regards state taxation, to "places of worship and monasteries belonging to the different religions recognised by the Government and their dependencies situate within their compounds, provided that they be not obtained by hiring or be leased out"—Article 4, sub-paragraph 5, law of the 14th June, 1326 (1910). This important distinction which affects in a similar manner the house rate, is not recognised in practice by foreign ecclesiastical institutions. It is accepted by Ottoman institutions with the exception of those native Christian churches which are affiliated to the Roman Catholic Church.

The expression "their dependencies situate within their compounds" is capable of wide interpretation. It is customary for large monastic establishments to provide hospices for the accommodation of their pilgrims. The restriction upon world travel has resulted in these establishments being converted into commercial hotels. The lay proprietor is thereby placed at an unfair disadvantage, since he is subject to all State and local taxation.

It is pertinent to remark that the regulations of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration and of the Régie des Tabacs, which were accepted by the Powers, do not grant immunities from the payment of excise duties and licences to ecclesiastical institutions, who claim exemption, however, from similar municipal duties.

In Jerusalem the foreign religious establishments refuse to pay any local rates for services rendered, with the result that the layman bears an extra burden of local taxation to make good the loss in revenue thus sustained.

Consular Privileges.

5. Consular representatives have, also, in many instances refused to pay local rates, and take the stand-point that as representatives of foreign Powers they are exempt from State and local taxation.

It is recommended that in so far as the immunity hitherto claimed or enjoyed by consular officers of all ranks in Palestine, whether *de carrière* or otherwise, from local taxation, has been based on the Capitulations, it should cease; and that the said officers should henceforth be liable to such taxation failing any provisions to the contrary in the Mandate.

Monopoly Privileges.

6. The Ottoman Public Debt and the Régie des Tabacs are, under the articles of their respective concessions immune from local taxation of all kinds.

Military Privileges.

7. The Municipality has hitherto regarded the Army of Occupation as exempted from the payment of rates and taxes. The commission considers this policy to be correct, but is inclined to the view that it should not be extended to army and Government officials residing in Jerusalem in their private capacity.

8. From the foregoing observations, it may be remarked that Jerusalem is a city of privileges. The revenues of the Municipality are considerably reduced, or conversely the incidence upon the layman or Palestinian is increased to make good the loss of revenue sustained through the exercise of numerous immunities. Further, the immunities enjoyed by various institutions and persons who can legally claim them, are often wrongfully extended to Palestinians in their employ. The Municipality has hitherto avoided any policy which might embarrass the Government in their relations with ecclesiastical and civil institutions claiming immunity.

9. The commission is of opinion that the question of exemption should receive the earnest consideration of the Government, the more so as it finds that Moslem Wakfs are not subject to, and do not claim, exemption from local taxation.

Recommendations.

10. The commission recommends:—

- That the right of immunity from local taxation now exercised by ecclesiastical and certain civil institutions, and persons, *i.e.*, consuls, be examined into, and abolished wherever possible.
- That charitable institutions, including schools, hospitals, orphanages, &c., and buildings rented for those purposes, be subjected to local taxation at half the approved rates, providing the buildings be utilised for such purposes only.
- That Government buildings and institutions, including those of the Army of Occupation, be exempted; but that officials of the Government and members of His Majesty's Forces in their private capacity be subjected to local rates and taxes.

11. The Government of Cyprus abolished all rights of exemption from the payment of State and local taxes by the Law of XXI of 1879. The following extract is quoted:—

"Article 1. There shall not be claimed or allowed to any person, native or alien, whose domicile for the time being is this Island, and whether under plea or pretence of custom, licence, nationality, condition, creed, calling or otherwise, the right of exemption from payment of any of the several taxes, duties, imposts or obligations enumerated in the Schedule of this Law."

PART II.—RATES ON IMMOVABLE PROPERTY.

Aim.

1. Rates, like State taxes, are compulsory contributions to the common service; but local taxation differs from national taxation in that it is devoted to a limited area and is more distinctly beneficial in character. It is productive in its aim as providing public conveniences, such as roads, sanitation, lighting, &c., for a special locality.

House Rate and Legality.

2. The first of local taxes in natural order is a tax upon land and house property. In Jerusalem there is no rate levied upon land (see paragraph 16 *et seq.*). The municipal fees for scavenging, lighting, watering and public security were consolidated into a rate upon house property under instructions received from Military Administration No. 3026/F, dated the 14th January, 1919. The new tax is not supported by Turkish precedent, the Ottoman Law enacting that the expenses for scavenging and lighting should be met from the municipal share of the Government Werku Tax—Article I of the Municipal Tax Law of 1330. The rates to be levied for the watering of public roads and for the maintenance of public security, which are not referred to specifically, were presumably to be levied under a special rate or to be met from the general revenues of the Municipality. The Senior Judicial

Officer stated that the new consolidated rate was not strictly in accordance with the provisions of Article 369 of the "Manual of Military Law," but that an order of the Chief Administrator was sufficient authority. On this decision Military Magistrates, or the Courts, were empowered to order distraint on property should the ratepayer question the legality of the new tax. In part I, paragraph 4, mention has already been made of the necessity for legalising municipal taxation when Military Law ceases to operate.

Assessment.

3. The house rate was assessed by a committee of two persons who estimated the annual rental value of property. No allowance was made for expenditure on the reparation of property, as it was assumed that the total incidence would fall upon the occupier for all forms of house property, i.e., trade premises, warehouses and dwelling houses. The rate is fixed at 5 per cent. of the rental value calculated from Muharrem—a period of 352 days.

The following particulars show the assessment for Jerusalem:—

Within the Walls.			Outside the Walls.		Total Premises.	Total Rents, £ E.
Annual Rent, £ E.	No. of Premises.	Rents, £ E.	No. of Premises.	Rents, £ E.		
1	1	1	117	117	118	118
2	152	304	367	734	519	1,038
3	724	2,172	647	1,941	1,371	4,113
4	526	2,104	669	2,676	1,195	4,780
5	294	1,470	384	1,920	678	3,390
Over 5	2,982	55,289	5,167	121,812	8,149	177,101
Total ..	4,679	61,340	7,351	129,200	12,030	190,510

The rate is levied upon property of which the rental value is £ E. 4 or over. The total annual value of rateable property is therefore £ E. 185,271, which should provide a revenue of £ E. 9,260 per annum. This assessment was made previous to the commencement of the financial year 1919–1920 when it first came into operation.

Collection and its Difficulties.

4. For the financial year 1919–1920 the sum of £ E. 2,976 was collected, the estimates for the current year 1920–1921 being £ E. 4,500.

Considerable difficulty is experienced in collecting the amounts due. The assessment committee did not include sacred sites, churches, synagogues, and mosques in the schedule of valuation. Ecclesiastical institutions, hospitals, schools and other charitable organisations were assessed at an exceedingly low rate. The rental value of these properties is as follows:—

	£ E.
Within the walls	9,104
Outside the walls	13,068
	22,172

The rate due upon this valuation is £ E. 1,008

It may be stated generally that the rental value of this category of property would bear an increase of 50 per cent. without such a valuation being in any way excessive.

5. Ecclesiastical communities, hospitals and schools under the control of foreign subjects have for the most part refused to pay house rates, contesting the right of the municipality to impose this tax on the ground that the Capitulations and various foreign treaties granted them exemption from the "impôt foncier." They, therefore, accept the benefits derived from local services, and do not contribute proportionately to the advantages received.

The old city, within the walls, is immune from the payment of Government Werku (house and land tax), and there are thus no State assessments for this area. The right to exemption from local taxation has not been contested; but there exists a peculiar class of occupiers of property who receive accommodation gratuitously from the several ecclesiastical organisations in Jerusalem. The persons who are

provided with such dwellings, are not necessarily indigent. In many instances such occupiers have refused to acknowledge the legality of the rate.

6. Immunity has been claimed by the personnel of His Majesty's forces, and by Government officials who reside within the municipal area as private individuals, and they have exercised specific privileges of exemption from local taxation.

7. Under the Law of 18 Rabi Awal (see Part V, Leases and Fines), lessors are compelled to register leases. In practice this is not carried out, with the result that it is not possible for tax collecting officials of the municipality to follow the ramifications of sub-letting. No special regulations have been enforced compounding the rate for tenements, &c., and for placing the onus of payment upon the landlord.

8. The municipality has not tested the legality of the house rate in the courts, although many civilians and lay inhabitants have refused or delayed payment. This, coupled with the recognised and traditional system of privileges existent in Jerusalem, has resulted in only 50 per cent. of the total rate being estimated for during the current financial year.

9. The commission desires to call the attention of the Government to this unparalleled state of affairs.

Rents Ordinances.

10. The military Administration issued the Rents Ordinance of the 26th June, 1919, and of the 13th June, 1920, which protected tenants against excessive rents, limiting the maximum increases that might be charged to a fixed percentage. The military Governor of Jerusalem, under powers conferred upon him by the ordinance of 1920, placed the maximum rents for the present year at a figure which should not exceed the previous rent by 7 per cent. in the case of residential property, and by 10 per cent. in the case of business premises. The assessment made in 1919 was admittedly provisional and subject to revision. It was, moreover, hastily carried out, and no fixed procedure or instructions were laid down. It may be generally assumed that property was undervalued, although, in some cases, protests were received. The subsequent increase in rents allowed under the ordinance of the 12th June, 1920, has not been considered in estimating the current year rates, and, with the exception of leases extending over a period of one year, landlords have taken full advantage of its terms. An average increase of 8½ per cent. upon the 1919 valuation would increase the rateable value to £ E. 201,019, and the annual rate from £ E. 9,260 to £ E. 10,050.

State House and Land Tax.

11. State taxes on immovable property consist of a land and house tax, the valuation being made upon the capital value of property. The assessment was carried out some thirty years ago and the registers are therefore completely out of date. It is not obligatory for heirs to re-register on succession, and as a consequence the Government registers cannot be considered as providing accurate data. It may, however, be observed that within the municipal area the taxes due from landlords are:—

	£ E.
House tax	5,356
Land tax	6,643
	11,999

The rate fixed at 10 per mille for non-tithable lands and for buildings used as business premises or for hire. A comparison of the capital value of central and local valuations gives the following figures:—

	Buildings £ E.	Lands £ E.
State	535,600	664,300
Municipal	3,350,316	—

The local valuation includes the site value of plots of ground on which buildings are erected, and accordingly no division is made between the site value and the construction value.

Article I of the Municipal Tax Law of 1330 provided that local authorities should have allocated to them a share of the Government tax on immovable property.

In Jerusalem, where a house rate is in force, this has been cancelled. It would appear, however, that as there is no local rate upon agricultural land the municipality is technically entitled to a share of the land tax.

Law of June 14, 1326 (1909).

12. The Ottoman Government promulgated a new law for the taxation of buildings in 1909, which completely reversed the procedure as regards the house tax. It established the principle of a new valuation to be made every ten years calculated upon annual value, and not on capital value of property, fixing the rate at which the tax is to be levied at 12½ per cent. of the gross rent. The landlord, or in his absence the occupier, is responsible for payment.

The law cancels the existing State tax with any subsequent amendments and additions and provides that:—

"The amount of the tax will be determined annually by Budget requirements, and an additional tax for educational and local purposes may be added to it." (Article I.)

It therefore maintains the principle already laid down in the old law, that the Government is responsible for the collection of the municipal share recognising the right of local authorities to impose, through the medium of the State, additional taxation on buildings within their localities.

The new law was not brought into operation in Palestine, and it may further be observed that it recognises the existing immunities granted under special firmans or foreign treaties.

Recommendations: Buildings.

13. From a consideration of the foregoing paragraphs the commission is inclined to the view that the Government should undertake a new valuation of buildings based upon rental value as outlined in the Law of the 14th June, 1326. The rate of 12½ per cent. on the annual value is high when the present excessive scale of rents is being demanded.

The increase in rents has more than kept pace with the increased cost of living since the value of buildings in Jerusalem is fast attaining a monopoly standard. In Egypt the inhabited house duty is the equivalent of one month's rent, or 8½ per cent. A tax upon buildings levied at this rate would produce the sum of £ E. 16,750 on a rental valuation of £ E. 201,019 (see paragraph 10). The division of this amount between the central and local authorities would be as follows:—

					£ E.
State	6,700
Municipality	10,050
					<hr/> 16,750

The commission is of opinion that a new appraisalment would show a considerable increase on these figures. The advantages attached to one State and local assessment are such as to incline the commission to press this view upon the Government, but it recognises that political and financial considerations may render a new valuation impracticable for the immediate future. It desires, however, to observe that the Law of the 24th June, 1326, has placed an instrument in the hands of the authorities, which with certain modifications may well be utilised in urban areas.

Equalisation of Rates.

14. The introduction of a new method of assessing State and local taxes upon buildings brings forward an important consideration. The equal division of rates between the occupier and owner is advocated in the interests of equity. While not altering the primary incidence in any marked degree, it may, however, remove an apparent injustice and thus allay irritation. The "Demand Note" may be framed to allow the occupier to deduct half the rate from the rent to be paid to the owner.

The commission is of opinion, however, that the entire rate should be payable by the landlord having regard to the fact that it is customary in Palestine to lease property for short periods. The difficulties experienced in collection would point to the tax being paid by the owner, the more so as an extensive system of sub-letting is prevalent.

15. Assuming that the Government is not in a position to modify immediately the existing regulations of the house tax, the commission records the following recommendations:—

The commission recommends—

- (1.) That the municipality should be given authority to increase the house rate up to a maximum duty of 7½ per cent. of the annual value of buildings, as and when the expenditure of the municipality justifies an increase upon the existing percentage.
- (2.) That the collection of the rate be undertaken by the Government, who shall make a new valuation in conjunction with the municipality assisted by representatives of ratepayers.
- (3.) That the rate include within its valuation, privately owned gardens, adjacent to the building, such gardens, &c., not being subject to the land rate.
- (4.) That leases should be made for a period of twelve calendar months as opposed to the Hejira year.
- (5.) That the rate be payable by all sections of owners of property without regard to nationality, and that the immunities enjoyed by ecclesiastical and other communities be abrogated.
- (6.) That, having regard to the power of tenants of business premises to pass on to the public, in the shape of increased fees on prices, the whole or part of the rate, the municipal rate upon business premises be fixed at 5½ per cent., and that on dwelling houses at 4½ per cent. for the forthcoming financial year, such rates being assessed on the new valuation.
- (7.) That a rebate of 50 per cent. be allowed upon empty buildings, dwelling-houses and business premises when containing not more than twenty empty rooms.

Land Rate.

16. The municipality has not imposed a rate upon land. Real property within the city area is for the most part "mulk," which is the absolute property of its owner, and can be disposed of by him as he wills, without restrictions, save for such general conditions as are laid down for all classes of land. At present the owner of built-on property is subject to a local rate, while the possessor of unoccupied land, often not usable for agricultural purposes, is untaxed though he may be holding up a probable building site for speculation.

The value of land is so much increased by the action of social conditions, that it forms a most suitable mark for local taxation that the wants of urban societies make necessary.

The commission is of opinion that it is highly desirable that a rate should be imposed on land.

17. "Land near a growing town, which is still used for agriculture, may yield very little nett rent, and yet be a valuable property. For its future ground rents are anticipated in its capital, and further, its ownership is likely to yield an income of satisfaction outside of the money rent received for it. In this case it is apt to be under assessed even when rated at its full rental value, and the question arises whether it should not be assessed at a percentage on its capital value instead of a percentage on its rent."—"Marshall's Principles of Economics—Rates on Site Values."

The above extract supplies an authoritative argument in favour of a land rate being assessed upon capital value and not upon annual value. The city boundaries of Jerusalem include valuable building sites which are at present being utilised as agricultural land, and until such a time as the restrictions on land transfers and sales are removed it may be surmised that considerable areas will be retained under single ownership, and not divided and offered to the public as building lots. The effect of the present land regulations should theoretically place no bar upon unrestricted sales, but in practice it will be found that in urban areas the selling public is holding up land for speculative purposes in the hope that future regulations may permit of unrestricted transfers at no distant date.

The commission is of opinion that the unoccupied land rate should be divided into two categories:—

- (1.) A rate upon the annual agricultural value of land.
- (2.) A rate upon the capital building value of land, after deducting the agricultural value of the site.

18. The direct result of the imposition of such a rate would be to stimulate the building of more houses. Owners would obtain a financial return from vacant building sites by letting or selling them for building purposes. The amount capable of being raised by a special site-valuation is speculative, but the tax should be regarded in the nature of a local policy tax. It must also be borne in mind that the expenditure of ratepayers' money upon improvements such as new roads, public parks, drainage, lighting, &c., enhances the value of sites although the fortunate owners have not expended capital on such improvements.

Recommendations: Land Rate.

19. The Commission recommends—

- (1.) That a land rate be imposed upon vacant building and agricultural land within the municipal area.
- (2.) That the rate should take the form of
 - (a.) A rate of 5 per cent. upon the annual agricultural value of land.
 - (b.) A special rate upon the difference of the capital agricultural value and the probable capital building value of land.
- (3.) That the valuation of land and the collection of the rate should be undertaken by the State on behalf of the local authorities.
- (4.) That gardens, open spaces or lands scheduled in the Town Planning Ordinance, or such open spaces which may be exempted from being built upon in the public interest, shall not be rated above the agricultural rate.

20. The Commission is unable to propose a rate of assessment for the proposal outlined in paragraph 19, sub-paragraph 2 (b) as no accurate data are available of the area effected. The last State valuation gives the capital value of land as £ E. 664,300 within the city area. An approximate valuation would result in a large increase on this value, and the commission is inclined to the view that the new rate should include the State tax upon mulk and mirie property. It is of opinion that there will be no financial loss to the general revenues of Palestine should the Government find it desirable to consolidate the State tax and the local rate retaining a share of the revenues accruing from the new valuation.

Town Planning Ordinance.

21. Part IV of the Town Planning Ordinance lays down its financial provisions including the institution of a "betterment tax." Where outlay is incurred on behalf of a limited class of owners they may be justly required to pay for the peculiar advantage that they have obtained. The commission desires to record that the application of the special assessment requires most careful scrutiny. Local administrators and owners of the "bettered" property may form widely different estimates as to the value of the improvements in question, and in such cases the latter will not always be mistaken. The proof of benefits bestowed must be clear and well established and the amount diffused over the general community. It would be desirable that special assessments should be payable in instalments.

PART III.—OCTROI AND KANTAR TAXES, MARKET FEES.

Scope of Enquiry.

1. The commission in discussing the question of octroi is unable to approach this subject without extending the scope of its enquiry to Palestine. The local conditions of taxation prevalent in Jerusalem are similar to those of many other towns, affecting the rural population as well as the townsman.

Octroi and Kantar Taxes.

2. The total collection of octroi and kantar taxes for the country are estimated to amount to the sum of £ E. 55,680 for the current financial year, and the expenditure upon collection to £ E. 1,500. The low rate of expenditure compared to the receipts is explained by the fact that many municipalities place these taxes out to contract, which terminate on the 31st March, 1921.

3. Octroi dues are collected by fifteen municipalities out of a possible twenty-two. The following municipalities do not collect octroi: Nazareth, Tiberias, Safed, Jenin, Shefr-Amr, Ludd and Mejdal.

4. Certain towns collect a kantar tax which may be said to be a form of octroi. It is a tax levied under article 17 of the Municipal Tax Law of 1330, on goods, chiefly cereals and legumes, calculated upon weight and measurement according to a tariff fixed by the municipality concerned. Under authority No. GS/ET/316/I dated the 19th October, 1919, the Chief Administrator was empowered to substitute the kantar tax for a 1 per cent. *ad valorem* octroi on all articles entering a municipal area by road, sea or rail. Such municipalities as do not levy an octroi duty impose a kantar tax. In some instances both taxes are maintained.

Effects.

5. The effects of introducing the octroi system in its present form, may be summarised as follows:—

- (a.) The institution of a customs barrier around towns.
- (b.) An increase in price of all articles of consumption within town areas.
- (c.) The increase in prices of articles imported from abroad and consigned to rural districts, since such articles are commonly offered for sale in towns.
- (d.) The imposition of a tax upon agricultural products brought in from rural districts.
- (e.) The octroi is also inconvenient in collection and inequitable in incidence, since it falls with severity upon the poor consumers of necessities.
- (f.) The burden of the tax is not distributed in any degree in proportion to the benefits gained from local expenditure. Briefly the duty may be considered in its present form as being incapable of economic defence.

Octroi Duties in Jerusalem.

6. In Jerusalem four road control posts have been established which neglect the numerous bye-paths around the city. It is impossible owing to the large suburban population to impose the tax upon all produce entering the city. Consignments imported by rail are checked at the Railway Custom House, where the municipality maintains an employee.

7. It may be remarked that a constant source of complaint amongst merchants is the fact that they are often charged double and treble dues on imported foreign consignments arriving at Haifa or Jaffa.

Octroi is collected at both these ports, and should the consignment be separated into small lots and despatched elsewhere, a second duty is collected on entry into another town. A system of drawback has been tried, but failed in practice owing to the difficulty of recognising the contents of consignments which have been split and transported to another centre. It may conceivably happen that octroi duties are collected in the first instance at Jaffa, then at Jerusalem, Bethlehem and Hebron, before the article reaches its final destination at Beersheba, where it may be retailed to a country inhabitant on whom the total tax falls.

Receipts for Palestine.

8. The following list shows the estimated receipts for all towns in Palestine levying octroi and kantar duties:—

Municipality.	Population (approximately).	Octroi Receipts.	Kantar Receipts.	Percentage of Octroi and Kantar Taxes to Total Revenue of Municipality.
		£ E.	£ E.	Per cent.
Jerusalem	58,600	18,250	..	49
Bethlehem	6,500	1,000	24	16
Beit Jala	3,300	250	5	25
Ramallah	2,700	233	181	22
Haifa	24,100	11,000	350	56
Acre	6,500	150	380	8
Shefr Amr	2,200
Nazareth	9,000	..	200	10
Tiberias	6,000	..	670	8
Safed	14,000	..	1,056	28
Beisan	4,700	225	72	25
Hebron	16,300	620	352	23
Tulkaram	2,400	1,200	..	19
Jaffa and Tel-Aviv ..	44,000	11,000	960	40
Ludd	11,000	..	20	16
Ramleh	10,000	40	20	15
Nablus	20,700	5,600	90	68
Jenin	3,500	..	100	5
Beersheba	239	54	19
Gaza	15,100	1,000	60	14
Khan Yunis	5,600	60	11	5
Mejdel	4,900	..	8	·03
Total	271,100	50,867	4,613	33

Value of Imports.

9. The value of the import trade of Palestine is as follows:—

	For the Year ending March 31, 1920.	For the Half-Year ending September 30, 1920.
	£ E.	£ E.
Imports from abroad	4,191,060	2,250,540
.. .. Beirut	283,706	263,424
Less—	4,474,766	2,513,964
Goods consigned to Damascus ..	309,498	317,533
Total	4,165,268	2,196,431

One per cent. on the sum of £ E. 4,165,268 is £ E. 41,652. It will thus be seen that 1 per cent. of the total imports, exclusive of those consigned in transit to Damascus, is £ E. 13,828 less than the receipts received from the octroi and kantar duties, which amount to £ E. 55,480.

It is considered, however, that the estimates for octroi are excessive, as in one instance at least the estimates include a 1 per cent. *ad valorem* duty upon goods in transit. A reduction of £ E. 4,000 on this account will leave a difference of £ E. 9,828 to be accounted for.

Exemptions.

10. Under pre-war treaties and various customs regulations exemption from the payment of import dues is granted in the case of:—

- Agricultural machinery, chemical manures, seeds, printed matter, &c.
- Ecclesiastical and charitable institutions.

The value of these articles amounted to:—

	£ E.
Under (a)	24,372
Under (b)	41,737
	66,109

for the financial year 1919-1920. These figures are included in the totals enumerated in paragraph 9.

Abolition of Interior Octroi.

11. The commission recognises that in the present insufficiency of municipal revenues, and having regard to the fact that expenditure is likely to increase in the immediate future, it is not possible to advocate the entire abolition of a system of taxation, which is harmful in its effects and is a hindrance to the free development of commerce. The commission is inclined to the view, however, that the Government should undertake the collection of octroi on foreign imports as an addition of 1 per cent. to the customs duty, abolishing all internal restrictions upon the free interchange of commodities.

It is worthy of note that the interior octroi and kantar taxes amount to 24 per cent. of the total collections of the combined taxes, which, in view of the large volume of internal trade and of the movement of commodities from town to town, would appear to be an excessively low percentage. The commission can only ascribe this discrepancy to the amount of traffic which escapes the payment of duty, or to inefficient methods of collection. It considers that an inestimable benefit would result to the rural population from the abolition of the interior octroi and kantar duties having regard to the fact that the deficit may be met by the imposition of an additional customs duty upon certain commodities as set out below.

Additional Duties.

12. The collection of the exterior octroi upon foreign imports will produce a net deficit of £ E. 8,328. Three methods present themselves as solution to this question:—

- A grant-in-aid.
- An increase to the house rate.
- An additional customs duty on certain imported commodities.

With regard to (a) and (b) the commission considers that any increase to municipal revenues under these headings will automatically become absorbed into town improvements, or be set aside to provide for the repayment of loans and interest thereon. Further, it is of opinion that at this juncture it would be impolitic to reduce one of the main sources of local revenue, when enlightened public opinion is demanding a higher standard of efficiency in local Government.

The system of *ad valorem* custom duty allows certain categories of articles to be imported at a minimum duty. The commission proposes that the import duty on wines, spirits, liqueurs and intoxicating drinks, tobacco, cigarettes, cigars and snuff and perfumery, be increased from 11 per cent. *ad valorem* to 16 per cent., the additional 5 per cent. to be allocated to municipalities. The total value of these articles imported for the year ending the 31st March, 1920, was £ E. 113,445, exclusive of pure alcohol valued at £ E. 36,765 (which is imported in part for re-exportation as manufactured wines, &c.). Import duty calculated at the rate of 11 per cent. on £ E. 113,445 is £ E. 12,474. The additional duty would yield £ E. 5,670.

For the half-year ending the 30th September, 1920, the figures are:—

	£ E.
Value	74,528
11 per cent. duty	8,195
5 per cent. duty	3,725

It may be remarked that, though there are heavy excise duties upon imported pure alcohol, none is levied upon foreign imported wines, spirits, liqueurs and other intoxicating drinks arriving in bottle or barrel.

The surtaxes which it is proposed to assign, would yield a greater return if levied upon *proof* in the case of wines, &c., or upon *weight* in the case of tobacco, &c.

13. The above proposal will reduce the deficit which may be expected upon the abolition of the interior octroi and kantar taxes, to £ E. 2,658. It must also be

borne in mind that no system of collecting octroi dues exists for consignments imported into Palestine from the territory under the control of the Government of Damascus.

Recommendations.

14. The commission recommends:—

- (1.) That the present system of collecting interior octroi and kantar taxes be abolished.
- (2.) That the Government maintains the additional 1 per cent. *ad valorem* duty upon foreign imports.
- (3.) That the Government undertakes the collection of the foreign octroi, allocating the proceeds to municipalities, thus relieving the local authorities of the expenses attendant upon collection.
- (4.) That an additional surtax of 5 per cent. *ad valorem*, the proceeds of which will be assigned to municipalities, be placed upon foreign imported wines, spirits, liqueurs and other intoxicating drinks; tobacco, cigarettes, cigars and snuff; perfumery.
- (5.) That ecclesiastical and charitable institutions be subject to the payment of octroi, since they are interested parties in town improvement schemes.

Distribution of Octroi Revenue.

The commission has discussed at length the method by which an equitable distribution of the proceeds should be made. It is unable to determine satisfactorily the basis upon which such allocation should be carried out. The more equitable method would seem to be on the proportion of foreign imports received within municipal areas, but we find that there are no statistics of this nature which could be considered as even reasonably accurate. It therefore recommends that the Government should allocate the revenues accruing from foreign octroi according to the individual necessities of municipalities, regarding the present estimated receipts of the octroi and kantar duties as the minimum amount payable to each municipality for the forthcoming financial year.

Market Fees.

15. The Jerusalem municipality has recently opened two markets, where vegetables and legumes are sold by growers to the public. The sites have been rented for a sum of £ E. 345 per annum, and the collection of fees placed out to contract for the sum of £ E. 660.

The fees sanctioned by the municipality are:—

- PT. 2 per sack of commodities.
PT. 1 per basket or case.

A number of shawishes are maintained by the municipality, who include among their duties the enforcement of the bye-laws compelling the sale of legumes and vegetables in authorised markets. They are paid at the same rate as the police, and are provided with uniforms. Allocating one-fourth of their maintenance to the enforcement of the market bye-laws, there remains a net gain to the municipality of approximately £ E. 100.

Duties payable under the present system of collecting octroi do not exclude the payee from a further charge on account of market fees.

Recommendations.

The commission recommends:—

- (1.) That the system of farming out market fees be abolished.
- (2.) That the municipality undertakes direct collection.

PART IV.—Licences.

Present System.

1. An examination into the subject of licences involves a review of all licences issued by the Government and the local authorities which operate within a municipal area.

2. The system at present in vogue has led to the introduction of a series of vexatious restrictions, many of them obsolete in their purpose, emanating from different Government Departments and local authorities, which are imposed upon the trader to the detriment of his occupation. In many instances the licensee must obtain the permission of three or four Departments before he can carry on his calling.

3. Theoretically, there should be no objection to a considerable share of local revenue being levied through the agency of licences in proportion to the benefits received from an active and judicious local administration. In practice, however, it would appear that extra taxation has been placed upon certain trades through the lack of co-ordination among the fiscal authorities responsible.

4. Certain of the taxes collected in the form of licences under the Municipal Tax Law of 1330 are not strictly economic in character, and are not levied for specific local services: such may be taken to include the inspection and the supervision of dangerous and unhealthy trades, or of factories.

Examination of Various Licensing Fees.

5. The commission desires to quote, *in extenso*, a number of taxes on various trades, from which it will be observed that the system of multiplying licences received additions under the fiscal regulations of the late military administration.

6. Establishments where Intoxicating Drinks are Consumed.

(a.) Ottoman Public Debt Licence—Law of the 27th August, 1867:—

- (i.) 25 per cent. of the annual rent on the actual premises where intoxicating liquors are consumed; or
- (ii.) 12½ per cent. of the annual rent on the actual premises where liquors are consumed, and other articles sold; or
- (iii.) 6¼ per cent. of the annual rent on the actual premises where small quantities of intoxicating liquors are sold.

(N.B.—None of Class (iii) exist in Jerusalem. It may be observed that the rental value of rooms only in which intoxicating liquors are sold, are assessed, and not the entire premises—*vide* article 11 of the law.)

(b.) Municipal licences:—

(i.) Registration of unhealthy trades, imposed under the direction of the Department of Public Health:—

Grade I, item 21—

Hotels 1st class	... £ E. 2 per annum.
" 2nd "	... £ E. 1 "
" 3rd "	... PT. 50 "

Grade I, item 26—

Restaurants	... PT. 50 "
-------------	--------------

(ii.) Under article 3 of the Municipal Tax Law of 1330—

- 5 per cent. on the annual rental value.
2½ per cent. on the annual rental value when other articles are sold.

(c.) Other municipal taxes:—

- (i.) House rate 5 per cent. of the annual rental value.
- (ii.) Octroi 1 per cent. *ad valorem*.

It will be observed that the levy on the annual rental value of a 1st class establishment may amount to 35 per cent. in addition to other State and local taxes.

7. Places of Public Amusement.

(a.) Stamp duties (Government)—Public notice, No. 78, dated 15th November, 1918:—

On tickets for theatres, cinematographs, &c., 5 m/ms.

(b.) Ottoman Public Debt—Stamp law, dated 1906 (1321), article 9, clause 113:—

Theatre, concert and ball-room tickets of values from—

PT. 10 to 40	PT. 1
Above PT. 40	PT. 2
Tickets with no indication of value	PT. 2.

(c.) Municipal licences under article 4:—

- (i.) An annual licence (not collected in Jerusalem).
- (ii.) A charge of PT. 10 per diem when a public performance is given.
- (iii.) An extra tax for every hour when performances continue after midnight (not collected in Jerusalem).

8. Factories and Industrial Establishments.

(a.) Stamp duty (Government)—Public notice, No. 78, dated 15th November, 1918:—

Annual licensing fee of PT. 200.

(b.) Ottoman Public Debt—Stamp Law of 1906 (1321). Article 9, clause 10:—

Permit on construction, PT. 100.

(c.) Municipal:—

(i.) Registration of unhealthy trades—

An annual licence varying from PT. 50 to £ E. 2 on certain specified categories of factories and on "all industries employing machinery."

(ii.) Under article 10 of Municipal Tax Law—

A graduated tax of from £ E. 2 to £ E. 10 on fuel-driven machinery to be collected on erection only, and not annually.

(iii.) Under article 2 of the Municipal Tax Law of 1330—

Building permits calculated on floor space (see paragraph 21, building licences).

The commission is unable to determine the reason for the imposition of a State licence within a municipal area, as it would appear that there is no supervision of factories carried out such as the English Factory and Workshop Acts provide for.

9. Advertisements, Signs and Notices.

These may be divided into fixed notices and signs, and sheets for distribution. Fixed notices and signs—

(a.) Ottoman Public Debt—Stamp Law of 1906 (1321), article 94.

On fixed shop signs according to meterage from PT. $\frac{1}{2}$ to PT. 5.

On advertisements affixed to hoardings or sandwich boards, PT. 1.

(b.) Municipal—

(i.) Under article 19 of the Municipal Tax Law—

PT. 20 per metre or fraction thereof.

PT. 40 from 1 to 2 metres, &c.

(ii.) Under Public Notice No. 167, dated the 20th July, 1920, a tax of 1 millième for every 5 square centimetres of space occupied upon specified hoardings.

Advertisements which may be distributed—

(a.) Ottoman Public Debt—Stamp Law of 1906 (1321), article 91.

Business advertisements, programmes, $\frac{1}{2}$ millième.

10. Shooting Permits and Gun Licences.

(a.) In conformity with the Ottoman Law on Game, dated 1882, article 33, a licence for shooting is chargeable as follows:—

PT. 10 per licence.

PT. 20 per licence, within the kaza of Jerusalem.

The proceeds are credited to the O.P.D.A. and the municipality in equal proportions, the collection of the fee being undertaken by the Debt.

(b.) Government Public Notice No. 142, dated the 9th December, 1919, states—

"a fee of PT. 50 shall be charged on account of each weapon for which a licence is granted."

The licensing authority is the Police, and the proceeds are credited to State revenues.

General Remarks.

11. The commission finds that the duplication of licensing fees and the number of issuing authorities requires a remodelling of such licences, whereby a greater degree of co-ordination may be practised among the authorities responsible. Where possible one form of licence should be granted containing the sanction of one authority, who shall have obtained, previous to issue, the approval of the officer concerned.

Certain duties which embrace in their application rural as well as city areas should be collected by the Government as a single tax for central and local purposes, a proportionate allotment being made to municipalities. Other duties would appear to fall within the jurisdiction of the regulations for the registration of unhealthy and dangerous trades which are controlled by the principal medical officers attached to districts.

A third category of licences, such as dog licences, would be more efficiently supervised by the local authorities themselves. In every case, whoever the issuing authority may be, it is essential that the licensee should be put to as little inconvenience as possible in complying with Government and local regulations. In this connection the Commission desires to record that some uncertainty exists among the public as to the procedure to be followed. It ascribes this in part to the lack of co-ordination already mentioned, and to the doubts expressed to us by witnesses as to which Ottoman regulations dealing with this subject remain in force.

The Commission records its recommendations below, having given due consideration to the fact that licences issued for the privilege of carrying on certain industries, or for selling certain goods (beer, spirits, tobacco, &c.), ultimately resemble in their effects and general incidence a tax upon the articles themselves, while they also tend to restrict the number of producers and dealers. Their chief recommendation is that they provide a registration of the persons engaged in these employments, and that the local authorities provide a central and inspection of such employments in the interests of the public, and as a safeguard to public security.

General Recommendations.

12 The commission recommends—

- (1.) That the closest co-operation be maintained by the different Government and local bodies issuing licences;
- (2.) That the procedure for application be made known to the public;
- (3.) That, where possible, one form of licence be granted which should include the endorsement of the different Departments concerned;
- (4.) That contravention against the licensing regulations, both Government and municipal, be triable before the municipal bench (see Fines);
- (5.) That the factory stamp duty authorised under Public Notice No. 78, item 18, dated the 15th November, 1918, be abolished;
- (6.) That the Ottoman Stamp Law of 1906 should be examined and reported upon, as it duplicates in many instances Government and municipal dues;
- (7.) That the municipality be given powers to impose licensing regulations upon all arts, crafts, industries and professions, subject to the approval of the High Commissioner;
- (8.) That the following articles of the Municipal Tax Law of 1330 be abolished as serving no useful or economic purpose:—

(a.) Article 5. A licence must be obtained from the municipality in order to occupy stalls or premises, and use shop-blinds, covers and partitions on pavements, streets or open places, whether they are profitable or otherwise.

A tax in proportion with and not exceeding one-fourth of the daily, weekly or monthly rent of the said premises will be levied.

A licence fee to be fixed by the municipality, not exceeding 1 per cent. of the rent as above, will be levied on shop-blinds, covers and partitions. Partitions the breadth of which does not exceed $\frac{1}{2}$ metre will be exempt from the tax.

- (b.) Article 10. A single licence fee will be levied, as under, on all steam-boilers and motor engines, except those used for agricultural purposes and those exempted under special ordinances:—

	£ E.
5 horse-power	2
5-10 horse-power	5
Over 10 horse-power	10

- (c.) Article 12. A tax in accordance with a tariff to be fixed by the municipality will be levied on spring water carried for sale in special vessels. The water is subject to inspection by the municipality, and a mark indicating the spring from which it comes must be stamped on the vessel.

Regarding article 5, it may be remarked that the building licence (see paragraph 21 below) should serve as a means of controlling the building of overhead structures and partitions, and that the erection of booths of a temporary nature is included under the "Hawkers and Pedlars" licence (see paragraph 16 below).

Article 10 would appear to be a direct impediment on the introduction of fuel-driven machinery, which is subject to municipal octroi dues upon importation if of foreign manufacture.

Article 12 is a matter for inclusion in the regulations of the Department of Public Health.

Manufacture and Sale of Intoxicating Liquors.

13. It is evident that the list of duties collected under this heading tends to give the licensee considerable inconvenience in paying the fees required to different Government and local authorities, and the number of such licences encourages fraudulent declaration. The present system is based upon a valuation of the annual rent or upon the actual rent paid by the occupiers, and is assessed only upon the value of space occupied for the sale of intoxicating liquors. In practice, the lessee, who pays abnormally high rent in Jerusalem, renders a different return to each issuing authority, or escapes payment through the want of one central body being responsible for registration.

An important class of traders, i.e., wholesale commercial houses selling imported and country intoxicating liquors in bottle and bulk, are untouched, except through the medium of the Public Health requirements who charge a registration fee of P.T. 50.

Recommendations.

The commission recommends—

- (1.) That licences for the manufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors be collected by the Government as a single tax, the Government crediting the Municipality with the proceeds of such licences collected within the municipal area;
- (2.) That adequate legislation be promulgated giving effect to the principle outlined in sub-paragraph 1; such legislation providing penal clauses for offences against the ordinance triable by a municipal bench when contravention takes place within the area under their jurisdiction;
- (3.) That in the interests of traders a separate scale of licences be introduced to cover—

- (a.) Manufacturers and distillers;
- (b.) Wholesale sellers;
- (c.) Retail sellers.

The commission recommends that as regards sub-paragraph 3—

- (a.) Manufacturers and distillers, who are taxable under the excise duties, a licence of P.T. 200 should be collected for municipal services.
- (b.) Wholesale dealers in intoxicating liquors should be divided into two categories—

- (i.) Dealers in imported foreign intoxicating liquors.

The duty payable should be—

Premises whose annual rental value is £ E. 50 and over,
£ E. 6 per annum.
Premises whose annual rental value is under £ E. 50,
£ E. 4 per annum.

- (ii.) Dealers of liquors manufactured in the country—

The duty payable should be a licensing fee of £ E. 4 per annum.

The form of licence set out below is recommended:—

Wholesale Wine and Spirit Licences.

Not including permission for the consumption of intoxicating liquors upon the premises of the licensee.

Available to
Registered No.
Name.
If shop or otherwise.
Situation and No.
Rental value.
Amount paid.
Endorsed by public security.
Endorsed by Public Health Office.

On category (c) retail sellers—

For every hotel, any premises occupied by a club, restaurant or other place used for the sale of intoxicating liquors by retail, being consumed upon the premises, an annual percentage on the rental or yearly value of the premises so used, at the rate of 30 per cent.; but that—

- (a.) The licence duty of an hotel shall not exceed £ E. 50 per annum;
- (b.) A club-house £ E. 25 per annum;
- (c.) Other premises £ E. 20 per annum

with a minimum duty of £ E. 4 for (a), (b) or (c) respectively.

For selling by retail in any tent or booth or in the open air, thirty piastres per diem.

The commission proposes the use, with the necessary amendments, of the licence form given above, and on the reverse of the licence, the penalties for contravention.

(N.B.—Alternative methods of assessment based upon the ratio of receipts from the sale of intoxicants to the total receipts in the case of hotels; and a direct tax based upon sales in the case of clubs, were considered. It is agreed that such systems though being in theory more equitable to the licensee, are in practice difficult to operate.

- (4.) That the licensing duties above specified should be inclusive of all other fees now payable to different government and local authorities.

Taxes upon Places of Entertainment.

14. The stamp duties imposed by the Government and the Ottoman Public Debt already enumerated in paragraph 6, Licences, cause considerable inconvenience to proprietors. The incidence falls upon the buyer and not upon the proprietor, who makes an additional charge to the public to cover these duties.

The method of cancellation, which is compulsory under the law, is imperfectly carried into effect with the result that stamps are detached and again used. In many instances it is the custom of the house to collect the tickets sold when the public are shewn to their seats.

The abuses attendant upon affixing adhesive stamps are so great, that it is suggested that these duties should be abolished and replaced by another form of taxation based upon the number and value of tickets sold. The commission does not regard a discussion of the existing law as within its terms of reference, but places this proposal before the Government for its consideration.

Recommendations.

The commission recommends:—

- (1.) That an annual licence be collected by the municipality from proprietors of cinematograph establishments, as follows:—

Seating Capacity—

From 1 to 100,	PT. 50 per mensem.
" 101 to 200,	£ E. 1 " "
" 201 and over "	2 " "

The lessees of cinematograph establishments when exhibiting shows by theatrical companies will be charged the following rates:—

£ E. 2 per night for the first three nights.
£ E. 1 per night for every entertainment after the third night.

- (2.) That the proprietors of "café chantants" and other places of public entertainment be charged half the rates enumerated in sub-paragraph (1) above.
- (3.) That charitable concerts and charitable entertainments be exempted.
- (4.) That the taxes imposed under article 4 of the Municipal Tax Law be abolished. In the event of the Government imposing a general amusement tax, a proportion of the proceeds collected within the city area should be allocated to the municipality.
- (5.) That strolling players and itinerant actors be registered under the "Hawkers and Pedlars" Licence (see paragraph 16), and that such licences be collected only once at the place of registration.

Advertisements, Notices and Signboards.

15. The regulations embodied in the Ottoman Stamp Law of 1906 are irksome and vexatious in their incidence. The commission, however, is not empowered to put forward concrete proposals on this subject, but calls the attention of the Government to article 9, clauses 91-94, which would appear to require adjustment.

It views with concern the increase in the number of fixed signs placed at right angles to shop fronts, and considers that the city is suffering disfigurement through this practice. Having regard to this fact, it is proposed to place a prohibitive tariff upon such signs and recommends:—

Recommendations.

The commission recommends:—

- (1.) That shop signs projecting over the street be taxed as follows:—

	PT. per annum.
From 1 to 2 metres in length	100
From 2 to 3 metres in length	150
Over 3 metres	200

- (2.) That article 19 of the Municipal Law of 1330 be retained with present rates now charged, i.e.—

PT. 20 per metre or fraction thereof.
PT. 40 from 1 metre and upwards.

- (3.) That the authority given to municipalities under Public Notice No. 167, dated the 20th July, 1920, be retained. The rate now imposed, 1 millième for 5 square centimetres, gives no indication of the period for which such an advertisement or notice may remain upon the hoarding.
- (4.) That the duties enumerated in paragraphs 1, 2 and 3 be collected by the municipality.

Hawkers and Pedlars.

16. Article 15 of the Municipal Tax Law provides for the registration of hawkers and pedlars occupying booths on the public highway or in bazaars, exhibition grounds, racecourses and auction stands.

The municipality have, however, extended this to include a registration of all itinerant hawkers and pedlars, charging a fee varying from PT. 5 to 25 per mensem. The Public Health authorities also charge an annual fee of PT. 5 for the inspection of the articles sold to the public.

Recommendations.

The commission recommends:—

- (1.) That an annual licence be charged by the Public Health Office at the following rates:—

(a.) Itinerant hawkers and pedlars ...	PT. 60 per annum.
(b.) Occupiers of booths ...	£ E. 1 per annum.

- (2.) That the licence be collected once only at the place of registration and available for all Palestine.
- (3.) That the form of licence should satisfy the requirements of the Department of Public Security.

Auctioneers' Licence.

17. As far as the commission can ascertain, there is no law regulating the responsibility of auctioneers in regard to the auctioneer being held liable for the conversion of goods which he has sold upon the instructions of a person whom he believed to be the owner, but who in fact may have no legal right to dispose of them. In the interests of the public it inclines to the view that auctioneers should be registered locally, and that, if necessary, a financial guarantee should be demanded.

Recommendations.

The commission recommends:—

- (1.) That article 8 of the Municipal Law be abolished, whereby a tax of 12½ per cent. upon auction sales is levied.
- (2.) That auctioneers be registered locally on the payment of an annual fee of £ E. 5.

Tobacco, Cigarettes, Cigars and Persian Tumbeki.

18. (i.) A licence is collected by the Ottoman Régie des Tabacs of £ T. 1 per shop selling tobacco, cigarettes, &c.—Monopoly Law of 1914.

(ii.) The Ottoman Public Debt impose an additional duty of from PT. 12½ to PT. 187 on establishments selling Persian tumbeki. No special licence beyond the general licence to sell tobacco is required in the case of home-grown tumbeki.—Tombac Convention dated 1891 and Annex dated 1897.

Recommendations.

The commission recommends:—

- (1.) That the Government revise the system of licensing as carried out by the Régie des Tabacs at the earliest opportunity, increasing the licence to £ E. 2 per annum.
- (2.) That the Government undertake the administration of the licensing regulations.
- (3.) That a partial allocation of the proceeds of this licence, as in the case of wines, spirits and liquors, &c., be credited to the municipality for licences granted within the city area.

- (4.) That the tumbeki licence be abolished at the earliest possible opportunity.
 (5.) That the sundry stamp duties additional to the licensing fee, amounting to PT. 9½ per licence, be abolished.

Gun and Game Licences.

19. In view of the special conditions prevalent in Palestine and the fact that the shooting of game is carried out over rural areas, it inclines to the view that the issue of game licences should be controlled directly by the Government, as is the case when permits are issued sanctioning the possession of firearms. (Public Notice No. 142, dated the 9th December, 1919.)

It does not consider that the municipality is entitled to any share of the proceeds of this licence, as it would appear that the allocation of the revenues accruing should be made by the Government to the rural authorities.

It desires to draw the attention of the Government to the small sum required by the Public Debt for the issue of a game licence.

Recommendations.

The commission recommends:—

- (1.) That the whole proceeds of the game licence revert to the Government.
 (2.) That the administration of the gun licence remain as at present in force.

Dog Licence.

20. Article 18 of the Municipal Law of 1330 lays down that a licence of 25 piastres will be levied upon dogs, whether kept for sporting purposes or otherwise.

The administration of this tax is not strictly enforced in Jerusalem, and is capable of wide expansion financially.

The commission recommends—

- (1.) That the present licence be retained and administered by the municipality.
 (2.) That dogs under six months of age, and those kept solely for the purpose of tending sheep or cattle, or by shepherds, or by blind persons for their guidance, be exempt.

Building Licences.

21. The Municipal Tax Law, article 2, gives the municipality powers to levy certain fees calculated upon the floor space of the building to be erected.

Recommendations.

The commission recommends—

- (1.) That a licence fee be charged by the surveyor's office of the municipality calculated on the cubic value of the building work to be done, and that the rate chargeable be fixed at ½ per cent. with a minimum fee of PT. 50 and a maximum fee of £ E. 100.
 (2.) That compulsory structural alterations and additions carried out by order of the Public Health office be exempted from the payment of a fee, but not from the supervision of the surveyor's office. The provisions of the Antiquities Ordinance shall be applied to such alterations.
 (3.) That interior reparation and reconstruction shall be exempted from the control of the surveyor's office, but that the provisions of the Antiquities Ordinance shall apply.

Registration of Dangerous and Unhealthy Trades.

22. The Department of Public Health under cover of their memorandum No. 2472/M dated the 7th January, 1919, and published in "Official Gazette," No. 23, dated the 16th June, 1920, reimposed the provisions of article 257 of the Law of 19 Jamad Awal 1332. This law with the departmental instructions accompanying it, gives to the Public Health Department wide powers involving the control and inspection of unhealthy and dangerous trades. A scale of fees is attached to the memorandum referred to above, from which it will be observed that the scale varies from PT. 5 to PT. 200 per annum according to the class of employment. The

application for licence is received at the office of principal medical officer of the district, who undertakes the administration of the regulations. When the applicant has completed the conditions laid down, the form is stamped by the Public Health Department, and the licence form is then sent to the municipality for collection of fees and endorsement therein. The functions of the municipality are, therefore, confined to the collection of fees.

It may be remarked that an order of closure is carried out direct by the District Governor on the recommendation of the Public Health Department.

The present regulations afford a basis for future factory and workshops legislation.

Recommendations.

The commission recommends—

- (1.) That the regulations in force should be retained as serving the essential interests of health in town areas.
 (2.) That the scale of fees be increased as set out below: and that the licensing fees enumerated under section "Licences" be regarded as inclusive of any fees charged under the regulations of the Department of Public Health.

Scale of Fees.

No.	Item.	As at present per annum.	Proposed Scale per annum.
CLASS I.			
1	Factories for manufacture of mineral and other chemical products	£ E. 2	£ E. 2
2	Factories for manufacture of alcohol	1	See para. 13
3	Depots of excreta, manure and cesspool contents	PT. 50	£ E. 1
4	Factories for production of artificial manure	50	1
5	Distilleries	50	See para. 13
6	Asphalt and bitumen factories	50	£ E. 1
7	Butter (natural or artificial) factories	50	PT. 50
8	Aerated water factories	50	£ E. 1
9	Public baths	50	1
10	Breweries	50	See para. 13
11	Sugar-refining factories	50	£ E. 1
12	Candle-making factories	50	1
13	Soap-making establishments	50	1
14	Preparation of preserved fish and meat	50	1
15	Sugar-making establishments	50	1
16	Crematoria and cemeteries	50	1
17	Slaughter houses	50	2
18	Tanneries and other offensive trades (fellmongering, leather dressing, blood boiling, bone boiling, soap boiling, gut scraping, tripe boiling, tallow melting, glue making)	50	1
19	All industries employing machinery	50	PT. 50 £ E. 2
20	Match factories and store houses of matches	50	2
21	(a.) Hotels and public lodging houses when selling intoxicating liquors— Class I Class II Class III	£ E. 2 1 PT. 50	See para. 13
	(b.) Ditto when not selling intoxicating liquors— Class I Class II	£ E. 2 1	
22	Ice factories	PT. 50	2
23	Public markets	£ E. 2	2
24	Confectioneries, sweatmeat, jam and preserved fruit factories	PT. 50	PT. 50
25	Dairies	50	£ E. 1
26	Restaurants, bars, khans selling intoxicating liquors	50	See para. 13
	Restaurants, khans, pastry cook shops	50	PT. 75
27	Butcher shops	50	75
28	Fish-frying shops, fish shops	50	75
29	Tripe shops	50	75
30	Dispensaries	50	75
31	Any other establishment, trade or storehouse of products which may be detrimental to public health	50	75

No.	Item.	As at present per annum.	Proposed Scale per annum.
CLASS II.			
1	Alcohol depots	PT. 25	See para. 13
2	Brickworks, tile-making industries and potteries..	" 25	PT. 50
3	Bone-burning factories	" 25	" 50
4	Public laundries	" 25	" 50
6	Ovens and bak-houses	" 25	" 50
7	Dye works	" 25	" 50
8	Cattle markets	£ E. 2	£ E. 2
9	Oil mills, cotton-seed oil factories	PT. 25	PT. 50
10	Starch factories	" 25	" 50
11	Groceries when not selling intoxicating liquors ..	" 25	" 50
	Groceries when selling intoxicating liquors ..	" 25	See para. 13
	Flour and wheat stores	" 25	£ E. 1
	Oil stores	" 25	PT. 50
12	Poultry shops	" 25	" 50
13	Ice cream establishments	" 50	" 50
14	Preserved fish depots	" 50	" 50
15	Hawkers or itinerant vendors of milk, fish, vegetables, confectionery, fruits, meat products and any other article for human consumption	" 50	See para. 13

(3.) That contraventions against the regulations be triable before the municipal bench.

(4.) That the act of closure be applied through the medium of the municipal bench.

Petition Writer's Licence.

23. Under public notice No. 132, dated the 26th August, 1919, every person carrying on the calling of a petition writer is requested to obtain an annual licence from the District Governor. A registration fee of PT. 25 is charged. The contravention of this notice is punishable on conviction with a fine not exceeding £ E. 5 or imprisonment for a period not exceeding one week.

We are inclined to the view that if this form of registration is maintained the licence should be issuable by the municipality, who should be credited with the receipts.

Road Transport Licence.

24. The Commission finds that there are two separate taxes imposed upon road transport. The Government regulations are embodied in Public Notices 177, dated the 19th August, 1920, and No. 135, dated the 15th September, 1919.

Under article 13 of the Municipal Tax Law the rates which may be imposed by a municipality are fixed.

The taxes payable per vehicle are as follows:—

	Government Tax. Per Annum.	Municipal Tax. Per Annum.	Total Tax. Per Annum.
	PT.	PT.	PT.
(a.) Mechanically-propelled vehicles—			
Not exceeding 12 horse-power ..	150	600	750
" " 20 " ..	300	1,200	1,500
Over 20 horse-power ..	500	1,800	2,300
(b.) Hackney carriages—			
Drawn by 2 animals ..	75	240	315
" " 1 animal ..	50	144	194
(c.) Carts—			
Drawn by 2 animals ..	30	100	130
" " 1 animal ..	30	80	110

In addition, the police issue a licence at an annual charge of PT. 50 to drivers of mechanically-propelled vehicles and hackney carriages.

25. The registration of road transport is carried out at the office of the district commandant of police, who refers the applicant to the municipality for the payment of

the municipal charges. In practice, it is found that this duplication of licensing has led to a financial loss on the part of the municipality. Private owners have, in many instances, escaped the payment of taxes through lack of adequate inspection and control.

26. It is obvious that if roads are to be repaired and improved, the users of the roads should be made to pay a large contribution, but, having regard to the importance of cheap transport facilities to the prosperous economic life of Jerusalem, it is unsound in principle to place any special tax upon transport agencies which must largely be passed forward in higher rates of fare or charge. The Commission, therefore, considers that the taxes as they stand are reasonable and should not be unduly increased.

27. The alternative method of a special tax upon petrol consumed by transport owners was considered in the case of mechanically propelled vehicles, and although realising that a system of motor-fuel duties would appear to be the only fair one, by reason of its being an approximate measure of the user of the road by any motor vehicle, the members are convinced that any such system of duties is impracticable as against the advantages of a single tax system.

Recommendations.

28. It is recommended:—

- That a single tax based on the vehicle in accordance with the scale of duties set out below be adopted, all licences expiring on fixed dates.
- That the collection of the proposed single tax should be the sole levy for State and municipal purposes.
- That the tax be levied and controlled by the Government, who should allocate to the municipality 75 per cent. of the proceeds of the tax levied within the municipal area.
- That the fee for a driver's licence be PT. 50, applicable to the drivers of mechanically propelled vehicles and other vehicles. The proceeds of this licence to be allocated as in sub-paragraph (c) above.
- Foreign visitors bringing cars into this country for a period not exceeding four months should be liable to the payment of the annual driver's licence only.

PROPOSED Scales of Duty.

Class.	Rate suggested per annum. £ E millièmes.
I. Motor Cycles, private and commercial:—	
Motor cycles—	
Including motor-assisted cycles...	1,500
With right to draw trailer or side car ...	2,000
II. Motor Cars:—	
(a.) Hackney and private motor-cars—	
Seating capacity 1-5 ...	12,000
" " 6-12 ...	15,000
" " over 12 ...	18,000
(b.) Motor commercial goods vehicles—	
Carrying capacity not exceeding 10 cwt. ...	8,000
" " " 1 ton ...	10,000
" " " 1½ " ...	12,000
" " " 3 " ...	16,000
III. Hackney Carriages:—	
Seating capacity 1-5 ...	3,000
" " 6-12 ...	4,000
" " over 12 ...	5,000
IV. Private Carriages, as in section III above.	

V. *Non-Mechanically drawn Commercial Goods Vehicles:—*

Scale.	Rate suggested per annum. £ E. millièmes.
Carrying capacity not exceeding 1 ton ...	3,000
" " " 2 " ...	4,000
" " " 3 " ...	6,000
Trailers or road trucks drawn by fuel power ...	8,000
Agricultural wagons, carts or other agricultural horse vehicles ...	Free.
Hand-drawn vehicles ...	Free.

VI. *Driver's Licence:—*

For all forms of road transport, excepting agricultural horse-drawn vehicles ...	PT. 50
Government and army drivers ...	Free.

Government Transport Licences.

29. The commission desires to record the fact that under the terms of Public Notice No. 177, article 9, Government cars are free of all transport taxation, which includes cars owned by officials of the Government in receipt of a transport subsidy. It is considered that such privately-owned cars should be subject to half rates on the understanding that cars of this description are used upon part-time service of the Government. The above remark should be taken to include cars owned by army officers and used in part for army purposes. The registration of all such cars should be carried out according to the procedure applicable to civilians. A driver's licence, at the full rate, should be charged.

PART V.—LEASES AND FINES.

Leases.

1. Under the provisions of the law relating to the leasing of immovable property, dated 28 Jamad Awal 1299, as amended by the subsequent ordinance, dated 18 Rabi Awal 1332 (see appendix III), a fee of 10 paras for every PT. 100 on the total amount of the rent agreed upon in the lease is authorised as a municipal fee, chargeable in the form of special contract stamps.

2. In view of the additional expenditure which the municipalities enumerated under the provisions of the proposed town planning ordinance may be called upon to incur, the commission is of opinion that this form of taxation should be retained with the modifications proposed below. The tax is of long-standing and traditional custom, and will provide important data for any subsequent legislation affecting the rental valuation of house property within municipal areas.

3. It may be observed that section 4 (lease) of the "Palestine Land Registries, Schedule of Fees," provides for a new State fee upon leases of more than three years.

Recommendations.

4. The commission recommends—

- That the registration of leases at the office of the municipality (or such places as it may appoint) be compulsory and definitely stated to be such in the law.
- That article 20 of the Law on Leases be amended, causing the sale of municipal stamps to be held at the office of the municipality (or such places as it may appoint), and not at the office of the public notary;
- That the fees payable be increased from $\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. to $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on leases not exceeding three years in duration, having regard to the fact that the fee is payable by the lessor;
- That the penalties enumerated in article 22 be increased from 3 per cent. to 5 per cent., and those in article 23 from $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. to 2 per cent.;
- That the municipal fines as proposed in sub-paragraph (d) above, imposed by the Courts for the contravention of the provisions of the Law on Leases, be credited quarterly to the municipality;
- That the Ottoman Public Debt and H.J.Z. stamp duties be amalgamated under one schedule of fees for leases of from one to three years in duration.

The O.P.D.A. duties are as follows (Stamp Law of 1906, article 9, clause 20):—
Leases:—

For a rent up to Ps. 2,000, reckoned in accordance with the duration of the lease ...	1
Above Ps. 2,000 to Ps. 5,000 ...	2
" " 5,000 " " 10,000 ...	3
" " 10,000 " " 25,000 ...	5
" " 25,000 " " 50,000 ...	10
" " 50,000 " " 75,000 ...	15
" " 75,000 " " 100,000 ...	20
" " 100,000 " " 150,000 ...	30
" " 150,000 ...	50

The Government duties (H.J.Z. stamp duties) are as follows (Public Notice No. 78, dated the 15th November, 1919, article 21):—

PT. 1 per 1,000, with a minimum of payment of PT. 2.

(N.B.—The fees set forth in "Palestine Land Registries, Schedule of Fees," section 4, would appear to cancel the debt and H.J.Z. duties upon leases of more than three years.)

5. The Commission is of opinion that the greatest publicity should be given to the compulsory registration of leases at the office of the municipality, as it would appear that the existing law is in general disregarded by lessors, who in many cases make out no written form of contract.

6. The lease fees are estimated for the current financial year to produce £ E. 54, which, at the present scale of charges, would give the gross value of leases at £ E. 21,600. It would therefore appear that the municipality is losing a lucrative and legitimate source of revenue.

Government Leases.

7. The accommodation available in Jerusalem must for some time to come be limited, and unequal to the growing needs of the capital. The lack of suitable buildings has been further intensified by the requirements of the Government in offices and in private residences, which has resulted in a large amount of property being taken off the market. The Commission is of opinion that the lessors when leasing houses to the Government should be considered on the same standing as other civilian lessors. Certain properties have also been taken over by the Government from ecclesiastical communities, who, as owners of property, are subject to the law of immovable property, and thus to the lease law and its provisions as to contract fees.

Fines.

8. The Ottoman Penal Code, Chapter III, enumerates the powers of municipalities regarding the infliction of fines. Fines might be imposed up to the sum of £ E. 3 for contravention of certain offences stated in the municipal bye-laws. Under Public Notice No. 175, dated the 13th August, 1920, amending Ordinance No. 89, concerning contravention, the power of imposing fines by the members of a municipality is limited to PT. 25. If the person on whom such a notice of fine is served fails to pay voluntarily or contests his liability, the contravention must be prosecuted before a magistrate (article 2 of Public Notice No. 175, dated the 13th August, 1920).

9. The limitation thus imposed upon the judicial powers of members of a municipality has resulted in a very considerable addition to the work of the magistrate's court. Fines imposed by the court for the contravention of bye-laws are credited to the municipality.

Further, the contravention of bye-laws dealing with public nuisances and of the regulations of the the Department of Public Health require a speedy settlement in the interests of the local inhabitants, who are often compelled to suffer the continuance of nuisances while the case is being referred to a magistrate's court.

Recommendations.

10. The commission recommends:—

- (1.) That an ordinance be promulgated constituting the Municipal Council (under the presidency of the mayor or deputy-mayor) with the powers of a court of summary jurisdiction to try contraventions of bye-laws.
- (2.) That the powers to be delegated to the magisterial bench above mentioned should not be less than those now exercised by second-class magistrates.

The contraventions triable by second-class magistrates, who are Palestinian inspectors, include "contraventions of the orders of the municipality" (*vide* circular No. L/Gen./506, dated the 5th October, 1920). It would appear that such powers should in equity be exercised by the municipal council.

- (3.) That the power of applying for revision of sentence be granted to offenders, but not the right of appeal before another court.
- (4.) Article 20 of the Town Planning Ordinance states:—

"Any person carrying out any work within a town planning area in connection with the street, or building without having obtained a permit or otherwise than in accordance with any bye-laws made as above mentioned, may upon conviction thereof by a magistrate's court be condemned to pay a fine not exceeding £ E. 200, and shall at the same time be required to demolish the work or pay the cost of demolition thereof."

The commission is of opinion that the proposed municipal bench should be given powers to deal with contraventions of the ordinance, imposing a fine on conviction not exceeding the sum of £ E. 50. Since the financial resources of the municipality are limited, and the expenditure necessary to operate a town-planning scheme are likely to prove a heavy burden upon the municipal revenues, the commission further recommends that fines imposed by the magistrate's court should be credited to the municipality (or local commission), and set aside to meet expenditure incurred upon the operation of the ordinance.

PART VI.—MISCELLANEOUS TAXES AND FEES.

Temettu Tax.

1. Article 7 of the Municipal Tax Law of 1350, states:—

"An additional municipal tax of 10 per cent. of the temettu tax will be levied and collected by the mamour of the Finance Department, and paid into the treasury of the municipality."

This article establishes the principal of an allocation of a share of the temettu to municipalities, which, in effect, is a share of a tax upon trades, arts, crafts and professions resembling an income tax in its incidence. The taxing of a person on his salary for the service of the locality in which he resides is open to the objection that it is likely to be evaded. Local authorities have not at their disposal efficient machinery to control or to assist in the collection of such a tax.

The Government do not levy temettu.

The commission recommends: That article 7 of the Municipal Tax Law of 1330 be abolished

Storage Fees on Combustible Liquids.

2. Article 9 states:—

"A maximum tax which may be reduced by municipal councils will be levied on the undermentioned liquids consumed in any city—

	Paras.
"Per kilog. of petrol or 'bacora'	5
" " " alcohol	40
" " " benzine or any other liquids used for lighting purposes	10

"A monthly storage tax of 5 paras will be levied on each tin of petroleum, or on every 25 kilog. of liquids used for illuminating purposes deposited in municipal depots."

The rates actually levied upon the above commodities are:—

- (1.) Octroi, at the rate of 1 per cent. *ad valorem*.
- (2.) A flat rate of 5 millièmes per tin. The estimated receipts under (2) are £ E. 500.

The storage fee of 5 millièmes per tin is a legitimate charge provided that municipal storage is available. At present, however, the military authorities occupy the municipal store, and have not paid rent or compensation in lieu.

The commission recommends:—

- (1.) That the rates per kilog. on combustible liquids, enumerated in the first paragraph of article 7 be abolished.
- (2.) That storage fees be maintained on condition that accommodation is provided.

Slaughter Fees.

3. Article 14 states:—

"Until public slaughter-houses are established by the municipalities, the following slaughter tax per head will be levied:—

	PT.
"Slaughtered head of sheep or goat	3
" " " lamb or kid	1½
" " " heifer	6
" " " ox or cow	9
" " " camel or buffalo	15

"The taxes collected under this article will, in accordance with the usual rules, be divided into halves, one of which will go to the 'vilayet,' and the other to the municipality. The General Council will be allowed to reduce one-third of this tax."

The municipality will shortly be in possession of a new slaughter house.

The tax is estimated to yield £ E. 960 for the current financial year.

Tax on offal: The municipality was authorised by the Ottoman Government to regard as its property the intestines of all animals slaughtered within the municipal area.

The offal was sold by public auction. This procedure was discontinued during the war. The municipality has requested approval to continue this practice, but the butchers are contesting the right of the municipality to reimpose it.

The estimated yield is £ E. 150 per annum.

The rate for slaughter fees is a pre-war rate, and might be increased without placing an additional burden upon the consumer, providing the municipality surrenders its auction rights to offal, which should become the undisputed possession of the butcher.

The Ottoman Government authorised the imposition of a surtax upon slaughter fees in order to provide funds for educational purposes. There is no record of this increase having been applied in Palestine.

The commission recommends:—

- (1.) That the tax on offal be abolished.
- (2.) That the rates for the slaughter tax be increased as follows:—

	Present rate PT.	Proposed rate PT.
Per slaughtered head of sheep or goat ...	3	4
" " " lamb or kid ...	1½	2
" " " heifer ...	6	7½
" " " ox or cow ...	9	11
" " " camel or buffalo ...	15	17

- (3.) That the whole tax be a municipal revenue, and not divided between the State and municipalities.

(N.B.—In Jerusalem the whole proceeds are credited to municipal funds.)

Sale of Livestock.

4. Article 11 states:—

"An *ad valorem* tax of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., payable by sellers, will be levied on the price of camels, buffaloes, horses, mules, donkeys and cattle sold at fairs, in public places or bazaars. Sales carried out through brokers in any part of a city are not exempt from this tax."

The estimated receipts are £ E. 900.

The commission recommends—

- (1.) That this tax be retained.
- (2.) That the municipality undertakes direct collection.

Weights and Measures.

5. Article 16 states:—

"All weights and measures and cereal measures must be stamped by municipalities. A tax of 2 piastres for each weight or measure will be levied thereon. This tax will only be levied once. An annual tax of 20 paras will be levied for inspecting weights and measures."

"Pedlars are subject to half the tax."

We understand that the Government has under consideration the publication of a Weights and Measures Act, which will provide for use certain legal standards. In consideration of this fact, we are of opinion that in the interest of trade it would be preferable for the Government to undertake the administration of the new Act within the city area.

The estimated receipts for the present financial year are £ E. 50.

The commission recommends that article 16 be abolished as a municipal measure.

Monopoly Receipts.

6. Article 21 states:—

"A share of the profits levied by the Government upon the monopoly companies established for public services in towns or cities will be due to municipalities. The share of profits due to the Government by monopoly companies now in existence will be due to the municipalities as from the beginning of the year 1331."

The commission recommends that article 21 be retained.

Municipal Trading.

7. Article 22 states:—

"The municipalities are permitted to construct in their own names and on their account, casinos, baths, racing institutions, hotels, theatres and other places of a similar nature. Municipalities can collect the incomes or transfer their rights to companies. Gambling is forbidden in such establishments."

The commission recommends that article 22 be retained.

Improvement (Sharefieh) Tax.

8. Article 23 states:—

"A person who constructs a new building on a plot of ground is obliged to make a pavement on the roadside of his house, not exceeding $1\frac{1}{2}$ metres in breadth, in the manner required by the municipality. The costs of constructing pavement, which exceed $1\frac{1}{2}$ metres in breadth, are to be covered by the municipality after the occupier has paid for the $1\frac{1}{2}$ metres."

Article 24 states:—

"Half of the expenses incurred for a new pavement or gutter made by the municipality in any street will, after the construction is completed, be paid in instalments by the proprietors of houses."

"The distribution of the amount, as well as the instalments to be paid, will be fixed by the municipality. Nothing will be collected by municipalities from houseowners for repairs. If the street is more than 9 metres in breadth the extra expenses incurred for paving will be covered by the municipality."

The municipality has not enforced article 23, but has, in some instances, collected receipts under article 24. The receipts for the current financial year are estimated at £ E. 100, which do not represent the total cost of pavement construction, &c. It is capable of wide expansion.

The commission recommends that articles 23 and 24 be retained.

Sanitary Services.

9. The Municipal Sanitary Office charges fees for services rendered. They are:—

- (1.) For the cleaning of cesspits—PT. 100—PT. 200 per cubic metre of matter removed.
- (2.) For the emptying of latrines—a monthly fee of PT. 125—PT. 275 per latrine.

The expenditure incurred is covered by the receipts, which would appear to be somewhat high for the nature of the services rendered.

No fees are charged for the removal of refuse from private houses.

Disinfection Tax.

10. Article 6 states:—

"Excepting in cases of epidemic a disinfection tax will be levied according to a special tariff."

"The expenses of transportation of articles to be disinfected will be covered by the parties concerned."

This article serves no useful purpose, and the commission therefore recommends that it be cancelled.

Charges under this heading should not be covered by the institution of a special tax.

PART VII.—CONTROL IN LOCAL FINANCE.

Estimates.

1. The Financial Adviser's office of the late military administration circulated, under cover of letter No. 10824/FM, dated the 15th January, 1920, instructions regarding the preparation of municipal estimates. It is a matter of national importance that the Government should secure unity of idea and some uniformity in method, while permitting elasticity in local administration. The powers of a municipality are, legally, the result of a delegation, and it may be compelled by due process of law to account for its proceedings in regard to expenditure, levy of taxation, or borrowing. The first essential to an effective control of local expenditure is the preparation of estimates. The commission considers that a more detailed formula is required differentiating between capital and recurrent expenditure.

Audit.

2. Whatever be the safeguard that enlightened local opinion may provide through its examination of finance, there remains the absolute necessity for control and audit by external authority. The most elementary step in this direction is that of making members of the local government liable for any illegal expenditure that they may have sanctioned.

The necessity for a proper audit becomes more apparent if loans are to be negotiated. The system of obtaining loans encourages public outlay upon improvements by the facility with which it enables capital to be obtained. The danger is that it renders extravagance easy, and by placing this burden upon the future, it favours a tendency on the part of local authorities to embark upon enterprises which involve heavy charges being imposed for the repayment of capital and interest.

As far as can be ascertained, there has been no audit of the municipal accounts since the British occupation.

Accountancy.

3. The responsibility of the Government to the ratepayer demands that the State should lay down a system of municipal accountancy. It is considered that the introduction of a simple system such as is now in force in district finance sections would enable more effective control to be practised.

Recommendations.

4 The commission recommends—

- (1.) That detailed instructions be issued regarding the preparation of municipal budgets;
- (2.) That an effective system of audit and accountancy be introduced;
- (3.) That the inspecting officials be given the fullest powers of investigation, including the production of any books and papers and the attendance of any persons accountable;
- (4.) That the method of "surcharge" be applied by the Courts or by official auditors, thus making the members of the local government liable for any illegal expenditure that they have sanctioned;
- (5.) That the municipal budgets be published for the information of the public, and that at stated periods an official statement of receipts and expenditure be published in the "Official Gazette."

J. B. BARRON (Chairman).
E. KEITH ROACH.
H. C. LUKE.
Y. FARRADJ.
EDGAR SHELLEY.
RAGHEB.
DAVID YELLIN

Governorate, Jerusalem,
November 20, 1920.

- APPENDIX I.

MUNICIPAL TAX LAW.

(24 Rabie 1333—February 26, 1330—March 10, 1915.)

Chapter I.—Taxes on Immovable Property.

Article 1. An additional tax of 25 per cent. in Constantinople and 10 per cent. in the provinces on the present building tax will be levied as a sweeping and lighting and building tax. This tax will be levied in addition to the taxes levied on buildings within municipalities. The latter tax of 10 per cent. levied on the provinces may at the discretion of municipal authorities and councils be raised to 25 per cent. This tax, together with the building tax, will be collected by the mamours of the Finance Department, and no fee will be paid for the collection. The amount will be paid over to the municipalities. The said additional tax will be levied on Miri and Wakf property which are productive of revenue.

Art. 2. In accordance with the schedule below, a licence tax to be levied only once will be paid on every square metre of ground for every storey of a building according to the approximate ground value of the plot on which the building and parts thereof are to be constructed.

Where the price of the plot falls between any two ground values set forth in the schedule the licence tax will be levied on the smaller. Cellars, the average height of which above the ground is 2 metres, will not be reckoned as storeys. Half the licence tax will be levied for rooms on the ground floor 2 or more metres in height. A double tax per square metre will be levied on all balconies, outside balustrades, platforms, galleries or portees which open on a street. Half of this double tax will be levied in the provinces. This tax will also be levied on Wakf and Miri buildings.

Schedule.

Ground Value.	Tax Levied per Square Metre on each Storey.		Ground Value.	Tax Levied per Square Metre on each Storey.	
	PT.	Paragraph.		PT.	Paragraph.
10,000	1	..	70,000	7	..
15,000	1	20	75,000	7	20
20,000	2	..	80,000	8	..
25,000	2	20	85,000	8	20
30,000	3	..	90,000	9	..
35,000	3	20	95,000	9	20
40,000	4	..	100,000	10	..
45,000	4	20	110,000	10	20
50,000	5	..	120,000	11	..
55,000	5	20	130,000	11	20
60,000	6	..	140,000	12	..
65,000	6	20	150,000	12	20

On ground values exceeding this amount a tax of PT. 20 will be levied on every square metre of ground in each storey.

Art. 3. A tax of 5 per cent. on the total fixed or approximate annual rent of liquor casinos, beer houses and public houses will be levied by the municipality.

Art. 4. A licence must be obtained from the municipality and taxes will be levied upon all establishments used for public entertainment where an entrance fee is charged or refreshments sold, such as punch and judy shows, theatres and juggling shows, skating rinks, "Luna parks," cinema and similar places of public entertainment. In addition to all clubs and casinos and hotels having public baths, concerts, balls, horse races or other public meetings and on establishments connected with fortune telling, panoramas, phisic seances, bars and "cafés chantants" are liable to a similar tax.

The licence fee, together with the permanent, daily, monthly or annual tax due to the municipality, will be paid in accordance with a tariff to be drawn up by the municipal authorities. In drawing up the tariff the location and status, as well as the degree of popularity of such establishments, will be taken into consideration.

An extra tax per hour, to be fixed by the municipality, will be levied on all bars and "cafés chantants" kept open after midnight.

Art. 5. A licence must be obtained from the municipality in order to occupy stalls or premises and for the use of overhead covers and partitions on pavements, streets or open places, whether these be for profit or otherwise.

A daily, weekly or monthly tax not exceeding one-quarter of the daily, weekly or monthly rent of the said premises will be levied.

A licence tax to be fixed by the municipality not exceeding 1 per cent. of the rent as above will be levied on overhead covers and partitions. Partitions of $\frac{1}{2}$ -metre or less wide will be exempt from the tax.

Art. 6. Excepting in cases of epidemic, a disinfection tax will be levied to the amount to be fixed according to a special tariff.

The expense of removal of articles to be disinfected will be covered by the parties concerned.

Chapter II.—Taxes on Movable Property.

Art. 7. An additional municipal tax of 10 per cent. of the "temuttah" tax will be levied and collected by the mamours of the finance department and paid into the treasury of the municipality.

Art. 8. An *ad valorem* tax of $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on the prices of all articles sold by public auction will be paid to the municipality. The tax is payable by the purchaser at the auction to the special tax collector.

Sales for auction in private places are forbidden unless written notice is previously forwarded to the municipality and approved.

Haberdashery of trifling value is exempt from this tax.

The local municipal councils in the provinces will fix the rate of this tax. The legal taxes on auctions which are held by Government departments belong to the municipalities. The auctioneers will be appointed by the municipalities.

Art. 9 A maximum tax, which may be reduced by local municipal councils, will be levied on the under-mentioned liquids consumed in any city :—

	Paras.
Per kilog. of petrol or "bacora"	5
" " alcohol	40
" " benzine or any other liquid used for lighting purposes	10

A monthly storage tax of 5 paras will be levied on each tin of petroleum, or on every 25 kilog. of liquids used for illuminating purposes deposited in municipal depots.

Art. 10. A licence tax, to be paid only once, will be levied as under on all steam-engines and motors, excepting those used for agricultural purposes, and those exempted under special ordinances :—

	£ E.
5 horse-power	2
5 to 10 horse-power	5
Over 10 horse-power	10

Art. 11. An *ad valorem* tax of 2½ per cent. payable by the vendor will be levied on the price of camels, buffaloes, horses, mules, donkeys and cattle sold at fairs, in public markets or in bazaars. Sales carried out through brokers in any part of a city are not exempt from this tax.

Art. 12. A tax in accordance with a tariff to be fixed by the municipality will be levied on spring water carried for sale in special vessels. The water is subject to inspection by the municipality, and a mark indicating the spring from which it comes must be stamped on the vessel.

Art. 13. A monthly tax on means of transport will be levied as follows :—

	PT.
Carriage plying for hire—	
Two animals	20
One animal	12
Carts drawn by buffaloes or oxen	10
Carts with two animals	10
Carts with one animal	8
Every animal kept for hire for riding or burden purposes	5
Every donkey kept for hire for riding or burden purposes	2½

In levying this tax the number of animals and not the number of carts or carriages will be taken into consideration.

Military officers who are entitled to keep a certain number of horses for riding are exempt from the tax.

A monthly tax as under will be levied on motor-cars and all kinds of motor vehicles as follows :—

	PT.
Up to 12 horse-power	50
12 to 20 horse-power	100
Over 20 horse-power	150

The following are also subject to the tax levied on motor-cars, carriages, and animals plying for hire.

Private carriages and motor-cars. Riding animals, vehicles and motor-cars of every description used for transport and belonging to any company or commercial firm.

The above taxes may be levied by the municipality quarterly, half-yearly or annually.

Taxes will be levied in accordance with a tariff to be fixed by municipal councils on all steam-boats, motor-boats, schooners, sloops, barges, vessels, as well as canoes or boats which run in ports, lakes and rivers within the city boundaries.

Taxes will be levied in accordance with the tariff to be fixed by municipal councils upon schooners and other vessels plying upon the sea, lakes or rivers which, with their cargoes, regularly or periodically touch ports or towns or places that are used as dockyards or depots.

The taxes set forth in this article may be reduced in the provinces at the discretion of the municipal councils.

Art. 14. Until public slaughter-houses are established the following slaughter tax per head will be levied :—

	PT.
Slaughtered head of sheep	3
" lamb or kid	1½
" heifer	6
" ox or cow	9
" camel or buffalo	15

The taxes collected under this article will, in accordance with the general rules, be divided into halves, one of which will go the "vilayet" and the other to the municipality.

The general council will be allowed to reduce one-third of this tax.

Art. 15. A tax to be fixed by the local municipalities will be levied on every square pique (roughly about a square yard) of ground occupied by traders or dealers when bazaars, exhibitions, race meetings and auctions are held.

Art. 16. All weights and measures and grain measures must be stamped by municipalities and a tax of 2 piastres for each weight or measure will be levied thereon. This tax will only be levied once. An annual tax of 20 paras will be levied for inspecting weights and measures.

Peddlers are subject to half the tax.

Art. 17. Articles which are sold by weight or measure and are brought to any city to be sold from depots, shops or in markets and public places must be weighed and measured by municipal weights and measures. Taxes for such weighing and measuring will be fixed by a tariff to be prepared by municipal councils. In transactions carried out among merchants, and sales in public places of goods which are sold by lot, the parties may choose whether the transactions be carried out in accordance with the municipal weights and measures or otherwise. Fuel sold by sack or steelyard must be weighed.

Art. 18. A tax of PT. 25 will be levied on dogs whether they be kept for hunting or otherwise. This tax will be fixed in the provinces by the municipal councils in accordance with the circumstances prevailing in the district.

Art. 19. A tax will be levied in accordance with the tariff to be fixed by the municipal councils on any notices, plaques, writings and signs, except such notices, writings or signs on glass doors, store rooms or factories which state the names and addresses of the proprietors.

Chapter III.—Taxes relating to Persons and Government Employees.

Art. 21. The share of profits levied by the Government from the monopoly companies established for public services in towns or cities is due to municipalities.

The share of profits due to the Government from the monopoly companies now in existence will be due to municipalities from the beginning of year 1331.

Art. 22. Municipalities are permitted to construct, in their own names and on their account, casinos, baths and race courses, hotels, theatres and other places of a similar nature. Municipalities collect the revenues or transfer them to companies.

Gambling is forbidden in such establishments.

Chapter IV.—Miscellaneous Articles.

Art. 23. Any person having erected a new building on a plot of ground is obliged to make a pavement on the side of the road nearest his building not exceeding 1½ metres in width and of the length of his frontage, and in the manner suggested by the municipality. The cost for pavements which exceed 1½ metres in width are to be defrayed by the municipalities, after the owner has paid for the paving of his share of 1½ metres.

Art. 24. Half of the expenses incurred for a new pavement or gutter made by the municipality in any street will, after the construction is completed, be paid in instalments by the proprietors of the houses. The distribution of the amount, as well as the instalments to be paid, will be fixed by the municipality. Nothing will be collected by the municipalities from house-owners for repairs.

If the street is 9 or more metres wide, all the expenses incurred for paving will be borne by the municipality, except such expenses incurred as defined in article 23.

Art. 25. This law is substituted for the following laws:—

Rules regarding protection of petroleum in the city areas; the provisional law of municipal taxes of Constantinople dated 21st Rabi I 1330—27th March 1328; the supplement of the aforesaid law dated 6th Jumada I 1331 and 31st March 1329; the provisional law dated 21st Rabi I 1332 and 4th February 1329 amending article 16 of the said law; the provisional law of vilayet municipal taxes of 15th Jumada II 1332 and 28th April 1330; the provisional law of slaughter taxes dated 29th Moharrem 1332 and 16th December 1329 as well as its supplement of 28th Rabi II 1332, and March 15th 1320; and the article 58 of the provisional law of buildings which article contains "Rights of Reserve" dated 4th Jumada II, 1332 and 17th April 1330.

Taxes not referred to in this law but levied by municipalities in accordance with law or custom will be levied as hitherto.

Art. 26. The law shall come into force from the date of its publication.

APPENDIX II.

STATEMENT of Estimated Receipts for the Year ending March 31, 1921.

Receipts.

1. Revenues derived under the authority of the Municipal Tax Law of 1330:—

Article		£ E.
1.	Share of Werku	535
"	2. Building permits	250
"	3. Liquor licences	60
"	4. Amusement tax	110
"	5. Licensing of stalls, booths, &c.	450
"	6. Disinfection tax	—
"	7. Share of Temettu tax	—
"	8. Auction dues	—
"	9. Combustible liquid dues	500
"	10. Licensing of commercial fuel-driven machinery	10
"	11. Sales of animals	900
"	12. Water carriers' licence	—
"	13. Transport licence	400
"	14. Slaughtering fees	960
"	15. Hawkers' and pedlars' licence	150
"	16. Weights and measures	50
"	17. Kantar tax	—
"	18. Dog licences	5
"	19. Advertisement fees	300
"	21. Monopoly tax	—
"	22. Municipal trading	—
" 23	24. Improvement tax	200
		4,880

2. Revenues derived from various Ottoman decrees:—

(1.)	Lease fees	54
(2.)	Sale of contract forms	20
(3.)	Offal sales	150
(4.)	Fines	275
(5.)	Game licences	25
		524

3. Revenues derived from powers granted by the military administration:—

	£ E.
(1.) Octroi	18,250
(2.) House rate	4,500
(3.) Sanitary services	520
	23,270

4. Revenues from municipal property, &c.:—

(1.) Rents	3,600
(2.) Compensation for drainage	900
(3.) Sandry receipts	305
	4,805

5. Surplus balance from previous year

3,427
36,906

STATEMENT of Estimated Expenditure for the Year ending March 31, 1921.

Expenditure.

	£ E.
1. General administration and collection charges—	3,486
Establishment	—
2. Public services—	2,000
Lighting	2,200
3. Public security	18,753
4. Public health	4,230
5. Public works	300
6. Relief services	830
7. Repayment of loans	500
8. Extraordinary	1,731
9. Miscellaneous	—
	34,030
Estimated balance	2,876
	36,906

APPENDIX III.

Extracts from the Law relating to Lease of Immovable Property dated 28 Jamal Awal 1299, as amended by the Subsequent Ordinance dated 18 Rabi Awal 1332.

Article 1. In leases of immovable property such as a house, shop or a warehouse, it shall be the duty of the lessor to make a written contract of lease between him and the lessee.

Article 6. A registration fee at the rate of one per ten of the value of the special contract stamp to be fixed on the contract of lease shall be collected by the Court on any contract of lease required to be approved by it. The payment of this fee shall be recorded on the back of the contract and signed and sealed.

Article 10 (as amended by the law of 13 Rabi Awal 1332). The fees on a contract of lease shall be at the rate of 10 paras per every PT. 100 on the total amount of the rent, and shall be paid by the means of special contract stamps. In addition, the Stamp Law is applicable to these contracts. The fees on the contract shall be paid by the lessor. The stamps under the Stamp Law shall be paid by the persons by whom the copies of the contract are taken.

Article 11. Special contract stamps have been designed of various grades, and divided into two parts. Each municipality shall have a supply of special contract forms bearing its own number.

Article 12 (as amended by the law of 18 Rabi Awal 1332). A fee of 10 paras for every PT. 100 on the total amount of the rent for the period agreed upon in the lease shall be charged in the form of special contract stamps, to be affixed through the municipality of the district within which the property is situated. Each stamp will be divided into two halves, one half to be affixed to the lessor's copy of the contract and the other to the lessee's copy. Where the property is held in joint ownership or where the lessees are numerous and each of them or of the joint owners requires a copy of the contract no further stamps shall, after the production of the original copies, be affixed to the additional copies required. The additional copies shall, on the payment of a fee of PT. 5 for each copy, be certified to be true copies of the original. When the fees paid for the original copies are less than PT. 5, the same fee shall be charged for certifying each of the additional copies. The certification of the additional copies shall take place in the office where the originals were made.

Article 16. These regulations are also applicable to all contracts of lease concluded with the Government Department.

Article 17 (as amended by the law of 18 Rabi Awal 1332). Where a lessee desires to assign his lease to another he shall make a note to this effect at the foot of his contract of lease. This note shall be signed or sealed and the assignment shall be subject to an additional 5 piastres special contract stamp to be affixed thereto. Should the lessee let the property for a rent higher than the rent paid by him the extra amount of rent shall be subject to an additional fee of 10 paras for every PT. 100 in the form of a special contract stamp to be affixed thereto.

The death of one of the parties to a contract of lease does not dissolve the contract. The terms of the contract remain valid and no further fees are payable.

Article 20 (as amended by the law of 18 Rabi Awal 1332.) Where, in the case of a contract of lease conforming with the law as regards the affixing of stamps, one of the parties applies to the magistrate, or to the Court of 1st Instance if there is no magistrate, claiming execution of the terms of the contract, the president of the Court or the magistrate shall warn the defendant that unless he complies with the terms of the contract within ten days he will be compelled to do so by the police. On the expiration of the term of the lease the property let shall be vacated in accordance with the Notary Public Law, and shall be delivered to the lessor, even without waiting to see the result of the action which may be pending between the parties to the contract.

Where in the case of a contract of lease not conforming with the law as regards the affixing of stamps, one of the parties thereto applies to the magistrate or to the Court claiming execution of the terms of the contract, he shall not have the benefit of the above-mentioned privileges unless the fine according to this law is paid by him to the municipality.

The contract stamps will be supplied and cancelled by the Notary Public, who will, after retaining 5 per cent. according to Article 99 of the Notary Public Law, hand the balance in cash to the municipality.

Article 22 (as amended by the law of 18 Rabi Awal 1332). The lessor who fails to make a contract of lease for the property let by him shall, in addition to the payment of a fine of 3 per cent. of the amount of the rent of the property for the previous year, be bound to pay a fee of 60 paras for every PT. 100 in the form of special contract stamps, which will be cancelled in his presence.

Article 23 (as amended by the law of 18 Rabi Awal 1332). Where a contract of lease shall have been reduced before any Court or Government Department and stamps according to the law have not been affixed thereto or, when affixed, have not been cancelled in accordance with Article 14 hereof, a fee of 10 paras for every PT. 100 of the amount of the contract shall be collected in the form of contract stamps to be affixed on the contract, in addition to a fine of $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the amount of the contract. If the stamps affixed are less than the amount required by law, or if, after a contract of lease has been signed, the period of lease and the amount of rent are altered by a note at the foot of the contract to higher rent and no stamps are affixed to cover the additional rent, a fee of 10 paras for every PT. 100 of the deficient amount shall be collected in the form of contract stamps to be affixed to the lease, in addition to a fine of $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. of the amount of the contract.

Article 25. Fines imposed by the municipality shall be collected in the same way as other municipality taxes are collected.

Article 27. All dealings connected with contract stamps will be under municipality control and supervision, and Government and municipality officials are required to take all necessary measures for the purpose of strictly carrying out the provisions of this law.

*Translations of Ottoman Laws,
June 1919.*

APPENDIX IV.

SCHEDULE OF H.J.Z. STAMP DUTIES.

Fixed Duty.

	PT.	Millieme.
1. Tickets of theatres, cinematographs, &c. ...	—	5
2. Cheques, bills of exchange and promissory notes payable on demand, and receipts of all descriptions (up to any amount) ...	—	5
3. Copies of petitions ...	—	—
4. All documents presented to the courts ...	—	—
5. All registration papers connected with the enumeration and control of animals coming under the "animal tax" ...	1	0
6. Receipts issued by the customs offices ...	—	—
7. Delivery orders issued by shipping agents ...	—	—
8. All documents issued by notary public ...	—	—
9. Petitions addressed to the authorities ...	2	0
10. Customs house declarations ...	—	—
11. Bills of landing (each copy) ...	—	—
12. Insurance policies ...	—	—
13. All petitions and declarations connected with the transfer or mortgage of immovable property ...	5	0
14. Licences for the publication of books and printed matters ...	20	0
15. Deeds of attorney (containing no indication of value) ...	50	0
16. Documents of guarantee of security (containing no indication of value) ...	100	0
17. Brokers' licences ...	200	0
18. Factory licences ...	—	—

Proportional Duty.

19. Bills of exchange and promissory notes not payable on demand:—

Exceeding—	Not exceeding—		
£ E. —	£ E. 100	2	0
" 100	" 500	5	0
" 500	" 1,000	10	0
" 1,000	—	25	0

20. Contracts for the sale of any property, movable or immovable minimum, $\frac{1}{2}$ 2 0

21. Leases. 2 0

22. Tenders for supplies required by the Government or for goods to be sold by the Government ... minimum, 1 2 0

23. Deeds of attorney.

24. Documents of guarantee or security.

25. Title deeds.

26. Licences of limited liability companies (on capital subscribed).

[E 501/35/88]

No. 78.

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 10.)

(No. 244.)

My Lord,

Jerusalem, January 1, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith my report on the political situation for the month of December.

The report on the economic, financial and administrative position will be sent by the next bag.

I have, &c.

(For High Commissioner),

E. KEITH-ROACH.

Enclosure 1 in No. 78.

Political Report for December.

THE political situation in Palestine continues, on the whole, satisfactory.

1. The events which have occurred in Transjordan during the last few weeks have not passed unobserved in Palestine. Exaggerated rumours have been current as to a movement, instigated by King Hussein and conducted by Emir Abdullah, against the French, and as to the establishment in Amman of a Hedjaz Government. When, however, the truth of the recent events and their sequence becomes known in Palestine it should, on the whole, redound to the advantage of the British Government and of its representatives in Transjordan.

2. The rumours regarding affairs in Transjordan were undoubtedly of some service to those members of the Christian-Moslem Societies who met during the middle of the month in conference at Haifa. The conference was composed of all those who call themselves "delegates" of the societies in question. It should, however, be observed that these societies, of which the number in June last was forty-three, and the membership alleged to be about 3,000 (but it is probable that most have fallen into abeyance), cannot rightly be regarded as representative (in a European sense) of the views of the whole population. At the same time there is reason to believe that certain of the views expressed are passively shared by some sections of the population.

The conference at Haifa passed off without untoward incident. It is not yet evident what effect, if any, will be given to their resolutions.

These resolutions were embodied in the form of a memorandum which was presented by Musa Kazim Pasha al Husseini (the president of the conference) to his Excellency the High Commissioner.

A copy of this memorandum, together with a copy of the reply sent thereto, is attached. (Marked (A) and (B).)

As Musa Kazim Pasha's memorandum was published in the Arabic press, the reply of the High Commissioner has also been published. It is probable that the articles in a certain section of the British press were the occasion, if not indirectly the cause, of the recent recrudescence of political discussion in the local press, and to a limited extent, in the country.

A communiqué issued by the Government on the 16th December is herewith attached. (Marked (C).)

Information has been received since the assembling of the conference that it is the intention of members to hold another such meeting at Nablus next month. It is also stated that it is intended to carry out propaganda in the country, and to get in touch with persons holding similar views in Egypt, Syria, and further north. But the truth of this information is not yet established.

3. A few days prior to the meeting of the conference above referred to, a general meeting of the four parties representing Jewish workmen took place at Haifa. The object of the conference was to arrange for the consolidation of all labour groups in one party. The total number of workmen represented was 4,500, and the total number of delegates was eighty-seven. A copy of the statutes agreed to at the conference is attached. (Marked (D).)

4. There has also been during the course of the month a little labour unrest in Jaffa. At a sweet and confectionery establishment in that town a strike had been in progress for a considerable time, and although the number of the workmen and the

size of the industry is inconsiderable, the strike was regarded by the workmen as a test case from which to deduce the Government's probable action in future labour disputes. The point of interest turned, not unnaturally, on the Government's attitude towards picketing. In a communiqué dated the 20th December, and given to the press (copy attached marked (E)), the Government made it known, amongst other things, that employers and non-union men would be protected in the enjoyment of their legitimate rights. A few days before, on the 17th December, a party of workmen broke into the premises of a wood merchant and damaged the machinery. Upon the police attempting to arrest the leaders of the party, an affray ensued resulting in injuries of varying gravity to upwards of ten persons.

5. At first sight it might appear that, in the present condition of labour and industry in the country, these disputes can be regarded as of minor moment. But since their political effect upon other elements of the population is appreciable, and since they involve questions of principle respecting the relative spheres of action of capital, labour, and of the Government, an importance which they would not otherwise deserve must be attached to them.

6. The 9th December (the anniversary of the entry into Jerusalem of the British army) was celebrated in Jerusalem by a parade of the garrison. A service was held in St. George's Cathedral in the morning, and in the afternoon the acting District Governor of Jerusalem held a reception at the Governorate. The service was attended by his Excellency the High Commissioner and the senior members of the civil Administration and the garrison, together with the religious and secular heads of all sections of the community with the exception of the Latin Church. The service was most impressive. Great care had been exercised by Bishop MacInnes in the choice of portions of the Scripture and Prayer Book suitable to the occasion and to the congregation. Selections from the Scriptures were read in Arabic, Hebrew and English, while the Orthodox Patriarch read a part in Greek. The day was characterised throughout by a spirit of cordial friendship.

7. On Sunday the 19th December, a service was held by the Orthodox Church in the Holy Sepulchre to celebrate the return to Greece of ex-King Constantine. This service took place at the request of the Greek consul who, having previously posed as a zealous Veniselist, has now become an equally zealous Constantinist. The consul attended the service in uniform, but none of the other consuls were present, although it is understood that they had been invited by the Greek consul. A letter from the Greek consul (marked (F)) was received by the acting District Governor, Jerusalem, and it is understood that letters in the same sense were addressed to all consular representatives, and that they were requested to hoist their flags. This request was not complied with; indeed the French consul-general, who usually hoists his flag on Sundays, refrained on this occasion from so doing in order that it should not be thought that he had complied with the request of the Greek consul.

8. On the 25th December the usual ceremonies at the Church of the Nativity at Bethlehem were performed. A report on this subject was forwarded in despatch No. 229, dated the 27th December.

9. On the 29th December the capture of Ramallah by British troops was celebrated in that place. His Excellency the High Commissioner and Lady Samuel attended, and speeches were made by the mayor and a number of leading residents of the town, expressing the deepest gratitude for the establishment of a British Administration, and satisfaction with the present situation in the country.

10. Before terminating the political section of this report, allusion should be made to the increasing harmony which characterises the meetings of the Advisory Council. There are some grounds for hoping not only that the spirit now prevailing at this round table conference of all three communities under the presidency of the High Commissioner may eventually spread amongst the rest of the population of Palestine, but also that the proceedings may be taken by them as an example in mutual work and co-operation.

December 31, 1920.

Enclosure 2 in No. 78.

(A.)

Memorandum presented to the High Commissioner.

THIS third Palestinian Arab Congress, legally representative of all the classes and communities of the Palestinian Arab people, meeting at the town of Haifa since the 13th December, 1920, referring to the covenant contracted by Great Britain

[5668]

U

with her ally His Majesty the King of the Hedjaz in the year 1915, to the statements of the British Prime Minister at Glasgow on the 23rd June, 1917, and to the declarations of the rest of the heads of the Allied Governments and their statesmen confirming the necessity of granting the liberated people, severed from the Turkish Empire, the right of choosing their future and the form of Government that may meet with their satisfaction—this congress, in the name of the honour of Great Powers and that of humanity, and in the name of the two religions of Islam and Christianity, appeals to Great Britain for the justice of immediately proceeding to form a native Government to be responsible towards a Legislative Assembly representative of, and elected by, the Arabic-speaking population living in Palestine up to the beginning of the war—such step being the realisation of Great Britain's sublime principles already in the process of application in the two Arabic-speaking regions of Mesopotamia and Transjordan, and to the solidification and confirmation of the deep-rooted friendship existing between her and the Arab nation in general.

This congress is perfectly confident that this request is to be met with the best of attention and readiness, and that the hesitation of according it amounts to the continuance of the unnecessary and unavoidable discontent of the Arab people, and the burdening of the British people with too heavy an expense for the sake of internal and external peace (restfulness), as this congress, speaking in the name of the people, is unsatisfied with the present Administration, which is contrary to the people's wishes and rights, for reasons, the main of which are:—

1. Its adoption of the competence to enact laws by itself in the absence of any representative and elected Legislative Assembly, and before the issue of the final decision of the League of Nations.
2. Its recognition of the Zionist Commission as an official body.
3. Its proceeding to fulfil the Zionist ambitions by introducing Zionist emigrants, using Hebrew as an official language, and keeping silent over the existence of a Zionist flag.
4. Its formation of an Advisory Council nominated by it *faisant semblant* of the existence in Palestine of a Legislative Assembly representing the population.
5. The existence in the highest of its positions of Zionist leaders notwithstanding the fact that Palestine is the very Holy Land of the two Moslem and Christian worlds, and that its destiny may not pass into other than Moslem and Christian hands.

This congress, in advance, tenders its thankfulness to Great Britain in as much as it is trustful that she is giving this appeal the best of consideration and readiness. Salaam.

M. KASIM EL HUSSEINI,
President of Congress.

December 18, 1920.

Enclosure 3 in No. 78.

(B.)

High Commissioner to Muza Kazim Pasha.

Sir,

December 21, 1920.

I AM directed by his Excellency the High Commissioner to acknowledge receipt of your memorandum dated the 18th December.

His Excellency the High Commissioner notes that the memorandum asserts at the outset that the congress was "legally representative of all the classes and communities of the Palestinian Arab people."

The information in the possession of the Government, on the contrary, is to the effect that the members of the congress were appointed by small groups, and are by no means representative of the population.

Before taking into consideration, therefore, the resolutions which were passed, his Excellency would be obliged if he could be informed—

1. By what societies the representatives were appointed.
2. What number of members of each society participated in the choice of the representatives.

I have, &c.
W. H. DEEDES,
Civil Secretary.

Enclosure 4 in No. 78.

(C.)

Communiqué issued by the Government, December 16.

IT has been observed that certain persons are engaging in a movement having as its object a change in the declared policy of the British Government with regard to Palestine.

It appears that this movement has been stimulated by some articles that have appeared in a section of the London press. The High Commissioner desires to state that there has not been, and will not be, any change in the policy of His Majesty's Government, as announced by him in his inaugural address in the month of July. That policy fully safeguards the rights of all sections of the inhabitants of Palestine in relation to the Holy Places, to the ownership and cultivation of land, and to all other matters in accordance with the dictates of justice.

Enclosure 5 in No. 78.

(D.)

Statutes agreed to at the Conference at Haifa, December 13, 1920.

Paragraph 1.—The conference of the Palestine workmen creates a communal organisation of the Hebrew workmen in Palestine. (Confederation of Labour.)

Paragraph 2.—The confederation unites all the workers and wage-earners of the country who live on their work, and are not employing others, in order to organise all settlement, communal and educational affairs of all the Palestine workers, and to build a Hebrew working community in Palestine.

Paragraph 3.—Speaks of self-governing institutions, and was deferred to the "organisation" clause.

Paragraph 4.—The confederation is embodied from trade organisations who organise their members according to their trades.

Paragraph 5.—The confederation is the only representative of the workers' community in all settlement, communal and educational affairs, within and without.

Enclosure 6 in No. 78.

(E.)

Official Communiqué to the Press.

IN the event of a labour dispute officers of the Government will—

- (a.) Preserve an attitude of impartiality on the economic questions that are in dispute, and endeavour to bring the parties to an arbitration.
- (b.) Preserve order.
- (c.) Maintain freedom of access to the premises where the dispute has occurred.
- (d.) Not deny to the workmen or their representatives the opportunity of stating their case to any work-people whom the employer may bring to take their places, provided that this right of "peaceful persuasion" does not in fact degenerate into violence. Workmen cannot, however, be allowed by violence, or the threat of violence, to prevent the employers carrying on their business, whether with their own labour or with the labour of other work-people whom they may be able to employ.

Enclosure 7 in No. 78.

(F.)

Greek Consul to the Acting Governor-General, Jerusalem.

M. le Gouverneur,

Jérusalem, le 12 décembre 1920.

J'AI l'honneur de porter à votre connaissance que Sa Majesté le Roi Constantin, mon auguste Souverain constitutionnel, arrivera au Phalère, dimanche prochain, 19 courant, pour reprendre l'exercice de ses fonctions royales.

A cette occasion le deuil Royal sera suspendu pendant trois jours, durant lesquels le drapeau de ce consulat général sera arboré.

Veuillez agréer, &c.
S. G. LIATIS.

[E 16163/4164/44]

No. 79.

Earl Curzon to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

(No. 87.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, January 10, 1921.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 3821 of the 26th December, enclosing a copy of a note from the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs regarding the attitude of the Italian Government towards the conferment of the mandates for Syria, Palestine, and Mesopotamia.

2. You will see from my despatches No. 4157 of the 29th December, 1920, and No. 2 of the 1st January, that I have already refused to accept the Italian Government's attitude in this matter, and have informed the French Minister here of the line adopted by His Majesty's Government. You should refer the French Ministry for Foreign Affairs to this correspondence and explain that I do not intend to make any further representations to the Italian Government on this matter until I learn the result of those referred to above.

3. Your Excellency should inform the French Government at the same time that His Majesty's Government agree generally with the views of the French Government regarding the necessity of provisionally putting into operation certain administrative measures, which cannot longer be delayed, provided such measures are in conformity with the terms of the draft mandates communicated to the Council of the League and with the spirit of article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations; His Majesty's Government further agree that since the Covenant of the League of Nations, which is in force, has laid down the method of government for the territories in question, and since the mandates have been selected by the principal Allied Powers, who, as the Council of the League readily admit, are alone competent to make such selection, there would appear to be no reason why the Council should not at once proceed to define the conditions in which these territories are to be administered by the mandates without waiting for any further formalities to take place. His Majesty's Government do not consider, however, that this line of argument can, as suggested in the note from the Ministry for Foreign Affairs, be pressed so far as to establish that on the issue of the mandates by the Council the legal position of the mandatory will be complete. The territories placed under these mandates are still in law under Turkish sovereignty, and, as Turkey is not at present bound either by the Covenant or by the decision of the Supreme Council at San Remo conferring the mandates, the necessary steps to divest her of sovereignty and thus to complete the legal position of the mandatory have not been taken. If, however, the Council is prepared to issue the mandates at its next meeting, the only further step to be taken would be to secure Turkey's adherence to the arrangement by the deposit of ratifications of the Turkish Treaty. If, moreover, the Council could be induced to combine its issue of the mandates with an indication of the propriety of the administration of the mandated territories being conducted in accordance with the provisions of the mandates, pending the coming into force of the Turkish Treaty, the position of the mandatory would, in the opinion of His Majesty's Government, be rendered more stable from the legal point of view.

4. The note from the French Government and the views of His Majesty's Government, as set forth above, are being communicated to the British representative on the Council for his guidance, and you should suggest to the French Government that, if they agree with these views, they should also be communicated to the French representative on the Council.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 16163/4164/44]

No. 80.

Foreign Office to Sir M. Hankey.

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 10, 1921.

WITH reference to the letter from this Department of the 30th December, I am directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to transmit the accompanying copies of correspondence* with the Italian Chargé d'Affaires and French Minister here, and His Majesty's Ambassador at Paris regarding "A" mandates.

* See Part IV, Nos. 312, 328, 329 and 339, and No. 79, ante.

2. I am to request that these papers and, in particular, the views expressed in the despatch to Lord Hardinge may be brought to the attention of Mr. Balfour for his guidance at the meeting of the Council at which the question of the "A" mandates is to be discussed.

I am, &c.

LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

[E 538/334/88]

No. 81.

War Office to Foreign Office.—(Received January 11.)

Sir,

War Office, January 10, 1921.

I AM commanded by the Army Council to acknowledge receipt of your letter dated the 29th December, 1920, and enclosures.

As regards paragraph 2 of your letter, I am to inform you that the present system of communication between the British and French military authorities on military affairs is by means of a British liaison officer at General Gouraud's headquarters and a French liaison officer at General Headquarters, Cairo.

I am to say that, while agreeing generally with Lord Curzon's views as regards questions involving the use of troops for political purposes, the Army Council consider that, since Syria and Palestine are both potential theatres of military operations, the existing system should continue for the present for the purpose of interchanging information of a purely military nature.

A copy of this letter has been forwarded to the India Office.

I am, &c.

B. B. CUBITT.

[E 570/570/88]

No. 82.

Sir H. Samuel to Sir J. Tilley.—(Received January 12, 1921.)

Dear Sir John Tilley,

Jerusalem, December 24, 1920.

I SHOULD be obliged if you would read the enclosed correspondence with Sir Alfred Mond, and the cables from him and Dr. Weizmann, copies of which are also enclosed.

As it is desirable that the Foreign Office should be fully acquainted with any step taken, such as that proposed by Sir Alfred Mond, I send you herewith a letter which I have written to Sir Alfred Mond to-day, in order that you may forward it to him, in the event of your having no comments to make with regard to it.

Yours sincerely,

HERBERT SAMUEL.

Enclosure 1 in No. 82.

Sir H. Samuel to Sir A. Mond.

Dear Sir Alfred Mond,

Jerusalem, November 29, 1920.

I HAVE received your letter of the 18th November relating to the Economic Council, but, before sending you a reply, it seems to be necessary to obtain Dr. Weizmann's views upon the subject. I do not know precisely what the relations now are between the Economic Council and the Zionist Organisation, and I should not like to take any step which may appear to the latter to be derogatory to its status. I have, therefore, written the enclosed letter to Dr. Weizmann, and I send it to you to read and to post if you think it not undesirable to do so. Should you be of opinion, however, that the latter would be likely to complicate the situation please return to me, with your suggestions as to the best course to pursue. If, on the other hand, you should forward the letter to Dr. Weizmann and he fully concurs in the suggestion made in your letter of the 18th November, perhaps you will be good enough to cable to me to that effect, and I will then write in the terms that you suggest.

I think, however, that the Foreign Office should be informed of the steps taken, and I would propose to answer your letter through them. The situation is governed

by the fact that the draft mandate contemplates an official Jewish agency which shall co-operate with the Administration of Palestine, and that pending the final constitution of a fully representative body the Zionist Organisation should fulfil that function.

Yours very sincerely,
HERBERT SAMUEL.

Enclosure 2 in No. 82.

Sir A. Mond to Sir H. Samuel.

Dear Sir Herbert Samuel,

35, Lowndes Square, London.
November 18, 1920.

I HAVE been requested to communicate with you with reference to the organisation of an Economic Council for the development of Palestine, which, as you are aware, held its first sitting on the 21st ultimo.

The members of the Council are very anxious to do their best to assist in the economic development of Palestine. The idea at present is that they should both individually and by suitable experts study the various economic and industrial problems which are awaiting solution, both with a view to giving advice to the Government of Palestine, if required, and also as to the formulation in a practical form of schemes, companies, &c. They may likewise have to organise financial and technical schemes which gain their approval as being of a sound character. A further step would be by combined representation of the existing organisations, such as the I.C.A. and other bodies, to endeavour to prevent overlapping and the dissipation both of energy and funds.

The first difficulty encountered by the Council was how to create for it some kind of authoritative standing. At present it is merely a body of gentlemen who have come together on my initiative. The suggestion, therefore, which I have been asked to submit to you is whether you could officially express to me your desire that such a body should be called into existence, and indicate that in your opinion it would be of help to you in your task of reconstructing Palestine. We are quite aware of the exceptional position which is given to the Zionist Organisation under the proposed mandate. While our Council wishes to be an entirely independent body in direct contact with your Government there is every desire to avoid all possible friction with the Zionist Organisation, who are equally disposed to work in harmony with us. In fact, it is agreed that the Zionist Organisation should be represented on the Economic Council, and that these two bodies should work together in the most friendly co-operation and harmony.

In order to meet the difficulty referred to it appears to us that it would be necessary for the Zionist Organisation, with your concurrence, to transfer to the Economic Council certain of its own functions where economic and financial problems are involved. If you agree with this view I think it will be possible for us to arrange the details here with the Zionist Organisation. Some preliminary discussions have already taken place on the subject.

You will readily understand some of the difficulties in getting to this preliminary stage, but I can assure you that the spirit is very good and is improving, and that the desire among Jews of all sections to co-operate in the reconstruction of the national home is very manifest. I have little doubt that as matters proceed and practical work is being done greater progress will be made, and that the present Council will develop into a more formal and juristic body. In fact this is already under discussion.

I sincerely trust you will be able to give us the amount of recognition which is necessary to enable us to carry out our proposed functions with the greatest possible measure of success.

Yours sincerely,
ALFRED MOND.

Enclosure 3 in No. 82.

Sir A. Mond to Sir H. Samuel.

(Telegraphic.) *London, December 18, 1920.*
WEIZMANN cabling you concurring my letter 18th November to you. Trust you will now write me necessary letter as very anxious to proceed.

Enclosure 4 in No. 82.

Dr. Weizmann to Sir H. Samuel.

(Telegraphic.) *London, December 18, 1920.*
FULLY concur Mond's letter 18th November.

Enclosure 5 in No. 82.

Sir H. Samuel to Sir A. Mond.

(Telegraphic.) *Jerusalem, December 24, 1920.*
LETTER suggested sent to Foreign Office.

Enclosure 6 in No. 82.

Sir H. Samuel to Sir A. Mond.

Dear Sir Alfred Mond,

Jerusalem, December 24, 1920.

I AM greatly interested to know that you have taken the first steps, with the concurrence of the Zionist Organisation, for the formation in London of an Economic Council to assist the development of Palestine. I write to express the hope that such a Council may be formally constituted, and may play an active part in promoting the financial, agricultural and industrial progress of the country. I have already had an opportunity of indicating the principal measures in which, in the opinion of this Government, such a Council could most usefully assist at the present time, and there can be no doubt that other measures will present themselves as the reconstruction of the country proceeds. The Government of Palestine regards the constitution of such a Council, on a comprehensive and authoritative basis, as likely to prove of the greatest value and importance, and would cordially welcome its co-operation.

Believe me, yours sincerely,
HERBERT SAMUEL.

[E 366/290/88]

No. 83.

Earl Curzon to Sir H. Samuel (Jerusalem).

(No. 51.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, January 12, 1921.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 186 of the 10th December relative to holidays for officials of the Palestine Government.

2. His Majesty the King approves the suggestion that his birthday should be regarded as a holiday for all creeds, and I concur in your proposals with regard to the eight holidays each for Moslems, Christians and Jews.

3. Empire day should not be included.

I am, &c.
CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

Consul Fontana to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 13, 1921.)

(No. 117. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Beirut, December 21, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to submit the following short report upon the present situation in the Grand Lebanon, and in the region comprised in the vilayet of Aleppo as it existed before the war.

In the late summer of 1915 the Lebanon mountains were visited by a great swarm of locusts, which ravaged the whole district and consumed every green thing. In 1916 the people of the Lebanon, which was then occupied by a Turkish division, began to feel the pinch of hunger, and in 1917 and 1918 famine desolated the whole region. Supplies of grain were sent by the Turkish Government to be distributed for the relief of the people, but these supplies were so manipulated by Mutessarifs, kaïmakams, and others, who in many cases sold the grain at exorbitant prices, that the relief afforded was entirely insufficient. Over one-third of the inhabitants of the Lebanon died of famine during those years, and in 1918 hundreds of people died of starvation in the streets of Beirut and other towns of the littoral. After the British occupation a great number of Lebanese who possessed the means to travel emigrated to America, so that not more than one-third of the original inhabitants of the Lebanon now remain in the country. I have visited various villages in the mountains which before the war were prosperous and full of life, but their present aspect is most desolate. The few inhabitants remaining live mostly upon money received from relatives in America, and there is very little sign of husbandry or activity of any kind. In every village there are a number of deserted and roofless houses, the owners of which, before perishing, demolished their roofing in order to sell the timber with which it was constructed, to buy bread. Many other houses, although still intact, stand empty or deserted, and buildings commenced shortly before the war still remain in the condition in which they were left when work was abandoned. Labour is so scarce and expensive that the work of construction cannot be resumed. The French authorities prohibited, some months ago, emigration from the Lebanon, but would-be emigrants have no great difficulty in evading the regulation by bribery.

At Beirut the economic situation is by no means good. There is a quantity of cloth and piece goods on the market for which there is now little demand, and of which the importers are eager to dispose even at a heavy sacrifice. The banks are reluctant to grant credit, and trade with the interior is at a standstill. The fluctuation and fall in the value of the Syrian piastre, the only currency now recognised as legal tender, tends to hamper both local and foreign trade. The Beirut custom-house is described as corrupt from top to bottom, and importers are submitted not only to monetary extortion but frequently even to distribution of a portion of the goods received among the customs officials. Civil functionaries and the middle-class generally are suffering from the high cost of living, and venality among the former, when Syrian, appears to be the rule rather than the exception. Certain French officers and officials are also accused of receiving and expecting liberal presents for services rendered by them.

In the Aleppo region the military situation is as follows: There is a large concentration of Turkish troops at Ourfa, under command of Mustapha Kemal Pasha, whose headquarters are, or are to be, at Diarbekir. One Turkish division is in Aintab, another, a "division volante," composed probably of Turkish regulars and local "chetas" or bands, is operating between Aintab and Kilis. A French division is beleaguering Aintab, but the town does not appear to be cut off from communication with outside. Another French detachment "volant" is said to be moving in the Aintab district. Idlip has been raided by Kemalists who killed some French soldiers, and carried off a considerable sum in gold from the Konak. In the Antioch region one Ibrahim Hannano has risen against the French and collected a large band of followers. He is acting in unison with the Kemalists, and on the 2nd instant marched from Harim and seized Djisr-esh-Shogour (where he installed a Nationalist kaïmakam), after defeating a force of gendarmes sent from Aleppo to arrest him, who suffered severe losses. A company and a-half of French troops were assailed and almost surrounded in a defile east of Ain Cherkia by a force of Alaouites, but managed to withdraw with a loss of several killed and wounded. In the Alaouite

territory generally the situation is at present unfavourable for the French, the chiefs having thrown in their lot with the Kemalists.

At Aleppo itself there are very few French troops, and the chetas are active to the north and east of the town. People refuse to go for business to villages only 10 miles distant, through fear of the bands. A French camel caravan which started recently from El Bab for Aleppo was obliged to return when only two hours out, the chetas being seen scouring the countryside. At Tel Ahmar the "shahtours," or ferry boats have been seized by the rebels. I have talked with two Englishmen who returned a few days ago from Aleppo, one of whom has passed many years in the country, and also with a third who returned from there later. They all state that the general opinion at Aleppo is that Mustapha Kemal can take the town when he pleases, but is holding back until the worst of the rains are over. The opinion prevails that he will be in Homs before the spring, and he has declared that he will blow up the railway between there and Beirut before the end of February. The inhabitants of Aleppo, both Christian and Moslem, are bitter against the French, and would almost welcome the return of the Turks. The Administration is very weak and corrupt, the Governor-General senile and a mere puppet of the French. His relative, Muhamed Bey Shayef, has been appointed Mutessarif of Aleppo, and another of his family is director of the post and telegraph office, having formerly been employed there and dismissed for breach of trust. The high administrative posts have been divided between members of the Shayeb and Koutsi families, all of whom are mere instruments in the hands of the mandatory Power. The post office is in great confusion, letters are opened and replaced in wrong envelopes, or lost, and correspondence is greatly retarded and much inconvenience caused to business men, especially those corresponding with abroad. Telegrams also are inexcusably delayed in transmission. Great venality prevails among certain high French officers in the Administration, as well as among native officials. According to the statement of a firm of Aleppo bankers, a French officer left Aleppo after some months residence with 50,000 fr., which had accumulated in the bank during that period. Three other officers also left with large fortunes, having apparently none on their arrival.

The three sons of the late Ibrahim Pasha arrived in Aleppo towards the end of November, fugitives from the Turks, after, it is said, cutting off the noses of certain Turkish officers at Veran Shehr. They applied to the French for money and troops to fight the Kemalists, and were well received.

Muchhem Bey returned to Aleppo in November from his disastrous expedition to Rakka and Der Zor. He travelled by the desert road, as he was unable to pass through Rakka, where his cousin Hashim Bey is now holding the country with Turkish troops, and has sent back to Aleppo the Government officials appointed by the French. On his return, Muchhem applied for a strong force of troops to eject his cousin and the Turks from Rakka, and impose his authority at Der Zor, where the inhabitants are either pro-Turk, pro-British, or in favour of decentralisation. But no attention was paid to his representations, and he is now living incognito at Aleppo.

There is marked and general dissatisfaction with French mandatory rule both at Beirut and in the Lebanon as a whole. Even the Maronite community, the largest of the various Christian sects, and considering themselves as Catholics to enjoy the special favour of the French, speak of the present régime with strong disfavour. Unanimous regret is expressed at the withdrawal of the British from Syria, and many people say that they were better off under the Turks than now. Various causes have combined to produce this public dissatisfaction. The one is that the French Government, after the enormous sacrifices and expenditure of the war, are unable to sink money in Syria as lavishly as the inhabitants expected. This the Syrians resent, and still more so the increase of taxation in the old Lebanon, where a merely nominal tax was before levied on real property. It is calculated that more than one-half of the landed property in the Lebanon mountains belongs to the monasteries of different orders, which are numerous and hold the finest positions. No account is taken of the fact that, in spite of this increase, taxation remains relatively very low. The French are accused of exploiting the country to their own profit, and the detriment of the Syrians. Another cause of complaint lies in the nomination of French "conseillers" to every department of the Administration, whose approval is required before action can be taken. It is urged that the native officials have no power in their hands, and that the French are virtually colonising the country. The blame for the corruption prevalent among officials is imputed to the French, as, owing to the enormous rise in prices sums now expended in bribery have to be far

larger than before the war. And the fact of certain French officers and officials being venal is so magnified as to elicit sweeping condemnation of local French officialdom. A third pretext for dissatisfaction is the defective lighting of Beirout, and relative paralysis in public works in the town itself, the malcontents overlooking the fact that they themselves loudly deprecate the increase of taxation necessary to render such works possible. French officers, moreover, have for some reason rendered themselves temporarily unpopular among ladies belonging to the higher native society at Beirout, and the existence of a large lay school under French masters, which is largely attended by Jews, is looked upon askance by high native ecclesiastics. The French are accused of looking down upon the Syrians, and the words *sale Syrienne* or *sale Syrien*, dropped by individual Frenchmen, are resented as a national insult.

The French, on their side, are embarrassed by the great military expenditure called for owing to the unsettled state of Syria and Cilicia, and by the comparatively modest military forces at their command. Military officers, nevertheless, hold posts in the Administration which would be better occupied by French civil functionaries of experience, whose number is wholly inadequate to meet the requirements of the moment. At Aleppo French officers are at present holding nearly all the posts intended ultimately to be filled by French officials. The French functionaries, moreover, besides being relatively few, have not always been wisely selected. The secretary of the acting High Commissioner told me that M. de Caix, when in France last year, did his utmost to recruit competent officials, with or without colonial experience, for Syria, but the gaps left by the war and disinclination to accept service in the Near East rendered his efforts almost fruitless. The lack of higher education among the Syrians, and the ignorance of any but Turkish methods of administration unfit them at present, in the opinion of the French, for administrative posts without foreign supervision; and thus the system of "conseillers," against whose decision appeal can only be made to the High Commissioner, has been evolved as a "temporary measure" to remain in force until the Syrians have acquired the art of self-government. Unfortunately, for the reason I have indicated, these "conseillers" do not always possess the tact and ability requisite for their functions. The sensitive vanity of the educated native, and his proclivity to intrigue and peroration rather than to action, call for more indulgence and patience than the average French official is likely to possess.

The sacrifices made by the French in blood and money for the pacification of Syria, and the excellent carriage roads suitable for motor traffic constructed by them throughout the greater part of the Great Lebanon and elsewhere in Syria, seems to elicit no word of appreciation from the Syrians themselves. Damascus is now accessible by motor in four hours from Beirout, and Aleppo in ten hours. Hundreds of motor cars and lorries now exist where none existed before. But the Syrian in general, disinclined to sustained action other than commercial, and respecting above all things wealth, in whatsoever way acquired, is naturally prone to criticism of western methods dissimilar to his own, however beneficial they may ultimately prove; and to impatience, under a foreign mandate, of any but the shortest road leading to his own aggrandisement and affluence. It is therefore safe, perhaps, to discount a large percentage of Syrian dissatisfaction with the French mandate, as likely to have evinced itself even under other and far more favourable conditions. Still it is to be feared that if General Gouraud's budget is disapproved of, and any serious retrenchment in Syria is insisted upon by the French Government, the military situation may get entirely out of hand and the Christians join with the Moslems in anti-French demonstrations. In local French circles it is surmised that the return of ex-King Constantine to the Throne of Greece may lead to the restitution of Smyrna to the Turks, and to an understanding with Mustapha Kemal Pasha whereby he shall cease military operations against the French in Syria and in Cilicia.

In view of rumours which have been prevalent in native circles as to the intention of the French to withdraw from Syria, a notice has been issued and published by the acting High Commissioner, a copy of which is annexed hereto.

I have, &c.

R. A. FONTANA.

P.S.—I have thought it safer, in order to avoid any risk of loss in the local post, to transmit copies of this despatch for transmission, should your Lordship judge expedient, to His Majesty's High Commissioners in Egypt, Palestine, and Mesopotamia.

[E 265/265/88]

No. 85.

Earl Curzon to Sir G. Buchanan (Rome).

(No. 17.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, January 13, 1921.

YOUR telegram No. 7 of 5th January: Italian guard detachment at Jerusalem.

Presence of French detachment is contrary to decision of San Remo regarding cessation of religious protectorate. See my despatches Nos. 105 and 154 to Count de Salis, former of which implies that Italian Government were as anxious as we that protectorate should be regarded as having ceased altogether.

In any case Italian Government will doubtless admit that as soon as the mandate is in force we as mandatory will be solely responsible for order and guardianship of Holy Places, and as Italian Government will therefore be forced to withdraw detachment after entry into force of mandate, their insistence on maintenance until that date seems discourteous.

You may add that presence of these detachments gives the appearance of divided authority and responsibility and is liable to be misunderstood by local population, and His Majesty's Government are at a loss to understand how Italian and French Governments feel able now to put forward a claim which they never preferred when the Turkish authorities administered Jerusalem.

Copy of note to French Ambassador here renewing representations regarding French detachment follows by bag.

Please inform Count de Salis.

[E 570/570/88]

No. 86.

Earl Curzon to Sir H. Samuel (Jerusalem).

(No. 30.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, January 13, 1921.

YOUR letter to Sir John Tilley of 24th December.

Provided Zionist organisation agree and will co-operate closely with council, which is assumed from correspondence enclosed in your letter to be the case, no difficulty seems likely to arise from article 4 of the mandate, and we entirely approve.

Since Sir A. Mond and S. Weizmann left for Palestine before receipt of your letter, we are not posting letter to Sir A. Mond here and assume that you will give him signed copy of letter on arrival.

[E 829/35/88]

No. 87.

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 18.)

(No. 1.)

My Lord,

Jerusalem, January 4, 1921.

IN continuation of my despatch No. 244 of the 1st January, 1921, I have the honour to transmit herewith the December monthly administrative report.

I have, &c.

(For High Commissioner),
W. H. DEEDES.

Enclosure in No. 87.

Palestine Administrative Report for December 1920.

Agriculture.

General.

The rainfall has been deficient during the month, particularly in the inland districts, and early planted crops are suffering. A hundred mules, cast by the army, have been bought and distributed to the colonies in Galilee for farm work. The cost thereof has been met by agricultural loans to the purchasers.

The agricultural prospects in the Beersheba district are exceptionally good. The Arabs are ploughing a larger area than has hitherto been brought under cultivation.

Forest Service.

Planting operations have been postponed pending further rainfall. The Zionist Commission are offering some two million trees from their nurseries, made available from a curtailment of their planting programme.

Veterinary Service.

Contagious disease in live-stock has been limited to a few isolated and sporadic cases. Quarantine arrangements for the reception of sheep and small stock are completed at Haifa.

*Antiquities.**Excavations.*

The work of excavating the apse of the 4th Century Basilica in the Garden of Gethsemane has been successfully concluded.

Museum.

The classification of the remains of the old Ottoman Palestine Museum has been initiated and is proceeding satisfactorily.

Conservation.

The sum of 100*l.* has been contributed by the department towards the repairs of the Hippicus Tower, Jerusalem.

Societies.

The French Republic has appointed the École biblique de Saint-Étienne to be the official École archéologique française at Jerusalem.

The activities of the Pro-Jerusalem Society have lately been curtailed owing to the lack of funds. The technical education branch of this society is progressing. Eighteen apprentices are at work in the society's loom, and over a hundred boys in the Rashidiah School are being instructed in gardening.

A society entitled "Pro-Carmel" has been formed at Haifa, organised on similar lines to the Pro-Jerusalem Society.

Commerce and Industry.

During December a fall in price of cereals, sugar and Manchester piece-goods took place. Retail merchants were holding on to their stocks in the hope of liquidating them at high prices before the market broke in sympathy with Egypt and the world, but they have been compelled to cut their losses.

Tanks for the supply of bulk oil for fuel have been erected in Jerusalem, and the companies are considering suitable sites in Jaffa and Haifa.

Supplies of wood are still not equal to demand, but there is some hope of large quantities shortly being available from Anatolia.

The banks are still pursuing a policy of restricting credits and calling in loans, but several important industrial concerns have recently approached the Government with a view to obtaining facilities for commencing preliminary operations in connection with their enterprises. The Shemen Oil Company and the Jaffa Tile and Brick Factory are amongst the more important of these.

A building construction company has been formed in Nablus with a capital of £ E. 50,000; 10 per cent. paid up.

Transportation continues difficult and expensive, and the lack of ploughing animals is hampering agriculture.

Education.

The Government's new elementary educational scheme, agreed to by the advisory council, has been started. Eighty-four villages up to date have asked for schools, and arrangements are completed for opening thirty-six.

It is also hoped to provide educational facilities for the nomad tribes in Southern Palestine, and arrangements are being made to provide a boarding school for the sons of Beduin sheikhs.

*Finance.**Customs.*

The value of imports for the month of November is £ E. 581,030, which is an increase of £ E. 221,886 over the corresponding month of 1919.

The value of exports for November shows a drop of £ E. 22,745 over the same month for the year 1919.

Agricultural Loans.

The sum of £ E. 61,600 has been disbursed as agricultural loans during November, making a total of £ E. 298,600 to date.

Treasury.

The accounts of the Palestine Railways and Posts and Telegraphs Department were taken over on the 1st October, 1920, and will be incorporated in the Government accounts.

A scheme has been put forward and approved for the decentralisation of the Government stores, whereby each department will be responsible for the care and issue of the stores appertaining to that department.

The general supervision of stores will be under the controller of stores, and the Central Tenders Board will be responsible under him for the placing of tenders and purchases.

Legal.

The principal case tried during the month of December was that of a gang of armed highway robbers who had infested the country between Jerusalem and Jaffa. Three were sentenced to penal servitude for life, and a number of the other members of the gang to short terms of penal servitude.

A question has been raised by the American consul concerning the jurisdiction of the Palestine Courts over American subjects. During the two and a half years that the Courts have been re-established under the British Administration no attempt has been made by the foreign Powers to assert any capitulatory rights. This claim, put forward just before the mandate is declared, has been referred to the Foreign Office.

Sir Anton Bertram, Chief Justice of Ceylon, has arrived to preside over a special commission which is being instituted to deal with the affairs of the Greek Patriarchate. An ordinance has been drafted defining the powers of such commissions of enquiry.

Steps have been taken to assist the Government of Transjordan to establish a Court of Appeal which shall serve the Courts of that region. They were hitherto dependent on the Court of Cassation and Court of Appeal in Damascus.

The ordinance to enable land in Palestine to be expropriated on behalf of the British army has been brought into force and a permanent Arbitration Board to assess the value of land is being established.

*Medical.**General Health.*

The general health of the country is good, and no abnormal epidemics have occurred during the month.

Malaria.

The high incidence of malaria resulting from the collections of water remaining from the abnormal rainfall and snow of the previous winter has now fallen and few new cases are occurring.

Arrangements have been made for the granting of loans to villages for the development of pure water supplies. The establishment of these water supplies will prove of great value as an antimalarial measure. The villagers in the Acre district are taking a keen interest in the antimalarial campaign.

Control of Practice of Pharmacy.

Public Health Ordinance No. 4, controlling the practice of pharmacy and the trade in drugs and poisons, was discussed by the Advisory Council.

Posts and Telegraphs.

The principal item of note during the month has been the establishment of a direct mail service from Germany to Palestine. At present the volume of correspondence is not sufficiently great to justify the making up of a direct mail in the opposite direction.

Public Security.

Recruiting of fifty men for a camel police detachment to take the place of Indian troops at Beersheba has commenced, and the men are to be trained by the army.

Thirty-one cases of heinous crimes were reported, an increase of nine on the previous month, twenty were detected.

The number of prisoners in custody in Palestine gaols for the month was 950.

Arrangements have been made for a complete company of gaol labourers to commence work in the new year with the railway.

Public Works.

During the month the consolidation of roads has been in active operation.

The extension of the customs quay at Haifa shows considerable progress, a length of 30 metres having been constructed during December.

[E 909/909/88]

No. 88.

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 19.)

(No. 20.)

(Telegraphic.)

Jerusalem, January 17, 1921.

YOUR despatch No. 493 of 24th December.

Following are my proposals:—

1. That Council of Four be elected by Moslem community without interference from Government.
2. A Wakfs policy to be determined by Council of Four, while Government approves estimates and audits annual accounts.
3. Nominations of Wakfs officials, kadis and muftis to be made by Council and submitted to Government for approval.
4. That above scheme be subject to review after four years. Should be glad of early reply as I am anxious to conclude this matter, which has aroused much interest.

[E 803/265/88]

No. 89.

Earl Curzon to Comte de Saint-Aulaire.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, January 19, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to refer to my note of the 23rd October regarding the maintenance of the French and Italian guard detachments in the Holy Places at Jerusalem.

2. His Majesty's Government sincerely regret that the French Government have not seen their way to meet the wishes of His Majesty's Government in this matter and to withdraw their detachment. The French Government will readily agree that His Majesty's Government as mandatory for Palestine are now in fact alone responsible for the maintenance of order throughout Palestine and of free access to the Holy Places, and that they will assume this responsibility *de jure*, as soon as the mandate for Palestine enters into force. As therefore the definite withdrawal of this detachment will become necessary in any case upon the entry into force of the mandate, His Majesty's Government earnestly trust that the French Government will not press their wish to maintain the presence of the force until that date.

3. In M. de Fleuriau's note of the 15th October he stated that the French and Italians as Catholic Powers cannot renounce marking their special position by the presence at important ceremonies of the Holy Places of small detachments of their arms. I venture, however, to point out that the French Government never put forward

such a claim when the Turkish authorities were administering Jerusalem. Secondly, the preferment of such a claim at this stage does not appear to harmonise with the engagement entered into by the French Government at San Remo regarding the renunciation of their religious protectorate, an engagement with which the maintenance of a French military detachment at the important ceremonies of the Holy Places would hardly seem compatible.

4. In reply to their representations to the Italian Government regarding the withdrawal of the Italian detachment His Majesty's Government have received a communication indicating that the maintenance of this detachment is dependent solely on that of the French detachment. Previous communications from your Excellency's predecessor indicate that the attitude of France is largely guided by that of Italy, and it seems to follow that even from the point of view of the French and Italian Governments there is now nothing to prevent the simultaneous departure of both detachments. I therefore trust that the French Government will now find it possible to issue forthwith the necessary instructions in this sense.

5. I am making a similar suggestion to the Italian Government.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 16216/15211/44]

No. 90.

Earl Curzon to Sir H. Samuel (Jerusalem).

(No. 69.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 19, 1921.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 209 of the 17th December, regarding the desirability of some arrangement between Palestine and Syria and Palestine and Egypt as to extradition.

2. As you are aware, there are clauses in the draft mandates for Syria, Palestine and Mesopotamia providing for the application to these countries of the extradition treaties in force between the mandatory of each country and foreign Powers, pending the conclusion of special extradition agreements for each mandated State. I am advised that the effect of this clause in the Palestine mandate will be that British extradition treaties will apply to Palestine as if Palestine were British territory, and when the mandate has been approved by the Council of the League extradition between Palestine and States members of the League with which His Majesty's Government have extradition treaties will be governed by those treaties, pending any special arrangements being made. An exchange of notes will probably, however, be required as between His Majesty's Government and the French Government to make it quite clear that the combined effect of the provision in the Palestine mandate regarding extradition and the corresponding provision in the Syrian mandate is to apply as between Syria and Palestine the extradition treaty between France and Great Britain.

3. It will also be necessary for legislation to be introduced eventually in Palestine on the lines of the British Extradition Acts with a view to enabling the provisions of the Palestine mandate to be put into force.

4. If you think it really essential that, pending the entry into force of the mandate and before the above exchange of notes has been effected, some temporary extradition arrangement should be made, you are authorised to arrange direct with the French High Commissioner for Syria for the putting into force of the draft rules, enclosed in your despatch under reference, as a temporary measure. You should report by telegraph any action which you may take in this sense.

5. I should also be glad to learn what arrangement you would propose to govern extradition between Palestine and Egypt which will not be covered by the provision in the Palestine mandate regarding the application of extradition treaties between the mandatory and States members of the League of Nations.

6. A copy of this correspondence is being sent to His Majesty's representative at Cairo.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 15695/15695/44]

No. 91.

Earl Curzon to Sir H. Samuel (Jerusalem).

(No. 77.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 19, 1921.

THE question of the right of Palestinians to the jurisdiction of the Egyptian Mixed Courts raised in your despatch No. 149 of the 23rd November has received careful consideration.

2. It would seem likely to prove so difficult to draw a satisfactory and indisputable distinction between those Palestinians to whom this privilege should or should not be accorded that I consider it preferable to retain the existing conditions, with the modifications introduced by the terms of the mandate, when the latter enters into force.

3. The question of the position of Palestinians of Western origin or civilisation in Egypt will be borne in mind when the provisions as to the Mixed Courts in Egypt come to be drafted.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 909/909/88]

No. 92.

Earl Curzon to Sir H. Samuel (Jerusalem).

(No. 48.)

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 22,

YOUR telegram No. 20 of 17th January: Wakfs administration in Palestine.

Your proposals are approved, and you may proceed accordingly.

Please reply by despatch to question asked in second half of last paragraph of my despatch No. 493 of 24th December.

[E 1061/909/88]

No. 93.

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 10.)

My Lord,

Jerusalem, January 7, 1921.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 158 of the 29th November, 1920, concerning the control of the administration over Moslem Wakf funds, I have the honour to transmit, for your Lordship's information, a copy of the resolutions reached at a meeting held on the 2nd December, 1920.

1. It is to be noted that prior to the war the Wakfs of this country were administered by the Ottoman Ministry of Awkaf and the Sheikh-ul-Islam at Constantinople. The changed conditions brought about by the war necessitate the creation of a local administrative machinery to replace the Awkaf Ministry and the Sheikh-ul-Islam. Resolutions Nos. 7, 8, 9, 10, 11 refer to this question, and No. 12 is a provisional arrangement. I have already set out in my despatch No. 158 of the 29th November, 1920, the grounds on which the Moslem community ask for the appointment of the Moslem Council of Four, and I await the instructions of His Majesty's Government upon their proposals.

2. It will be observed that reference is made to the Central Wakf Council. This body was instituted by the late Military Administration to replace the Ottoman Ministry of Awkaf in the actual management of Wakf revenues. In general, the control exercised by this council is financial, and among its functions is the preparation of estimates, which are submitted to the Government for approval.

3. The Ottoman Government had confiscated for general purposes the revenue from certain Wakfs, and this revenue was consequently not available for the purposes for which the Wakfs were originally founded. To make them so available would appear to be an act of justice, and with this object resolutions Nos. 1, 4 and 5 were passed.

4. Among the original objects of some of the Wakfs was the furtherance of education. Resolution No. 3 will enable the cause of Moslem education in this country to profit by the revenues which will now accrue for this purpose.

5. The acceptance of these proposals would, it is thought, have a beneficial effect

on Moslem opinion, not only in Palestine and Transjordan, but also in the world of Islam in general, in that it should afford evidence of the desire of His Majesty's Government to do all that is possible for the welfare of Islam in Palestine.

It is also worth noting that the desire to set up a new Moslem body for the supervision of Wakfs is but a local expression of developments that have occurred elsewhere during the long process of disintegration through which the Ottoman Empire has passed. For instance, in Egypt the Egyptian Administration instituted a Ministry of Awkaf; in Bosnia and Herzegovina also the Austrian Government found it necessary to constitute a Central Council at Serajevo to administer local Wakfs, and in Cyprus similar action was taken.

On the other hand, there does not appear to be a precedent for investing the power of appointing and dismissing judges of the Religious Courts (that remain Government Courts), in an elected Moslem body, but the circumstances in Palestine and the natural desire of the Moslem community to exercise autonomy in their religious affairs appear to justify this new departure. It is to be remembered also that a safeguard is provided in the condition that all such appointments must have received the prior approval of the Government.

I should be glad if your Lordship would communicate to me the decision of His Majesty's Government respecting these resolutions.

I have, &c.

HERBERT SAMUEL,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 93.

Resolutions of the Committee on Awkaf, &c.

1. A COMMITTEE was convened at Government House, under the presidency of his Excellency the High Commissioner, on the 2nd December, 1920. The following members were present:—

Mr. W. H. Deedes, Civil Secretary.
Mr. H. A. Smallwood, Financial Secretary.
Mr. N. Bentwich, Legal Secretary.
Mr. H. E. Bowman, Director of Education.
Mr. H. C. Luke, Acting District Governor of Jerusalem.
Mr. R. J. Legge, Assistant Director of Education.
Mr. J. B. Barron, Assistant Financial Secretary.
Kamel Effendi Hussein, the Mufti of Jerusalem.
Abdulla, the Mufti of Acre.
Mohamed Murad, the Mufti of Haifa.
Ragheb Bey Nashasheby, Mayor of Jerusalem.
Omar Zeita, Mayor of Nablus.
Munir Hamad, Mamour of Wakfs, Nablus.
Said Effendi Shawa, Gaza.

2. The following resolutions were agreed to:—

Finance.

- (1.) That the revenues for the Khasgi Sultan Wakf, less charges for collection, be returned to the Wakf and administered by the Central Wakf Council.
- (2.) That in consideration of (1) the Central Wakf Council undertake the maintenance of Moslem orphans and Moslem relief and charity, now undertaken by the Government.
- (3.) That the revenues of the Mundarassah Wakfs be collected by the Government and be expended upon schools for the education of Moslem children only.
- (4.) That the Mudarass Wakfs be administered and controlled by the Central Wakf Council, the Government passing over the funds to the Wakf authorities after deducting the expenses of collection.
- (5.) That the revenues of the Mudarass and any other expropriated Wakfs be further examined into and reported upon. In regard to "other expropriated Wakfs," exclusive of Mundarassah Wakfs and the Khasgi Sultan Wakf, no decision is arrived at pending further examination.

[6668]

Y

- (6.) That the revenues of the Mudarass Wakfs be devoted to the maintenance of a Moslem religious college controlled by the Central Wakf Council. The Moslem members do not agree that any portion of this revenue shall be diverted to Moslem secular or other education under Government supervision unless there remains a surplus after the needs of the proposed Moslem college have been fully satisfied.

Constitution of a Central Moslem Authority.

It was resolved—

- (7.) That there should be a Council of Four, consisting of four Moslem notables, who should be elected in the manner proposed in the memorandum of the Moslem Committee.
- (8.) That the functions of the Council of Four be—
- (a.) To nominate and dismiss the cadis of the Moslem Religious Court and the members of the Moslem Court of Appeal and the local directors of Awkaf after consultation with the Government.
 - (b.) To supervise the administration of the Awkaf by the Central Wakf Council.
- (9.) That the Moslem Court of Appeal should remain the highest Court for Sharia cases, and that the Council of Four should not act as a Court of Cassation.
- (10.) That the Council of Four, if in receipt of salaries from the Government, should receive only a modest honorarium for the exercise of their functions in nominating two Moslem offices, and that it should be for the Wakf to decide whether they should be given a grant from Wakf funds for the work of supervising the administration of the Central Wakf Council.
- (11.) That the proposed constitution of the Council of Four be submitted to His Majesty's Government, and that no action be taken pending the receipt of the views of His Majesty's Government on the subject.
- (12.) That *ad interim* appointments to Sharia Courts and communications with the Court on matters pertaining to Moslem law be signed by the inspector of the Sharia Courts on behalf of the Legal Secretary.

ADDENDA.

Resolutions passed on November 8, 1920.

The following resolutions were agreed to at a meeting of Moslem notables held at Government House on the 8th November, 1920:—

1. That Moslem Awkaf should be under the control of the Government, and that the method of control should be that now exercised by the Government through its representative on the Central Wakf Council.
2. That Mundarrissin, or teachers of Moslem religion, should be a charge upon Government funds, subject of the following:—
 - (a.) The Government of Palestine will continue the practice of the Ottoman Government and be responsible for the salaries of such Mundarrissin as are now performing the functions of their office.
 - (b.) Mundarrissin who are salaried officials of the Government shall receive the same emoluments as those they were in receipt of at the time of the British occupation, and when the present holders of these appointments retire or become deceased the vacancies thus created shall not be filled by the Government.
 - (c.) No new appointments will be made by the Government.
 - (d.) Any new officials who are appointed will be nominated by, and will become employees of, the Central Wakf Council, and will be maintained from Wakf funds.

[E 1062/401/88]

No. 94.

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 11.)

My Lord,

Jerusalem, January 8, 1921.

AFTER six months' experience of the administrative conditions of Palestine, I am now in a position to submit a general appreciation of the finances of the country, particularly in relation to the cost of defence.

2. The revenues of the current financial year are likely fully to realise the estimates. If the present tranquillity continues to prevail, and if the anticipations of economic development in many directions, that may reasonably be entertained, are realised, the revenue should show a steady and considerable expansion in the next and subsequent years. The expenditure in the country of part, at least, of the proceeds of the Government loan which it is proposed to contract, and of any sums which may be raised by Zionist organisations, would assist in promoting production and trade, and thereby help to swell the revenue.

3. Information which has now, after much delay, been furnished from Constantinople indicates that the annuity payable by Palestine under the terms of the Treaty of Peace in respect of the Ottoman Pre-War Debt will not exceed £E. 200,000, and may be less. The revenues formerly collected by the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, which now fall into the Palestine Exchequer, will yield, under the better management that now prevails, over £E. 300,000 a year.

4. The abolition of the tobacco monopoly will probably involve the payment to the Régie of some compensation during the eight years that their concession has still to run. The materials are not available on which an estimate of the amount of that compensation can be based; but it may be anticipated that the yield of customs and excise taxation on tobacco will more than defray it, and at the end of eight years the whole yield of such taxation will accrue to the Exchequer.

5. There now stands to the credit of the accounts opened for the O.P.D.A. revenues a sum of £E. 630,000, being the accumulated revenues from the occupation until the 30th November, 1920. From this sum the amount of approximately £E. 146,250 must be deducted in respect of the Pre-War Ottoman Debt Annuity, which begins to be payable as from the 1st March, 1920. There is left a sum of £E. 483,750.

6. These favourable aspects of the situation are subject, however, to some important qualifications:—

- (1.) The general fall in values which is now taking place will have a considerable effect upon the revenue of Palestine, since that revenue is mainly derived from *ad valorem* taxes—the tithe and the customs. Against this must be set any consequent economies, *e.g.*, in the cost of coal for the railways. And if the fall in the cost of living proves to be large, the question of reducing the allowances to the administrative staff will need to be considered. It is possible, however, that savings in these directions will fall short of the shrinkage of revenue due to the deflation of prices.
- (2.) The country is ill-equipped with harbours, roads, railway rolling stock, administrative buildings, and many other essentials. The capital expenditure which is contemplated will go some distance to making good those deficiencies, and in the long run will prove remunerative. But in the first instance there will be only a small return, while the charges for interest and sinking fund on the loan that is necessary must be met from the outset.
- (3.) Even more serious is the lack of adequate provision for general education, agricultural instruction, water supplies, sanitation, and other requirements of a well-ordered State. Some progress has been made since the occupation towards making good these deficiencies, but financial restrictions have prevented many things being done that are obviously necessary. This must continue to be the case, in Palestine as elsewhere. There are, however, certain minimum requirements that cannot be postponed. For example, of the 134,000 children of school age in Palestine, 100,000 have no opportunity of education of any kind whatever. This fact is a source of complaint frequently expressed by the spokesmen of the people throughout the country, and it is impossible under a British administration to allow such a state of things to continue.

A scheme of educational improvement has therefore been adopted, on the basis of a minimum expenditure and spread over a series of years, which will gradually make good these defects. It is impossible to avoid a charge upon the budget for this and for some other urgent measures of reform, although primary education is the only case, as at present foreseen, in which the sum involved is at all considerable.

- (4.) The yield of the existing taxes has shown, and is likely to show, a large increase, but it does not appear practicable to raise the rates of the taxes themselves or to impose new ones of any considerable yield. The conditions of the country do not allow the assessment and the collection of an income tax. The agricultural population already pay a tax of one-eighth, not of their incomes, but of the gross yield of their lands. There is a small house and land tax in addition. All classes of the population pay in customs duties 11 per cent. on the value of almost all imports. Municipal revenues have to be furnished as well. Moreover, nothing could be more inexpedient politically, in a country newly occupied after a war, and administered by an unfamiliar Government, than any marked increase in the rates of taxation imposed under the previous régime. Already the greater efficiency of collection does, in fact, in many cases, impose upon the people a heavier burden, even when allowance is made for the stoppage of the system of bribes to officials.
- (5.) Part of the customs revenue collected in Palestine is levied upon goods consumed in Transjordan. Pending a settlement of the status of Transjordan, it has been arranged, with your Lordship's approval, to endeavour to arrive at an estimate of the revenue in question, and to carry the amount to the credit of a Transjordan account. Against this account would be charged any annuity in respect of the Ottoman Pre-War Debt which Transjordan may be made liable to pay, and any expenses incurred on behalf of that territory by the Government of Palestine. The figures on which an estimate may be based are being collected. It is possible that a sum in the neighbourhood of £E. 20,000 a year may have to be deducted under this head from the revenues at the disposal of the Palestine Government for Palestine purposes.

7. The railway system has been transferred from the military authorities to this Administration as from the 1st October, 1920. It was found that it was being conducted at a loss, largely owing to the great rise in the price of coal. Steps were immediately taken to remedy this situation, and passenger fares were raised as from the 1st November, 1920, by an average of nearly 50 per cent. The railways are very badly supplied with rolling-stock and buildings. Works of some magnitude are needed for the strengthening of parts of the line, which were hastily constructed during the war, and planned only with a view to meeting the exigencies of the campaign. A survey of the railways and their equipment has been made at my request by three of the principal officers of the Egyptian State Railways. Their reports confirm the advice of the general manager of the Palestine railways that a considerable capital expenditure is unavoidable. This will be one of the principal purposes of the loan which is in contemplation. In addition to the annual charges for the service of this debt, the railways will be required to pay some annuity to the French company which built and owned the Jerusalem-Jaffa line, and no doubt an annual payment will also be necessary in respect of the capital provided for the construction of that part of the Hedjaz Railway which lies within the boundaries of Palestine, namely the line from Haifa to Semakh. The railways have not hitherto been debited with any of these charges. In these circumstances, while I am hopeful that the railways will be made to pay their own way, and not to be a burden upon the general finances of Palestine, I do not anticipate that, in the near future at all events, they will furnish any surplus to assist those finances.

8. I believe I can truly claim that the Administration in general is conducted with a very careful regard for economy. The financial secretary exercises a close supervision on expenditure, which his long experience in the colonial service renders fully effective. The Treasury is conducted with great efficiency, and is strict in the suppression of waste. The Stores Department, which was less satisfactory, has now been placed under a controller of wide experience and much activity, who is already bringing it to a proper standard. No opportunity will be missed to effect savings. It is unlikely, however, that these savings will prove to be more than a

small offset to the increases of expenditure, which, in view of the starved condition of many of the public services, are inevitable.

9. Such is a brief survey of the financial position of Palestine as it presents itself to those on the spot. At the same time, Palestine appears to His Majesty's Government and to British public opinion—so far as questions purely of finance are concerned—as a source of considerable expense to the British tax-payer from which he ought to be relieved as speedily as may be. The cost of its garrison is large, and in view of the immense expenditure that devolves upon the people of Great Britain, your Lordship urges that Palestine should at once assume part of the cost of its own defence, and that measures should be taken calculated to transfer the whole after no long interval of time. To this demand I do not in any way demur. It is evidently right that the people of Palestine should bear forthwith as much of the cost of their own defence as the conditions allow. If Palestine is to provide a national home for the Jewish people, I can see no reason why the British tax-payer should be permanently charged with the cost of its defence, and I am convinced that this view is generally held by Jewish opinion throughout the world.

10. The troops, however, which are stationed in Palestine are not available only for local defence. They are close at hand if, in any emergency, military action is needed for the defence of British interests on the Suez Canal and in Egypt. At the same time, it is true that the garrison of the Canal might be available, at need, for assistance in Palestine, and I do not advance these considerations as more than a minor factor which should not be forgotten when the whole situation is under review.

11. It is my earnest desire that His Majesty's Government should be in a position to assure the British public, not only that the civil Government of Palestine costs nothing to the British taxpayer, and that even on the morrow of the war it asks for no grant-in-aid for its finances, and not only that it does not expect even the contingent advantage of a British Treasury guarantee for its loans, but also that it has already taken the first steps to provide for the cost of its own garrison, and will continue on that path until the British Exchequer is relieved from the whole of the charge which it now bears.

12. To this end I propose that there should be devoted to the cost of defence, first, the whole of the difference between the former revenues of the O.P.D.A. in Palestine and the annuity payable by Palestine in respect of the Ottoman Pre-War Debt, now amounting to over £E. 100,000 a year; secondly, the £E. 483,000 of accumulations of the O.P.D.A. revenues; and thirdly, the major part of any future surpluses of revenue over expenditure.

13. I propose also that the maximum value should be obtained from this expenditure by devoting it, not to the maintenance of a comparatively small strength of professional soldiers, but to the maintenance of a militia as numerous as the funds will allow. The duties which will fall to a Palestine defence force are not such as to render indispensable the training of the men up to the standard of European armies, however desirable that might be in itself. A training of six months, followed by six months' service in their stations, and then periods of three months in each of the three following years, should suffice to provide a militia efficient enough for its purpose, and numerous in proportion to its cost. Since the men would probably be quite young when they undertook their first year of service, and since the three months during which they would be called up in the subsequent years could be arranged so as to interfere as little as possible with their ordinary avocations, it may be anticipated that numbers would be ready to serve, from patriotic motives, without expecting high rates of pay. With such an organisation, the Palestine Government should be able to maintain a considerably larger force than His Majesty's Government would be in a position to provide for the same expenditure. Moreover, the men would be required to undertake the liability to be called up as reservists in the event of any national emergency occurring during a period of years after their militia service was over. I am considering, in consultation with the Commander-in-chief, Egypt, the details of the organisation and the cost of such a militia. It is possible that some modifications of these suggestions may therefore be found to be necessary, and I will communicate further with your Lordship in due course.

I would add that it is proposed that the militia should be trained by the British military authorities, be under the command of G.O.C. the troops in Palestine, and form an integral part of the garrison.

14. Since it is the intention of the Palestine Administration to assume a continually increasing responsibility for the cost of defence up to the limit of the funds

available, until the burden upon the British Exchequer is altogether discharged, I venture to submit that it should not be expected to contribute to the expenditure that has been incurred by the army in the construction of railways, roads and minor public works in Palestine. In support of this submission, the following considerations are advanced:—

- (i.) Any charge upon the revenues of Palestine for such contributions would leave so much the less for defence. Assuming that the number of the troops to be maintained in Palestine is fixed in accordance with the necessities of the case, a lessened expenditure by Palestine on defence would leave a larger expenditure devolving upon His Majesty's Government. There would therefore be no saving in the long run, while it may be that less difficulty would be caused to His Majesty's Government by writing off capital expenditure already incurred as part of the cost of the war, than by including an equivalent sum in the estimates presented to Parliament.
- (ii.) The greater part of the expenditure in question would not have been undertaken by Palestine in its present stage of development. Apart from the very high cost of the construction of these roads and railways due to war conditions (which would, I presume, in any event have been allowed for) this country would not have been able to afford such works as a railway from Rafah to Haifa, or a share in the cost of a railway from Rafah to Kantarah, or the widening of the line from Ludd to Jerusalem, or roads of a high grade of construction such as have been built by the army in various parts of Palestine. All these works are undoubtedly of great utility to the people of Palestine, and will promote largely the economic prosperity of the country. But had a British civil Administration existed in Palestine prior to the war and subsequently, it is doubtful whether any of these works would have been undertaken by it at the cost of the very limited funds available locally.
- (iii.) It will be necessary to lay next year's budget before the Advisory Council, and the principal items will certainly form the subject of public discussion. The country looks for large material benefits from the British connection, and the policy of substituting the Palestinian taxpayer for the British taxpayer, as the person by whom the cost of defence is to be met, will come as a painful surprise. It would be a political advantage if it could be announced at the same time that the British authorities had been generous enough not to claim repayment for the works constructed by them as a consequence of the military campaign and occupation, but on accepting the mandate for the administration of Palestine, had conferred them upon the people to help them to inaugurate the regeneration of their country.

15. With respect to the size of the garrison of Palestine, the point to which it would be safe to reduce it depends upon two main factors. I assume that the country will not be liable to attack from the north. Should conditions change substantially in this respect, either through the evacuation of Syria by the French or through any other cause not at present foreseen, the situation would need to be considered afresh. Any such change is not likely to be sudden, and there would be time to adopt any new measures that might be necessary. The two factors to which I refer are the internal political situation and the influence of Transjordan.

16. The political situation at present is satisfactory, and there are no signs that the complete tranquillity which now prevails throughout the country is likely soon to be disturbed. To ensure the contentment of the people with their Government is an obvious condition for the continuance of this tranquillity. It would be a short-sighted policy, therefore, to stop all activity in education, in public works, and in other departments, in order to devote the whole expenditure so avoided to the cost of defence. The result would inevitably be the alienation of public opinion, and in the long run a larger force and larger expenditure would be needed than would otherwise be necessary. Given an Administration which shows concrete results in measures that directly benefit the people, and which treats all sections with sympathy and with complete impartiality, I see no reason why the internal condition of Palestine should call for the presence, in a year or two from now, of more than a very moderate military force. But it is too soon yet to arrive at a final opinion in this regard. The present favourable appearances may be deceptive. There is more than one quarter,

outside Palestine, where political trouble here would be regarded without dissatisfaction, and inside Palestine, as in all Eastern countries, there are elements which would be ready to respond to propaganda from abroad.

17. The question of Transjordan is hardly less important. It may perhaps not be fully realised in London—I certainly did not fully realise until I had been some time in Palestine—how close are the relations between this country and Transjordan. Many of the land-owning families of the one own property in the other. There are tribes of Arabs who occupy the two sides of the Jordan valley equally. Merchants continually pass from the one to the other. The food supplies of Palestine have been very largely and freely drawn from the extensive and fertile districts on the highlands across the river. The boundary between the two territories has been no more real a barrier than that between two English counties, and the differences to be noted as one passes from one to the other do not resemble in the least degree the differences that are evident on either side of a frontier between two States. (Nor, in fact, has the Jordan ever been the frontier of Palestine throughout all the many vicissitudes of its long history.)

18. Under these conditions events in Transjordan have an immediate influence upon Palestine. If there is no effective administration there, if lawless bands are able to terrorise the settled population, if trade is hampered, or stopped altogether, and life and property are insecure, the effects will straightway be felt here. The raids which have been launched from that quarter periodically will recommence. The supplies of food will be curtailed or cease, and the people of Palestine will become aggrieved at the higher cost of living that will result. The whole territory having been placed under British influences, such a state of affairs will discredit British administration; and the prestige which, without need of a large force, makes the government of Palestine a comparatively easy task will be undermined.

19. But if, as an alternative, an Administration dependent upon some foreign State is established in Transjordan, the position might well prove even worse. Should it be an Arab principality, it is most unlikely that a strong Administration would be maintained. The conditions that actually prevailed in the earlier months of last year were not far removed from those that have just been indicated. In addition, Transjordan would now furnish the Cave of Adullam for all political malcontents which was once found in the foot-hills of Judea. It would become a centre for any propaganda hostile to the present régime.

20. It is on account of these considerations, which are very patent to everyone who sees the situation close at hand, that I have ventured so often to urge the vital importance to Palestine of a satisfactory settlement in Transjordan. I do not suggest, and have at no time suggested, that the territory should be brought under the same administration. That is not necessary, and is not at present desired by the majority of the inhabitants. But in my judgment, the definite establishment of British influence in Transjordan, and the maintenance of orderly government there, are essential to the peaceful progress of Palestine. They are a prior condition to the reduction of the garrison to the modest scale which is all that the local revenues are able to afford.

So important are these considerations that I have not hesitated to make, from Palestinian funds, the advances that were necessary to enable an efficient gendarmerie and central reserve force to be organised in the neighbouring territory. By their means, and only by their means, is it possible for the local authorities to collect their revenues; and out of those revenues it may be hoped that the advances may be repaid. But even if they were not repaid, a preventive expenditure of £ E. 30,000 on the other side of the Jordan may well save Palestine from an expenditure of £ E. 100,000 for defence on this. In the same way the presence of 500 men of the British army at Amman would be calculated so to influence the situation as to obviate the necessity for stationing a much larger number along the Jordan valley and as a reserve in the central parts of Palestine.

21. For the excessive length of this despatch the excuse must be found in the importance to the future of this country of the matters with which it deals. I would conclude it with a summary of its contents:—

1. The present financial situation of Palestine is favourable. The revenue will fully realise the estimates in the current year, and is likely to increase.
2. An additional sum of not less than £ E. 100,000 a year will be made available through the annuity payable in respect of the Ottoman Pre-War Debt being less than the revenues collected for the Debt Administration by that amount.

3. There is also a sum of £ E. 483,000 in hand from the accumulations of O.P.D.A. revenue since the occupation.
4. On the other hand the fall of values that is now taking place is likely to result in a set-off to the anticipated increase of the revenue. A considerable capital expenditure, and some additional annual expenditure, are unavoidable. To impose heavier taxation upon the people is not practicable. Some deduction must be made from the revenue collected in Palestine in respect of customs duties levied on goods consumed in Transjordan.
5. The railways are likely to be conducted without loss, but cannot be expected to provide a net contribution to the general revenues in the immediate future.
6. The Administration of Palestine does not ask for any grant-in-aid from His Majesty's Government, nor for any Treasury guarantee for its loans.
7. It is prepared to assume the whole cost of the defence of the country as soon as its finances enable it to do so, and to begin the transfer in the coming financial year.
8. There can be devoted to this purpose the sums of £ E. 100,000 a year and £ E. 483,000 mentioned above, together with the greater part of any future surpluses of revenue.
9. These sums would be devoted to the maintenance of a militia, which should be under the command of the G.O.C. Troops in Palestine, and form an integral part of the garrison.
10. For the reasons stated in paragraph 14, it is submitted that Palestine should not be required to repay expenditure by the army, during the campaign and the occupation, on railways or other public works.
11. The internal political situation is likely to allow a large reduction in the garrison in the near future.
12. But the situation is dominated by the relations with Transjordan, and without a satisfactory settlement there such a reduction would be unsafe.

I have, &c.

HERBERT SAMUEL,
High Commissioner.

[E 1064/31/88]

No. 95.

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 24.)

(No. 13.)

My Lord,

Jerusalem, January 7, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to transmit for your Lordship's information two general reports dealing with the Ajloun and Belka (Salt-Amman) areas of Transjordan.

These reports have been prepared from information received from the British representatives in these districts. It is hoped subsequently to forward a similar report dealing with the Kerak area.

I have, &c.

(For the High Commissioner),

W. H. DEEDES.

Enclosure 1 in No. 95.

General Report on Ajloun Area.

THE total area of Ajloun is about 1,000 square miles, with a population of about 100,000, of whom 70,000 are peasants and the remainder cultivating Bedouins, consisting chiefly of the Beni Hasan and the Bedouins of the Jordan valley.

The peasants live in 130 villages, none of which contains over 3,000 inhabitants.

The northern half of the district and the Beni Hasan country are similar in character, flat in parts, but generally rugged and comparatively treeless, although oak scrub exists in places.

The Kura and Jebel Ajlun districts are extremely rugged, and to a large extent covered with forests of oak, pine, &c.

Products.

Animals.—The Beni Hasan keep large flocks of sheep and goats, which for half the year are pastured east of the railway, and the traders, Damascene and Nablusi, who live at Jerash, Medwar, &c., do a large trade in semn, wool, &c.

The peasants keep a fair number of cattle, sheep and goats, but little of their produce is exported.

The Beni Hasan and the peasants of the Beni Obeid and Beni Juhma districts own a large number of camels; elsewhere trade, harvesting, &c., is carried on almost entirely by means of donkeys.

Crops.—The chief crops are:—

Wheat and barley, northern half of the district and Beni Hasan.

Beans and lentils, northern half of the district.

Olives, western half of the district.

Grapes, Jebel Ajlun.

Tobacco, Beni Hasan.

Figs and pomegranates are also grown considerably, except by the Beni Hasan, but are not much exported.

Charcoal is exported from Kura, Jebel Ajlun, and the slopes of the Yarmuk valley.

Trade.—Trade in the district is fairly flourishing. The traders at Irbid, Jerash, and elsewhere are doing satisfactory business, and the bi-weekly animal market at Irbid is well attended.

Trade goods are almost entirely brought from Damascus.

This is due to—

1. Most of the traders are Damascenes.

2. Goods are to be bought at Damascus cheaper and in greater variety.

3. The trade of Ajloun is carried out entirely in Turkish currency. Egyptian notes, though their value has now risen to 7½ medjities, do not really form part of the currency, and there is no Egyptian silver in circulation at all. The trade of Damascus is also still carried on in Turkish currency.

4. Better communications.

Manufactures.—The people of the district are almost entirely occupied in agriculture. A certain amount of mat-making is carried on, and at Irbid, Jerash, &c., boots, saddles, woollen mattresses, &c. are made, but chiefly by outsiders.

The people of Mezar export wooden ploughs to Hauran.

Political Situation.

The uncertainty as to the frontier and the future form of Government, the Shereefian movement, and the various agitations going on in adjacent districts have combined to prevent Ajloun from settling down, but on the whole, as far as political agitation is concerned, it compares favourably with most other parts of the country. This is due to the broken nature of the country, which tends to confine the interest of the inhabitants to their own groups of villages. The people as a whole are contented with the present state of affairs, which if not ideal, is at any rate better than what they have been accustomed to, and from the point of view of the peasant, compares favourably with that of Palestine.

A serious problem is afforded by the immigrants from the north. They are of all descriptions, extreme nationalists, persons condemned by the French, discharged officers and officials, adventurers and criminals. Many have moved on south, but many remain, and as they are mostly penniless their presence is both a burden and a danger.

Administrative.

Kaza of Irbid.—This kaza consists of sixty villages plus a still indefinite number of the Bedouins of the Yarmuk and Jordan valleys, with a total population of about 30,000. The state of administration is good.

Kaza of Mezar.—This kaza which consists of thirty-three villages with a population of about 22,000 has been formally abolished.

Kaza of Jebel Ajlun.—Consists of twenty-six villages and the Belauna tribe of of the Ghor, with a population of about 20,000. The administration is fairly satisfactory, but the revenue is insufficient to support the kaza.

Kaza of Jerash.—Consists of eight villages and Beni Hasan tribe; total about 25,000. The administration is very unsatisfactory.

Finance.

The total revenue of Ajloun is £ E. 60,000, but it could easily be increased without hardship to the people. The tithes are all fixed.

The collection of taxes in Irbid kaza, though some difficulties have been experienced, is proceeding satisfactorily.

In Mezar and Jebel Ajlun kazas a fair amount of money has been collected. In Jerash the collection is still unsatisfactory.

In none of the kazas except Irbid is the revenue collected more than barely sufficient to pay the working expenses of the Government, and there is no doubt that if Ajloun is to have schools and roads, and pay its share of the Central Transjordanian Government it will have to be reduced to two kazas.

Crime.

There is very little in the way of professional crime. What crime there is is chiefly due to feuds, land disputes, family quarrels, &c.

Gendarmerie.

The gendarmerie consists of nine officers and about 170 men. If two of the kazas were abolished it could be reduced to five officers and 120 men. Eight out of the nine officers are local men, three with no experience. Many of the n.c.o.s are friends and relatives of the officers.

Justice.

There is a court of justice in each of the kazas, but no appeal court. They work as well as they can. Both among the peasants and Bedouins there are certain sheikhs who are hereditary judges under tribal law, who take regular fees and from whose judgments there is no appeal.

Posts.

There are posts twice a week to Deraa and Semakh, and once a week to Jerash.

Health.

The only hospital in the district is that at Irbid, which belongs to Dr. Sanyal, with Mr. Blofield as assistant. There are Syrian doctors at Irbid and Hosn, but they are not very efficient. A doctor at Jerash is urgently needed as malaria is very bad there.

The health of the people is good.

There is a good deal of tuberculosis and in a few villages malaria.

Infectious diseases are rare.

There is no sanitation, but diseases arising from the lack of it do not occur.

Antiquities.

The chief place of interest is Jerash. When I was there recently I noticed that several stones of the large amphitheatre had been broken off presumably for building purposes. The same thing had occurred at Mukeis. I warned those concerned not to allow further damage. The whole district is full of ancient remains of various kinds, and I suggest that a representative of the Archaeological Department make a tour of the district.

Education.

Ten schools have been opened in the Irbid kaza and more will be opened when suitable teachers can be found. In the other kazas there are no Government schools, but at most villages the Khatib teaches the boys reading, writing and the Qur'an.

There is a C.M.S. school at Hosn and a Roman Catholic Mission school at Hosn and Ajloun.

Ajloun, December 31, 1920.

Enclosure 2 in No. 95.

*General Report on the Mutessariflik of the Belka.**1. Administration.*

The administrative areas remain as they were before the arrival of the British representatives in August. The mutessarif has his headquarters at Salt. Under him are kaimakams at Amman and Zizia. Temporarily Madeba takes the place of Zizia

as the residence of the kaimakam on account of the activities of the Beni Sakhr. In the budget for the coming year provision is made for kaimakams at Amman and Zizia with Mudirs at Madeba, Wadi Sir, Diban, Zerka and Na'ur. Diban is the centre for the Beni Hamaideh tribe. Most of this tribe lives to the north of the Mojib, and part of it lives to the south of the Kerak area. They are at feud with Kerak and wish to come into the Belka. A new council has recently been elected but is not yet convened, and the budget must be passed by this council before any administrative changes for the new year can be effected. Meanwhile the old administrative council of the mutessarif continues to act. The new council more fairly represents the whole area than its predecessor. All its members (except the Bedouins, who are appointed by the mutessarif with the British representative's approval) are elected. There are no Bedouin members on the old council. For the new council there will be two; these will be either Sultan Majed for the Adwan and Belka tribes, and Mashur for the Beni Sakhr and the Beni Hamaideh. The new council will be convened as soon as the budget and other matters are ready for presentation.

2. Agriculture.

The chief products of the country are wheat, barley, grapes, raisins, and live-stock. The early and plentiful rains of November make the prospects for the new year unusually good and larger areas than in former years are now being ploughed. With the abolition of the Régie it would be possible to cultivate tobacco to good advantage.

3. Antiquities.

There are many antiquities in this area notably at Amman, Madeba and Zizia. Every possible effort to prevent damage is made, though no Antiquities Administration can be formed until there is sufficient money to spare after the pressing needs for roads, schools, and courts have been provided.

4. Investigation of Crime.

No elaborate method for the investigation of crime exists. The police and public prosecutor act together, and very effectively unless the criminals happen to belong to a tribe too large for the existing forces to deal with. Very little is spent on secret service, nor is it necessary to spend more. To live among the people is to know what is going on.

5. Commerce and Industry.

Deposits of phosphate are found near Salt on the Amman road. Coal of poor quality is said to exist between Madeba and Zizia. If this coal should prove no poorer in quality than the coal known as "Braunkohl" in Germany, illuminating and lubricating oils might be made of it. Lack of transport to a large extent handicaps commerce, especially at the present time when all animals are being used for ploughing. Supplies by rail from Damascus have been cut off by recent political disturbances. The main trade routes of this zone are likely to be railway Damascus-Deraa-Amman and Haifa-Damascus-Amman, unless of course prohibitive custom dues are established at Amman or other point of entry, or unless transport facilities to Palestine are improved. It might be practicable to construct a narrow gauge electric railway to Jerusalem by means of water power in the Wadi Kelt near Jericho, and at the Jordan Bridge and the Shaib (on the road to Salt). At a future date it may prove worth while to consult expert opinion on this matter.

6. Education.

Government education in the Belka is almost non-existent. The Government schools that do exist are poorly staffed, but are free. The best schools are those of the Greek Orthodox, Greek Catholic, Latin and Protestant communities. The new budget provides for an extension of educational work, and it is hoped that continued progress may be made from year to year. It is difficult at present to find expert teachers ready to accept positions in the country. It is hoped that when provision for agricultural education is made in Palestine opportunity will be given for a few pupils to enter Transjordanian should they be willing to do so.

7. Finance.

The monthly rate of expenditure since the 1st September has been about £ E. 6,000, and the local treasury now contains about that amount. Total collections

[6668]

Z 2

for the four months from the 1st August to the 1st December have been about £ E. 25,000. At the end of the year there should be a small surplus of about £ E. 2,000 in the treasury. The main difficulty has been in the collection of taxes from the Beni Sakhr who have not paid anything for five or six years, as far as can be ascertained. Next year's expenditure, will, if the reserve force is to be charged to this area, amount to £ E. 100,000, and the expected revenue to about £ E. 80,000. The estimated expenditure represents the minimum requirements in respect of salaries, justice, public security, education and communications. If custom-houses become necessary between here and Syria another £ E. 10,000 would probably be added to the receipts of this zone. With the abolition of the Régie a further increase can be expected that might be sufficient to meet requirements. With a strong reserve force and gendarmerie it may prove possible to collect a further £ E. 10,000 from the Beni Sakhr and Beni Hamaideh.

8. Health.

The health of the country is good usually, but unusually cold weather early in the winter caused many deaths through pneumonia. In the Jordan valley and at Amman malaria is prevalent. There are no prostitutes. Venereal disease is almost unknown. The cases that have been reported occurred after visits to Jerusalem or Damascus. There is a Government doctor at Salt and one at Amman, and Dr. Alexander of the C.M.S. and Miss Fisher are in charge of a hospital and dispensary at Salt. Miss Purnell, an English lady, practices at Amman and maintains a dispensary there. There are a few other private practitioners in Salt with no very high qualifications. The country produces enough food for all, and the people are very hospitable. Sanitation does not exist.

9. Justice.

The organisation of the law courts leaves much to be desired, but the officials do their best under the circumstances. A combined Appeal and Supreme Court, a circuit Court of First Instance, and magistrates and kadis in the most important centres are provided for in next year's budget. If persons in the Kerak and Ajloun areas desire to make use of the Appeal Court it may be possible to make some satisfactory arrangements to enable them to do so.

10. Political.

Since the message from the Emir Feisal was received the political situation has improved. Shereef Ali is still at Amman, and Captain Kirkbride hears that he intends to remain there until he hears the results of the negotiations now proceeding in Europe. Shereef Ali is reported to have said "If the results are not satisfactory then the sword shall be the only policy of the Arabs, and I shall use it." It is hoped that Amir Abdullah will recall Shereef Ali from this area; he is young and under the influence of Said Kheir, Mithgal and various outlaws from the French zone.

11. Posts.

There is a bi-weekly postal service with Jerusalem. Gendarmes take the post once a week to Madeba, Zerka, Jerash, Ajloun and Irbid. From Amman to Salt and Jerusalem the telegraph line is working and a new line to Madeba from Amman is being laid. The telephone is working from Amman to Salt and from Salt to Jerusalem. Prior to the arrival of Amir Abdullah's emissaries, the telegraph line was working from Amman to Deraa. A number of old German telephones and two exchanges have been repaired. A telegraph line is being constructed from Madeba to Zizia, and from Madeba to Wadi Sir. The personnel now employed is untrained. Arrangements are being made for the training of some in Jerusalem. In order to increase the postal revenue it is suggested that the higher value of Egyptian Expeditionary Force stamps be overprinted for disposal to collectors. Two collectors are known who are prepared to spend more than 100l. each on these stamps. It is thought that more than 1,000l. of stamps can be sold if all the values of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force were overprinted.

12. Public Security.

Public security in the towns and on the main road from the Jordan Bridge to Amman, via Salt, continues excellent. The main difficulty still comes from the Beni Sakhr encroachments on the farms of Salt landowners whose property is adjacent

to the lands of the Beni Sakhr. The land question between the people of Madeba and the Belka is not settled, and cannot very well be settled until a proper system of courts is established. The new town police, the presence of many of the Arabs in the Jordan valley, and the ploughing season all account for the temporary improvement in public security. The Arabs have an increasing respect for the gendarmerie and reserve force. An increase in the reserve force is necessary.

13. Works.

The Serai, which was partially destroyed during the war is being slowly repaired. The Salt-Amman will require about £ E. 4,000 to make it into a good motor road next year. The proper repair of the Salt-Jordan Bridge Road will cost more. The latter road is still open for motor traffic and seems likely to remain so unless there are very heavy rains this winter. The biggest piece of work done by the local Government has been the construction of the telegraph and telephone lines from Salt to the Jordan Bridge, and from Amman to Madeba. The lines have not been very well constructed, and are badly in need of insulators which will be brought from Damascus as soon as the railway is working again. The new budget provides for an engineer whose chief work will be looking after roads and buildings.

14. General Conclusion.

The whole future of this area depends on public security. The chief dangers are Hedjaz emissaries and outlaws from the French zone, and the Beni Sakhr within. The former can be dealt with only by a just settlement of the Arab question, the latter only by the reserve force. The activities of the former would almost certainly result in very little harm if a central reserve force of at least 300 of all the areas were created. With it, there is every hope of maintaining public security so far as internal conditions and considerations are concerned, and of collecting all the taxes and thus obtaining the necessary revenues.

Es-Salt, December 21, 1920.

[E 1061/909/88]

No. 96.

Earl Curzon to Sir H. Samuel (Jerusalem).

(No. 98.)
Sir,

Foreign Office, January 27, 1921.

I HAVE received your despatch No. 10 of the 7th January, regarding the control of wakf funds in Palestine and the institution of a council of four Moslems.

2. I would refer you, in reply, to my telegram No. 48 of the 22nd January, expressing approval of the proposals on this subject summarised in your telegram No. 20 of the 17th January.

3. I approve the resolutions of the committee which you convened on the 2nd December to discuss this subject.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 1269/29/88]

No. 97.

Earl Curzon to Sir H. Samuel (Jerusalem).

(No. 55.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, January 29, 1921.

YOUR despatch No. 145 of 22nd November: Pay of officials of Palestine Government; and your telegram No. 471 of 31st December.

2. Your proposals for the three secretaries are accepted.

3. See my telegram No. 49 of 24th January.

4 and 5. We must insist that the five grades already sanctioned should be retained.

We consider that grade 1 should contain only five heads of major Departments and five District Governors, but we are prepared to regard the Chief Justice as outside the authorised numbers of grade 1. Assuming that Public Works and Railways, when on a normal footing, will each contain one grade 1 post, we think the other grade 1 heads of Departments should be reduced to three. Of the four posts, Education, Agriculture, Public Health and Public Security, we still think that either two should be combined or one reduced to grade 2, while heads of other Departments, such as

Director of Posts and Telegraphs, should all be grade 2 or below. We suggest that the Chief Justice should be the only judge paid a salary equal to grade 1 scale, and should be glad to learn your proposals as to grading of other judges.

We are inclined to think that generally too many grade 2 appointments may have been made, and that, while it may be necessary to have especially good men at the head of Departments in the present stage of affairs, these specially selected officials, who will formulate and initiate policy, should be assisted by young and keen juniors, and not by men of more or less the same age, experience and salary.

Your argument regarding Treasurer and Deputy Head of Treasury does not seem cogent. Should not Financial Secretary be able in fact to act as Head of Treasury in a country the size of Palestine?

7. We are inclined to think that absence of opportunity to advance may be partially due to over-staffing and partially due to the fact that, owing to difficulties of recruitment, there may be a large proportion of officials not suitable for advance beyond maximum of grade 2. It is impossible to contemplate grade 1 posts being available for the majority of the present staff, but as the administration develops there should be some corresponding development of departmental staffs and greater opportunities for promotion.

8. Objections to creating an interval between scales for grades 4 and 5 would be that scale for grade 4 would have to be £E. 400 to £E. 500, which is open to objections raised in your paragraph 7. Scales should therefore remain fixed as in paragraph 7 of my despatch No. 351.

9. Entertainment allowances of £E. 910 are accepted, subject to a report at the end of the year as to extent of entertaining necessary and expenditure actually incurred.

10. Fixed percentage deduction seems better than continuously variable rate. You should report what rates you ultimately propose and whether they are to vary with each rank or geographically. If you decide upon definite percentages, they should not be permanently fixed, but subject to revision at definite periods in relation to the actual rates obtaining. Generally, percentage reduction should bear relation to the cost of housing in Palestine and not to the percentage reduction in the quite different case of the Soudan.

All emoluments hitherto fixed, except where specific sanction obtained for individuals, must be regarded as provisional, pending settlement of permanent scales, and as carrying no claim to continued remuneration at these rates.

Apart from question of judges, you should carry out regrading in accordance with the scales now sanctioned as soon as possible, and at any rate not later than the commencement of the next financial year.

[E 1391/522/88]

No. 98.

Board of Trade to Foreign Office.—(Received January 31.)

Sir,

Board of Trade, January 29, 1921.

WITH reference to your letter of the 15th January on the subject of the extension of Imperial preference to Palestine, I am directed by the Board of Trade to state that they concur generally in the draft letter that Lord Curzon proposes to address to the Law Officers of the Crown, but that they would venture to suggest that it might be useful to take the opportunity of securing the opinion of the Law Officers not only in regard to the case of Palestine, but also in regard to the extension of Imperial preference to mandated territories generally.

Should Lord Curzon concur in this suggestion, the last sentence of paragraph 5 of the draft letter might perhaps be omitted and a new paragraph added somewhat in the following sense:—

6. The question at issue has been considered with special reference to Palestine, because a definite proposal for the extension of Imperial preference to that country has been made by the High Commissioner, but a similar question will no doubt arise in connection with other mandated territories. Lord Curzon will accordingly be glad to be favoured with any general observations which you may be good enough to offer on the extension of Imperial preference to mandated territories, having regard to the most-favoured-nation clauses in commercial treaties and on the considerations which will have to be taken into account in determining whether, without infringing those treaties, some classes of mandated territories could be accorded preferential customs

duties, whilst other could not, if in your opinion it is possible in this connection to differentiate among the several classes of mandated territories provided for in article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, a copy of which is enclosed (Paper 1).*

I am, &c.

H. FOUNTAIN.

[E 964/334/88]

No. 99.

Earl Curzon to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

(No. 322.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, January 31, 1921.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 4075 of the 18th December last, I should be glad if your Excellency would now propose to the French Government that direct communication between His Majesty's High Commissioners for Mesopotamia and Palestine and the French High Commissioner for Syria should be regulated as follows:—

2. Communications should take place direct, or through the consular officers at Damascus and Jerusalem and Bagdad respectively, regarding matters of purely local interest of a non-political character, e.g., commercial and customs questions, matters in the regulation of which consular officers have functions recognised by treaty and usage, and administrative questions of relative unimportance.

3. As a general rule no direct communications would take place on questions with a political or politico-military character except for urgent communication of information regarding matters of fact. In the latter case, the High Commissioners for Palestine and Mesopotamia would communicate direct with the High Commissioner for Syria and *vice versa* except when it may be necessary to telegraph in cypher, when the consular channel would be employed.

4. Otherwise, unless direct communications were expressly authorised on particular subjects by the French and British Governments in agreement, all communications should take place through Paris and London, except in very occasional cases of real emergency where it might be imperative for the High Commissioners to discuss direct between themselves a question involving matters of policy.

5. The existing military arrangements for the exchange of information of a purely military nature would remain unaffected.

6. His Majesty's Government feel that a regular and agreed procedure on these lines is best calculated to ensure that harmonious co-operation between the three High Commissioners and between His Majesty's Government and the French Government on matters of common interest in Syria, Mesopotamia and Palestine, which is essential to the peace and progress of the Middle East.

7. I should be glad if you would enquire whether the French Government agree to these proposals, and if so whether they will instruct the High Commissioner for Syria accordingly.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 1577/36/88]

No. 100.

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 18.)

My Lord,

Jerusalem, January 16, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to submit for your consideration an ordinance dealing with the constitution and functions of benches of local magistrates. The Commission on Municipal Taxation, whose report I forwarded to you under cover of my despatch No. 243, recommended that the municipalities should be invested again, as they were under the Ottoman system, with magisterial powers to try contraventions of municipal bye-laws. I was not prepared to accept that recommendation, because it seemed to me undesirable that the members of the municipality who were interested in the result of the prosecution should be judges. On the other hand, it would, I think, be desirable to enlist the services of leading citizens in the chief towns of Palestine for minor judicial work.

There are a number of men well fitted to exercise functions like those of the

* Not printed.

Justice of Peace in England, and who would be willing to act in an honorary capacity. It is proposed in the ordinance that the city benches should try contraventions of municipal regulations as well as contraventions against the penal code and any ordinances issued by the Government. The sentences which they will be enabled to impose are limited to fifteen days' imprisonment, and an application for revision may be taken from a judgment of imprisonment passed by them to the district court.

I believe the institution of honorary magistrates will be popular, and will at once make for the prompt disposal of petty offences and relieve the civil magistrate's court of a large amount of work. I should propose in the first place to establish benches of this kind at Jerusalem, Jaffa and Haifa. If the experiment works well, the system could be extended to other towns.

I should be grateful if you will let me know, by telegraph, whether the draft ordinance has your approval.

I have, &c.

HERBERT SAMUEL, *High Commissioner.*

Enclosure in No. 100.

Ordinance.

WHEREAS the Ottoman Law of Municipalities, dated the 27th Ramadan, 1294, provided that contraventions of municipal regulations might be judged by members of the municipality; and

Whereas ordinance No. 89, issued by the military administration, enacted that these provisions should no longer be applied and that all such contraventions should be tried by the civil magistrate; and

Whereas it is now desirable to institute in certain cities of Palestine a bench of magistrates who shall have power to try contraventions committed within a municipal area.

Be it enacted by the High Commissioner, after consultation with the Advisory Council as follows:—

- (1.) The High Commissioner after consultation with the district governor, may appoint by warrant in such places as he thinks fit citizens of education and standing to be honorary magistrates.
- (2.) The magistrates so appointed will form a court known as the city court. The bench shall consist of not less than three members and shall decide by a majority of voices. The High Commissioner shall appoint a chairman of the bench, and in his absence the magistrate senior in age shall preside over the court.
- (3.) The court shall sit in such places and at such times as may be fixed by the district governor. A record of all cases tried shall be kept in the form laid down by any rules published under the provisions of this ordinance.
- (4.) The jurisdiction of the city court shall extend to all contraventions either of the penal code or of the provisions of any ordinance issued by the Palestine Government or of any municipal regulations, committed within a municipal area, provided the maximum penalty for the contravention does not exceed the limit of jurisdiction of the court. The court shall be entitled to pass a sentence not exceeding a fine of £ E. 5 or fifteen days' imprisonment or both these penalties.
- (5.) The court shall have the same powers as the civil magistrate's court in regard to the summoning of witnesses, the arrest of the accused persons, and any other matter concerned with the hearing of a criminal case. Any fine imposed by the court shall be recovered in the same way as a fine imposed by the civil magistrate.
- (6.) There shall be no appeal from the judgment of the court, but any person sentenced either to fine or imprisonment shall have the right to apply for revision to the president of the district court on the same terms as a person sentenced by the court of the civil magistrate.
- (7.) The court may order that a person convicted of an offence shall pay the costs of the proceedings, such costs to be assessed at the same rate as in the court of the civil magistrate and to be recoverable by the same means.
- (8.) No person shall sit as a member of a city court who has any interest in the case or who is related to any of the accused persons.

- (9.) The legal secretary, with the sanction of the High Commissioner, may issue rules regulating the procedure and administration of the court. Such rules shall be published in the "Official Gazette."

High Commissioner.

Government House, Jerusalem, January 1921.

[E 1579/1579/88]

No. 101.

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 20.)

My Lord,

Jerusalem, January 12, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to transmit a copy of the minutes of the fourth meeting of the Advisory Council, which was held at Government House on the 4th January, 1921.

I have, &c.

(for the High Commissioner),

E. KEITH-ROACH.

Enclosure in No. 101.

Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the Advisory Council.

THE fourth meeting of the Advisory Council took place on Tuesday, the 4th January, 1921, under the presidency of his Excellency the High Commissioner.

The following were present: Mr. J. L. Barron, Mr. M. Berouti, Mr. N. Bentwich, Mr. I. Ben Zwi, Mr. H. E. Bowman, Mr. P. Bramley, Lieut.-Colonel C. Cox, Mr. W. H. Deedes, Mr. R. H. Harari, Colonel G. Heron, Ismail Bey Husseini, Mr. H. M. Kalvarisky, Sheikh Abdel Hadj-el-Khatib, Mr. H. C. Luke, Sheikh Freieh Abu Middien, Suleiman Bey Nassif, Dr. Habib Salem, Mr. E. R. Sawyer, Mr. H. A. Smallwood, Suleiman Abdul Razzak Tukan Bey, Mr. D. Yellin.

MAX NUROCK, *Secretary, Advisory Council.*

PART I OF THE PROCEEDINGS, JANUARY 4, 1921.

In response to a question from Ismail Bey Husseini, *his Excellency the High Commissioner* made the following statement regarding the tobacco monopoly:—

"I am now in the position to make a definite statement with respect to the limitations on the cultivation and importation of tobacco, which have resulted from the concessions granted by the Turkish Government to the Régie cointéressée des Tabacs by the Convention of 1913.

"The limitations are undoubtedly injurious to the people of Palestine, and I propose to discontinue immediately and entirely the operation in Palestine of the tobacco monopoly.

"All restrictions on the cultivation and on the sale of tobacco are henceforth abolished throughout Palestine.

"New customs regulations will be necessary, and it must be some little time before these can be prepared.

"The present customs duty and surtax on imported tobacco and cigarettes will be replaced by a fixed tariff, which will, it is hoped, come into force on the 1st March, 1921. Till then the Régie will continue to collect its dues on imported tobacco.

"It is intended to impose a tax on all tobacco grown in the country, on whatever kind of land. I should be glad to have the observations of members of the Council on this question of taxation.

"Notice has been sent to the Régie in accordance with the terms of this announcement, and the Government is prepared to recognise a claim, if any, which can be established by the Régie in accordance with the terms of the Peace Treaty with Turkey.

"The Government anticipates that the taxation that will be imposed here, as in other countries, upon tobacco, will be willingly paid by the people in consideration of the freedom and relief that will be obtained by the abolition of the monopoly."

[6668]

2 A

Dr. Salim, on behalf of all the members of the Council and of the people of Palestine in general, expressed thanks to the High Commissioner for all that he had done for the benefit of this country and for that statement. He requested his Excellency to have this statement translated and published in all parts of the country, so that the people may understand that the Government takes an interest in all that will benefit the people of the country. His Excellency replied that this would be done at once, and said he would be glad to have the opinion of the members as to the future taxation of tobacco. On this point discussion was postponed until the following day.

His Excellency announced that as the desired reduction in foodstuffs had been effected partly as a result of the Government's prohibition of the export of cereals, it had been decided to modify that prohibition so as to allow the export of up to one-half of all stocks of barley of 20 tons and upward held on the 10th January. Certificates would be issued by District Governors to facilitate such export. A public notice to this effect would be issued at once.

Tukan Bey, while thanking his Excellency for the new order, asked that the concession be extended also to durra, of which there was an unsaleable surplus in the country, and of no use to the present holders.

Dr. Salim agreed, and suggested that permission be given for a quantity only to be exported as a trial, to see what, if any, effect on the price of cereals it would have.

With reference to the terms of the public notice (copy attached), *Mr. Berouti* thought it would be preferable to obtain the certificates of export from Chambers of Commerce. In order that the markets in the countries to which the barley is exported (England and Syria) should not be affected, the export should take place by degrees weekly or monthly, and not all at one time, which would cause a great decrease in price in the foreign markets.

Mr. Harari said that public notice 183 prohibited the export of durra until after the winter, approximately the 1st March, and the question could come up at the next meeting of Council. The durra crop is harvested after the barley crop, and it seems rather premature to raise the export restrictions on both at present, particularly as durra is food for both human beings and animals, and if we have been too generous in the export of barley, it would be possible in the future to make good that generosity in durra. The figures for durra are not considerable, the total crop being only 28,000 tons. It is very largely consumed by the fellahen, and if small holders were permitted to export, it would have a very bad effect on price. The Government was of opinion that it would be possible and desirable to release a portion of the surplus of barley in the country, if such existed, and by limiting export licences to holders of quantities of 20 tons and more, the Government hopes that the quantities held by the small holders would be retained, as they are extremely important to agriculture. Indeed, as a result of the existence of these small stocks, the Director of Agriculture reports that the condition of the animal population this year is considerably better than it was last year.

Ismail Bey Hussein drew attention to the fact that if export were allowed it would react on home prices, and emphasised the present high cost of essential commodities as compared to pre-war prices. Much of this increase was due to the action of agents, who bought quantities from the farmers and then held stocks and so controlled the selling prices.

His Excellency said that owing to the war prices all over the world were increased, and the measures the Administration had taken with regard to export of cereals were calculated to reduce prices, and have undoubtedly contributed to that result, for prices have fallen in Palestine during the last few months. The fact that many people were anxious to export barley shows that the prices obtaining elsewhere are higher than in Palestine. Any measures that can be adopted which would reduce prices still further would certainly be considered by the Government. There are, indeed, profiteering tribunals at work, and in several cases fines have been imposed.

Mr. Yellin also complained of high prices. Although it is true that prices all over the world are higher, now that normal conditions are returning steps should be taken against prices being five or six times higher than before the war. 200 per cent. or 300 per cent. increase might be necessary, but he was of opinion that the Administration must intervene and fix maximum rates for various foodstuffs. He

did not think it was merely a question of profiteering on the part of agents, but also of profiteering on the part of cultivators.

Sheikh Freieh Abu Middien recommended that the cost of labour be controlled.

Other members advanced suggestions for the regulation of the prices of petrol, coal, wood, &c.

Dr. Salim was of opinion that a tariff on all goods and vegetables would be detrimental. Where introduced it resulted in an increase of prices or the disappearance of the commodities from the market altogether. No regulation was needed, as prices would drop naturally.

Mr. Berouti thought that the importation of coal from England would reduce prices in general.

Mr. Harari said that the remarks made by various members about the high cost of living were very true. It was likewise true that the situation was at present abnormal, but tending towards the normal. *Dr. Salim* had very ably pointed out the disadvantage of a tariff of prices. During the early days of the occupation such a tariff was imposed, but rescinded as being unnecessary and harmful. It would have to vary from district to district, and would impose innumerable and vexatious restrictions. It was hoped that the fall in the world prices will react upon Palestine, and will result in a very large fall in prices here.

As regards meat, the Administration had been in communication with the Soudan Government with regard to the importation of Soudan slaughter-cattle into Palestine. After very considerable trouble, preliminary arrangements had been completed, and representative butchers are now actually in Cairo to arrange for a trial consignment of 100 head of Soudan cattle to be imported into Palestine. The Administration had likewise endeavoured to obtain sheep from Cyprus, and although informed that export was prohibited, was still trying to obtain at least a limited importation. An endeavour was further being made to arrange for importation of sheep and goats from Syria and Transjordan, and the army had been requested not to place any local contracts for meat in order to obtain the largest possible supplies for the people of Palestine. With reference to the question of fuel, kerosene had recently risen in price because kerosene supplies, being drawn from America, are sold here in Egyptian currency which must later be remitted to America in dollars, and as the exchange is more and more unfavourable so the price in piastres increases. The Administration, however, hoped to achieve a considerable reduction in the price of kerosene by the supply of bulk oil, and tanks had already been erected in Jerusalem by one oil company, which had placed an order in Egypt for small hand-carts to distribute tank oil. This would result in a reduction of some 20 per cent. in price. Tanks were also to be constructed in Jaffa and Haifa.

The price of coal was likewise falling. The railways had been able to supply small quantities of coal to those who required it, and it was hoped that merchants who needed coal would themselves take the necessary steps to import it, as on the importation of coal and other necessary articles no restriction whatever existed.

His Excellency said that the Government would note all the observations that had been made by members. There was reason to hope that the decline in prices which had manifested itself recently would continue and be accelerated.

His Excellency read the subjoined telegram from Lord Allenby in reply to one sent on the occasion of the celebrations upon the anniversary of the liberation of Jerusalem. From it the members would realise how greatly appreciated would be the gift from the people of Palestine of the sites for soldiers' graveyards which the Council had resolved upon at its last meeting:—

"I have the honour to thank you for your telegram informing me of the solemn and impressive celebration of the anniversary of the liberation of Jerusalem. I am deeply touched by your kind reference to myself in connection with the splendid army I had the honour to lead to Jerusalem. On behalf of that army I would express to you and your community our warm appreciation of the generous manner in which you have paid tribute to those who fell for the Holy Land. No fitter memorial could be theirs."

Various amendments to the Pharmacy and the Police Ordinances, as proposed at the last meeting of Council, were approved.

Public Notice.

Whereas Ordinance No. 183 of the 24th September, 1920, prohibited the export of barley, durra and wheat, and whereas it is now desirable to allow the export of barley under certain conditions—

Notice is hereby given that—

1. The export from Palestine of barley shall be allowed until further notice as from the 10th January, 1921, under the following conditions:—

- (a.) Any person holding in any one place on the 10th January, 1921, a stock of 20 tons or more of barley will be granted by the competent District Governor, and free of charge, a licence to export a quantity of barley equal to half the amount of his holding upon producing a certificate from a bank certifying the amount of his holding at the date specified.
- (b.) Where no banks are available a District Governor will issue the certificate after satisfying himself as to the stock held.
- (c.) The decision of the District Governor shall be final in all disputes arising in connection with the issue and use of licences issued under this public notice.

2. The restriction upon the export of durra and wheat will remain as stated in Ordinance No. 183, dated the 24th September, 1920.

HERBERT SAMUEL,

High Commissioner for Palestine.

*Government House, Jerusalem,
January 4, 1921.*

PART II (JANUARY 4, 1921).

The following note on Village Water Supply Loans was read by Mr. Barron:—

Application for loans have been received from villages requiring financial assistance in order to lay down water systems. Many villages have springs in their vicinity, but do not possess any means by which water can be brought from the spring to the village, thus compelling the villagers to go considerable distances daily for their water supply.

Arrangements have been made whereby loans up to £E. 400 can now be granted by the Government on the collective guarantee of the mukhtars and leading members of the village community, who will be severally and jointly responsible for the repayment.

The loans will be repayable in a short term of years, three to five, with interest at 6 per cent.

Dr. Salim thought that 400*l.* would be insufficient in some instances for bringing water from one place to another. If an engineer found that 600*l.* or 800*l.* were necessary, how would this sum be obtained? Will the villagers or the Government have to pay? He hoped that District Governors would be instructed to take this matter into consideration.

Ismail Bey Hussein, who agreed with the previous speakers, added that closing rain-water cisterns and wells would help to abolish malaria throughout the country, and, emphasising the value of village water-supplies from a health point of view, asked that the Administration should deal as generously with this as it was with other matters.

His Excellency said that when visiting villages this question had been mentioned to him. In some cases, with a comparatively small expenditure, a good supply of water can be brought into the village. The water may come from a spring that is perhaps only 300 or 400 metres away, and all that is needed is a length of pipe to bring it to the village itself. The village can obtain the required amount up to 400*l.* upon application to the District Governor on giving proper security for repayment and interest. It is not expected that this will impose any cost on the budget, and consequently there need be no limit to the number of villages which make application. The repayment and interest will be collected by the Government at the same time as the taxes. Labour will, as a general rule, be supplied by the

village itself, and consequently the work can be done at a smaller cost than if it were done by the Government or a contractor. In some cases the medical authorities may be able to take some steps at the same time to improve sanitary and health conditions.

The suggestions of *Dr. Salim* and *Ismail Bey Hussein* will be borne in mind.

Cases where more than 400*l.* are required would be considered in relations to the security which is offered and special sanction would be necessary. It is hoped, however, that the majority of cases will fall within the 400*l.* limit.

Port Dues Ordinance.

With regard to paragraph (b) of article 1, which reads:—

“If a vessel has paid dues at one port in Palestine, half only of the above-mentioned dues, with a maximum of £E. 10, shall be payable at any other port in Palestine on the same voyage.”

Tukan Bey asked why it should be necessary for a ship to pay dues again after paying at one Palestinian port. It was explained that the dues were reduced to half at the second port.

Colonel Heron asked whether paragraph (c) in article 1 which reads:—

“In the case of a vessel arriving at any port in Palestine from a foreign country or from another port in Palestine, and leaving without having taken on cargo and without having landed or taken on board any passengers, only one-half of the dues shall be charged that would otherwise be payable,”

would apply to vessels bringing mails only.

Mr. Bentwich said that this point was covered and it would not apply.

Dr. Salim asked whether the provisions of the ordinance were permanent, as the ports of Palestine were not yet decided, and no doubt the dues would be changed when proper ports were made.

Mr. Bentwich stated that laws and ordinances were designed to meet the needs of the present and were subject to change when conditions changed.

Suleiman Bey Nassif asked whether steamers which ply only between ports of Palestine were entitled to lower payments.

Mr. Bentwich replied that the reduction covered only coasting vessels registered in Palestine.

In reply to a further question from *Suleiman Bey Nassif* whether ships which call each week at Palestinian ports from Beirut or Alexandria would have to pay the same dues as those which call once a month or once a year, *Mr. Bentwich* pointed out that it would be difficult to draw a distinction between vessels which called weekly or otherwise.

Major Jeune, Controller of Ports and Lights, stated that ships calling at Palestinian ports were already paying these dues, and in fact the procedure was customary.

Mr. Berouti suggested that if a certificate had to be obtained before a steamer could leave he feared it would delay the departure of the boat, but *Major Jeune* replied that this was the rule all over the world.

Mr. Berouti thought that the drawing up of a tariff of charges should not be decided by the Government alone. The advice of the Chambers of Commerce and merchants should be taken.

His Excellency said that this would certainly be done.

With regard to article 9 which reads:—

“The ordinance is substituted for any regulations now in force concerning port dues, but all dues hitherto levied at any port of Palestine shall be deemed to have been validly imposed.”

Mr. Yellin asked why, as no law is deemed to be retrospective, it should be so in this case?

Mr. Bentwich said that as these dues were already being paid this point had to be made clear.

A question by *Dr. Salim* as to whether the new regulations would apply to Caesarea was answered by Major Jeune in the affirmative.

Suleiman Bey Nassif and *Mr. Berouti* complained that dues should be exacted for the lighthouses at Haifa and Gaza which were in bad repair and of no utility.

His Excellency explained that the dues were paid to a French company which had been given a concession by the Turkish Government, whereupon *Suleiman Bey Nassif* asked if a communication might be sent to the company requesting that the lighthouses be repaired.

His Excellency said that this matter was already being dealt with.

Commissions of Enquiry Ordinance.

Mr. Bentwich having read the note on the draft ordinance:—

"It has already been found desirable to appoint commissions of enquiry to investigate important questions in a judicial manner, such as the commissions on municipal taxation, increment of land, credit banks, &c. These commissions require power to hear witnesses on oath, to call for the production of documents, and generally to exercise the powers of a court. It is desirable that these powers should be defined, and the ordinance which has been drafted deals with their constitution, their powers and their remuneration."

several members asked for information as to the extent of the powers that would be wielded by such commissions.

His Excellency said that a commission constituted under this ordinance would make investigations according to its terms of reference, and submit its recommendations to the Government for embodiment, if deemed desirable, in a draft ordinance, which in its turn would be submitted to the Advisory Council for discussion and approval.

Commissions of enquiry under this ordinance would not be the same as the Administrative Councils which existed under the Turkish régime. They would not necessarily sit in Jerusalem, but in any place according to the exigency of the matter into which enquiry was being made.

The ordinance was approved.

Mawat Lands.

The draft ordinance before the council proposed to amend the last paragraph of article No. 103 of the Turkish Land Code with regard to Mawat lands, which reads:—

"But if anyone has broken up and cultivated land of this kind without leave there shall be exacted from him payment of the tapu value of the piece of land which he has cultivated, and it shall be granted to him by the issue of a title-deed."

so as to ensure that no persons shall occupy Mawat land without first obtaining permission from the Government.

Ismail Bey Hussein asked whether the action of this amendment would be retrospective.

Mr. Bentwich replied that the new clause would only be operative in the future.

His Excellency suggested that it might be desirable to add an article to that effect, and *Mr. Bentwich* recommended the addition of an article providing that persons who had already cultivated such waste lands must immediately apply to the District Governor for the title deeds.

Dr. Salim asked whether waste land which had been held for a long period without cultivation, but which the holder with financial assistance could now cultivate, could be claimed by another person who could work it at once.

Mr. Bentwich replied that this clause dealt with land not in the possession of anyone.

Mr. Ben Zwi asked for an explanation of the term "offence by trespass," and enquired as to the position with regard to title-deeds of a person who had cultivated

some land. Could the land be taken from him, or would he remain in possession of the land?

Mr. Bentwich replied that trespass was the offence of entering on property to which the person had no right. The penalty was five days' imprisonment and a fine of P.T. 50. The position with regard to land that a person had cultivated without permission would be that he could be turned off it.

At this stage the sitting was adjourned.

PART III (JANUARY 5, 1921).

His Excellency, in calling upon the Director of Agriculture, *Mr. Sawyer*, to read his statement on agriculture, said that it might interest the members to hear from time to time statements from the heads of Departments as to the work which is being done, and if they desired it, he would ask for such statements to be prepared.

After *Mr. Sawyer* had read his statement (which will be published separately for general information), *Suleiman Bey Nassif* expressed his thanks and asked that the Department of Agriculture should issue a weekly or monthly periodical to be published and distributed to all parts of Palestine.

Dr. Salim drew the attention of *Mr. Sawyer* to three points: (1) In Palestine now one saw only bare mountains, whereas in the Lebanon the mountains are covered with trees, which are not only beautiful, but also produce healthy conditions. The present Administration was not to blame for this state of affairs, but the previous régime, which did not take care of forests. The Department of Agriculture should endeavour to effect an amelioration in the state of afforestation. (2) The Department of Agriculture should keep cultivators acquainted with what has been done and what it is intended to do in the future; it should forward them communications in simple, comprehensive language, so that action would result. (3) Was the Director of Agriculture able to reduce taxation on plantation of new trees in order to encourage planting? For example, orange trees pay a good deal in taxes. Cotton has not yet been cultivated. Was it possible in order to encourage the cultivation of these crops to reduce the present taxes, in view of the many experiments required before results are obtained? With regard to tobacco growing, *Dr. Salim* suggested that suitable places in the neighbourhood of Jaffa, Nablus, Jerusalem and Galilee be selected for experimental tobacco cultivation. The villagers could be instructed, and in two or three years good results could be obtained throughout the country.

Mr. Yellin mentioned that under the previous régime, when it was desired to encourage the growth of a particular American vine, this vine was exempted from tithes for five years after bearing fruit. He hoped that this point would be remembered when the subject of tithes was being dealt with. With regard to the distribution of information to villagers, *Mr. Yellin* suggested that suitable articles be reprinted from the local press.

Mr. Berouti considered that the statement as a whole and the instructions it contained to cultivators were very good, but he drew attention to the fact that the operation of tithes was harmful for the development of fruit growing.

A discussion ensued upon the question of tithes, but *his Excellency* said that while the remarks of the members would be taken into consideration, the whole question could not be fully gone into at this juncture.

Mr. Sawyer said he would be glad to adopt *Dr. Salim's* suggestion of experimental stations for tobacco growing. With regard to the publication of a journal by the Department of Agriculture, the cost of printing a paper in three, or even two, languages would be very high. It was thought that a wider publicity would result from sending articles to the general press in Palestine, and it was proposed to obtain reprints, with perhaps simple illustrations, for distribution in the villages. With regard to the question of forests raised by *Dr. Salim*, this matter was receiving attention, and the policy of the Department of Agriculture would be to utilise, for purposes of afforestation, all unsuitable lands for arable cultivation, including sand dunes.

Mr. Barron pointed out that fruit trees did not become titheable until they bore a crop. With regard to cotton, there was but a small area under cultivation, but in view of the importance to Palestine of cotton growing, the Government would

consider the matter carefully before making regulations regarding taxes. At present, however, there was no tithe duty on cotton, and a definite statement could not be made yet about the future. In answer to Mr. Berouti's point that the Turkish Government had imposed a war land tax, Mr. Barron said that in March 1914 the Turkish Government had imposed an addition of 50 per cent. to the land tax. This addition was approved by the Ministry of Finance in Constantinople, but the first collection was not made prior to the outbreak of hostilities in Europe. It cannot therefore be considered as a war tax. In addition to this increase, the Turkish Government in 1917 imposed a 66 per cent. addition to the land tax, but this addition was not maintained or collected by us. Mr. Barron further stated that a proclamation had recently been published exempting American vines from tithe duty for a period of ten years from the date at which they were planted.

Tukan Bey thought that Mr. Sawyer's statement showed a great knowledge and understanding of the agricultural conditions of the country. He wished, however, to draw his attention to the question of the travelling assistants. He did not think the best results were being obtained from those employed. Assistants should be selected from people who had had experience in agricultural matters, so that they could inform and help the cultivators—not merely travel and make reports. Improved methods of agriculture should be made known to the cultivators, and he too considered that in order to encourage the cultivation of new crops a certain freedom from tithes should be granted in these cases.

Colonel Bramley made several suggestions which he thought public or private enterprise might take up, in association with the Government, in the interests of agriculture. One was the establishment of district stud farms, another the holding of exhibitions and agricultural shows, accompanied by horse and motor shows and perhaps horse-racing. All these would bring people together on common ground, and Mr. Sawyer could take advantage of these gatherings to disseminate and popularise the view of his Department in a pleasant manner. A further question was the development of the fishing industry and also the preservation of game in forests.

Mr. Bowman promised that with respect to the dissemination of instructions on agriculture among the villages, the Education Department would collaborate with the Department of Agriculture in issuing simple pamphlets on agricultural subjects suitable for the children in the village schools. In this way, the children in the village schools would rapidly and easily pick up the rudiments of agricultural education.

Mr. Ben Zwi said that mention had been made in the statement of the need of agricultural instruments in Palestine. He wished to emphasise this need. It was most desirable to facilitate the import of agricultural machinery, particularly when purchased by and for co-operation farmer-growers. He also wished to draw attention to the need for drafting proposals with regard to co-operative selling of farm produce, which would certainly bring about a fall in prices. Another point was the introduction of new plantations. It was important, in this connection, to discriminate between settlements of workers who live of their work and investors who wish to make profits. This country is keenly interested in the development of industry, but the population should live on its industry; it was not enough to create a large industrial development if the workers were not paid a living wage. This was especially important in connection with cotton production, which should not be conducted on the system of landlords and capitalism, but that of a colonisation of workers.

Dr. Salim said that though Palestine was a purely agricultural and not a commercial country, in every city there was a Chamber of Commerce, but not a single Chamber of Agriculture, of which there was great need. The Government should consider the establishment of such chambers, which would be useful for the education of cultivators, and the Government could come to an understanding with farmers on many different matters.

His Excellency thought this was a very interesting suggestion, which merits consideration. He himself had for many years been a member of the Central Chamber of Agriculture in England, which had rendered very great service to agriculture, and he would welcome the establishment of a similar organisation in Palestine.

Mr. Sawyer said he would give, at a later date, a considered reply to the various points raised.

Amendments to Town Planning Ordinance.

The legal secretary said that the Town Planning Ordinance had been submitted for consideration to His Majesty's Government in London. A reply had now been received which made it desirable to bring forward some few amendments on the lines suggested by His Majesty's Government. All the amendments are matters of detail and do not affect the general principles which have been adopted.

Amendments to Town Planning Ordinance.

Article 3. "The limits of a town planning area shall be fixed by the Central Town Planning Commission and shall be stated in the order mentioned in Article 2."

Article 17 shall read as follows: "Upon the approval of the scheme by the High Commissioner, notification thereof shall be posted at the Municipality Office if the scheme includes any part of a Municipality district, or, if no part of such district is included, at some public office within the area, and shall be published in the 'Official Gazette.' Copies of the scheme and of the plans as amended shall be deposited and be open for inspection at the office of the local commission, and the notice of such deposit shall likewise be published in the 'Gazette.'

"The scheme shall come into force fifteen days after the publication of such notice in the 'Gazette' unless some other date be fixed in the order of approval."

Article 20. The words "a sum not exceeding 100 of the pre-war value" shall be substituted for the words "a sum equal to 100 per cent." The following provisions shall be added to the article. In assessing compensation, the arbitrators shall have regard to the following provisions:—

- (a.) No allowance shall be made on account of the acquisition being compulsory.
- (b.) No allowance shall be made on account of the adaptability of the land for the purpose for which it is acquired.
- (c.) The arbitrators may order that the costs of any party in the proceedings before the arbitration tribunal shall be paid by the other party or parties.

Article 23. Sub-section (6) to be deleted.

Article 28 shall read:—"Provided that the High Commissioner certifies that such provisions are reasonable, property shall not be deemed to be injuriously affected as a consequence of the scheme on account of any provisions inserted therein which prescribe the space about buildings or limit the number of buildings to be erected or prescribed the height or character of the buildings."

Article 22. The words "and widening" shall be added after "constructing."

The amendments were approved.

Mawat Land Ordinance.

A revised draft, prepared by the legal secretary, was submitted:

"Whereas the Government intends to use for closer settlement all dead and waste lands, and it is therefore necessary to amend the provisions of article 103 of the Ottoman Land Law.

"It is hereby ordered as follows:—

"(a.) The following paragraph shall be substituted for the last paragraph of the said Article 103.

"Any person who without obtaining the consent of the Administration breaks up or cultivates any waste land shall obtain no right to a title-deed for such land, and further will be liable to be prosecuted for trespass.

- "(b.) Any person who has already cultivated such waste land without obtaining authorisation shall notify the Registrar of the Land Registry within one month of the publication of this Ordinance and apply for a title-deed.

"High Commissioner."

It was considered by several members that the period of one month within which application must be made to the Registrar of the Land Registry for title-deeds was inadequate, and it was unanimously decided that the period should be fixed at two months.

The ordinance was then approved.

His Excellency asked whether members were in a position to say anything with regard to the proper rate at which the tobacco duty should be fixed.

Dr. Salim suggested that the question be postponed until the next meeting as it required study and consideration. It was also necessary to get some definite information on the subject.

Suleiman Bey Nassif asked whether members could obtain information from the Administration on the subject.

Mr. Harari stated that in 1919, 89 tons of tobacco had been imported, and in 1920, 300 tons, mostly from Constantinople and other parts of Turkey.

Ismail Bey Hussein proposed that before imposing taxation a proper committee be appointed to enquire into the question, which would submit a report to the Council at its next meeting.

The Council approving the recommendation of *Ismail Bey Hussein* was adopted. *Ismail Bey Hussein*, *Mr. Kalvarisky* and *Suleiman Bey Nassif* were appointed to serve on the committee, in addition to officials of the Administration concerned with the matter.

General Questions.

1. Roadwork in Palestine.

Dr. Salim said that roadwork in Palestine, which could provide a livelihood to many, should be free to all, and asked that tenders for this form of work be invited by press notice. A term of thirty days from the date of such notice, in which to apply, should be given to contractors, and the lowest tender should be accepted, provided that all the technical requirements of the work are satisfied. In this way all Palestinians would have a chance of sharing in the work of road building, which he understood was not the case at present.

Mr. Deedes answered that where the standard of efficiency was the same, he knew of no instance where one set of workmen were paid higher wages than any other. Government Departments employed labour at fixed rates, and all labourers applying for work were treated alike. In various trades the rate varied according to the efficiency of the workmen, and certain categories of workmen were possibly able to command higher wages than others as their standard of work was higher. With regard to contract labour, tenders were always put out to the public. It was possible that some groups were able to compete more favourably than others by reason of employing more modern tools and methods. Employers of labour will invariably prefer to accept a contract where everything is supplied rather than that they should be troubled with the minor details themselves. He would be very pleased if *Dr. Salim* would give him particulars of any cases of differential treatment between workmen.

2. Palestinians and Government Posts.

Dr. Salim asked that all Government posts should be open to Palestinians, who should be given a preference over non-Palestinians.

Mr. Deedes said that the Government entirely associated itself with this view, as was evidenced by the figures given by his Excellency at the first meeting of the Council. It was indeed a very important question, which was constantly under the consideration of the High Commissioner and himself, and no inducement whatever was required by the Government to make use of the services of Palestinians wherever possible—given a certain standard of efficiency, for it was the first to benefit by the employment of people who had a knowledge of local conditions and peoples.

3. Law of Evidence.

Dr. Salim raised the question of giving greater latitude to judges to accept hearsay or similar evidence. At present it often happened that a criminal escaped punishment because such evidence was not allowed.

Mr. Bentwich replied that the wisdom of generations had worked out the law of evidence, and the rule against hearsay evidence existed both in the English law and the Mejlle. It was an imperfection of the administration of justice in every country that a certain number of criminals were acquitted because of the lack of evidence. The remedy, however, was not to endanger the liberties of innocent men by allowing any kind of evidence to be accepted, but to improve the methods and the capacity of the police. Judges were permitted to accept circumstantial evidence, but could not accept hearsay evidence.

4. Police Wage.

Mr. Kalvarisky, while admitting that public security had very much improved under the new régime, complained that the police were not receiving an adequate wage. Underpayment was not conducive to the high moral standard necessary in that force. He suggested for unmarried policemen a monthly wage of from 9*l.* to 10*l.*, and for married policemen 11*l.* to 12*l.* Such an addition would be a burden on the community, but the matter was so important that no sacrifice was too great to be taken.

Mr. Deedes agreed that the rates of pay were low in relation to what had been the cost of living. There were two ways of increasing them, one by reducing the total number of police, and the other by an increase in taxation. The addition suggested by *Mr. Kalvarisky* would require about 60,000*l.* per annum. It was out of the question to raise this sum by taxation at the present time. He looked rather to the improvement in the living conditions of the police and the general fall in prices which was confidently expected to compensate the men. The police were, at any rate, paid regularly now, which was not the case under the Turkish régime.

5. Mortgages on Properties.

Ismail Bey Hussein asked for greater freedom with respect to transactions of mortgages on properties, particularly of properties that were mortgaged previously on definite sale, and dwelt on the latitude given to such transactions under the Turkish régime.

Mr. Bentwich replied that most of the points raised by *Ismail Bey Hussein* were covered by the Ordinance which had been published about two months ago.

6. Land and Property in Cities.

Ismail Bey Hussein asked that the sale and purchase of land and properties in the cities be permitted, as the prohibition was detrimental to the Government and the inhabitants.

Mr. Bentwich stated that the sales of land in cities was permitted, but it was necessary to check speculation in urban land as well as in agricultural land. No difficulty was put in the way of purchasing any area of land in the city, provided the buyer proved intention to build or develop the land at once: it would be against the interests of the people to allow the purchase of large areas of urban land which would then remain undeveloped.

7. Need of a Credit Bank.

Ismail Bey Hussein emphasized the need for the establishment of a credit bank in the country, which should not draw its capital from capitalists.

His Excellency said that the Government regarded the matter of land credit banks for agricultural and other purposes as of the highest importance, but the present economic condition throughout the world rendered it difficult to obtain money for such banks. Bankers and other financiers were seeking rather to contract their credits than enlarge them, and so far, therefore, it had been difficult to establish a land credit bank in Palestine.

With respect to the sources of revenue which *Ismail Bey* suggested, it should be remembered that Palestine under the Peace Treaty would have to pay a large sum every year in respect of the interest and sinking fund of the National Debt of Turkey

before the war. Part of the guarantee for that interest and sinking fund was the 3 per cent. on customs duties mentioned, and that 3 per cent. could not in consequence be devoted to the formation of a bank. With respect to the 50 per cent. Torko this would only yield about 12,000*l.* a year. There was an additional $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on the tithes which was imposed by the Turkish Government for the purpose of the land banks, and which now brought in about 15,000*l.* a year. There was also available the loans issued by the Ottoman Agricultural Bank in Palestine, which the present Government had now taken over. As these loans fell due, this Government would collect them and devote to the purposes for which they were intended—namely, the furtherance of agriculture. In the meantime, until the bank could be founded, the Government was making loans at the rate of $6\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., which was less than any banking firm would consent to accept, directly to agriculturists. Up to the present these loans amounted to no less than 300,000*l.*, so that the Government was already lending as much as the yield of the $\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. on tithes during twenty years and, indeed, he believed, much more than the Ottoman Agricultural Bank ever lent. He would continue his efforts to arrange the formation of a bank for making loans both to agriculturists and others, and in the meantime this process of direct loans by the Government would continue.

8. Registration of Properties in English Language.

Ismail Bey Hussein commented upon the disadvantages and difficulties of the registration of properties in English in the Land Registry.

Mr. Bentwich replied that the language of the Land Registry Department had hitherto been Turkish. English had been adopted in the reformed registries because one language must be used and English is the most convenient of the three official languages for record. The title-deeds are drawn up in the language desired by the parties, and a translation of the Kushan in Arabic or Hebrew, according to the mother tongue of the person to whom issued, is inserted free of cost.

Where official translations of documents issued out of the Land Registry Office are required they may be furnished in Arabic or Hebrew on payment.

9. Labour Gangs outside Prisons.

Ismail Bey Hussein objected to the employment of prisoners in labour gangs outside the prisons on the ground that this sort of treatment only produced hardened criminals. The prisons should endeavour to educate the prisoners to a realization of the error of their ways.

Mr. Deedes said that he could claim to have some experience with Turkish prisoners, and on the whole he thought everyone would agree that the present condition of prisoners here was far better than it used to be. With regard to their employment outside the prison, in the old Turkish days prisons were inhabited by large populations supported by the State in comparative comfort and idleness. He thought it only right that they should be employed, and so in some small measure make a return for the conditions under which they are permitted to live.

10. Standardised Weights and Measures.

Suleiman Bey Nassif urged the adoption of a standard system of weights and measures, preferably metric, in Palestine. Many different standards existed at present, and they varied confusedly from district to district. He suggested the appointment of a commission to enquire into this subject.

His Excellency said that the Government had anticipated *Suleiman Bey Nassif* in this respect, and a commission had already enquired into the matter and had made certain recommendations based on the metric system. Before taking action on that report, he would like to know how far the introduction of so radical a change would meet with popular approval. When a new Government was established in a country, it was perhaps a mistake to make many new changes at once. People became quite certain that the present confusion of weights and measures in different parts of the country caused much inconvenience. The members might give the question due consideration and it would be discussed at a future meeting.

Mr. Yellin was opinion that the change could be made without creating dissatisfaction. He instanced the introduction of Egyptian currency all over the country, which displaced many currencies, yet had been accepted uncomplainingly by the entire population.

11. Cotton.

Suleiman Bey Nassif raised the question of the promotion and cultivation of cotton in Palestine. He was satisfied with the promise on the part of *Mr. Sawyer* as to the establishment of special conditions for the encouragement of cotton cultivation, but he suggested exemption of cotton crops from tithes.

His Excellency said that at present cotton was exempt from tithes, and the Government was considering what steps should be taken in the future. *Suleiman Bey Nassif's* observations would be borne in mind.

Mr. Sawyer made the following statement:—

"We have satisfactory evidence that good cotton can be grown in Palestine both as an irrigated and dry-land crop. Samples from last season's experiments were forwarded both to the British Cotton Growing Association and the Fine Cotton Spinners' Association, who reported favourably on the Sakoleridis, and less favourably on the Afifi types. American varieties may prove relatively satisfactory for dry-land cultivation. A power ginnery has been re-equipped at Haifa, and could cope with a considerable expansion of the present areas.

"Three principal obstacles to extended cultivation are found in the cotton boll-worm, the scarcity of skilled labour and the present low prices for lint. The worm seriously affected both yields and quality last year, and concerted and sustained action by all growers will be necessary to its control. A circular explaining approved methods for destroying the pest was sent to all growers, who are asked to co-operate and assist the Department's efforts. An application for skilled Egyptian labour was received too late in the season to permit of completion of the formalities required by the Egyptian Government. It is hoped that earlier action will be rendered possible this year.

"The market for cotton has always been subject to extraordinary and unforeseen fluctuations. The wise man plants cotton when prices are at their lowest, for reaction from a temporary slump is inevitable, in view of a world shortage of cotton.

"A petition from cotton growers asking that the cotton crop may be exempt from taxation for a number of years is receiving the careful consideration of the Government."

Mr. Sawyer further stated that he would call a meeting of cotton cultivators at Haifa at an early date to discuss the more technical aspects of the question, and, if possible, he would arrange for it to coincide with the inauguration of a Chamber of Agriculture.

Dr. Salim said that he had been requested to raise the question of the necessity of establishing a station at Alifta, a village between Massudieh and Tulkeram.

His Excellency said it would have been better to have had notice of the question, but he would communicate with the general manager of railways.

The meeting then adjourned.

The next meeting was fixed to take place on Wednesday, the 9th, and Thursday, the 10th February, 1921.

[E 1588/40/88]

No. 102.

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 32.)

My Lord,

Jerusalem, January 30, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your Lordship's despatch No. 490 of the 24th December, and to inform you that the abolition of the Régie monopoly was duly announced at the last meeting of the Advisory Council. It met with the unanimous approval of the non-official members, and has been warmly welcomed throughout the country. The political effect of this measure is likely to be considerable.

2. With reference to the question of the validity of the Régie concession of 1913, I would point out that the Palestine Administration has an interest in this matter distinct from that of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, the Turkish Government and the Financial Commission under the Turkish Treaty—the bodies

mentioned in paragraphs 2 and 3 in the despatch under reply. If the concession should prove to be invalid, this Government will gain through being exempted from the necessity to pay compensation; while those authorities may not have any reason to raise the question, since the existence of the Régie brings them revenue. It would appear therefore that only when the Régie is able to show that it does in fact possess an asset for which it is entitled to be compensated should the Government of Palestine consent to meet its claim. This point has been strongly pressed by a member of the Advisory Council who claims to speak with special knowledge. His view is supported by an ex-member of the Turkish Parliament who took part in the discussions on this matter. Should compensation be paid without the right to it being clearly established there would probably be considerable local criticism.

3. As regards paragraph 6 of your Lordship's despatch under reply, it is not desired to limit the growth of tobacco purely to local requirements, but rather to develop in Palestine a tobacco industry for export as well as for local consumption.

I am informed by experts that some regions in Palestine are particularly suited for the growth of fine tobacco, and one of them has already cabled for the necessary seed, and has ordered machinery which when erected will give occupation to over 100 persons.

It may well be that this country will be able to add largely to its wealth and revenue from the cultivation and manufacture of tobacco.

Every practicable step will be taken to stop at the source any attempted smuggling of Palestine-grown tobacco into neighbouring countries.

I have appointed a committee of official and non-official members of the Advisory Council to consider what rates of taxation shall be levied on production and on import. It is hoped that the committee will be in a position to render a report for the consideration of the Advisory Council at its next meeting on the 9th February.

I transmit herewith a copy of the Financial Secretary's letter to the Société de la Régie and a copy of their reply.

I have, &c.
(For High Commissioner),
E. KEITH ROACH.

Enclosure in No. 102.

Financial Secretary, High Commission, to Société de la Régie

Sir,

Jerusalem, January 3, 1921.

I AM directed by his Excellency the High Commissioner to inform you that, after careful consideration of the circumstances, the Palestine Government in the interests of the people of the country has resolved to suspend immediately the operation in Palestine of the monopoly of tobacco granted by the Ottoman Government to the Régie cointéressée des Tabacs, as set out in the convention dated the 4th August, 1913, and the provisional law dated the 15th August, 1914.

The public notice dated the 11th June, 1918, in which the Chief Administrator of O.E.T.A. in Palestine recognised the principle of the monopoly, announced that the convention and the provisional law above mentioned were reinstated for the time being and should be deemed to be in force until further notice. The Palestine Government is convinced that the maintenance of the monopoly would be contrary to the public interest; and it therefore proposes to announce immediately that the cultivation of tobacco may henceforth be freely practised in Palestine without licence.

Further, it proposes to replace the present customs duty and surtax on imported tobacco and cigarettes by a fresh tariff, to come into operation from the 1st March, 1921. Special arrangements will be made with the Régie in regard to their present stock of tobacco in Palestine, and to consignments already ordered, and the Régie will be entitled to carry on the business of manufacturing cigarettes.

The Government of Palestine is prepared to recognise a claim, if any, which can be established by the Régie under the terms of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey on account of the revocation of the concession; but at the same time it reserves to itself the right of contesting the authority of the Provisional Law of 1914 on the ground that it was never adopted by the Ottoman Parliament, and is expressed to be subject to that adoption.

I have, &c.
H. A. SMALLWOOD, *Financial Secretary.*

Enclosure 2 in No. 102.

Société de la Régie to Financial Secretary, High Commission.

Jerusalem, le 4 janvier 1921.

Monsieur,

NOUS avons reçu en date de ce jour votre honorée lettre du 3 janvier courant concernant le fonctionnement du monopole et la culture de tabacs en Palestine.

Nous en avons transmis une copie à nos chefs, et nous nous faisons le devoir de venir par la présente lettre réserver à notre administration le droit de faire valoir ses prérogatives et ses privilèges et de faire ses réclamations ultérieures pour tout dommage et pour toute perte qui lui seront causés par les mesures mentionnées dans votre susdite estimée lettre.

Nous avons l'honneur, &c.

Régie cointéressée des Tabacs,
Merkez Mudiriet de Jérusalem,
Le Merkez Mudir.

[E 1596/144/88]

No. 103.

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 45.)

My Lord,

Jerusalem, January 25, 1921.

IN accordance with instructions contained in your telegram No. 248, dated the 16th November, 1920, I have the honour to submit the following report on the number of Jewish immigrants that have entered Palestine during the month of December:—

(a.) Total immigration of Jews to Palestine	...	1,442
(b.) Number arriving with sanction of Zionist Commission	...	1,135
(c.) Number arriving without sanction of Zionist Commission	...	307
(d.) Number endeavouring to enter without passport	...	17

In the case of (d) permission to enter Palestine was refused in each case.

I have, &c.

HERBERT SAMUEL, *High Commissioner.*

[E 1577/36/88]

No. 104.

Earl Curzon to Sir H. Samuel (Jerusalem).

(No. 66.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, February 7, 1921.

YOUR despatch No. 18 of 16th January: Ordinance regarding benches of local magistrates.

Position of foreigners in relation to these courts does not appear to have been considered. It may not prove necessary to give them any special privileges as regards such minor courts, but, if so, some more extended privileges of appeal than that laid down in section 6 will probably be necessary. Please telegraph your views.

In any case question of this Ordinance raises whole question of permanent system of courts in Palestine in relation to foreigners as well as natives, and it would seem best to defer issue, pending entry into force of mandate and treaty.

[E 1577/36/88]

No. 105.

Foreign Office to Colonial Office.

Sir,

Foreign Office, February 8, 1921.

WITH reference to the letter from this Department of the 31st January, I am directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to transmit the accompanying copy of correspondence with His Majesty's High Commissioner for Palestine regarding a proposed ordinance dealing with the constitution and functions of benches of local magistrates.*

* See Nos. 100 and 104.

2. Lord Curzon would be glad to be furnished with the views of your Department on the ordinance proposed by Sir H. Samuel in the light of experience gained in British colonies from similar local judicial bodies, on the supposition that the precedents for such bodies exist in colonial practice.

I am, &c.
D. G. OSBORNE.

[E 1962/37/88]

No. 106.

*French Delegate to Sir E. Drummond.—(Communicated to Foreign Office,
February 14, 1921.)*

*League of Nations Assembly,
Geneva, December 1, 1920.*

Sir,

IN accordance with instructions from my Government, I have the honour to communicate to you the enclosed text of the mandate which the French Republic has accepted for Syria and Lebanon, and I beg you to deposit it with the Bureau of the Council of the League of Nations.

In conformity with the spirit of article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, the Government of the French Republic has prepared this text after an exchange of views and in complete agreement with His Britannic Majesty's Government. The French Government ventures to hope that the Council, after examining this mandate, will consider it to be drawn up in conformity with the principles laid down in article 22 of the Covenant, and will give it its approval.

I would add that, in the interests of the populations of Syria and Lebanon themselves, and with a view to ensuring to them as soon as possible the benefits of a government based on the terms of the Covenant, the Government of the Republic ventures to call the attention of the Council to the advantage of putting an end to the present temporary régime.

I have, &c.
JEAN GOUT.

Enclosure in No. 106.

Draft Resolution approving the Terms of the Mandate for Syria and Lebanon.

THE Council of the League of Nations,

Whereas, by article 132 of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, signed at Sèvres on the 10th August, 1920, Turkey renounced in favour of the principal Allied Powers all rights and title over the territories of the former Ottoman Empire situated to the south of the southern frontier of Turkey as fixed in this treaty;

And whereas, by article 94 of the said treaty, the high contracting parties agreed that part of the above-mentioned territories known as Syria should, in accordance with the terms of article 22, paragraph 4, of the Covenant of the League of Nations, be constituted an independent State, subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance of a mandatory Power, until such time as it is able to stand alone;

And whereas the principal Allied Powers have decided that the mandate for these territories comprising Syria and Lebanon should be conferred on the Government of the French Republic, which has accepted it;

And whereas the terms of this mandate, which are also defined in the articles below, have been accepted by the Government of the French Republic;

And whereas the Government of the French Republic has undertaken to exercise this mandate on behalf of the League of Nations, in conformity with the following provisions:

Hereby approves the terms of the mandate for Syria and Lebanon as follows:—

ARTICLE 1.

The mandatory will frame, within a period of three years from the coming into force of this mandate, an organic law for Syria and Lebanon. This organic law shall be framed in agreement with the native authorities and shall take into account the rights, interests and wishes of all the population inhabiting the mandated territory. The mandatory shall further enact measures to facilitate the progressive development

of Syria and Lebanon as independent States. Pending the coming into effect of the organic law, the government of Syria and Lebanon shall be conducted in accordance with the spirit of this mandate.

The mandatory Power shall, so far as circumstances permit, encourage local autonomy.

ARTICLE 2.

The mandatory may maintain his troops in the mandated territories for the defence of the territory. He shall further be empowered, until the entry into force of the organic law and the re-establishment of public security, he may organise such local militia as may be necessary for the defence of the territory, and employ this militia for defence and also for the maintenance of order. These local forces may only be recruited from the inhabitants of the territories under the mandate.

The said militia shall thereafter be under local authorities, subject to the control which the mandatory shall retain over these forces.

The mandatory shall prevent the employment of the militia for other purposes than those mentioned above. Nothing shall preclude Syria and Lebanon from contributing to the cost of the maintenance of the forces of the mandatory stationed in their territory.

The mandatory shall at all times possess the right to make use of the ports, railways and means of communication of Syria and Lebanon for the passage of its troops and of all materials, supplies and munitions.

ARTICLE 3.

The mandatory shall be entrusted with the exclusive control of the foreign relations of Syria and Lebanon and with the right to issue exequaturs to the consuls appointed by foreign Powers, nationals of Syria and Lebanon, living outside the limits of these territories, shall be under the diplomatic and consular protection of the mandatory.

ARTICLE 4.

The mandatory shall be responsible for seeing that no part of the territory of Syria or Lebanon shall be ceded or leased or in any way placed under the control of a foreign Power.

ARTICLE 5.

The privileges and immunities of foreigners, including the benefits of consular jurisdiction and protection as formerly enjoyed by Capitulation or usage in the Ottoman Empire, are definitely abrogated in Syria and Lebanon.

At the same time, foreign consular tribunals shall continue to perform their duties until the coming into force of the new legal organisation provided for in article 6.

ARTICLE 6.

The mandatory shall establish in Syria and Lebanon a legal system which shall assure to natives, as well as to foreigners, a complete guarantee of their rights.

Respect for the personal status of the various peoples and for their religious interests shall be fully guaranteed. In particular, the mandatory shall exercise the administration of the Wakfs in complete accordance with religious law and the dispositions of the founders.

ARTICLE 7.

Pending the making of special extradition agreements, the extradition treaties at present in force between foreign Powers and the mandatory shall apply within the territories of Syria and Lebanon.

ARTICLE 8.

The mandatory will ensure to all complete freedom of conscience and the free exercise of all forms of worship, subject only to the maintenance of public order and morals. It will be the duty of the mandatory to see that the extradition treaties in force between foreign Powers and the mandatory are observed in the territories of Syria and Lebanon. No discrimination of any kind shall be made between the inhabitants of Syria and Lebanon on the ground of differences in race, religion or language.

The mandatory shall encourage public instruction which shall be given through the medium of the native languages in use in the territories of Syria and Lebanon.

[6668]

2 C

The right of each community to maintain its own schools for the instruction and education of its own members in its own language (while conforming to such educational requirements of a general nature as the Administration may impose) shall not be denied or impaired.

ARTICLE 9.

The mandatory shall refrain from all interference in the administration of "conseils de fabrique" or in the management of religious communities and sacred shrines belonging to the various religions, the immunity of which has been expressly guaranteed.

ARTICLE 10.

The supervision exercised by the mandatory over the religious missions in Syria and Lebanon shall be limited to the maintenance of public order and good government; the activities of these religious missions shall in no way be restricted, nor shall their members be subjected to any restrictive measures on the ground of nationality, provided that their activities are confined to the domain of religion.

ARTICLE 11.

The mandatory must see that there is no discrimination in Syria or Lebanon against the nationals (including societies and associations) of any State member of the League of Nations, as compared with its own nationals (including societies and associations) or with the nationals of any other foreign State, in matters concerning taxation or commerce, the exercise of professions or industries, and of navigation; or in the treatment of ships or aircraft. Similarly there shall be no discrimination in Syria or Lebanon against goods originating in or destined for any of the said States, and there shall be freedom of transit, under equitable conditions, across the mandated territory.

Subject as aforesaid, the mandatory may impose or cause to be imposed by the local authorities such taxes and customs duties as it may consider necessary. Under the same conditions it may take, or cause to be taken, such steps as it may think best to assure the development of the natural resources of the mandated territory and to safeguard the interests of the local population.

Nothing in this article shall prevent the mandatory, or the local authority acting under its orders, from concluding, on grounds of contiguity, any special customs arrangement with an adjoining country.

ARTICLE 12.

The mandatory shall adhere on behalf of Syria and Lebanon to any general international agreements as already existing or that may be concluded hereafter with the approval of the League of Nations, especially in respect of the following: slave traffic, the traffic in drugs, traffic in arms and munitions, commercial equality, freedom of transit and navigation, aerial navigation, railways, postal telegraphic and wireless communications, and measures for the protection of literature, art and industries.

ARTICLE 13.

The mandatory shall secure the adhesion of Syria and Lebanon so far as social, religious and other conditions permit, to such measures of common utility as may be adopted by the League of Nations for preventing or combating disease, including animal or plant diseases.

ARTICLE 14.

The mandatory will draw up and put into force in the year following the coming into force of this mandate a law of antiquities, based on the contents of article 421 of the Treaty of Peace concluded between the Allied Powers and Turkey. This law shall assure equal treatment in the matter of excavations and archaeological research to all States members of the League of Nations.

ARTICLE 15.

Upon the coming into force of the organic law referred to in article 1 an arrangement shall be made between the mandatory and the local authorities on the subject of its reimbursement by the latter for all expenses incurred by the mandatory in

organising the administration, developing local resources, and carrying out permanent public works, the benefit of which the country would retain. Such arrangement shall be communicated to the Council of the League of Nations.

ARTICLE 16.

Arabic and French shall be the official languages of Syria and Lebanon.

ARTICLE 17.

The mandatory shall make to the Council of the League of Nations an annual report as to the measures taken during the year to carry out the provisions of this mandate.

Copies of all laws and regulations promulgated during the year shall be communicated in the report.

ARTICLE 18.

The consent of the Council of the League of Nations is required for any modification of the terms of the present mandate. In case of any modification proposed by the mandatory, such consent may be given by a majority of the Council of the League.

ARTICLE 19.

If any dispute whatever should arise between the members of the League of Nations relating to the interpretation or the application of the provisions of this mandate, this dispute shall be submitted to the Permanent Court of International Justice provided for by article 14 of the Covenant of the League of Nations.

Made at Geneva, on _____, in one original, which shall be deposited in the archives of the Secretariat-General of the League of Nations. Certified copies shall be forwarded by the Secretary-General of the League of Nations to all Powers signatory to the Treaty of Peace with Turkey.

[E 1922/35/88]

No. 107.

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 14.)

(No. 53.)

My Lord,

Jerusalem, February 1, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the political portion of the monthly report for the month of January.

The administrative portion will be forwarded to your Lordship by the next bag.

I have, &c.

(For High Commissioner),

W. H. DEEDES.

Enclosure in No. 107.

Political Report for the month of January 1921.

AMONG the enclosures which accompanied my last report was a copy of a letter dated the 18th December, 1920, received from Musa Kasim Pasha el-Husseini, President of the recent Haifa Conference, and also a copy of the reply dated the 21st December, sent by me.

The promoters of the Conference at Haifa held in December thereupon felt called upon to vindicate its representative character, and shortly afterwards the Government received several telegrams signed by various groups in different parts of Palestine affirming the representative character of the Congress.

On the 8th January a public meeting was held at Nablus. The rain fell heavily. From 2,500 to 3,500 people were present. These included very few peasants. No disturbance took place but, as a precautionary measure, two troops of the 8th Cavalry were standing by in their barracks with their horses saddled. The object of the meeting was to emphasise the leader's contention that this town's delegates at the Haifa Conference represented the people of Nablus. The meeting lasted about 15 minutes.

[6668]

2 C 2

After an interview between the Governor and one of the chief notables of the town, the latter informed the crowd that the Governor had promised to submit their case to the High Commissioner and requested them to return quietly to their homes.

At Gaza the Governor was asked to sanction a similar demonstration. The suggestion was not encouraged and no meetings took place. In Jerusalem leaflets were circulated declaring that the Haifa Congress was representative of the Arabs in Palestine.

These events not unnaturally gave rise to a number of rumours, particularly in Jerusalem, and the fears and anxieties of the nervous or excitable in the different sections of the community were aroused.

Towards the middle of the month (January) steps were taken with a view to allaying apprehensions. A luncheon party, given by a leading member of the Moslem community, was the occasion of a short and friendly conversation between the High Commissioner and Musa Kasim Pasha. During this conversation it was arranged that the Pasha and five of his friends should come to Government House on the following Sunday (16th) and should there discuss with the High Commissioner the questions about which their minds were exercised. It was stipulated that they should be received in a private capacity, and that no communication should be made to the press.

The meeting took place as arranged. Musa Kasim Pasha, on behalf of his friends, mentioned the fears of the community in regard to Mr. Balfour's statement and Jewish immigration. He also raised the question of representative government. The High Commissioner in the course of his reply stated that it was not within his competence to discuss the policy laid down by His Majesty's Government; that it was his duty to carry out the Balfour declaration as a whole, giving no less importance to the second part of the declaration than to the first; and that the question of the election of municipalities was already receiving his close attention. In the discussion which followed, one of the speakers pressed for an elected assembly as even more important than elected municipalities. The High Commissioner gave reasons for considering that the present time was not a favourable one for launching the country into a general election. But he added that he was prepared to recognise any body of gentlemen representing any important section of the community, in the same manner as he had already given recognition to the Jewish National Assembly and under the same conditions. He pointed out that in recognising that assembly he had made it a condition that no resolutions should be adopted or submitted that were contrary to the conditions of the mandate.

Musa Kasim Pasha and his friends stated that they were grateful for this offer, and the High Commissioner proposed that he should embody it in a letter.

The High Commissioner took the opportunity of emphasising not only the paramount need of public order but also the determination of the Government to maintain it, and he referred to the responsibility in this regard which necessarily falls upon prominent members of all communities.

Although it has not been possible hitherto to come to an agreement with Musa Kasim Pasha and his friends as to the exact terms in which the letter above mentioned should be couched, it is hoped and believed that the discussion has been beneficial.

The attitude of the people of Nablus continues to be unsympathetic towards the Jews.

In Haifa the class and the arrival of Jewish immigrants is still the chief text of anti-Zionist propagandists.

The bulk of the population has been quiet. The rains promise to be sufficient. The people on the whole show as yet no inclination to devote their time or energy to giving any active backing to the political agitators of the Effendi or property-owning class.

On the 14th, Dr. Weigmann and Sir Alfred Mond arrived in Jerusalem, and on Sunday, the 16th, a meeting took place to welcome them at the Zionist Committee assembly rooms. A reception was held also on the 17th at the Vaad Hayir, Jewish City Council. Sir Alfred Mond, in his address, emphasised his belief that there is room in Palestine, not only for a Jewish national home, but also for a flourishing Arab community. For the 25th, the National Jewish Council has called a special meeting in honour of Sir Alfred Mond and Dr. Weigmann.

The commission appointed to enquire into the affairs of the Orthodox Patriarchate has begun its sittings, and good progress has already been made, largely owing to the complete enquiries previously made by Sir Anton Bertram.

A preliminary meeting was held on the 18th. At this meeting the Rev. Archimandrite Timotheus Thamelis intimated that his official position as chief secretary to

the Orthodox Patriarchate rendered it difficult for him to sit as an assessor with the commission. He was, however, fully prepared to supply all evidence in his power if called as a witness. The president of the Court considered that the Archimandrite would be a freer agent if appearing only in such a capacity, and it was accordingly agreed that he should withdraw from the position of assessor.

As the Metropolitans and those with them had not found it possible to nominate an assessor, it is felt that a conceivable ground for a charge against the commission of partisanship will be thus removed.

Mr. Mackareth, His Majesty's vice-consul at Beyrouth, and the British military liaison officers at Beyrouth and Damascus respectively, paid a visit on the 23rd instant to Jerusalem and had conversations with his Excellency the High Commissioner, with the object of discussing various questions and of establishing close touch with our officers.

It is satisfactory to be able to report that British police and junior administrative officers stationed along the northern frontier of Palestine have established cordial relations with French officers on the other side of the frontier.

Transjordania.—Some account of the conditions in Transjordan may properly be added here, because the administrative, economic and financial state of the country must always be of great importance to Palestine. Public security continues to be good in the main, although the Beni Sakhr tribe and their more important chief, Mithgal, are inclined to respect the authority of Shereef Ali Ibn Hussein (who is still at Amman) rather than that of the local Government at Salt. Mithgal even went so far recently as to detain Kaïmakam Peake, who was on a visit to him, with the object of settling a land dispute between him and a neighbour. Kaïmakam Peake was, however, released on the intervention of other sheikhs and of Shereef Ali Ibn Hussein. Amir Abdullah, in a letter to Shereef Ali, blamed him for the incident. He also summoned Mithgal to Haan. Mithgal, since his visit, is generally regarded to be in disgrace. Kaïmakam Peake reports having seen a petition to be presented to Ali Ibn Hussein, signed by the Amman notables, and asking Ali to separate Amman from Salt.

The new Council of the Belka met on the 20th, after the return from Jerusalem of the Mutessarif, Mazhar Bey. The latter, accompanied by some of the members of the Council, has since gone to Ajloun to consult the authorities of that district on the question of joining the Mutessariflik of the Belka. In the Ajloun district the country is still divided into three kazas, while the agitation against the suppression of the fourth kaza (that of Mezar) still continues. Tax collecting in the Ajloun district is slow and returns are small. Hence, though all is quiet outwardly, no real progress can be recorded.

In the Kerak area conditions are less satisfactory. Although some success has been achieved in the collection of taxes, more than £ E. 40,000 are still overdue for this year and for past years. The Government is barely able to maintain itself. Rafeifan Pasha is now on a visit from Kerak to Jerusalem. He confesses his inability under present circumstances adequately to maintain law and order, even to the extent of ensuring the continuance of open communications between Jerusalem and Kerak. Rafeifan's position is admittedly difficult. He is doubtful as to the turn events may take, as there are many pro-Shereefian sympathisers in his district.

At the same time, the reserve force continues in Kerak, as elsewhere, to afford, albeit to a limited degree, some moral support to the local Government, though not sufficient, as in the Belka, to enable the collection of revenue to the extent needed to support functionaries.

In conclusion, it may be said of Transjordan that no Government can be expected to assert its authority, much less to introduce reforms, so long as the country remains a prey to the agitation of political adventurers, and so long as the more important people remain in doubt as to the Power towards which they must ultimately look for support. These people not unnaturally attempt to shape their conduct in such a manner as to avoid the personal mishaps which might occur in the future to those who showed in too marked a manner the direction of their sympathies.

The political situation in Transjordan cannot, as already observed, but affect Palestine, and while there is at present no dangerous collaboration between the agitators across the Jordan and the malcontents on this side, yet the possibility of common cause being made cannot altogether be dismissed from the mind.

The danger that would arise from any such combination requires no emphasis.

[E 2131/35/88]

No. 108.

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 66.)

My Lord,

Jerusalem, February 4, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith the January monthly administrative report.

I have, &c.
(For High Commissioner)
E. KEITH-ROACH.

Enclosure in No. 108.

Palestine Administrative Report for the month of January 1921.

Agriculture.

General.

THE rainfall has been most favourable in all districts—with the exception of Galilee, where there is a shortage—and, on the whole, splendid harvests may be expected.

Barley, lentils, kersanneh, vegetables and other earlier crops are doing well, and wheat also shows every progress. No crop diseases of great importance have been reported, and the lemon-tree disease previously reported from Jericho has now disappeared. The arrival of sulphuric acid for the orange-tree fumigation is still awaited, and until its arrival no progress can be reported on in fumigation methods.

General satisfaction is expressed from all districts at the abolition of the tobacco monopoly. Many demands for tobacco seeds have been received. Experimental work in tobacco growing will be undertaken. Meetings have been held in various towns with a view to establishing the industry on a large scale.

The orange export trade is satisfactory, and good profits were made out of the first shipment to Liverpool.

Veterinary.

The following contagious diseases cases have been reported in the course of the month: Anthrax, 2; epizootic lymphangitis, 2; mange, 2; and sheep pox, 2.

There is a proposal to establish a stock-breeding society at Gaza, which is being considered by the chief veterinary officer.

Forestry.

The Forest Demarcation Commissions are now at work, but difficulties are experienced in determining boundaries.

Fishery.

The preparatory work of this section is being carried out. The standardisation of units is being considered, fishing logs and daily market reports are analysed and recorded, and the Departmental fishery biologist has enquired into and reported on the fishing industry of the Sea of Tiberias, with a view to its improvement.

Antiquities.

General.

The Director of Antiquities, now in England, hopes to arrange a meeting between the British and French Consultative Committees, with a view to reaching closer agreement on the subject of the antiquities services of Palestine and Syria.

Jerusalem.

The work of restoration on the Damascus Gate, one of the principal entrances to the old city, which has been financed by the Pro-Jerusalem Society, has now been completed. The stone pinnacles which were missing have been replaced. The restoration of the Roman masonry in the citadel walls is nearing completion.

Civics—Jerusalem.

Plans for the creation of the Dabbet Er Rish Park have been approved. The site contains a number of old Jewish and Græco-Roman tombs, which will be cleared of rubbish and planted round with trees, and the roads linked up to the places of interest.

A Street-naming Committee has definitely fixed twelve names to Jerusalem streets in the three languages. A commission is being formed to investigate and report on the dangerous condition of some of the old houses and streets of Jerusalem.

Commerce and Industry.

The commercial situation is still difficult, but there are signs of a gradual, if slow, improvement. Retail prices are moving in sympathy with the fall in world wholesale prices, although local markets are very small, and it is often possible for merchants on the spot to "squeeze" consumers through lack of competition.

Banks continue to charge 9 per cent. and commissions amounting to some 3 per cent. per annum on advances, and are most sparing in their credits.

The prohibition of the export of gold was rescinded on the 1st January, without producing any apparent effect on the economic situation of the country.

The export of barley under licence was permitted as from the 10th January, but so far little has left the country.

The unrestricted export of durra (millet) was permitted from the 29th January.

Prices for local produce are still comparatively high; prices for imported commodities have fallen.

A system has been instituted whereby the Palestine railways sell coal under certain conditions to the public at cost price plus expenses. The price of fuel wood, which rose to over £ E. 8 a ton at the beginning of the month, has now dropped to £ E. 7 in Jerusalem.

The Jerusalem Chamber of Commerce held their third half-yearly meeting on the 20th January. The Chamber has done excellent work, and is in a sound financial position.

Special rates have been granted by the railways for the transport of cereals. Endeavours are being made to promote a regular motor-lorry service between Nazareth and Afuleh.

The mother-of-pearl trade at Bethlehem is paralysed owing to the high rate of wages and of exchange, and the lack of tourists. Many orders have been declined.

The Hassolel Publishing Company, the proprietors of several newspapers in Palestine, have imported printing machinery, and hope to set up in due course a modern printing establishment.

Customs.

The value of imports for the month of December is £ E. 559,384, an increase of £ E. 181,156 over the corresponding month of 1919.

The value of exports is £ E. 67,795, which also shows an increase of £ E. 2,257 over the corresponding month of 1919.

The Palestine customs-house at Kantara East Station was removed from Egyptian territory to Ludd on the 10th January, inspection of passengers' baggage being conducted on the trains *en route*.

Agricultural Loans.

The sum of £ E. 21,120 has been disbursed in agricultural loans during January, making a total of £ E. 319,720 to date.

Currency.

Under the authority of public notice No. 73 A, dated the 12th December, 1918, the Field-Marshal Commander-in-chief of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force declared as legal tender the currencies then in general use by the Allied troops and the public. Certain currencies—i.e., French, Italian and Turkish—have steadily depreciated in value, and it has become impossible to insist on their acceptance at their legal value as expressed in the public notice. Furthermore, the Government lays itself open to serious financial loss should speculators introduce this depreciated currency into Palestine.

A public notice has now been issued declaring Egyptian gold, notes, silver and nickel as legal tender. The British sovereign is also declared legal tender at the rate of 97.50 Egyptian piastres to the pound.

Ottoman Régie des Tabacs.

The abolition of the tobacco monopoly was announced to the Advisory Council on the 4th January. The planting of tobacco may be undertaken forthwith, which will enable growers to cultivate seedlings during February and March. The super-tax upon imported tobacco, cigarettes, cigars and snuff will be removed on the 1st March, 1921, and replaced by a modified tariff.

The customs and excise duties are now being considered.

The measure has proved extremely popular, and is welcomed as another step towards the reform of the numerous and vexatious imposts imposed under the regulations of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration.

Education.

Out of thirty-two candidates examined for the training college for men, twenty-seven have been accepted and will begin work on the 1st February. Arrangements are being made to strengthen the teaching staff of the training college.

It is hoped to make arrangements at an early date for pamphlets on subjects of local interest, e.g., agriculture, hygiene, communications, &c., to be printed in the three official languages and distributed to all schools. Lectures on similar subjects, illustrated by lantern slides or cinematograph, are also contemplated.

A grant of £ E. 300 has been made to the tile-making industry in Jerusalem, and apprentices are indentured on the same terms as in the school for weaving.

A preliminary meeting of representatives from various Boy Scout organisations was held at Government House under the presidency of the High Commissioner and discussed the question of closer co-operation. The High Commissioner has been asked to accept the post of Chief Scout for Palestine.

The matriculation examination of London University was held in Jerusalem. Five candidates presented themselves.

Health.

A system has been approved whereby at Jaffa all immigrants, pilgrims, &c., will be disembarked in a sheltered bay to the south of the town, and quarantine procedure, disinfection and medical examination will be effected there; also the procedure required by the Government Immigration Department and Zionist Commission.

Influenza of a mild type has been widespread throughout the country, and caused a number of deaths in villages where the population was already debilitated through malaria. Medical work in these villages is being carried out.

A case of typhus was imported by an immigrant from Russia.

Immigration and Travel.

During the month 589 immigrants arrived, of whom 438 were recommended by the Zionist Commission and 151 were independent immigrants.

The number of tourists travelling in Palestine shows an increase over that of last month of about eighty.

305 German pre-war residents returned to Palestine during the month.

Legal.

The most important criminal trial of the month was a case of murder heard by the Court of Jerusalem, in which three persons were convicted and sentenced to death. The case is now before the Court of Appeal.

A committee has been appointed to consider what amendments will be necessary to make the draft Egyptian Penal Code, which is to be applied by the Mixed Courts in Egypt, applicable to Palestine. The English and the Palestine judges are in agreement that the Ottoman Penal Code is not adequate, and it requires so much amendment to make it suitable that it seems better to adapt a modern scientific statement of the criminal law.

Transactions in land show a steady increase, and dealings in land are now taking place in all parts of the country; the great majority are for small areas.

The legal classes have completed their first term of work, and examinations have been held. Mr. Goadby, one of the professors of the Sultanieh School of Law in Egypt has been lent by the Egyptian Government to the Palestine Administration for six months, and has taken over the direction of the classes.

Posts and Telegraphs.

Agreements have been signed by the Postmaster-General and the Director of Posts and Telegraphs, Salt, Transjordan, for the exchange of telegrams, money orders and parcels between Palestine and Transjordan. This should result in improved commercial relations between the two countries.

There is a general demand throughout the country for the provision of telephonic facilities, but difficulty is experienced in making this owing to the world-wide shortage of apparatus and material.

Public Security.

The Galilee and Ajloun district police captured five more members of the Mudeiris gang on the 22nd January.

Recruiting for the Palestine military police was commenced by the army with help of civil police authorities, to replace Egyptian military police in the country.

Twenty cases of heinous crimes were reported for the month of January, and twelve cases were detected. Crime shows a steady decrease during the last three months.

The gaol labour company of the 140 men commenced work on earthworks on the railways at Khuderia on the 11th January.

On Sunday, the 16th instant, a mutiny broke out in the Jerusalem central gaol during the early morning, and some fifty long-sentence prisoners attacked the warders, overpowered them, and eighteen made their escape. A special court of enquiry is being held.

Public Works.

Road construction and repair operations are progressing satisfactorily. In spite of the heavy rains in the first fortnight of the month communications have been uninterrupted.

The Jerusalem and Haifa projected water supplies have been carefully studied, and preliminary steps taken towards obtaining the necessary pumping plants.

Satisfactory progress is noted in the Haifa breakwater extension, the present length of completed work being 50 metres.

Repairs to Government offices, hospitals, prisons, &c., all over the country have given employment to a large number of men.

Railways.

The rebuilding and strengthening of the bridges on the Jerusalem line is now in hand, and when completed it will be possible to improve the service on this line by the use of heavier locomotives.

The survey of the Petach-Tikvah line is completed, and work will shortly begin.

A new station is being opened at Zichron Jacob.

Owing to the embargo being removed on the export of grain every effort has been made to persuade the merchants at Beersheba to use the railway, and it is hoped to get 4,000 tons transported to Haifa in the near future.

The revenue of the railway shows signs of increasing.

Ports and Lights.

Steamers arriving at the ports, 78.

Tonnage of registered shipping, 86,600.

General.

Under the presidency of the High Commissioner a sports club for Jerusalem has been inaugurated. Membership will be open to all residents of Palestine, official and non-official.

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 67.)

My Lord,

Jerusalem, February 4, 1921.

IN my despatch No. 11 of the 8th January, 1921, I submitted a general report on the finances of Palestine, in relation particularly to the cost of defence. It is desirable that this should be supplemented by a statement of the needs of the country with respect to capital expenditure and the extent to which it may be possible to supply those needs in the immediate future.

2. A large part of the cost of development must devolve upon private enterprise. Not only is this the case with respect to ordinary industrial and agricultural businesses, but large schemes of land reclamation and colonisation must be left to public utility bodies, such as the Zionist Organisation, or to individual effort. The cost would be too great for the Administration to assume, in addition to the many tasks which of necessity devolve upon it. Similarly with respect to house building, except in particular cases of the housing of its own officials, the State is not in a position to intervene.

3. For the assistance of agriculture, industry and commerce the establishment of one or more banks for giving long term credits on mortgage is one of the most urgent needs of the country. There is no subject to which reference is more frequently made at conferences with the notables of the various districts. There is no allocation of capital which is more likely to increase the productiveness of the country and to assist the expansion of its revenue.

The Turkish Government had established an Agricultural Bank and had added $\frac{1}{4}$ per cent. to the tithe taxation for its assistance. That addition would now produce in Palestine about £E. 15,000 a year. I have appointed a liquidator to bring into order the affairs of this bank. Many of the books are missing, and I have not yet been able to obtain from the headquarters of the bank in Constantinople the particulars that are needed. Whatever sum is found to belong to the Palestine branches of the Ottoman Agricultural Bank will accrue to this Administration, and should be allocated to the same purpose; but the indications are that the amount will not be large. I have endeavoured to interest various financiers in England, Egypt and America in the establishment of a mortgage or land bank in Palestine, but, owing to the world-wide financial stringency, those efforts have not yet borne fruit.

Meanwhile, the late military administration established a system of agricultural loans at $6\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., employing for the purpose money borrowed from the Anglo-Egyptian Bank at 6 per cent. About 300,000*l.* has been lent in this way, and the scheme has gone far to save the agricultural situation in Palestine. The cultivators who had lost most of their working cattle and other essentials during the war were enabled to replace them. Seed and manure were bought, and the large expansion of the tithe revenue is undoubtedly due in some measure to these loans. But the sum lent is far short of the need, and the system that had to be adopted, in default of a better, is not a satisfactory one. It is not advisable that the Government should find itself in the direct relationship of creditor to debtor with large numbers of individual cultivators; nor has it the machinery for dealing rapidly and efficiently with a multitude of small cases.

I consider it most necessary that long term credit banks should be established in Palestine, and I am compelled to contemplate the possibility that the Government may be obliged to assist the promoters of such a bank, not only by amalgamating with its capital the sums belonging to the ex-Ottoman Agricultural Bank, and not only by collecting on its behalf, through the tax collecting machinery, instalments and interest due from borrowers, but also by participating in providing, on suitable terms, part of the capital itself.

4. Palestine has no harbours, and the fact that shipping can only anchor in open roadsteads is a serious hindrance to its trade. Both Haifa and Jaffa have advantages, and, if it were possible to construct harbours at both places, the country would greatly benefit. Jaffa would serve, as now, as the port for Jerusalem and all Southern Palestine and Southern Transjordan; Haifa would serve Northern Palestine and Northern Transjordan, the Hauran and Damascus. If there were through railway communication with Mesopotamia, the connection might be made with either port.

An active committee, composed of the principal business men of Jaffa, has already had prepared for it a plan for a port. This plan contemplates the reclamation of a considerable area of land, the value of which, it is claimed, would go far to cover the cost of the harbour works. The scheme has been sent to your Lordship, with a view to its being submitted to expert examination in London.

Plans for Haifa are not so far advanced, but a number of data are available on which a definite scheme could be based. It remains to be seen whether private capital will be willing to undertake one or both of these enterprises. Meantime, I do not contemplate the allocation of any sum to these objects from the proceeds of any Government loan.

5. The largest item for which capital expenditure by the Government is needed is railway development. The estimates prepared by the general manager were reviewed, at my request, by a commission of three of the principal officers of the Egyptian State Railways, who came to Palestine for the purpose. They were subsequently revised in some particulars, and are appended to this despatch (Appendix I). They show a total projected expenditure of £E. 1,914,315, of which £E. 1,277,000 is needed as soon as the orders or contracts can be placed and executed.

In addition to the purposes included in these estimates, it will probably be found desirable in the near future to construct a narrow gauge railway from Semakh to Tiberias, and perhaps northwards to Metulleh. Such a line would develop a rich agricultural district, and would also be of considerable strategic value. The cost is roughly estimated at £E. 20,000.

6. A programme of the public works that are needed has been prepared by the Public Works Department, and is attached (Appendix II). Such a programme must, of course, be spread over a series of years. The total sum needed is:—

	£E.
For buildings	277,190 (approximately).
For roads	221,750 (approximately).
For other purposes	229,575 (approximately).

Of this a sum of £E. 500,000 should be spent during the next two or three years.

7. In addition there are various works urgently required in the principal towns of Palestine, which can only be undertaken by the help of municipal loans. The provision of adequate water supplies for Jerusalem and Haifa is urgent, and there are a number of minor works which ought not to be postponed. It would greatly facilitate the improvement and development of the towns if the Government were in a position to lend them the funds that they need, on the security of the local revenues. A sum of perhaps £E. 60,000 would be needed in the immediate future for this purpose.

8. It will be necessary to establish a local Palestinian currency. The proposals which I have already submitted contemplate the issue of Government currency notes, covered by deposits, to the value of 100 per cent., at the Bank of England. They provide also for an initial sum being made available by the Government of Palestine as cover for the first issue of notes, the next issue being covered by the securities bought with the money received in Egyptian currency in exchange for the first issue, and so on. Ultimately, when the currency was fully established, the whole would be covered in this way, and the deposit originally made would be repaid. Meanwhile, it would be invested in short term securities bearing interest. An initial sum of perhaps £E. 200,000 would be required under this head.

9. A capital expenditure of £E. 79,152 is needed in 1921–1922 for the development of posts, telegraphs and telephones. The principal items are set out in Appendix III. The Postmaster-General estimates that a further 100,000*l.* will be required later.

10. A cadastral survey is indispensable to the agricultural progress of Palestine. It will be a costly undertaking. A preliminary estimate indicates a sum of £E. 400,000 spread over a period of possibly eight years. In addition, there is the work of a Land Settlement Court costing perhaps 20,000*l.*

11. Afforestation, anti-malarial work and a number of minor purposes will involve an expenditure which is rather to be measured by the funds that may be made available than by the amount that could usefully be employed. A figure of £E. 150,000 may be allocated to these heads.

12. We therefore reach the following totals in round figures:—

	£ E.
Railways	1,914,000
Semakh-Tiberias Railway	20,000
Public works	728,000
Municipal loans	60,000
Currency	200,000
Posts and telegraphs	179,000
Cadastral survey	400,000
Land Settlement Court	20,000
Afforestation, anti-malarial and minor purposes	150,000
Total	3,671,000

13. Fortunately by far the greater part of these amounts are not in the nature of dead-weight debt.

(1.) Of the railway expenditure, £ E. 536,000 is for the purchase of rolling-stock. But the Palestine railways are now paying £ E. 69,500 per annum for the hire of rolling-stock, the whole of which would be saved as the new stock that is to be purchased came into use. This saving would alone be sufficient to pay the interest and sinking fund on nearly £ E. 1,000,000 of new capital. The service of half of the proposed railway debt can therefore be met without imposing any additional charge upon the budget. It may confidently be anticipated that the railway revenue, which is now estimated at 770,000/., will expand sufficiently to provide for the service of the other half of this debt, particularly since the traffic is now largely restricted through the absence of a sufficient quantity of good rolling-stock.

(2.) Against the annual charge in respect of the capital cost of new Government buildings are to be set off sums of approximately £ E. 16,000 now paid for the hire of buildings that will be surrendered.

(3.) The municipalities will themselves pay the interest and sinking fund on the money borrowed by the Government and lent again to them. It is proposed that a large part of those revenues should be collected by the Government itself (see my despatch No. 243 on the reform of the finances of the municipality of Jerusalem). There will therefore be ample security against the possibility of default.

(4.) The funds employed as deposit against the issue of Palestine currency notes will be invested in securities bearing interest. That interest might be at a somewhat lower rate than that which would be payable on a Palestine Government loan. But the difference between the rates of interest received and interest paid on the capital sum in question would involve a loss to the Palestine Government of a very small sum.

(5.) The Palestine Post Office is conducted at a profit, and there is no reason to doubt that the proposed investment in additional telegraph and telephone plant will be remunerative.

(6.) The cadastral survey will bring a new revenue from survey fees. It is estimated that, when the work is fully developed, this will amount to £ E. 20,000 a year.

(7.) Should it be found necessary to provide any capital for a land or mortgage bank, the income of that bank should not fail to cover the interest and sinking fund.

14. There remain the following heads of capital expenditure against which no specific amount of revenue can be credited:—

	£ E.
Public works	500,000
(Not including a proportion of the cost of buildings, which would be covered by savings in rentals.)	
Cadastral survey and Land Settlement Court	260,000
(Not covered by fees.)	
Afforestation, anti-malarial and minor purposes	150,000
	910,000

15. The question then remains to be decided how much of this capital expenditure Palestine will be able in the near future to afford. In my former

despatch (paragraph 16) the reasons were given why it would be inadvisable to devote the whole of any future surpluses of revenue to the cost of defence, important though it is that Palestine should undertake, at the earliest moment that the conditions allow, the cost of her own defence. To stop all expenditure upon the development of education, of public works and of other departments would give rise to a popular discontent, which would in the long run entail an increase in military expenditure. Moreover, a careful expenditure upon roads, agricultural development and other similar objects, although no particular return in revenue can be allocated to them, do yield an indirect return and tend to pay for themselves.

16. In the estimates for 1921-22, a sum of only £ E. 15,000 has been included in respect of new debt, other than for railway purposes. In view of the expansion of general revenue which is proceeding and which may confidently be expected to continue, it would be no imprudence to contemplate allocating in 1922-23 and future years a further sum of £ E. 55,000 to interest and sinking fund upon debt incurred for purposes that do not yield a direct return in revenue. The total sum of £ E. 70,000 would suffice to pay interest and sinking fund charges at 7 per cent. upon £ E. 1,000,000.

17. The expenditure of this amount would be distributed among those objects, not directly remunerative, that are the most urgent among those that have been specified.

18. The total amount needed for capital expenditure in Palestine was stated in paragraph 12 to be £ E. 3,671,000. Of this, all but £ E. 910,000 will be spent upon purposes which will yield their own revenues, sufficient to cover interest and sinking fund charges. Those charges upon the remaining £ E. 910,000 will be covered by an allocation of £ E. 70,000, which can be made from general revenue. It is to be hoped that some reduction can be made upon the estimate of expenditure, particularly since the railway estimates were mostly framed prior to the recent decline in prices. It will be observed that nothing is included in respect to a contribution to the capital of a mortgage bank, that question not being ripe for decision.

19. A considerable part of this expenditure would be spread over two or three years.

20. The loan which is contemplated should therefore be for an amount of £ E. 3,500,000. It would be convenient if the money could be received in instalments spread over two years, should such an arrangement be found practicable. The rate of interest and the period of repayment would be a matter for discussion with the financial houses that would issue the loan.

21. A British Government guarantee, while it would no doubt be very welcome to those houses, and would be of advantage to the Administration of Palestine, is, it is understood, not contemplated by His Majesty's Government. Nor, in my opinion, is it necessary. The interests of lenders would be adequately secured by a charge upon the general revenues of Palestine, which now amount, including railways, to over £ E. 2,200,000 a year; the only prior charge being the annuity in respect of the Ottoman Pre-War Debt, which will not exceed £ E. 200,000, and may be considerably less. They are further safeguarded by the following provision in article 27 of the draft mandate for Palestine: "In the event of the termination of the mandate conferred upon the mandatory by this declaration, the Council of the League of Nations shall make such arrangements as may be deemed necessary . . . for securing, under the guarantee of the League, that the Government of Palestine will fully honour the financial obligations, legitimately incurred by the Administration of Palestine during the period of the mandate."

22. Your Lordship will no doubt agree that, although preliminary arrangements can, and should, be made, there can be no question of the actual issue of the loan until the mandate is formally conferred. So serious a matter as the incurring of a large financial obligation for a long term of years cannot be undertaken until the position of the Palestine Government is definitely regularised. Since, however, it is very possible that several months may still elapse before the mandate is issued, the question arises what course should be pursued meanwhile.

23. This is a matter of great importance to Palestine. In ordinary circumstances, the natural course would be to postpone all capital expenditure until the mandate is conferred and the loan issued. But under present conditions, such a policy would be open to grave objection.

In the first place, there is a considerable Jewish immigration into Palestine now proceeding. To stop it would have serious political disadvantages. It would

be a great discouragement to Zionists throughout the world. It would be especially resented by Zionists in Palestine. It would give the impression that the policy of creating a Jewish National Home was being minimised, if not abandoned. But if the immigration is allowed to proceed, the new arrivals must be given an opportunity of finding employment. Land settlement takes time. The growth of new industries must also be gradual. Employment upon public works is a suitable temporary resource, and at the present time many hundreds of young immigrants are, in fact, being employed on road-making and railway reconstruction work, with quite satisfactory results. If capital expenditure were to stop during the next few months, or indeed if it were not to be expanded, the effect with respect to immigration would be most serious.

Secondly, the population of Palestine at large have been assured that the advent of a British civil Administration would mean a large and rapid economic development of the country. Important sections of them look to this development as a compensation for certain results of the British occupation which they dislike, particularly the existence of a non-Moslem Administration, and the possibility, as they think it, of their interests being subordinated to those of a Jewish immigrant population. Already some complaints are being heard that the promised results are slow in coming, and that few actual achievements are yet visible. If the Administration were compelled to mark time during the next few months, the discontent among the Jewish population would be at least equalled by the discontent among the other elements.

24. In these circumstances I desire, with your Lordship's approval, to proceed at once with certain enterprises which are the most urgent among those in the lists embodied in this despatch.

(a.) An additional water supply for Jerusalem is essential. The supply brought in by the army has proved quite inadequate even for the present population, and it allows no margin for future growth. If new hotels, or other buildings, or the garden suburb which it is intended to construct at once, were built, they could not be connected with the existing water supply. A scheme has been prepared by the Public Works Department utilising some ancient reservoirs, which will cost about £ E. 40,000. The sale of water would, from the beginning, cover the greater part of the annual charges for the capital and the cost of working, and in two or three years it is expected that the scheme would be self-supporting. It is contemplated using for this purpose some of the engines employed for the pipe-line from Kantara to Rafah, which would be purchased from the Disposals Board. The new supply would be regarded as a great boon by the people of Jerusalem; the work would give a considerable amount of direct employment; it would enable various building enterprises to proceed. I am anxious to place funds at the disposal of the Municipality which will allow this scheme to be undertaken at once.

(b.) There are certain roads which urgently need reconstruction, and which ought to be undertaken without delay.

(c.) The provision of additional rolling-stock for the railways is imperative, and although this will not furnish employment in Palestine, it would do so in the country, probably the United Kingdom, where rolling-stock would be manufactured. It will be some time before the orders can be completed, but they should be placed immediately. As already mentioned, as fast as the new rolling-stock comes forward, that which is at present being hired can be returned, and the financial result will be, not an increase of expenditure, but a saving.

(d.) The railways need further strengthening in several places to prevent wash-outs, and this is work which would furnish a considerable volume of employment.

(e.) The railway administration is put to heavy expense through its workshops being situated in so inconvenient a place as Kantara. The general manager is most anxious to remove them to Haifa as soon as possible. A preliminary is the filling up of certain depressions in the proposed site at Haifa, and this can be done most economically by combining it with some dredging work that is needed in Haifa harbour.

(f.) The building of houses for officials in certain places is another urgent need. We have been compelled to requisition in some cases the houses of local residents—necessarily an unpopular measure, and it is only when fresh building is undertaken that they can be released.

(g.) The staff for the cadastral survey is being rapidly collected, and their work should begin at once.

(h.) There are some minor works of comparatively small cost which would be of

great public utility, would conduce to the contentment of the people, and would give a considerable amount of employment. For instance, the expenditure of £ E. 5,000 upon the construction of a jetty at Gaza would enable the coasting trade to develop there, and would revive the local fishing industry. It would also be a great encouragement to the people, whose town was destroyed in the war.

25. The course which I propose for providing the funds needed for such purposes, during the interval until the issue of the loan becomes possible, is this. There is a sum of nearly £ E. 500,000, being revenues of the Ottoman Public Debt Administration, which has been accumulated during the occupation, but has not been allocated by the Treaty of Sèvres to the Turkish debt (see my previous despatch, paragraph 5). This sum I have proposed, and still propose, should be used for purposes of defence. It is intended to employ it partly in equipping a Palestine Defence Force, and partly in meeting the deficit, during the first few years, caused by the cost of that force being in excess of the sum which it is possible to allocate to it from annual revenue. Only a small proportion of the accumulated sum would, however, be needed for these purposes this year. It has already been drawn upon for certain urgent railway works and telegraph and telephone expenditure. I propose to utilise it further for the purposes already mentioned, it being clearly understood that all these advances should be repaid when loan money becomes available, and that the allocation of the whole of the accumulated Ottoman Public Debt Administration revenues to defence remains unaffected.

26. The question of the amount and terms of the loan will no doubt require time for careful consideration. I venture to suggest that the decision of the urgent matters discussed in the foregoing paragraphs 22-24 should not be postponed until the larger question has been settled. The works that would be undertaken prior to the issue of the loan would be kept to the minimum that the circumstances demanded, and on that understanding, I should be glad to receive, at an early date, your Lordship's approval of the measures proposed.

I have, &c.
HERBERT SAMUEL,
High Commissioner.

APPENDIX 1.

Palestine Railways.

SUMMARY of Capital Estimates, 1921-22.

	Amount to be Spent during 1921-22.
	£ E.
(A.) Reconstruction of line; remodelling of station yards and installation of interlocking system; survey; provision of western electric telephone control system and electric staff instruments; removal, &c., of locomotive workshops and stores from Kantara to Haifa; new carriage and waggon sheds at Haifa; provision of turn-tables, weigh-bridges, coal stages; purchase of wooden sleepers; purchase of printing machine; and expropriation of land	627,500
(B.) Staff accommodation, provision of station buildings and goods sheds	113,588
(C.) Purchase of rolling-stock	536,300
Total	1,277,388

(A.)

Item.		Total Estimated Cost.	Amount to be Spent during 1921-22.
		£ E.	£ E.
1	Clearing drains, widening cuts and banks and ditching	36,000	18,000
2	25 new bridge openings, spans from 120 feet to 20 feet	45,000	22,500
3	25 new bridges required to replace present temporary bridges ..	30,000	30,000
4	5 kilom. of stone pitching to banks, average height 3 metres; 25,000 centim. at £ T. 50	12,500	6,250
5	Relaying present second-hand track from Kilometre 315 to Haifa with new 75-lb. rails and good sleepers, 50 kilom. available at £ E. 100 per kilometre = £ E. 5,000	17,500	17,500
6	50 kilom. to be picked up from Kantara-Rafa section and relaid at a cost of £ E. 250 per kilometre = £ E. 12,500	130,000	100,000
7	Stone ballasting track, Rafa to Haifa, 213 kilom. plus 47 kilom. at sidings = 260 kilom. at £ E. 500 per kilometre	15,000	15,000
8	Rearrangement of Ludd yard	17,500	17,500
9	Remodelling of station yards, picking up sidings and installation of interlocking system	5,000	5,000
10	Survey, future development	4,000	4,000
11	Provision of western electric telephone system complete, with headquarters set at Haifa, operating Acre, Semakh, Nablus, Tulkeram lines; also continuation of existing system, Ludd-Rafa; Ludd-Jaffa sections with headquarters set at Ludd	3,500	3,500
12	(a.) Taking down locomotive workshops and stores and power-house, Kantara East, removing to Haifa, and re-erecting and augmenting	266,000	133,000
	(b.) New carriage and waggon sheds at Haifa	5,250	5,250
13	3 turn-tables (broad gauge) at £ E. 1,750 each	12,000	12,000
14	6 weigh-bridges at £ E. 2,000 each	3,000	3,000
15	Erection of 3 coal stages at £ E. 1,000 each	400,000	200,000
16	Purchase of 400,000 wooden sleepers at £ E. 1 each	15,000	15,000
17	Purchase of printing machine, complete	20,000	20,000
18	Expropriation of land required for erection of future buildings, railway development, &c.		
	Total	1,037,250	627,500

(B.)—STAFF Accommodation, Provision of Station Buildings and Goods Sheds.

Item.		Total Estimated Cost.	Amount to be Spent during 1921-22.
		£ E.	£ E.
1	Housing senior staff	42,000	
2	" telegraph department's personnel	8,060	
3	" employees—Ludd	65,420	
4	" of stores department staff at Haifa	9,350	
5	" of artisans at Haifa	161,700	113,588
6	Staff quarters and station buildings, Rafa to Beersheba, both exclusive, and Rafa to Haifa, both exclusive	29,860	
7	Goods sheds at various stations and special station buildings at Ludd	24,375	
	Total	340,765	113,588

(C.)—PURCHASE of Broad Gauge Rolling Stock.

Item.	Number of Vehicles required.	Type.	Estimated Cost.	Amount to be Spent during 1921-22.
			£ E.	£ E.
1	6	Bogie passenger coaches—		
2	6	1st class, at £ E. 8,000 each	48,000	
3	4	2nd class, at £ E. 7,000 each	42,000	
4	20	Composite, 1st and 2nd class at £ E. 7,500 each	30,000	
		3rd class, at £ E. 5,000 each	100,000	
5	6	Bogie passenger vans—		
6	3	For baggage, parcels and luggage, at £ E. 5,000 each	30,000	
7	4	For mail sorting at £ E. 5,000 each	15,000	
8	6	6-wheeled saloons at £ E. 500 to be purchased from E.S.R., and converted at an extra cost of £ E. 200 each	2,800	
9	15	Locomotives, special type, for Jerusalem line at £ E. 12,000 each	72,000	
10	25	(15-ton) open flat waggons for vehicle traffic at £ E. 400 each	6,000	
11	100	(10-ton) covered animal trucks at £ E. 500 each	12,500	
		(35-ton) steel bogie covered goods waggons at £ E. 1,000 each	100,000	
			458,300	458,300
1	..	Purchase of narrow gauge rolling stock	78,000	78,000
		Total	536,300	536,300

It is not intended to place this latter stock (item 1) on order until such time as a definite decision is reached concerning the ownership of Hedjaz Railway rolling stock.

APPENDIX II.

PUBLIC Works—Extraordinary.

	£ E.		£ E.
Completion of disinfecting and bathing station, Jerusalem	500	Post for 4 M.P. and 1 F.P. and stabling—	
Conversion of building into lunatic asylum, Bethlehem	2,000	Zerin	350
Reconstruction of infectious hospital, Hebron	1,000	Jenin	350
Completion of hospital, Jaffa	1,500	Police barracks and stables, Gaza	2,000
" " lazaret, Jaffa	1,500	Lock-up and cells	900
" " disinfecting station, Jaffa	1,500	Police barracks, stables, rest-house, administration offices	3,000
New hospital, Ramleh	24,000	Police outpost and rest house—	
Completion of hospital, Tulkeram	1,000	Khan Yunis	400
New hospital, Haifa	48,000	Paluge	400
Permanent lazaret building, Haifa	12,000	Police post and stables, Katra	400
Completion of hospital, Gaza	2,500	Stone buildings at customs stations	10,000
Drainage of marshes	50,000	Posts, telegraphs, garage, workshops and store	3,000
Police school, Jerusalem	5,000	New drainage system for post office	750
Prisons, Jerusalem	250	" premises for telegraph office, Jaffa	2,500
Construction of stables, Hebron		" " post office, Ludd	600
" " " Daharieh	200	Alterations and fittings to premises for 10 new offices, Ludd	1,000
" " " police stables, Deir Aban	200	Alterations to post office's premises, Haifa	150
Completion of police barracks, Jaffa	2,500	Orphanage to provide agricultural training, Jaffa	5,000
Alteration to old soap factory and prison, Ramleh, to provide barracks, &c.	600	School for 200 pupils, Jaffa	4,000
Completion of barracks, stables and lock-up, Tulkeram	750	Schools, Nablus	1,100
Police barracks and stabling, Haifa	5,000	Additions and alterations to existing schools, Nablus	500
Completion Acre prison	8,000	New school buildings and repairs, Nablus	1,400
Police post, Zimmarin	300	Schools, Jenin	560
New police post, Sejera	500	New girls' school, Jenin	2,000
" " " Kefr Misr	500	2 extra rooms above boys' school, Jenin	500
Police and prison buildings, Beersheba	400	New school buildings and repairs	1,050
Police hut, post and shed, Imara	250	Boys' school—	
Post for 6 M.P. and F.P., Akraha	200	Mejdel	5,000
Stabling for 6 horses, Akraha	150	Khan Yunis	1,000
Post for 6 M.P. and 1 F.P. and stabling—		Gabalia	1,000
Bidia	350	Schools for 15 villages in Gaza district	6,000
Tubas	350	1 port office and 1 store room, Jaffa	200

	£ E.		£ E.
1 mast, Jaffa	125	Hebron-Beersheba road	25,000
Improvement to port billets, Jaffa	40	Bethlehem-Hebron road	5,000
1 dock office and 1 store room, Haifa	250	Bethlehem-Hebron road, culverts	500
Provision of guiding lights, buoys, &c., Haifa	500	Jerusalem-Jordan road	17,500
Improvement to port billets, Haifa	40	Jerusalem-Jaffa road	12,000
Harbour for fishing craft, Gaza	5,000	Jerusalem-Jaffa road, culverts	1,000
2 large covered iron sheds, customs, Jaffa..	1,000	Surveys, southern roads	2,000
Making of met. road, Beisan to station ..	1,000	Latrone-Wadi Sarara road	3,000
Repair of met. road, Nazareth-Shefa Amr..	1,000	Eight 10-ton rollers!	6,800
Tulkaram-Ludd road	20,000	Stone breakers	800
Beit-Degan-Rehovoth road	750	Road plant, cauldrons, boilers, concrete mixers	2,500
Bridge, Auja, 20-metre span, Ferrikieh ..	3,500	General and quarry plant	3,000
60-metre span, Sheikh Muannis	3,500	Decanville trucks and rails	5,000
Richon-le-Zion K. 7, Rehovoth station to Rehovoth	10,000	Jerusalem water supply	35,000
Town and station roads, Zimmarin	3,000	Haifa water supply	25,000
Haifa-Shefa Amr-Acre road	10,000	Electrical supply	15,000
Bridges, Haifa-Jenin road	3,000	Extension of Haifa jetty	30,000
Acre-Safed	15,000	Widening of existing jetty	3,000
Gaza-Ramleh road	10,000	Suction dredger	2,500
Met. road, Gaza town to port	2,000	Walls to foreshore reclamation..	8,000
Bridges, Gaza-Beersheba road	2,000	Cistern and water supply to quarters and forest stations	200
Beersheba-Hebron road	3,000	Agricultural and Fisheries Department construction	36,900
Ramallah military roads	4,000	Administrative buildings	100,000
Approaches to Jerusalem	3,000		
Completion of North road, Jerusalem ..	30,000		
" " Haifa-Nazareth road	10,000		
" " Tiberias-Semakh road	20,000		
			728,515

APPENDIX III.

Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones. Estimates 1921-22.

CAPITAL Expenditure.

	£ E.
1. Rebuilding road route Jerusalem-Ludd..	8,988
2. Rebuilding railway route Nablus-Tulkaram-Afula-Haifa ..	17,374
3. Rebuilding road route Jerusalem-Nablus ..	6,258
4. Transferring wires from "AA" route to new railway route Rafa-Ludd ..	7,633
5. New magneto telephone exchange, Jerusalem (including instruments for subscribers)	13,662
6. New magneto telephone exchange, Jaffa (including instruments for subscribers)	10,771
7. Six new magneto telephone exchanges for small offices (including subscribers' instruments)	2,577
8. Automatic exchange, Government House, Jerusalem	3,150
9. Automatic exchange, Railway, Haifa	3,150
10. Telephone apparatus for new subscribers in districts	276
11. Erection of lines for new subscribers	5,313
Total	79,152

[E 2209/522/88]

No. 110.

Law Officers to Foreign Office.—(Received February 19.)

Law Officers' Department,

Royal Courts of Justice, February 18, 1921.

My Lord,

WE were honoured with your Lordship's commands, signified to us in Mr. D. J. Osborne's letter of the 8th instant, requesting us to advise your Lordship whether, in view of the commercial treaties to which this country is a party, Imperial preference could be granted to Palestine.

We have taken the matter in our consideration, and in obedience to your Lordship's commands have the honour to—

Report

That in our opinion it is impossible, in view of the commercial treaties with Italy and Portugal and of other treaties in similar terms, to extend to Palestine the preference to goods grown, produced, or manufactured in the British Empire.

Palestine would appear to fall within paragraph 4 of article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and not within paragraph 6, and we think that Great Britain as a mandatory is in the position of a trustee of the League.

We have, &c.

GORDON HEWART.

ERNEST M. POLLOCK.

[E 2351/36/88]

No. 111.

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 79.)

My Lord,

Jerusalem, February 7, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to refer to my despatch No. 46 concerning the composition of the courts in Palestine for the trial of foreign subjects, and to enclose a copy of Rules of Criminal Procedure which have been drafted concerning the special treatment of foreign subjects in criminal cases. These proposals amplify the provisions contained in the Rules of Court issued by the Military Administration in regard to foreign subjects, of which I enclosed copies in the despatch under reference.

I should be grateful if you would inform me as soon as possible whether these draft regulations are approved, as it is desired to introduce a new Code of Criminal Procedure as soon as the promulgation of the mandate makes that step possible. The draft of the code will be sent to you in due course.

I have, &c.

(For High Commissioner).

E. KEITH-ROACH.

Enclosure in No. 111.

Rules of Criminal Procedure.

EUROPEAN SUBJECTS.

Note.—The term "European subject" will be defined as follows:—

"The expression 'European subject' means any person who is the subject or citizen of a European State, and shall include all such subjects or citizens whether they be residents in or natives of Europe or of any other part of the dominions of a European State, but shall not include—

1. Subjects of a State or Government protected by or administered under a mandate granted to a European State.
2. Ottoman subjects.
3. Persons who were formerly Ottoman subjects and were then protected by a European State, unless such persons have since become subjects or citizens of a European State.

"Provided that subjects or citizens of an American State or of Japan shall be entitled to the like treatment and privileges as are by these regulations provided for or granted to Europeans.

"The term 'subject or citizen of a State' shall include corporations constituted under the laws of such States and religious or charitable bodies or institutions wholly or mainly composed of the subjects or citizens of such State."

1.—(1.) Warrants directing a search to be made in the private residence of a European subject, shall be issued by magistrates or investigating officers of British nationality only.

(2.) Nevertheless, if in the course of the execution of a search warrant not issued by a magistrate or investigating officer of British nationality the person against whom the search warrant is being executed claims to be a European subject and there appears to the person executing the warrant to be serious doubt whether such claim is well-founded, he may proceed with the execution of the warrant.

(3.) In any case in which it is the duty of any person under these regulations to bring an arrested person before a magistrate within a limited period and such person

[6668]

2 E 2

is a European subject arrested with or without warrant, such person shall, unless the warrant was made by, or by the direction of, or under a warrant issued by a magistrate of British nationality, be brought before a magistrate of British nationality within the like period.

(4.) If a person arrested claims to be a European subject, and would in that case be entitled under these regulations to be brought before a magistrate of British nationality, he shall, if practicable, be brought before such a magistrate, but if there appears to be doubt whether his claim is well-founded and it is inconvenient to bring him before such magistrate within the required period, he may be brought before any other magistrate.

2. A European subject accused of any offence may claim—

- (1.) That his investigation during the preliminary investigation shall be conducted by a person of British nationality.
- (2.) That the question of his release on bail and of his committal for trial shall be determined by a magistrate of British nationality.

3.—(1.) A European subject accused of an offence within the jurisdiction of a magistrate other than an offence within the jurisdiction of a magistrate of the 2nd class, may claim that he shall be tried in first instance by a magistrate of British nationality, and that any court before which any appeal from or application for revision of the decision of the magistrate is heard shall contain at least one member of British nationality.

Note.—It is intended that a 2nd class magistrate should have jurisdiction only in cases of offences punishable with imprisonment not exceeding one month or with fine not exceeding £ E. 10, or with both of these penalties.

(2.) A European subject accused of any offence not within the jurisdiction of a magistrate may claim that the court before which he is tried in first instance and any court before which any appeal from or application for revision of the judgment thereof shall contain a majority of members of British nationality.

4. If an officer in charge of a police station refuses to release on bail or discharge on bond any person who claims to be a European subject the officer shall report the circumstances forthwith to a magistrate, who may require the claimant to be brought before him in order that his claim may be considered.

5.—(1.) Where any person claims before any court, magistrate or investigating officer to be dealt with as a European subject he shall state the grounds of his claim on his first appearance in the character of an accused before such court, magistrate or officer.

(2.) The court, magistrate or investigating officer shall inquire into the truth of the statement and shall, if need arises, allow the person making it a reasonable time within which to prove that it is true, and shall then decide upon the claim.

In case of doubt an investigating officer may refer the question to a magistrate.

(3.) If a magistrate or investigating officer decides that a claim to be treated as a European subject is valid he shall forthwith send the papers relating to the proceedings to the Governor of the district, who may proceed to consider the case if he is competent so to do, or may refer the case to any other competent authority.

In any other case the hearing may be adjourned and the court shall be reconstituted in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.

(4.) Where the court, magistrate or investigating officer decides that the claimant is not a European subject the proceedings shall continue accordingly, but at the close of such proceeding the claimant may require his claim to be referred to the president of the district court, and no further step in the prosecution shall be taken until the president has given his decision.

(5.) If the president of the district court as the result of a reference to him upholds the claim he shall direct a reference of the case to a competent authority.

6.—(1.) If an accused person does not claim to be treated as a European subject upon his first appearance before a court, magistrate or investigating officer, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be so treated for the purpose of the proceedings before such court, magistrate or investigating officer.

(2.) If a person accused of an offence not within the jurisdiction of a magistrate does not claim to be treated as a European subject, either before the officer investigating the case or before the magistrate before whom he is brought upon application for

his committal for trial, or if any accused person whose claim to be so treated has been rejected fails to require his claim to be referred to the president of the district court after having been informed by the authority rejecting his claim of his right to require such reference, he shall be deemed to have waived his right to be so treated and shall not assert it at any subsequent stage of the same case.

7.—(1.) The decision of the president of the district court upon a reference under article 5 (4) shall be final for the purpose of all proceedings in the same case other than proceedings before the Court of Criminal Appeal.

(2.) If after such reference the claim is raised anew before the Court of Criminal Appeal, the decision of such court that the claimant is a European subject shall not invalidate any proceedings previously taken, but shall operate only to give him the right to be so treated before the Court of Criminal Appeal.

8.—(1.) A European subject who makes a claim for civil redress as a civil claimant in any criminal proceedings shall not be entitled to demand that the court hearing the case shall be constituted as a court for the hearing of a civil claim made by a European subject. By constituting himself civil claimant he shall be deemed to have waived any right which he may possess to have his claim determined by a court constituted for the hearing of a civil action brought by a European subject.

(2.) A European subject may institute a prosecution by complaint, notwithstanding that such claim is not accompanied by a claim for civil redress.

(3.) Nothing in this article shall be interpreted as affecting the right of a European subject to claim civil redress by civil action for any injury caused to him by the commission of an act constituting an offence.

[E 2352/1579/88]

No. 112.

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 81.)

My Lord,

Jerusalem, February 12, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a copy of the minutes of the fifth meeting of the Advisory Council, which took place on Wednesday the 9th February, 1921.

I have, &c.

(For High Commissioner),

W. H. DEEDES.

Enclosure 1 in No. 112.

Minutes of Advisory Council.

THE fifth meeting of the Advisory Council took place on Wednesday, the 9th February, 1921, under the presidency of his Excellency the High Commissioner.

The following were present :—

Mr. J. L. Barron, Mr. M. Beiruti, Mr. N. Bentwich, Mr. I. Benzwi, Mr. H. E. Bowman, Mr. W. H. Deedes, Mr. R. H. Harari, Mr. G. Heron, Colonel R. Holmes, Ismail Bey Hussein, Mr. H. M. Kalvarisky, Sheikh Abdel Hadj El Khatib, Sheikh Freih Abu Middein, Mr. H. A. Smallwood, Mr. R. Storrs, Mr. G. S. Symes, Suleiman Abdul Razzak Tukan Bey, Mr. D. Yellin.

Suleiman Bey Nassif and Dr. Habib Salem were unable, owing to illness, to attend.

MAX NUROCK, *Secretary,*
Advisory Council.

His Excellency read the following resolution passed by the Imperial War Graves Commission in acknowledgment of the unanimously adopted resolution at the December session of the Council, to present to the Imperial War Graves Commission the sites of war cemeteries in Palestine :—

"The Imperial War Graves Commission record their very deep appreciation of the generosity of the people of Palestine in presenting the permanent resting places of British dead, fallen in the war, the sites of British war cemeteries in that country."

Mr. Yellin suggested in this connection that a committee be formed, on which perhaps some members of Council might be willing to serve, to take charge of the interests of war graves in Palestine.

His Excellency said that the Government would bear this suggestion in mind.

A memorandum (copy attached) by Colonel Holmes on the Palestine railways was then read to the Council.

Tukan Bey pointed out that fares were recently increased because of the high cost of coal. The people of Palestine did not like this increase, and were now in many cases using carts for transport of goods, and preferred themselves to travel by automobiles which were cheaper than railways. Railway rates before the war were 2 millièmes per kilom.; they were now 5 millièmes, and in view of the fact that the price of coal had decreased, the Administration should reduce railway rates to the previous level.

Tukan Bey also asked that the railway line between Messudieh and Nablus, and Nablus and Haifa should be put into better order. The trains used between these places were in a very bad condition; the carriages had no windows, and during cold and rainy weather passengers were exposed to the elements; the carriages were without lamps, and travelling by night was very inconvenient. Particularly uncomfortable were the various stations where passengers had no waiting rooms, and often had to stand for hours in the rain and cold.

He suggested that 1st and 2nd class carriages be introduced, as at present between Messudieh and Nablus there was only one class of carriage. He also asked that if possible a statement be made as to how many Palestinians were engaged as engineers and in other capacities on the railways, as he had heard that there were very few Palestinians so employed.

Mr. Berouti raised three points.

There were at present three large administrative departments at Haifa, Ludd and Kantara. Would it not be possible to concentrate the three into one department at Jerusalem? Secondly, contracts were being given out without notice to, or knowledge of, the inhabitants of Palestine. All tenders for the railways should be given out through District Governors at least one or two months in advance.

Fares were very high; for instance the return 1st class fare between Jaffa and Jerusalem was 206 piastres, whereas under the old régime it was only 76 piastres. Goods transported from Egypt to Palestine cost half the rates charged upon goods sent from Palestine to Egypt. Furthermore, when the rates were increased the price of coal was 18*l.* a ton, but it was now 5*l.* per ton.

Mr. Yellin said that from the statement it was clear that the Administration and its officials are doing their utmost to improve travelling facilities in the country. Trains, however, should be made more comfortable; buffets, such as have already been opened on an inadequate scale at Ludd, opened at other stations; and dining cars attached to trains requested to cater for the special culinary needs of Moslems and Jews. The deplorable congestion at booking offices might be obviated by issuing 1st and 2nd class tickets from one office, instead of issuing 2nd and 3rd class tickets from the same office, as at present, if it was not possible to provide three separate booking offices.

Ludd was the junction of the Palestine railways, yet there were provided no sign posts indicating the various platforms from which trains left for all parts of Palestine, a defect which caused confusion to travellers.

The names of the stations had not yet appeared in Hebrew.

Mr. Yellin asked, in view of the extent of railway traffic at Rechovoth, that the station now serving passengers be enlarged to cope with freight also. Under the existing arrangement goods were sent by road to Ludd, to be entrained there, and *vice versa*. The revenue from Rechovoth station was estimated at from 12,000*l.* to 15,000*l.* annually, but a much greater revenue might be obtained if trains were run more than three times a week, and if facilities for goods traffic were established.

Mr. Yellin also drew attention to the bad state of the roads between Rechovoth and Richon-le-Zion. This road had been built by the Turks, but owing to the heavy traffic after the occupation, had been seriously damaged. If repaired it would help the people very much in bringing their goods to the station.

The following question was submitted in writing by Suleiman Bey Nassif:—

Could it be arranged to run a train from Haifa, at least two or three times a week, to meet the Jaffa-Jerusalem train at Ludd, and thus enable passengers moving between Haifa and Jerusalem and Jaffa to do so during daytime?

Colonel Holmes answered the various points raised.

The freight rates on the Palestine railways were exactly the same to and from Egypt. Passenger rates had been increased to meet the actual running expenses of the railway, and were not any higher than the rates prevalent in Europe. The railway, judging by the revenue for January, would barely cover its expenses, and an immediate reduction in fares could not, therefore, be promised, but as soon as the effect of the reduced price of coal became perceptible every effort would be made to reduce them.

The statement that the majority of travellers used motor transport was not borne out by the figures of the latest returns, which show that passenger traffic had increased. The increased cost of running the railways was not only due to the cost of coal but also to the cost of living and the increased wages now being paid, and labour was three times dearer now than before the war.

With regard to the question of the Nablus-Messudieh line, which had been dealt with in the memorandum, there was undoubtedly much room for improvement. It was difficult to supply lighting for the carriages on that line as the globes for the lamps had been made in Germany and Austria, and it had not been possible so far to obtain a fresh supply. An effort was now being made to secure a stock through the Crown Agents, and a consignment was expected shortly. All the stations of the Palestine railways had been badly damaged during the war, and the military authorities would not sanction the repair of these buildings. The High Commissioner had now approved certain capital expenditure, and repair to old stations as well as the building of new stations would now proceed.

It was not correct to say that the railways had large administrative offices in three centres. All railways must have district offices. However, the workshops at Kantara were now to be removed to Haifa, where all administrative work of the railways was being concentrated. It was always necessary to have the workshops at a port and not at such a mountainous place as Jerusalem.

All contracts of any importance had always been published in the press in Palestine and Egypt.

A buffet had just been opened at Jerusalem station, and a large buffet and restaurant are included in the new plans for Ludd station. It was also proposed to open a buffet and rest-room at Haifa in order to deal with travellers coming from Syria.

The list of the names of the stations in Arabic and Hebrew was still under the consideration of the Government, and until it was approved they could not be put up.

Restaurant cars were run by a private company. Three new restaurant cars were on order, and would be ready at an early date. It was intended to put one on each through train and one on the Jerusalem service. Mr. Yellin's suggestion would be transmitted to the company.

It was not quite correct to say that there was no goods station at Rechovoth. There was a siding specially erected at the request of the colony for goods traffic. It was the very best that could be done at the time.

The receipts from Rechovoth station in October were only 249*l.*, in November 516*l.*, in December 1,535*l.*, in January 1,042*l.* When it was noted that the receipts were increasing the question of a station was considered, but the management of the railways must wait some little time to see if these receipts were merely due to the orange trade before it could ask the Administration to sanction the cost of building a station, which would be 5,000*l.*

With regard to the question of Palestinian labour on the railways, the figures could not be stated off-hand.

Mr. Kalvarisky said that the promise made by Colonel Holmes that daylight trains would leave three times a week from Haifa, beginning on the 1st March, would be hailed with great pleasure by those using the railways.

He asked whether it would not be possible for people to take goods from the smaller stations between Ludd and Haifa instead of having to convey them by road to the principal stations, which was a source of great inconvenience and expense.

Mr. Ben Zwi asked what was the condition of the workers employed on the railways, and what wages they received in the various grades. The memorandum of Colonel Holmes mentioned the difficulty of securing skilled workmen and experts, and it was known that formerly there were accidents which happily had not been repeated. The development and progress of these technical branches of the railway administration depended on a suitable wage being paid to the workmen.

Colonel Holmes said that there was no difficulty in sending consignments of goods

from any one station in Palestine to another, but passengers could not expect to convey freight by passenger train.

In answer to Mr. Ben Zwi, Colonel Holmes said that casual labourers employed on the railways received 15 piastres per day, and skilled labourers up to 90 piastres per day. The average for skilled labour is about 35-40 piastres, foremen receiving up to 90 piastres per day. The clerical staff was paid at the same rate as in other Government departments.

With regard to the question raised at the end of the last meeting of the Advisory Council by Dr. Habib Salim that a station be provided at Anebta, Colonel Holmes stated that since the 1st of January an arrangement was in force whereby trains stopped to pick up and put down passengers at this village.

In conclusion, Colonel Holmes said that he wished members would inform the public that the railway administration would always be glad to receive any complaints they have to make, and every effort would be made to deal with and remedy such complaints.

Mr. Berouti asked what had been the result of the efforts which his Excellency had promised some time ago to make towards raising a loan for Palestine.

His Excellency said:

"Palestine being in need of considerable capital expenditure to promote its development, the issue of a Government loan is contemplated to provide the funds that are required. The loan will not be issued, however, until the mandate for Palestine has been approved by the League of Nations. The principal purposes will be the development of railways, postal telegraph and telephone improvements, the building of roads, the improvement of harbours (large and costly harbour schemes must be dealt with separately), the cadastral survey, the erection of buildings for Government purposes, and the provision of funds to municipalities for water supplies, road construction and other town improvements. Most of this expenditure will bring its own direct revenue, from which interest and sinking-fund on the loan will be paid. The remainder of the expenditure, which will bring in no revenue directly, will, nevertheless, increase the general revenue in the country through promoting its development and prosperity. It is anticipated that interest and sinking-fund can be paid on the whole of the loan without the necessity of imposing any fresh taxation upon the country.

"The amount and terms of the loan are under discussion. All sections of the population of Palestine will be given an opportunity of contributing.

"The provision of the large sums which this loan will make available is the first condition of the economic revival of the country. From this revival, every portion of the community will benefit."

The Council then discussed, in private, the question of the rates of taxation to be imposed upon home-grown and imported tobacco. A statement on this subject will be published in due course.

Sheikh Freih Abu Muddien said he had been requested by the Bedouins of the district of Beersheba to ask the High Commissioner the following questions:—

1. Whether the Bedouins were expected to pay the same taxes as the fellahen?
2. Whether the Bedouin custom which did not permit the appearance of women in a court of law would be observed?
3. Whether the Bedouins were expected to alter their customs?

His Excellency said that when he had the pleasure of visiting Beersheba, three weeks ago, he then stated to a gathering of all the Sheikhs that the Government had no intention of interfering with the ancient customs of the Bedouin people, and to that statement he adhered. He was not aware that Bedouin women had been summoned to magistrates' courts. Nor was the legal secretary aware of this fact. At the same time, it would be hard to deny admission to women who wished to enter the courts. The District Governor would be asked for a report on the matter.

With regard to the collection of taxes, the Administration recognised that different methods had to be adopted in different parts of Palestine, owing to different conditions, and no doubt the Revenue Department would bear these distinctions in mind with respect to the Bedouin population. The Administration much appreciated the part played by the Sheikhs of Beersheba in assisting the Government and they had been pleased, in response to the strongly urged requests of the District Governor,

to make them a better financial acknowledgement of their services than heretofore, particularly in view of the extent of the areas they had to administer.

Sheikh Freih said they were very grateful to the Government for the financial assistance, but Bedouins did not value money, but the maintenance of their honour.

The meeting then adjourned.

The next meeting was fixed to take place on Tuesday, the 8th March, 1921.

Enclosure 2 in No. 112.

Memorandum on the Palestine Railways.

IN consequence of the efforts of the Turkish forces to reach the Suez Canal in the earlier part of the recent campaign, the employment of a considerable number of British troops became necessary, and owing to the lack of proper roads transport difficulties east of Kantara became insurmountable.

It was therefore decided to construct a standard gauge railway from the east bank of the Canal in the direction of Romani for the purpose of ensuring the regular despatch of supplies as well as to enable troops to be moved quickly to the forward area in the case of emergency.

The construction of the line began early in 1916, and fairly rapid progress was made as far as Romani (41 kilom.), which was reached in July.

On the 4th August, the Turks carried out an attack on the British forces near Romani, but had to retreat with heavy losses. This action delayed the laying of the line, but as soon as it was considered safe for the construction parties to go out again, the work continued without much interruption, and El Arish station (155 kilom. from Kantara) was opened in January, Rafa (200 kilom.) in March, and Belah (219 kilom.) in June 1917.

The determined resistance put up by the Turks at Gaza resulted in the construction of the line being held up for several months, and in the meantime the line from Rafa to Shellal was built for strategical reasons and was eventually extended to Beersheba.

When the situation permitted the construction work to proceed beyond Gaza the line was quickly pushed forward to Ludd, and when the final rout of the Turkish forces took place in the latter end of 1918 it was decided to make Haifa the terminus of the railway.

Haifa (412 kilom. from Kantara), was opened for traffic in January 1919, and it has generally been accepted that the rapid construction of the railway was an exceptionally fine feat. In addition the line had been doubled between Kantara and Rafa.

The narrow gauge between Jaffa and Ludd had been pulled up by the Turks for use on the Gaza front, and a 60 centim. line was laid between these points for the transport of supplies for the British forces. The line from Ludd to Jerusalem was also destroyed in several places and the bridges were blown up. In addition considerable damage was done to the rolling-stock and other plant belonging to the old French railway company.

In consequence of the heavy military demands, it was found that the narrow gauge line, after it has been thoroughly repaired, could not cope with the traffic to be handled, and it was decided to extend the broad gauge line from Ludd to Jerusalem, and this work was completed in a very short time.

It will be seen from the foregoing remarks that the railway was built at tremendous speed, and although it sufficed for military purposes, it could not be considered as fit for permanent civilian traffic.

The severe winter of 1919-1920 sorely tested its strength, and it will be remembered that communications with Egypt were practically cut off for a period of three weeks. It became apparent that to make the line fit to handle the traffic of Palestine it would be necessary to consider a very large programme of reconstruction. This included the building of bridges and culverts, the lifting of the line over a large area, widening of cuttings, clearing of drains, and stone ballasting of the line throughout.

Estimates were got out for this work, but no money was forthcoming until the arrival of the High Commissioner, who, immediately he arrived, sanctioned a sum of 100,000*l.* to cover the initial expense of protecting the line from further washouts in the principal areas and the extension of the broad gauge line to Jaffa.

This work was immediately put in hand, and I am glad to say twelve bridges

and twelve culverts have been built, and 37 kilom. of track well ballasted; also considerable quantities of earth have been handled in widening cuttings and clearing drains and raising banks above flood level, and it is hoped the line will withstand this winter's rains.

Prior to the armistice in 1918 it was practically impossible to undertake the handling of civilian traffic owing to the heavy military demands on the railway.

Subsequent to the armistice, however, through booked goods consignments were accepted in unlimited quantities.

It must be borne in mind that before the end of 1918 the line was operated practically throughout by soldier personnel, who became available for demobilisation within a short period after the cessation of hostilities, and in consequence of instructions issued by the War Office, were due for early return to the United Kingdom, as the railways in England were badly in need of their staff who had joined up for service. It became necessary therefore for the soldier personnel to be replaced by civilians, and great difficulty was experienced in obtaining men who had had previous railway knowledge.

There was a certain amount of material offering, but it unfortunately meant that the majority of the staff engaged, although decidedly willing, had to be taught the work, and this proved to be a serious drawback to the progress of the railway.

Furthermore, it was not possible to obtain the services of highly technical personnel from other railways, as the Military Administration was not prepared to offer contracts in excess of six months, and the insecurity of tenure would not induce suitable men to leave other permanent employment and accept temporary positions with this railway.

The lack of proper passenger rolling-stock has been realised all through, and in December 1919, the War Office was requested to authorise two complete hospital trains, consisting of twenty-three coaches all told, to be converted into passenger coaches.

Sixteen of these coaches have already been placed in service, and the work on the remaining coaches, which has been held up owing to the scarcity of fittings, &c., is now in course of completion.

In consequence of the railway not being hitherto provided with proper rolling-stock, it has been necessary to retain a number of Egyptian State Railway coaches which were supplied during the war for the movement of troops and are of an old type.

The conversion of the Ludd-Jaffa section to standard gauge has proved to be of considerable benefit in the handling of goods consigned to and from Jaffa.

The ballasting of this section will be sufficiently completed within the next three of four months to allow of an acceleration in the time table.

Jerusalem station is now three times the size it was prior to the war, and apart from increased booking facilities being provided, modern lavatory arrangements and electric lighting are being installed.

The work of strengthening the bridges on the Jerusalem line to carry a heavier type of locomotive is now in progress, and it is anticipated that, after the end of February, it will be no longer necessary to have to change engines at Artuf, and that a slight reduction in the time taken for the journey between Ludd and Jerusalem will be possible.

A standard gauge line is being laid from a point off the Jaffa line to the site of the Surafend cantonment for the purpose of handling the army traffic for the troops that will be stationed there in the future.

A short line will be constructed in the immediate future from Kafr Jinnis to Beit Nabala for the purpose of conveying stone from the quarries at Beit Nabala for rebuilding the roads.

A line will also be constructed from Ras-el-Ain to Petach Tikvah to serve the requirements of the colony there, the cost being provided from private sources. It is also intended to lay a short line from Mejdel to Askalon in connection with the work of the Antiquities Department, and also to cater for the future tourist traffic.

There has been a decided increase in the passenger traffic, and it is confidently expected that a large increase in the goods traffic will follow as time goes on and the country gets properly opened up.

Six locomotives of a special type have been ordered for work on the Jerusalem line on account of the heavy gradients and the sharp curves.

In February of last year a service of dining and sleeping cars was inaugurated, and these have proved to be a decided acquisition to the comfort of the travelling public.

A daily train service was instituted between Palestine and Egypt in November last, and it is intended as soon as further stock becomes available and if the traffic justifies the expense, to run an extra train later in the day on three days a week from Haifa to Ludd, and *vice versa*, in order to avoid passengers for Jaffa and Jerusalem lines having to proceed by the 5.15 A.M. train. That train will continue to run, otherwise passengers for Egypt would be obliged to spend the night at Kantara.

An arrangement has been made with the International Sleeping Car Company to provide a further number of dining and sleeping cars, and this will permit of the extra passenger train, which was put on in November last, having a dining and sleeping car attached to it, and if it is found that the traffic on the Jaffa-Jerusalem line warrants it, a dining car will be put on to this service.

It is also expected that next winter the railway will be in a position to cater for the tourist traffic in far greater numbers than has been possible this year.

Considerable alterations are being made to the Ludd station in the shape of the construction of two island platforms with overhead cover.

There has been a shortage of first-class accommodation on the narrow gauge lines, and this has been entirely due to the fact that the passenger coaches captured from the Turks were in a very bad state of repair, and it has been extremely difficult to obtain the necessary materials to put them again in running order. It is expected, however, that first-class coaches will be available for both the Acre and Nablus services within the next few weeks.

In order to promote the exportation of oranges from Palestine to Egypt a considerable reduction has been made in the freightage rates.

The El Hersh railway bridge at Kantara was taken out of use at the end of December at the requirement of the Suez Canal Company, and since that date through booked consignments have been handled by means of the truck transporter which is satisfactorily coping with the traffic.

Consequent upon the decision given for the removal of the railway bridge, it became necessary to build a new passenger station on the east bank of the Canal, and this involved the laying of 3 kilom. of line.

Although the fate of the bridge was not finally known until the end of November, the new station was brought into use on the 30th December, and is within 2 minutes' walk of the Egyptian State Railways' station at Kantara West.

The length of track operated by the Palestine railways (including the Kantara-Rafa section which is being operated on behalf of the army), is approximately 1,000 kilom.

The sections are as follows:—

Kantara-Haifa.
Rafa-Beersheba.
Jaffa-Jerusalem.
Haifa-Acre.
Haifa-El Hamme.
Afule-Tulkaram.
Messudieh-Nablus.

In order to economise in cost, arrangements are being made to discharge all colliers for the railway at Haifa and local labour is being employed as far as possible.

It is intended to move the locomotive workshops and stores from Kantara to Haifa in the near future, and this should afford considerable employment to Palestinians.

The provision of proper station buildings and goods sheds and accommodation for the staff is expected to be taken in hand at an early date, and orders will be placed for sufficient passenger rolling-stock to meet future requirements.

[E 2354/35/88]

No. 113.

Sir H. Samuel to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 22.)

(No. 83.)

My Lord,

Jerusalem, February 12, 1921.

I BEG to enclose herewith, for your information, the notes of a conversation I have had to-day with Auni Abdul Hadi, who was one of the Emir Feisal's principal officers in the Damascus Government.

I have, &c.

HERBERT SAMUEL, High Commissioner.

Enclosure in No. 113.

Report of Interview with Auni Abdul Hadi.

I RECEIVED this morning Auni Abdul Hadi, who was the Emir Feisal's secretary at Damascus, and who has lately been living in Egypt, and from there has been in close touch with the King of the Hedjaz, Emir Feisal, Emir Abdullah and the supporters of the Arab cause in Syria, Palestine and elsewhere. He is now proposing to go to Transjordan to see Abdullah. It became apparent in the course of a long conversation that his principal purpose in coming to see me was to endeavour to obtain some expression of approval of the movement in Transjordan against the French. This, of course, I did not give, and said, on the contrary, that it was disapproved by the British Government, as was stated in a proclamation we had issued to the people of Transjordan; moreover, I thought that if it resulted in an attack upon the French forces in Syria, it would be found that they were well equipped and sufficiently numerous to repel such attack as would be made upon them in the south, and I therefore gave him friendly advice not to pursue it further. Abdul Hadi dwelt upon the deep disappointment of the Arabs generally, and the Shereefian family in particular, that, after the part they had played in the war, they had secured no results. The French had divided Syria into a number of separate States, and they had appointed very unsuitable local people to the principal posts of the Administration.

It was impossible for the leaders of the Arab movement to sit still and accept the present situation. He expressed the hope that I would represent to His Majesty's Government the very strong feelings which they entertained in this matter, and that Great Britain would use her influence with the French to secure a change in the existing régime in Syria—which they could not possibly accept as a final solution. The Arabs did not like the present form of government in Palestine, but they thought that the country was well administered, and they had complete faith in the sincerity of His Majesty's Government and of my own in desiring the welfare of the population. They were convinced also that self-governing institutions would be allowed to develop in the future, but in regard to Syria they had no such feelings and no such faith. I said that it was not a question only of the policy of His Majesty's Government, but that the French Government pursued an independent course, and that we could not be held responsible for the situation in Syria. I personally had always desired, and still desired, that there should be a friendly settlement between the French Government and the Arab nationalists, and I felt sure that His Majesty's Government would desire nothing better than to see such an arrangement, but that the situation arose from the fact that there was not one European Power alone but two who were interested in this part of Asia.

We discussed subsequently the present situation in Palestine, and I explained the course of events with reference to my recent conversations with the members of the Arab Nationalist Conference that had met at Haifa, with regard to which he had received information from them. He was of opinion that the political difficulties in Palestine largely arose from a misunderstanding on the part of the Arabs of the meaning of the term "Jewish National Home." Translated into Arabic the phrase really meant that Palestine was to be a Jewish National Fatherland, and the people consequently were convinced that the Arab population would be obliged to go elsewhere. He was personally of opinion that every effort should be made to enable Arabs and Jews to work in harmony, and that the desirable course would be to enable them to co-operate in practical measures. He had had a conversation in Egypt with Sir Alfred Mond and Dr. Weizmann, and was convinced that the fears that were entertained with regard to Zionism were unfounded. I said I would be glad to receive suggestions from him as to particular measures which he thought might be carried out with advantage in Palestine, and he said that he would be glad to write to me on the subject.

With reference to Transjordan, I pointed out the disadvantages that had resulted from the activities of Shereef Ali-bin-Hussein at Amman and now at Salt. Before his arrival local Governments had been established and were working not unsatisfactorily, with the assistance of a small number of British advisers. A gendarmerie and a reserve force had been established, taxes were collected and progress was being effected in many directions. I had advanced substantial sums for the payment of the gendarmerie and the reserve force from Palestinian funds. Now, however, the presence of Emir Abdullah at Ma'an, and Shereef Ali as his representative at Amman and

Salt, had introduced confusion into the minds of the people. The tribes were refusing to pay their taxes, the authority of the local Governments was diminished, the gendarmerie had had to be reduced in number, nor was I disposed to continue making advances of money from Palestine funds for police and military forces which might be induced to take part in the movement against our Allies. Abdul Hadi said he was convinced that the Emir Abdullah was determined to do nothing which would be displeasing to the British Government, on whose approval and support he recognised that everything depended. He asked what steps I thought advisable to improve the present unsatisfactory position, and I said that if Shereef Ali withdrew to Ma'an I should view it without any dissatisfaction. He replied to this that the withdrawal of Shereef Ali would diminish the prestige of the Emir in that district, but possibly he might be withdrawn and someone else substituted. He would discuss the matter with Emir Abdullah at Ma'an, and in any case he would strongly urge that nothing should be done in Transjordan which would affect the authority of the local Governments. He would come and see me again on his return from Ma'an.

[E 3102/117/89]

No. 114.

Consul Palmer to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 10.)

(No. 4.)

My Lord,

Damascus, February 19, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to report that the French now appear to be seriously considering a modified unification of Syria.

As at present discussed, the projet would entail the unification upon lines of a federation of Aleppo, Homs, Hama, Damascus, the town of Beirout, the Alawid district round Lattakia, and part of the Hauran.

It is at present proposed to leave the "Grand Liban," the Jebel Druze, and the Druze Hauran outside this federation. Beirout would be the port of Syria, and as eventual capital Beirout, Aleppo, Damascus and Baalbek (although the last is situated within the "Grand Liban"), each has its partisans.

The "Grand Liban" would presumably be more nearly assimilated to a French colony than the federated States; and this policy would appear to be confirmed by the number of appointments of French officials to administrative posts in the district in question.

I have, &c.

C. E. S. PALMER.

[E 3105/117/44]

No. 115.

Consul Palmer to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 10.)

(No. 7. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Damascus, February 21, 1921.

WITH reference to the second and last paragraphs of my despatch No. 2 of the 18th February, I have the honour to transmit herewith copy of a report addressed to G.S.I., Jerusalem and Cairo, by the British liaison officer here. I regret only one copy was available, and I am too short-handed here to have it copied.

As Colonel Easton only has instructions to forward his reports to G.S.I., Jerusalem and Cairo, presumably one of these latter would telegraph anything urgent to Bagdad; but it seems probable that there would be delay in such reports reaching the War Office, even if they were not simply embodied with others in extract form. Possibly the Foreign Office never receives them at all.

The salient points of the report in question appear to be:—

The French did not actually stop the caravan from leaving, but merely succeeded in frightening one man into staying behind, and the others into deciding to reach Kubeise by a roundabout route. Both these changes of plan sound suspicious.

As a result, the guns, which probably are not a myth, were sent on to a rendezvous ahead, so that a formal search of the caravan here must prove fruitless.

Colonel Easton's attempts to telegraph south or telephone to Beyrout were met by the statement that no wires were working, and the same reply was given to-day. As a similar inopportune break-down has occurred before, the coincidence struck me as

curious. I offered to send word to Beyrout by special messenger, in the hope that Mr. Satow could get a message through to Haifa; for the information seemed so circumstantial as to call for some immediate action here.

Finally Colonel Easton decided to motor down to our wireless station at Samakh, and attempt to get through to Bagdad from there. He left at 2 P.M. to-day. He returned here, however, at 5 P.M., finding the roads too bad to proceed.

I had just heard previous to his return that the bridge south of Deraa had been blown up by Arabs, and that the train for the south had returned here. The line via Beyrout is also reported down.

Under the circumstances I trust it will meet with your Lordship's approval that I am sending down one of the cawases to Beyrout with this report and Colonel Easton's telegram in the hope that Mr. Satow can get word to Haifa in time. Should any future caravan attempt to leave, I consider it would be better not to ask for French intervention, but to appear ignorant of its intended departure, and try to inform Bagdad in time for the necessary measures to be taken from there.

Returning to Colonel Easton's report, while agreeing that it is useless to expect a more benevolent interpretation of their responsibilities from the French as long as Transjordan remains the asylum for anti-French intrigues and worse, I must confess to some disappointment that the transfer of Major Somerset, their special *bête noire*, from Irbid to a district further removed from their frontier, has not had a more pronounced effect upon their attitude. Of course, I am not yet aware of what real grounds they have for their many vague accusations, e.g., that they have captured papers proving our complicity in attacks on them. If such documents are only of the type referred to in my No. 3 of the 19th February, the French accusations must fall to the ground. But it will not be easy to convince local French officials that the insertion of words such as "The English are in accord with us" is entirely irresponsible and unauthorised.

If the French sincerely believe such charges as they bring against us, they could hardly fail to welcome an immediate extradition treaty for "political" offenders, i.e., brigands and murderers. Their profession of eagerness to come to an immediate understanding on this point certainly sounds sincere, but they invariably hint that we would never agree to such a course. On the other hand, the unpopularity we should incur by such a measure would be incurred equally by the French, and they can hardly afford to take this risk as easily as we can.

Note.—The caravan is expected to take about fifteen days on the journey. It left on the 18th.

I have, &c.

C. E. S. PALMER.

Enclosure in No. 115.

Report on the Situation in Damascus.

THERE appears to be a renewal of Mesopotamian activities in Damascus. On the 14th instant I received news of the projected departure of two caravans for Kubeise, belonging to Ibrahim Mumeir, of Bagdad, and Ibrahim Dalul, of Damascus. The following were reported as accompanying these: Dlemil Medfahy (who brought the proceeds of the raid on Tel Afar to Kus), Neji Suedi (one time Governor of Aleppo) and fourteen ex-Shereefian officers.

I asked for confirmation from the French Mission, and on the 15th heard that the caravans were due to leave, and that Medfahy, finding that his departure was known, was staying, but that Suedi and the officers were still going.

Eventually, on the 18th, the following left with the two caravans: officers, Neji Suedi, Abdullah Daleemy, Abdulattif Falahi, his brother Mohamed, Husni-el-Hashemy and brother, Ibrahim Shawy, Yuness Wahby, Mohamed Saleh, Abel-el-Mejid, Captain Taufic, Captain Ismail Sabri, who left the train of Mesopotamian officers for repatriation at the last minute and was one of the men whom Bagdad marked "not to be repatriated free."

I also heard that this caravan carried from 400-500 rifles and a certain amount of ammunition. Rifles cost from £ T. 5-7 (gold), ammunition, 45 megidiehs (£ E. 7) per 1,000 rounds.

The principal agent for these arms is Yusef Hasseimi, brother of Mohd Pasha Hasseimi, who procures the arms from the Kurdish quarter. These arms were, I found

out later, sent on with part of the caravan on the 13th to Domeir, 60 kilom. east of Damascus, where they would await the arrival of the rest of the caravan on the 19th, so that, although I asked the French to search the caravan, which they readily consented to do, it is doubtful whether they found more than the fifteen rifles for which I had given permission to the camel-driver to take with him for defence purposes west of Kubeise.

Ibrahim-el-Mum'eir, the above-mentioned camel-driver, told me a certain amount of truth and a great number of lies, and he strictly denied the presence of any arms in the caravan, though he himself was carrying a Turkish 1914 rifle which had apparently been issued from store and which he had bought here.

The caravan carried a certain amount of propaganda, it is said, counselling acts hostile to the British, and letters for Abdel-el-Razak Bey, Ibn Fahd Pasha Sadoun, brother of Ajeimy Sadoun.

The Mesopotamian leaders in Damascus now are: Assin Pasha, Mauud Pasha, Djemil Medfahy, Ali Jaudet, Maumoud Adeeb, Jamil Lutfy, Captain Said Effendi and Abd-el-Fattah.

There are also at present in Damascus Yusef Suedi and El-Sayed-el-Sadr, a man of some influence with lower classes, who are said to be trying to organise a deputation to go to Europe to protest against "British atrocities and injustice in Mesopotamia." Suedi's idea may be to try and lend more importance to his son, Neji, who it is alleged wishes to come to an understanding with the British.

It has further been reported that the following had left Damascus recently for the Mosul district, with a view to stirring up disaffection amongst the Sandikoli tribe: Ali Mustapha-el-Kurdi, Kasem Ibn-el-Haj Shukri and Haj Easa.

Also a certain Major Fouan is supposed to have left at the same time from Aleppo for the districts of Zeibar and Ukr to incite against the British. And lastly, Captain Ali Kardukly and Major Ismail Sharkasy are supposed to have left Deir-ez-Zor for the purpose of stirring up trouble amongst the Dazieh Shawan and Taldany. Risings are supposed to take place in April and begin in the Nejaf, and the Ukeil Bedouin are acting as intermediaries for all communications.

Major Khalil Zeki (No. 11), Major Nazif Ibn Abdullatif (No. 12) and Major Kasem Sabri (No. 13), on list of ex-officers for repatriation to Mesopotamia, are all reported as disaffected and intending to proceed, when able, to Mosul for purpose of anti-British intrigue.

Agents in Bagdad are said to be: Fakhri Bey, of Haidar Khan quarter; Sheir Said, brother of Abdel Wahab; Captain Hasan Fahmi, Mouser-el-Shalabi, all of Bas-el-Keriat quarter; Haj Abdel Razak, of Nouraba quarter; and Rashed-el-Sufeik, Kadoun-el-Haddad and Abraham Argroumi.

As regards Damascus, the gun-running is supposed to be done by Ukeil Bedouin under the direction of Mohd Yusef Hasseimi and Nansour-el-Rumeih. The French are trying to collect arms and are imposing heavy fines on those without permits; it is therefore obviously to the advantage of those who have buried arms to sell them for 6l. or 7l. rather than risk detection and death, or heavy fines.

It is not rational to expect the French to risk not only the lives of their men, but also attracting the hate of the Arab still more, by interfering with the export of arms, merely for the *beaux yeux* of the British, who do nothing to give any hope of counter-measures in Transjordan. Neither have the French got the necessary camel corps to police the desert even if they wished to.

In Transjordan the British allow propaganda stating that the Arab is to attack the French, that the British are in agreement, and that large stocks of arms are hidden in Damascus to be used at the critical moment, whereas at the same time the British authorities expect the French to stop these arms leaving Damascus. The less arms in Damascus the more pleased the French will be, and with the best will in the world they cannot be expected to create special police and make special raids to prevent arms (imported originally by the British) from being sent to be used against the British rather than against themselves, when the French can procure no satisfaction as regards the proper administration and control of Transjordan. A subject of much discussion at present is that of the unity of Syria. The French appear to have come to the conclusion that their policy of decentralisation into vilayet administrations is not a success and there is every sign of a new policy being adopted in the near future. There is, however, no talk of an Emir being appointed and it is not possible to forecast which will be the capital, Damascus, Aleppo or some entirely new and unsuggested town.

It is fairly certain that the Grand Liban will remain outside this confederacy,

which lends colour to the belief that the French may eventually decide, once they have formed the "United Syria," only to lend military support to the Lebanon if the cry for economy in France proves too strong for them. The cry of "United Syria" will also be useful to them in turning the people's thoughts towards Palestine just at a season when racial troubles may be expected there.

The fall of Aintab has not had a strong moral effect here, the people believing that the garrison broke through leaving only civilians and wounded to be captured. The French attitude towards me and any request I have to make continues to be most thoroughly cordial, and when sounded as to whether my further presence here after the arrival of His Britannic Majesty's consul would be resented by them, I received assurances to the contrary, though naturally enquiries were made from an entirely unofficial point of view.

Communication remains unsatisfactory: on the 15th I tried to wire or telephone without success, again on the 19th I was unable to wire, and B.L.O., Beyrout, was unable to hear me on the telephone, I therefore handed in my wire K. 52 to the French mission for transmission, though it is quite likely that this had to be sent by post as well.

N. EASTON, *Lieutenant-Colonel,
British Liaison Officer.*

Damascus, February 20, 1921.

[E 3108/117/89] No. 116.

Consul Palmer to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 10.)

(No. 10.)

My Lord,

Damascus, February 23, 1921.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 7 of the 21st instant, I have the honour to report that the railway bridge which was blown up by Arabs was that situated between the stations of Zeizun and Makarin on the Mezerib-Haiffa line east of Tiberias.

The Arabs, who are said to have been some of Sherif Abdullah's men, appear to have been in force, as it is stated that they drove off the handful of gendarmes sent against them, and even some French troops sent later.

The bridge is a stone one, and one arch out of the three has been destroyed.

I have, &c.

C. E. S. PALMER.

[E 3109/117/89] No. 117.

Consul Satow to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 10.)

(No. 33.)

My Lord,

Beirout, February 24, 1921.

WITH reference to Consul Palmer's despatch No. 4 of the 19th February* from Damascus in which he suggests that the question of Syrian unification is now being seriously considered, I venture to express doubt whether it is at present in any way possible to forecast what will be done in this direction. The cry of a united Syria has been frequently raised, but the component elements are so dissimilar that it is hard to see upon what a serious unity could be based.

It is of course certain that the recently created "Great Lebanon" (see Mr. Fontana's despatch No. 77 of the 2nd September last) will wish to remain outside any new creation, with a view to retaining as much of its old privileges as possible. Recently a draft proposal, according to which the budgets of the Customs and certain other departments of Syria and of the Great Lebanon would be unified and henceforth depend on the High Commissioner, was forwarded by him to the Administrative Commission of the Lebanon. They are still discussing it, but the proposal is viewed with much disfavour. It may, they say, be a step towards Syrian unity, but, if so, the Lebanon should remain outside.

The present administrative division of Syria is: Great Lebanon, State of Damascus, autonomous territory of the Alaouites (from north of Latakia to Nahr-el-Kebir), and the Government of Aleppo. To these there is, as Mr. Palmer has reported, an inclination to add a Druse area. The frontiers between the districts are still to some extent provisional and liable to adjustment, and the whole arrangement appears to be an

* See No. 114.

attempt at greater administrative convenience. I doubt whether it will be radically modified at present. Beirout is of course now in the Great Lebanon. Whether it will maintain its position as a port is open to question. As other ports and railways are built it will have several serious competitors. At present a beginning is being made with the relaying of the railway from Tripoli to Homs.

The complaint as to the Great Lebanon being treated as a French colony and as to the appointment of French "conseillers" who practically control the Administration is not a new one. Mr. Fontana has dealt with it in several despatches, notably in his No. 117. It seems inevitable that in present conditions there should be such complaints.

I have, &c.

H. E. SATOW.

[E 3142/117/89]

No. 118.

Consul Palmer to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 11.)

(No. 11.)

My Lord,

Damascus, February 25, 1921.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 10 of the 23rd instant, I have the honour to report that the bridge destroyed by Arabs is said to have been blown up by Ahmad Mureiwed and his followers.

My source of information is the Director of Public Works in the Arab Government, who had accompanied the French "délégué" and other notabilities from here to Deraa to open a new civil hospital there.

Mureiwed was a follower of Feisal, who fled this city upon the French occupation, and was condemned to death by the French by default.

I have, &c.

C. E. S. PALMER.

[E 3345/117/89]

No. 119.

Consul Palmer to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 16.)

(No. 12.)

My Lord,

Damascus, February 28, 1921.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 11 of the 25th, I have the honour to report that Mureiwed was accompanied by Mahmoud Faour. The two had in all about 150 horsemen with them, and then split up into at least two sections.

Mureiwed, accompanied by about seventy, has since attacked and pillaged the village of Shagara in the caza of Kuneitra, killed the headman (a Circassian), drove off cattle to the value of 5,000L., and took off as prisoners fifteen Syrian gendarmes.

Most of these details were admitted to me to be correct by the Chief of Police, and I have the rest from an unimpeachable source.

French troops in an armoured train were hurried to the spot, and some fighting must have taken place, as about forty French wounded have been returned from Deraa and admitted to the French hospital here. 450 Syrian volunteers, part of a local volunteer levy of 1,000 men collected in this town by the French some time ago, have now been despatched to the Kuneitra caza.

I have, &c.

C. E. S. PALMER.

[E 3509/117/89]

No. 120.

Consul Palmer to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 22.)

(No. 15.)

My Lord,

Damascus, March 2, 1921.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 12 of the 28th February, I have the honour to report that Mureiwed and Faour's bands amounted in all to 300 men. The French have further despatched four companies of Senegalese and one field battery via Deraa with the intention of clearing up the entire district. The raiders have already been bombed by aeroplanes; but, though the damaged bridge has been temporarily repaired, it is not considered safe yet to run trains.

The above details are all official. I am further reliably informed that it is the intention to make a strong protest to London about this raid, as the men concerned are alleged to have come from the British sphere of influence in Transjordan.

I have, &c.

C. E. S. PALMER.

[E 3510/117/89]

No. 121.

Consul Palmer to Earl Curzon — (Received March 22.)

(No. 16.)

My Lord,

Damascus, March 2, 1921.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 8 of the 22nd February, 1921, I have the honour to report that, at the French request, a meeting of the Druse chiefs was held recently at Sweida to draw up definite propositions for a Constitution.

Farhan Sharaf, the Druse sheikh of Karyat Tima, finally drew up a memorandum, his own copy of which is attached together with a copy of its translation. The original memorandum was presented to the French Mission.

I may add that my informant, in whose house several of the chiefs stayed, stated that Rachid Bey Talii, referred to in my despatch No. 8, also had a considerable hand in compiling the memorandum.

The French were also stated to have practically decided on Selim Attrash as Emir or Governor, as Nessib is not altogether trusted by them.

Selim, if appointed, would reside at Sweida, where there is a fort, though his own house is at Ura. He would have a guard of his own clan; and there would also be locally raised gendarmerie under French officers. The Druses do not really favour the idea of a Governor, as they expect it will lead to fighting among various chiefs. In general, they are stated to attach little importance to their own proposals; and, although the French are stated to have accepted them, I doubt whether this means more than that they have accepted the memorandum, and are now considering what modifications should be introduced.

This draft Constitution is not the one drawn up by Faris Khouri, referred to in my No. 5.

I have, &c.

C. E. S. PALMER.

Enclosure in No. 121.

Memorandum by Farhan Sharaf, presented to the French Delegate.

(Translation.)

ACCORDING to your Excellency's repeated orders we have been charged by the General Assembly of all the different classes of the nation, and hereby state their demands to your Excellency, the High Commissioner, in the hope that they will be confirmed by the French Republic:—

1. The Jebel Druse to be a constitutional Government with complete interior independence, but under the French mandate.

2. This Druse State accepts the French mandate, but in a form that will not touch its independence.

3. The State to be styled the "Emirate of the Jebel Druse," and is to include the two remaining portions of the Leja and Safa; and will be bounded on the east by the Mahar, on the north by a point north of Deir Ali; on the west by Hebab (Khabab), Ezra, Busr-et-Hariri, the nahie of Sikake Umm Weled, Sahwet-el-Karn, Bosra Eski Cham, Es Summakiyat, Umm-es-Surab and El Fedein, cutting the former (French) railway line (destroyed by the Germans and transferred to Beer Sheba) which once ran to Tavra, which latter belongs to Hamam Markh and Kasr-el-Halabat; on the south by As-Safra, which is south of Karaa-el-Anweined, and the boundary of Kelaat-el-Azrak, Al Fuluk, El Maad and, finally, El Mankara, which is east of the Safa.

4. A Governor will be elected by the natives in a special manner (not specified) every four years, and he will have a similarly elected Administrative Council, the elections to which will be made every three years.

5. This council will replace the National Assembly, and must be not less than thirty in number.

6. The president and each member would have clearly defined duties, and regulations concerning these would be confirmed by a General Assembly.

7. The Druse Government will accept financial and economic help from the French, but refuses to belong to an eventual unified Syria, except for commercial purposes only.

8. The French have no right to interfere in the internal affairs of the Druse State, the natives of which should not be liable to military service, nor to be disarmed.

9. By accepting the French mandate is meant that the Druse State accepts French right to control Druse foreign policy, but not internal affairs.

10. The income of the State would be its share of duties on goods from Palestine, on the salt of Ethra and Kaf, a tax on its own villages, and any special taxes the council might decide upon. But the council cannot levy the tithes on land ("ashar") unless such tithes have first been agreed to by a special General Assembly.

The religious heads known as "akl" are elected for life, and the French have no voice in religious affairs.

(Seal of Farhan Sharaf of Karyat Tima.)

(No date.)

[E 3511/117/89]

No. 122.

Consul Palmer to Earl Curzon. — (Received March 22.)

(No. 17.)

My Lord,

Damascus, March 3, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to give herewith the present boundaries of the State of Damascus, as these differ considerably from those of the old vilayet of Syria.

The French policy of severing the fertile valley of the Bika (the old Coele-Syria) from Damascus and uniting it to the Grand Liban has had an adverse effect upon the trade and prosperity of this town, and caused a large rise in prices.

The similar customs barrier between here and the State of Aleppo, from which most of the meat supplies of this town were drawn, has had a like effect.

The boundaries given below may also help to elucidate the draft boundaries of the projected independent Druse Emirate given in my No. 16:—

Boundaries of State of Damascus.

Boundary on East.—A line extending from Kalat-el-Azrak in the south to the boundary of the Rika kaza in the Aleppo State, passing east of the Hauran and Palmyra and roughly contiguous to the boundary of Deir-ez-Zor.

North.—The old boundary between the Damascus (Syria) and Aleppo vilayets, touching the confines of the boundary of the kaza of Nmarat-el-Naman, which belongs to Aleppo. Hama is thus within the Damascus zone.

West.—The French Damascus-Homs Prolongement Railway from the kaza of Maarat-el-Naman to Kusseir (between Homs and Baalbeck), where it leaves the railway and runs south over the Anti-Lebanon, thus leaving the kazas of Baalbeck, Bikaa, Rashaya and Hasbaya to the "Grand Liban" zone. The other western limit is the kaza of Uraniat, which was formerly in the Hama sanjak and lies west of the railway. Besides the above kaza, Hama and Homs also cede about forty villages to the Grand Liban. In some spots the boundary follows the Asi River (Orontes).

South.—A line from north of Lake Huleh running along the Jordan to Lake Tiberias. For the rest of Franco-British Convention of the 23rd December, 1920, No. E 16081/4164/44.

The following kazas are therefore in the Damascus State:—

Deraa, Ezraa, Kuneitra, Wadi-el-Ajam, Zebdani, Damascus, Duma, Jeirud, Nebk, Homs, Jib-el-Jarrah, Kuryatin, Tadmor, Hamah, Salimiyet, Al Hamra; and the Jebel Druse and the Druse Hauran, the kazas of which are: Sweida, part of El Mesmieh.

The Druse State—to be separated from the Damascus State—would include 130 Druse and ten Christian villages.

I have, &c.

C. E. S. PALMER.

[E 3512/117/89]

No. 123.

Consul Palmer to Earl Curzon. — (Received March 22.)

(No. 18.)

My Lord,

Damascus, March 5, 1921.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 12 of the 28th February, I have the honour to report that the Kuneitra and Deraa districts have now been officially cleared of the raiders.

Sixty-seven of them had also attacked the village of Fik, where they killed three persons.

The French bombed Beduin tents near this latter village, but it does not follow that they were really those of the raiders. The French losses are officially stated to be two killed and seven wounded.

My informant was the French general here.

In spite of the statement in paragraph 1 above, the British liaison officer at Beirout, while returning by night to Damascus from Tiberias in his motor-car in spite of warnings not to attempt the journey, was fired at by two or three men near Kuneitra.

I have, &c.

C. E. S. PALMER.

[E 3513/117/89]

No. 124.

Consul Palmer to Earl Curzon. — (Received March 22.)

(No. 19.)

My Lord,

Damascus, March 7, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to report that Asad Attrash with ten of his men has joined the Sherif Abdullah at Kaan. The fourteen gendarmes who were on guard at the bridge, recently blown up by Mureiwed, are also said to have joined Abdullah. It is further stated that many volunteers and ex-officers from the Damascus State are flocking to him, and that he no longer intends to pay newcomers, as many are ready to join him without. An attack by him is considered imminent.

Sheikh Ali Farhat of Bekata, an agent of Mahmoud Fahour, is stated to have visited Damascus in disguise until to-day, and while here to have warned Faour of the despatch of French troops to Deraa.

Faour, who had been in that vicinity, promptly retired into the Ajlun.

My informant added that the Circassians round Kuneitra are adopting an anti-French attitude; as also Emir Said-el-Jezairli of the Abdul Kader family—who had formerly been considered pro-French, and who is now at Zawieh in the Kuneitra district.

Metaib-el-Attrash was in Damascus recently and was asked by the French to try and raise volunteers among the Druzes for the Syrian legion, but there has been no response.

With reference to my despatch No. 7 of the 21st February the same informant considered that gun-running caravans for Mesopotamia were most likely to pick up their cargoes at Duma and Adra, both of which are close to Damascus and north-east of it. I shall attempt to find some way of gleaning information from one of these villages.

In general the situation on the Druze-Hauran border remains the same, and raids on each other are of almost daily occurrence.

I have, &c.

C. E. S. PALMER.

[E 3356/800/44]

No. 125.

Foreign Office to General Haddad Pasha.

Sir,

Foreign Office, March 22, 1921.

I AM directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to refer to your conversation with Mr. Lindsay on the 15th March, when, after stating that an agreement had been concluded between the French Government and the Turkish Nationalist delegation by which Urfa and Aintab were to be ceded to the Angora Government, you handed to

Mr. Lindsay a letter addressed to the Secretary of State by the Emir Feisal protesting against this transaction.

2. In reply, I am to point out that the frontier between Turkey and Syria is defined in the Treaty of Peace with Turkey, and will only become effective on the entry into force of that instrument, which has not yet been signed by all the Allied and Associated Powers.

3. With the coming into force of the Turkish Treaty, France, as mandatory for Syria, will be responsible for the integrity of the territory covered by the terms of her mandate. In these circumstances His Majesty's Government are not directly concerned in the matter.

I am, &c.

LANCELOT OLIPHANT.

[E 3935/31/88]

No. 126.

Count de Saint-Aulaire to Earl Curzon. — (Received March 26.)

LE 23 de ce mois, au cours d'un entretien avec l'Ambassadeur de France, sa Seigneurie le Comte Curzon of Kedleston a bien voulu rappeler les efforts faits à diverses reprises par les autorités britanniques auprès de l'Emir Abdullah pour amener ce dernier à s'abstenir de toute intrigue dans la zone placée sous mandat français et plus particulièrement au Hauran. M. le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat pour les Affaires étrangères avait même ajouté que l'intervention du Roi Hussein venait d'être provoquée à cet effet.

L'Ambassadeur de France a été heureux de porter ces informations à la connaissance de son Gouvernement.

M. Briand s'y est montré fort sensible. Il a toutefois invité le Comte de Saint-Aulaire à attirer l'attention du Gouvernement britannique sur le fait qu'Abdullah venait de lancer à ses frères syriens une proclamation faisant appel à leurs sentiments de "solidarité musulmane pour lutter contre les colonisateurs français" coupables d'avoir "sapé en un moment le trône édifié par la Syrie sur une politique de rapprochement et d'amitié envers tous les peuples sans distinction."

Cet appel est très violent en la forme, injurieux et véhément à l'égard de la France. En même temps, des convocations individuelles à se rendre à Maan sont adressées à divers notables, en particulier aux chefs bédouins les plus marquants de la zone placée sous mandat français, et contiennent les renseignements les plus fantaisistes tant sur les forces réelles dont dispose l'Emir Abdullah que sur les événements diplomatiques actuels en Europe et les relations entre la France et la Grande-Bretagne.

Le Gouvernement français constate donc que les récents efforts tentés par le Gouvernement britannique auprès de l'Emir Abdullah n'ont pas jusqu'à présent donné de résultats appréciables.

En présence de ces actes caractérisés d'hostilité, le Gouvernement français envisage avec une réelle préoccupation la réception qui sera faite à l'Emir, le 27 mars, à Jérusalem, par Mr. Winston Churchill. Les marques de considération publique qui pourraient être témoignées par les autorités britanniques à des personnalités qui ont une attitude aussi ouvertement agressive envers la France auraient en effet leur répercussion immédiate sur l'opinion indigène de Syrie et du Hauran. Les populations musulmanes les interpréteraient comme une preuve de divergence dans la politique suivie par la France et la Grande-Bretagne en Orient.

Le Comte de Saint-Aulaire saisit, &c.

*Ambassade de France, Londres,
le 25 mars 1921.*

[E 3806/117/89]

No. 127.

Consul Palmer to Earl Curzon. — (Received March 30.)

(No. 21.)

My Lord,

Damascus, March 9, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith a sketch of the system of administration now in force in the State of Damascus.

Every Syrian employee must have the approval of the French mission before definite appointment.

In spite of the number of high officials, the departmental staffs have been reduced, and it is claimed that the system is more economical than previously.

Censorship.—It must be noted that there is a strict postal censorship maintained and passengers on trains are liable to be searched to see if they are carrying letters. There is also a press censorship.

The French civil and military missions are still paid from the French military budget.

There is no election by suffrage to posts in the Arab Administration. The Governor is appointed by the French, and he then nominates, with their advice, the Cabinet, or "Medjliss-el-Mudara." These are no longer styled Ministers, but Directors-General, and correspond to the old departmental heads of a vilayet. Each head draws up his departmental budget, which is submitted every three months to the Finance Department, where the French financial conseiller sees it.

The Governor further nominates a President to the "Medjliss-el-Shura" (Government Council), and the two together then choose the other members. This Medjliss prepares the decrees ("kararat") concerning all differences relating to land, title-deeds, property, &c., where the case does not appear one for the Courts.

The final decision is taken at a meeting of the Directors-General under the Governor, of which there are two or three a week, at which one of the French conseillers attends.

(A.)—Organisation of the State of Damascus.

Three mutessarifats, or liwas :—

Damascus, which has five cazas : Duma, Jerud, Nebk, Zebdani, Wadi-el-Ajam Kuneitra).

Homs, which has three cazas : Keryatsin, Jeb-el-Jarrah and Tadmor (Palmyra).

Hamah, which has two cazas : Salimieh and Hamrah.

Each caza (under a kaimakam) and mutessarifat has a Court of First Instance and each liwa also has a Court of Appeal. But the appeal in civil suits involving more than 40,000 gold piastres is to the Damascus Appeal Court. Similarly, the only Court of Cassation is at Damascus (cf. my No. 13 of the 28th February).

The taxes and revenues will form the subject of a separate despatch.

(B.)—Arab Administration.

Governor ("Hakim Mukataat-es-Sham") : Hakki Bey-el-Azem.

1. Directors-General ("Mudir Aam") :—

Interior : Ata Bey-el-Ayoubi.

Justice : Bedi Bey-el-Mouayad.

Finance and Revenue : Hamdi Bey En-Nasr. (Replaces old defterdar of vilayet.)

Agriculture, Commerce and Public Works : Dr. Chakir Kaim. (A former dragoman of this consulate.)

Education : Mohamad Bey Kurd Ali. (Also Press Censor.)

Military Affairs : Nassuhi-el-Boukhari.

2. Medjliss-el-Shura :—

President : Sheikh Abdul Mohsen Effendi Estouani (acting).

Members : Assad Bey Haidar, Emir Taher-el-Jezaerli, Sheikh Abdul Kader Khatib, Nejem Eddin Bey-el-Droubi, and Amin Bey-el-Hachimi (secretary).

The Mutessarif of Damascus ("Merkez") is Shakir Bey-el-Hambali. There is also a mayor and town council and a mudir, or "Reis-el-Ulama" (Mohammad Selim Bey-el-Boukhari), who has a post similar to the Sheikh-ul-Islam at Constantinople.

There are further mudirs (directors of lesser rank) :—

Police : Hamdi Bey-el-Jelad.

Consular Service Bureau : Halim Harfouch. (Formerly Foreign Relations.)

Public Health : Dr. Aractingi. (Also director of the St. Louis French Civil Hospital.)

Gendarmerie and Public Security : Lieutenant-Colonel Wahid Bey. (Under orders of Military Director-General and the Governor.)

Public Debt : Zannun Bey Mouayad.

Tabou.

Evkaf.

Each mudir has under him an inspector ("mufettish"), some of whom are important, e.g. :—

Inspector of Police Department : Sheikh Ibrahim Fubeich, and director of 3rd Division of Public Security. He is actually head of the Secret Police and in close touch with the French mission, and was appointed directly by the latter.

Inspector of the Justice and Correspondence : Sami-el-Aze.

Postal Censor : a cousin of the Governor.

(C.)—The Collateral French Organisation.

Délégué of the High Commissioner and head of both sections of the French mission here : Commandant Catroux.

1. Civil Section.

Head of mission and Conseiller for Interior : M. Schoeffler.

Conseiller for Agriculture and Commerce : M. Florimond.

(The two above are *de carrière*.)

Conseiller for Finances : M. Milliard.

Conseiller for Justice : M. Siroux (a Beirut lawyer).

Conseiller for Public Works and Municipal Affairs : Commandant Veyrier.

Conseiller for Sanitary Affairs : Colonel Delmas (Chief Medical Officer of the 3rd French Division here).

Conseiller for Beaux-Arts : a M. Feyrolla is expected some time.

French Inspectors—

Police : M. Carrette.

Public Debt : M. Wagner.

(By "Public Debt" I refer to the old Ottoman Public Debt.)

2. Military Section.

Aide-de-camp of the délégué and chief of the Bureau de Renseignements (deuxième Bureau) : Commandant Arlabosse.

Employé au deuxième Bureau : G.S.I. Lieutenant Brauet.

Adjutant : Captain Delhomme.

Legal Affairs and Courts-martial : Captain Maure.

Finance and Comptabilité of the Mission : Lieutenant Fouchet.

(There is a president of the Courts-martial : Colonel Riocreux.)

It will be seen that there is a French conseiller for each Arab Department, and these former have all the real power.

A somewhat awkward situation is created here by the presence of Major-General Goybet, commanding the 3rd French Division, as the French délégué has only the rank of major in the military hierarchy.

I have, &c.

C. E. S. PALMER.

Note.—There are also—

A French commissaire for the Hedjaz Railway (the portion within the Damascus State) : Captain du Cree de Villeneuve.

A French commissaire for the Damascus-Hamah Prolongement Railway : Commandant Cauvin.

A French inspector of the Post and Telegraph Department : M. Fayard.

[E 3809/117/89]

No. 128.

Consul Palmer to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 30.)(No. 24.)
My Lord,*Damascus, March 10, 1921.*

REFERRING to my No. 18 of the 5th March, I have the honour to report that the actual leader of the attack on the village of Shagara was Sheikh Abdullah of the Naim tribe, though Mureiwed was with him. The notable killed in the village was a Kurdish chief, agent of the late Abdulrahman Pasha, who was murdered at Kherbet-el-Gazaleh, and therefore not a Circassian, as previously reported.

The Naim tribe has its encampments in the Kuneitra district and has a bad reputation for fanaticism and turbulence. It was possibly some of them who fired at Captain MacCallum, as reported in my No. 18, and if it was their tents which the French aeroplanes bombed, this action may be considered justifiable.

They are now said to be accepting orders from Emir Abdullah, though I doubt whether he has told them to massacre all Christians as is believed here.

My Druze informant added, with reference to my No. 16, that upon enquiry he believed that Tadmor was also a likely place for caravans for Irak to collect arms for gun-running.

It may be of interest to add by way an estimate of the value of his information that I have recently seen certain reports from our representatives in Transjordan, and these confirm information supplied me some weeks previously by this Druze in nearly every particular.

I have, &c.

C. E. S. PALMER.

[E 3810/31/88]

No. 129.

Consul Palmer to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 30.)(No. 26.)
My Lord,*Damascus, March 14, 1921.*

I HAVE the honour to report the following information which has reached me from Druze sources:—

1. Shereef Abdullah has transferred his camp from Maan to Amman, which town the British representative promptly left.

Abdullah has been joined by most of the local sheikhs, including those of Kerak, Shubak and Amman, and his forces are estimated at 8,000 armed men ("regulars" my informant called them), including cavalry. Hassib Dabian the Druze is with him, and it was a mounted follower of the latter who brought all these details to Jaramana whence they reached me. Emir Zeid has not joined up yet, but seventeen guns and ten aeroplanes of the Hedjaz army are said to be moving up slowly.

2. Selim and Nessib Attrash, who are supposed to be more or less pro-French, took the opportunity of a mission to the Hauran in the French interests to send a letter to Abdullah assuring him that they were really on his side. My informant added that about half the Druzes and a portion of the Hauranese Mahommedans might be expected to side with Abdullah if he were successful at the outset. He has received letters from Deraa urging him to attack there, as the French forces there were weak.

There are also intrigues in his favour in the Merj Ayoun.

3. Abdullah has sent letters to Nabih Azmeh—a cousin of the former Minister of War, Youssef Bey-el-Azmeh—who is now at Jerusalem, and to Ali Riza Pasha Rikabi asking them to send him down volunteers as officers.

4. Abdullah Sukkar, a well-known merchant of the Meidan quarter here, has already contracted with Abdullah for 4,000 uniforms, and has supplied them through Jerusalem.

His cousin, Khalil Sukkar, was sent by the French with 100 mounted local volunteers to guard the bridge near Kiswe, very near here, which it was reported Abdullah meant to blow up; but Sukkar and his men deserted to the latter.

5. Turki Emir of the Druze village Hit, who was reported to have been arrested at Deraa by the French, has succeeded in escaping, and with seven of his men has joined Abdullah.

6. Abdullah is not giving any regular pay to his followers, but has promised to reward them with the spoils of Damascus, and meanwhile makes them a daily *largesse*.

I have, &c.

C. E. S. PALMER.

[E 3794/40/88]

No. 130.

Count de Saint-Aulaire to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 30.)

IL résulte d'une information émanant de Jérusalem, que le Haut-Commissaire britannique du mandat palestinien aurait décidé, en invoquant des raisons d'intérêt public, de suspendre immédiatement l'exploitation du monopole des tabacs concédés à la Régie cointéressée des Tabacs de l'Empire ottoman par le Gouvernement ottoman et la Dette publique ottomane, en vertu d'une convention datée du 4 août 1913. En même temps, le Haut-Commissaire de Sa Majesté aurait l'intention de contester la validité de la concession du 4 août 1913, sur laquelle est basée l'exploitation dudit monopole.

2. Le Gouvernement français admet parfaitement que, pour des raisons d'intérêt public, les autorités britanniques cherchent à appliquer dès maintenant l'article 311 du Traité de Sèvres, bien que ce dernier ne soit pas entré en vigueur; toutefois, si cet article doit être appliqué, il doit l'être intégralement. Or, les alinéas 3 et 4 dudit article ont prévu, pour estimer les dommages subis par les sociétés en cas d'annulation de leurs contrats, la constitution d'un tribunal arbitral, qui, "jugeant en droit et en équité, devra prendre en considération tous les éléments d'appréciation sur la base du maintien avec réadaptation du contrat." Ce n'est donc pas au Gouvernement du mandat britannique à décider si l'acte de concession du 4 août 1913 est valable ou non—c'est au tribunal arbitral, prenant en considération "tous les éléments d'appréciation."

3. Le Gouvernement de la République, considérant la Régie cointéressée comme un de ses ressortissants, serait en droit de protester contre la suspension immédiate du monopole; il serait d'ailleurs amené à le faire au cas où Sir Herbert Samuel persisterait dans son refus de s'en remettre intégralement à un tribunal arbitral pour se prononcer sur tous les éléments du litige.

4. En l'espèce, les décisions à intervenir ont des conséquences qui dépassent la portée des intérêts purement privés, étant donné que l'Administration de la Dette publique ottomane est intéressée dans l'exploitation de la Régie des Tabacs et qu'ainsi elle est en droit, au nom des porteurs étrangers de fonds ottomans, de veiller à un règlement équitable de cette affaire.

5. L'Ambassadeur de France a été chargé de porter ces faits à la connaissance de sa Seigneurie le Comte Curzon de Kedleston, et lui serait reconnaissant de vouloir bien lui faire connaître le plus tôt possible la réponse du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté au sujet de cette question.

Le Comte de Saint-Aulaire saisit, &c.

Ambassade de France, Londres, le 29 mars 1921.

CHAPTER IV.—MESOPOTAMIA.

[E 2611/576/93]

No. 131.

Earl Curzon to Mr. Davis.

Your Excellency,

Foreign Office, February 28, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 6th December enclosing a communication dated the 20th November from the Secretary of State of the United States Government, relative to the application, in territories placed under mandate, of the principles of equality of treatment and opportunity, and referring more especially to the petroleum resources found in the Near East. His Majesty's Government are pleased to observe that the United States Government appreciates the general policy adopted by His Majesty's Government in territories under military occupation. I notice, however, that Mr. Colby makes certain observations with regard to the San Remo Petroleum Agreement which appear to indicate that the scope of that agreement is not fully understood.

2. The co-operation of British and French interests in regard to oil production in various countries was first suggested in the early part of the year 1919 by the French Government, when it was proposed that some arrangement should be arrived at whereby French interests might be given some participation in the production of petroleum in various regions. The proposal put forward by the French Government was carefully considered, and it was found possible to come to an agreement based on the principles of mutual co-operation and reciprocity in various countries, especially where British and French interests were already considerable, and on the whole greater than those of other Allied countries. The agreement aimed at no monopoly or exclusive rights, and could only become effective if its application conformed to the desires and laws of the countries concerned.

3. As regards the provisions in the agreement relating to Mesopotamia, I desire to make it plain that the whole of the oilfields to which those provisions refer are the subject of a concession granted before the war by the Turkish Government to the Turkish Petroleum Company. The position of such concessions in territory detached from Turkey is expressly safeguarded by articles 311 and 312 of the Treaty of Sèvres. The history of this concession is as follows:—

Prior to the war the position in regard to the Mesopotamian oilfields was as follows:—

The concessions for all the oilfields of the two vilayets (provinces) of Mosul and Bagdad were bestowed by the ex-Sultan Abdul Hamid on his Civil List in 1888 and 1898 respectively, and private enterprise had long been debarred thereby from acquiring any oil rights in those particular districts. This situation was so far admitted and recognised that in 1904 the Anatolian Railway Company, nominally a Turkish Company, but in reality a German concern, obtained a contract from the Civil List by which the company undertook to carry out preliminary surveys of the oilfields and secured the option for their development on joint account.

4. The Civil List in 1906, considering the agreement with the Anatolian Company at an end, entered into negotiations with a British group with a view to the development of the oilfields. These negotiations, which had the full support of His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, continued during the year 1907; they were suspended during the political crisis which broke out in 1908, but were resumed in 1909 with the Turkish Ministry of Finance, to which Department the Mesopotamian oil concession had been transferred from the Civil List, by firmans issued in 1908 and 1909. The general upheaval caused by the events in those years impeded the progress of the negotiations during the years 1910 and 1911.

5. In 1912 endeavours were made by German interests to obtain the confirmation by the Turkish Government of the arrangements concluded in 1904 between the Anatolian Railway Company and the Sultan's Civil List, and, with the apparent object of pursuing the matter and of widening the scope of their activity in oil operations in other parts of the Turkish Empire, they formed a British limited

liability company called the Turkish Petroleum Company (Limited), the capital of which was partly British and partly German.

6. This development was succeeded by a series of negotiations entered into between the British group and members of the Turkish Petroleum Company for the amalgamation of the rival interests and for pursuing jointly the application before the Turkish Government for the grant of a concession for the Mesopotamian oilfields. These negotiations, in which the British and German Governments took an active interest, terminated in the early part of 1914, when an agreement was reached for the fusion of the interests of the original Turkish Petroleum Company and of the original British group in the new Turkish Petroleum Company. This agreement was signed not only by the parties immediately interested, but also on behalf of the British and German Governments respectively. The German share in this new company was fixed at 25 per cent.

7. In consequence of this arrangement, His Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople was able to make the necessary representations to the Turkish Government for the grant to the Turkish Petroleum Company of the oil concessions in the vilayets of Mosul and Bagdad, while representations of the same nature were made simultaneously to the Porte by the German Ambassador. The negotiation between His Majesty's Government and the Turkish Government was not confined to the question of the Turkish Petroleum Company, but covered a wide field and involved mutual concessions of very material importance. As a result the Turkish Government, on the 28th June, 1914, through the Grand Vizier, informed His Majesty's Ambassador, in an official communication, that the Turkish Ministry of Finance having been substituted for the Civil List in the matter of the petroleum deposits known or to be discovered in the vilayets of Mosul and Bagdad, had consented to lease the said deposits to the Turkish Petroleum Company, the Ministry reserving the right to fix later on its share in the enterprise as well as the terms of the contract. I should add that during the war the German interests in the company were liquidated, and thus came into the hands of His Majesty's Government.

8. From the facts as narrated, it will be seen that the Turkish Petroleum Company's right to the lease of the oilfields in the two vilayets rests on an official undertaking given by the Turkish Government to the two Governments concerned after prolonged diplomatic negotiations. In the circumstances the oil rights in the vilayets of Bagdad and Mosul cannot be treated merely as a matter of abstract principle or without reference to the special character of the negotiations which preceded the war. Had no war supervened, and had Mesopotamia remained till now under Turkish rule, the exploitation of these oil deposits would long since have begun. It can hardly be contended that His Majesty's Government should now question the validity of an undertaking granted by the Turkish Government in return for consideration received. And I may add, since the United States Government will presumably expect His Majesty's Government to recognise the rights acquired by the Standard Oil Company in Palestine from the Turkish Government, that these rights, which are based entirely on the grant of a prospecting licence, are no stronger than those of the Turkish Petroleum Company, to whom the Turkish Government had definitely undertaken to transfer a valid and already existing concession.

9. In this connection I feel bound to remind you that the attitude of the United States Government in suggesting that His Majesty's Government should disregard the rights acquired by the Turkish Petroleum Company is scarcely consistent with that adopted by the United States Government in regard to similar United States interests in oil properties in Mexico. For instance, in his letter of the 25th November, 1920, to M. Pesqueira, the Mexican representative in Washington, Mr. Colby expressed particular satisfaction at the statements made in M. Pesqueira's letter, then under reply, to the effect that President de la Huerta and President-elect Obregon had declared that article 27 of the new Mexican Constitution "is not, and must not be, interpreted as retroactive or violative of valid property rights."

10. It will be seen from the above facts that the acquisition by the French Government under the San Remo Agreement of an interest in the Mesopotamian oilfields represents the allotment to the French Government of the former German interests in the Turkish Petroleum Company in return for facilities by which Mesopotamian oil will be able to reach the Mediterranean. The agreement, so far as it relates to Mesopotamia, may therefore be said to be the adaptation of pre-war arrangements to existing conditions, and in this respect His Majesty's Government, far from acting in any selfish or monopolistic spirit, may reasonably claim to have consulted the best interests of the future Arab State. Neither the rights of the

Turkish Petroleum Company nor the provisions of the San Remo Oil Agreement will preclude the Arab State from enjoying the full benefit of ownership or from prescribing the conditions on which the oilfields shall be developed.

11. I have not failed to observe the large amount of public attention directed to the reported resources of Mesopotamia, which, Mr. Colby states, furnish a peculiarly critical test of the good faith of the nations which have given their adherence to the mandate principle. Apart from the fact that these resources are as yet entirely unproved, I can discern nothing in this principle which compels the mandatory Power to discriminate against its own nationals, who, after years of arduous negotiation, secured certain rights, and would, but for the war, have long since been actively at work, in order to afford an equal opportunity to other groups which before the war were not actively concerned in the petroleum resources of Mesopotamia.

12. I have noted with interest the allusions which Mr. Colby makes to the estimates which have been framed of the distribution of the petroleum resources of the world. While I agree that such calculations are of subsidiary importance in this discussion, I think it desirable that they should be placed in the proper perspective. It is stated in Mr. Colby's note that the United States possesses only one-twelfth approximately of the world's petroleum resources, but I may be permitted to point out that in 1919 the chief geologist of the United States Geological Survey stated that "the criteria on which such estimates can be based vary in every degree of inadequacy in the different regions," and he was then referring to estimates dealing with the United States only, and was not taking into account the infinitely more problematical resources of countries still partially or wholly unexplored, from a geological standpoint.

13. My object in referring to this aspect of the question in a previous note was to show that the United States controls a home production of petroleum which, whether it is about to reach its maximum point or not, is actually and potentially vast, while in neighbouring countries it possesses a predominant interest in oil-bearing regions of exceptional promise. The United States Government will doubtless agree that this statement of the existing situation admits of no dispute.

14. While the potentialities of the future are necessarily problematical, the undisputed fact remains that at present United States soil produces 70 per cent., and American interests in adjoining territory control a further 12 per cent. of the oil production of the world. It is not easy, therefore, to justify the United States Government's insistence that American control should now be extended to resources which may be developed in mandated territories, and that too at the expense of the subjects of another State who have obtained a valid concession from the former Government of those territories.

15. His Majesty's Government are, nevertheless, glad to find themselves in general agreement with the contention of the United States Government, that the world's oil resources should be thrown open for development without reference to nationality. I observe, however, that by article 1 of the Act of the Philippine Legislature of the 31st August, 1920, participation in the working of all "public lands containing petroleum and other mineral oils and gas" is confined to citizens or corporations of the United States or of the Philippines, and I cannot but regard this enactment as in contradiction with the general principle enunciated by the United States Government. In this connection I observe that Mr. Colby does not attempt to refute the statements contained in my note of the 9th August last concerning the action taken by the United States Government to prevent the exploitation by British interests of such resources in Hayti and Costa Rica.

16. In your note of the 28th July the attention of His Majesty's Government was called to the existence of reports to the effect that the officials charged with the administration of Tanganyika territory have accorded privileges to British nationals that have been denied to the nationals of other countries. It is from no mere love of controversy that I recall this matter to your attention, but rather from the conviction that misunderstandings between our two countries over oil questions, and indeed our present correspondence, are largely due to the spirit engendered by reports of precisely this nature, which, on dispassionate examination, can frequently be found to lack any basis of truth. In the absence of particulars, which the United States Government were requested to furnish, I can only express my regret at being unable to prove positively that the reports quoted by you are based on misapprehension.

I have, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

CHAPTER V.—ADEN AND ARABIA.

[E 455/455/91]

No. 132.

Acting British Agent, Jeddah, to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 10, 1921.)

(Secret.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, December 21, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the Jeddah report for the period ending the 20th December, 1920.

Copies of this report have been sent to his Excellency the High Commissioner for Egypt, and his Excellency the High Commissioner for Mesopotamia.

I have, &c.

W. BATTEN, Major, I.A.,

Acting British Agent.

Enclosure 1 in No. 132.

Jeddah Report covering period December 11 to 20, 1920.

Local Situation.—Since the submission of my last report further developments of the situation created by King Hussein's action in the matter of refusing to recognise certain foreign passports, and in regard to the case of the imprisoned British Indians, were reported to your Lordship in the two telegrams dated the 11th and 14th December, respectively.

2. King Hussein took the opportunity, in replying to my remarks on the anonymous letter reviling him as being under foreign domination, and for having betrayed the Arabs, to refer to events in Syria as fully justifying such accusations, and contradicting solemn agreements and oaths.

Continuing, he accused me of threatening and interfering at the present moment, against the interests of my Government, and stating that his rules were in complete accordance with our own as to passports and national status.

In a postscript, he added that he was only enabled to bear such a situation in the hope that in a very short period everything would be settled in one of two ways, either of which would preserve his honour, and intimated that he might write a line to His Majesty's Government, the result of which was not hidden from me.

I was not, however, to think that this was in the nature of a threat, such as my intimation to the kaimakam of Jeddah that if necessary the Soudanese subject claiming my protection would obtain it.

In a further postscript, in his own handwriting, King Hussein stated that his letter was not written with any object or from fear of anything. "Never! Never! But these are feelings the results of which will appear in a short time, apart from personal disagreements and preserving all honour."

The above letter which was very obviously written under stress of emotion, for which I made due allowance, was to have been transmitted by the hand of Abdul Malik al Khateeb, the Hedjaz representative in Cairo, who was leaving Jeddah for Suez the following day.

He urgently asked for an interview that night, but at the last minute telephoned that he was ill, nor was I able to see him, as I had hoped, before he sailed. I ascertained later that the illness was an excuse.

3. Certain portions of the above letter confirmed the opinion I had formed that King Hussein has been attempting to repeat his tactics at the time of the difficulties raised by him over the quarantine. Three incidents, which I had not otherwise intended to enlarge on, and which occurred within a few days of each other, confirm this view.

A completely baseless accusation was made that the customs police boats watching a steamer in the harbour had been maliciously cut adrift from the gangways at night. The matter was investigated at once, before the Director of Customs had time to communicate with the ship. None of the police concerned had any knowledge of the matter. The captain saw the Director of Customs, and the affair was at my request to the captain settled privately, the Director of Customs apologising, and stating before witnesses that it had been due to a mistake.

The same captain, who had already, when alone, been searched in accordance

with the local rules when leaving shore, the necessity for compliance with these rules having been notified previously by the agency to all captains of British ships calling at Jeddah, was about to leave in the agency launch in company with an officer from the agency, when a man on the quay rushed up shouting and attempted to detain him. The captain, having already been searched and not understanding Arabic, told him to go away in Hindustani and boarded the launch. The man thereupon seized hold of the launch, still shouting, and ordered the rais to stop, in spite of my officer's order to proceed.

Fortunately this officer behaved with commendable discretion and got the launch away without any incident. I received within a few hours a protest that one of the customs officials had been interfered with in the normal execution of his duty, and had been beaten on the quay by an officer of the agency.

Although there was every justification for doing so, I had not intended taking any action, after the report from my officer, in view of the undesirability of giving King Hussein any opportunity, however trivial, of forcing unpleasant incidents on the agency and taking advantage of them, as on a former occasion.

This accusation could not, however, be allowed to pass, and pointing out incidentally that the captain of a ship while in company with an officer of the agency staff should not be subjected to such treatment, I requested through the kaimakam an apology from the Director of Customs for the conduct of his subordinate in laying hands on and attempting to stop the launch, when I would consider the matter closed.

The Director of Customs has repeated the accusation in none too polite terms.

He is King Hussein's favourite and right hand man, and it may be taken as certain that the above incident, when coupled with others, was not accidental. The subordinate would never have dared to act as he did without instructions from his superior.

Finally, the agency medical officer was asked to go round to a house to inspect some curios. He was taken upstairs and shown into a room, which he had no sooner entered than loud cries of "Nasrani!" were raised below. The only occupant of the room was a woman, and he immediately left and reported the matter to me.

4. On the following day I was informed that the local Passport Committee was satisfied that the Soudanese referred to above, who had been detained for over three weeks, was a British subject, and would be permitted to return to Suakin.

Happily nothing further transpired as to my medical officer.

While being averse to laying undue stress on seemingly trivial incidents, I considered it advisable to report the above fully, as an indication of the conditions which may be expected to continue until it is impressed on King Hussein that if he expects to be treated as the ruler of an independent State and to possess the privileges due to his position as such, there are certain obligations and courtesies incumbent on him and his officials in dealings both with the subjects of other States and their representatives in Jeddah.

5. The two unjustly imprisoned British Indians were again brought before the mehkama, and told they would be released if they accepted a new judgment entailing payment of two-thirds of the present maintenance ordered.

They refused to accept the jurisdiction of the court, stating they were British subjects, and asked that the case be referred to their consul.

In order to obtain their release, I advised them privately to agree, without future prejudice to their case.

They accordingly borrowed the money, paid it into court, and were released.

I am informed the court ordered that this sum was due for the period already spent in confinement, and that future sums due were to be paid, during the absence of their father, to an agent appointed by him.

Subsequent to their release, I received an intimation from Mecca that these men were Hachimite subjects, having been born in the Hedjaz, and questioning my intervention in the case at all.

I had been careful both in writing and in telephoning to Mecca, to refer on each occasion to these men as British subjects. This was the first intimation in over five weeks, in replies from the King or officials, that they were not recognised as such.

The Government was accordingly furnished with documentary evidence (of which King Hussein was already well aware) as to their status.

6. A telegram in clear stating that H.M.S. "Clematis" was due at Jeddah was received on the 15th December.

The Soudanese left the same evening without any trouble. H.M.S. "Clematis" arrived on the 17th.

Recent incidents and the King's attitude and actions as affecting foreign rights had been keenly followed and discussed, and the visit appears to have had a markedly calming effect locally.

King Hussein having at the last moment given way, and as it was hoped this would be the last of such incidents for some time, it was agreed that it was not desirable for H.M.S. "Clematis" to prolong her stay and thus excite comment. She sailed for Port Soudan and Aden on the 19th.

The usual messages were exchanged between the commander and King Hussein, the latter's compliments being, however, somewhat double-edged, and the ship was given a handsome present of supplies.

7. The general question of the rights of foreign travellers and residents remains the same.

King Hussein's rules are still in force, and all foreign (native) subjects desiring to leave have first to obtain the permission of his Passport Committee, and resident foreign subjects are not recognised as such if born in the country or possessing papers granted or renewed since the outbreak of war.

King Hussein's action in raising such questions at the present juncture, in spite of every attempt to dissuade him and to temporise, was most inopportune, but there are grounds for hope that he may have now realised the unwisdom of his behaviour, in the somewhat changed tone of his present communications to me, and of his messages to London on larger issues.

GENERAL.

Ibn Saud.—There are many rumours as to a large force having begun to assemble in the neighbourhood of Asheirah.

Spread of Wahabism in the Hedjaz.—Enquiries made during the last few months tend to show that secret adherence to Wahabism is on the increase. Two-thirds of the poorer population of Jeddah and about half of the better class are said to be in sympathy. The outlying villages have been openly so for some time.

Infiltration by peaceful means has been proceeding elsewhere, especially in the district round Mecca and Taif.

As regards frontier districts, the motive appears to be largely due to fear, and a desire to be on the safe side in the event of invasion, but other motives—and this applies especially to Mecca and Jeddah—are genuine disgust with malpractices such as have tended to exist at the centres of all religions, and a reaction against the present state of affairs under King Hussein.

Wahabism appears to be certainly gaining ground since proselytism has taken a less violent form, though at the same time there appears to be some fear on the part of sympathisers that should any general invasion of the Hedjaz take place the more fanatical elements would gain the upper hand, and all not embracing the extreme views of the Mudayana would risk extermination.

Customs.—The attention of the Government was drawn to the omission to notify officially the proposed heavy increase in tobacco duty, referred to in my last report. Although the matter was carefully explained, King Hussein chose to consider this as an attempt to question his right to the control of his own customs.

Political Emissaries.—It is now stated that two of the emissaries mentioned in the last report returned to Cairo under cover of the usual letter, given at the King's request, to his nephew Shereef Jaffar and to the Hedjaz representative in Cairo, for themselves and servants. Confirmation or otherwise of this statement is being obtained from Egypt.

The ex-Russian colonel, who is still in Mecca, is now confirmed from India as having left Bombay *en route* for the Crimea.

Currency.—The King recently fixed the value of the gold sovereign at 7 mejediehs, the current rate being somewhat over 8. This was possibly due to his sale of £ T. 24,000 (paper) for 24,000 mejediehs, which he may change into gold.

This arbitrary order has increased local prices, already abnormally high, by some 7 or 8 per cent.

Anybody contravening the order is imprisoned.

Press.—Nos. 439, 440 and 441 of the "Al Qibla," and No. 17 of "Al Falah" are forwarded herewith.

"Al Qibla."—No. 439 is almost entirely devoted to an article from the "Review of Reviews," as translated in "Al Ahram," and quotes, in the same connection, an article from the "National Review" on the Syrian question, alleged to have been written by Colonel Wilson.

Much capital has been made out of the latter, and I am only awaiting a reply from Colonel Wilson to take action in the matter. He appears to have been accidentally or deliberately confused with another officer.

The French consul-general drew my attention, unofficially, to the effect of the article and the sentiments expressed. Nos. 440 and 441 contain further references to the above, praising the writers for their lack of prejudice, and fair presentment of the Arab case, referring to the recognition by Great Britain and France of the Arab army as an Allied force, and abusing the French on various counts. No. 441 quotes from the letter addressed by King Hussein in August 1918 to the High Commissioner, laying stress on the question of frontiers, referring to a letter from the High Commissioner on the subject of the Syrian littoral, and concluding with a reference to King Hussein's proffered resignation.

"*Al Falah*."—Also refers to the same article from the "National Review."
W. BATTEN, Major, I.A.,
Acting British Agent.

Enclosure 2 in No. 132.

Abstract of Mecca Report ending December 19, 1920.

1. There is nothing of political importance to report.
2. It is stated that the former system under which mutawwifs bought the hereditary right of canvassing and arranging for pilgrims in separate sub-divisions of the Moslem world, the pilgrims having no say in the matter, is to be revived. This system was one of the evils of the Hamidian régime, abolished some twelve years ago, and its revival would place pilgrims even more completely in the hands of unscrupulous mutawwifs than under the present system, by which pilgrims have a choice in the selection of their cicerones.
- As the fees for obtaining the farming of such rights were high—from 50% to 3,000%—according to the importance of the district—King Hussein may be contemplating this change for financial reasons.
3. Improvements in the city ordered by the King, and involving extensive demolitions, have aroused great opposition, leading in some cases to violence.
4. The King has approved of the opening of an Indian pharmacy for pilgrims, on condition that the business shall be entirely under Arab direction.
5. Great scarcity is reported in the Taif district.
6. Insecurity continues in and around Medina.
7. *Current Reports and Rumours*.—An alliance between the King and the Imam is reported.
- Ibn Saud has been approached by emissaries of the Pan-Islamic movement to persuade him to forsake his connection with Great Britain.
- The Nationalist forces and those of Emir Abdullah have effected a junction north of Maan.
- The 15th of January, 1921, has been fixed by the Bolsheviks for a general rising throughout the world of all sympathisers and disaffected persons against their Governments.

Enclosure 3 in No. 132.

Shipping Intelligence to December 20, 1920.

The following steamers arrived at and departed from Jeddah between the 11th and the 20th December, 1920.

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Cargo discharged.
Dakahlieh ..	British ..	P. Soudan ..	Suez ..	Dec. 11, 1920	Dec. 12, 1920	Packages, 36
Porto Maurizio ..	Italian ..	Suez ..	Massaua ..	" 13, "	" 13, "	84
Kenah ..	British ..	" ..	P. Soudan ..	" 15, "	" 16, "	3,444
Porto Maurizio ..	Italian ..	Massaua ..	Suez ..	" 19, "	" 19, "	768

H.M.S. "Clematis" arrived at Jeddah on the 17th December, 1920, and departed on the 19th December, 1920.

[E 456/456/91]

No. 133.

Political Resident, Aden, to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 10, 1921.)

(No. 60.)

Aden, December 23, 1920.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward for your Lordship's information a copy of the Thirty-first Aden News Letter dated the 22nd December, 1920.

I have, &c.

T. E. SCOTT, Major-General.

Enclosure in No. 133.

Thirty-first Aden News Letter.

THE following is a summary of the news reported since the despatch of my last letter dated the 8th December, 1920:—

Yemen (Upper and Lower).

News regarding Ibn Saud's movements is conflicting. One report states that he has retired to Nejran, north of Saada, owing to sickness among his soldiers, while another states that he has received a large sum of money from the Imam for his retirement. A third report states that he is still fighting at Al Kadam and Al Haut, and that the Dhu Mahomed and Dhu Hussain sub-tribes of the Bakhil have gone over to the Idrisi or Ibn Saud and that Hashid tribe are wavering.

According to an informant Saiyid Abdullah Ibrahim, referred to in previous letters, despatched 200 men to Al Udain and an equal number to Badan, for what purpose it is not clear. The party sent to Badan was attacked on arrival and suffered forty casualties in killed and wounded.

Fighting is reported to have taken place between the Zeidis and the inhabitants of Ibb in consequence of suspected poisoning of a Zeidi officer. The head sheikh of Ibb, Abdu Salama, is said to have been made a prisoner along with 150 other suspects.

A report says that Taiz is full of Zeidi troops and that although detachments are despatched towards Zabid they are replaced by fresh drafts from Sana. The concentration at Taiz is said to be due to the fear the Zeidis still entertain of a British advance.

Kadi Ahmed Mahomed-al-Ukam of Berut in the Yemen recently visited Aden and submitted a petition requesting me, in case the Imam was friendly to, or in alliance with, us, to write to him and ask him to confer a suitable post on him (the kadi) or to fix a subsidy for him. In the event of the Imam being unfriendly to us, the kadi offered to assist us in waging war against the Imam.

The kadi does not appear to be a man of much importance. He may be an emissary of the Imam sent to sound us, or he may be an emissary from some enemy of the Imam. I have given him a reply in general terms that we desire to live on friendly terms with all the rulers of Arabia, great and small, but we consider ourselves bound by treaty to grant protection to the Amir of Dhala and to support the smaller chiefs to whom we are pledged.

Two Turkish officers, Mustapha Azim and Tewfik Mahomed, who recently arrived here from the Yemen, gave the following information:—

There are 60 military Turkish officers in the Yemen, 45 of whom are now employed by the Imam. There are, in addition, 30 civil Turkish officers employed under Mahmoud Nadhim, and 101 Turkish infantry soldiers and 45 artillerymen under the Imam. All Turkish officers and soldiers are employed solely for training purposes. Three or four Turkish soldiers under Turkish officers are appointed to train 100 Zeidi troops. There are 3,000 Imamic regulars at Sana, but thousands more are in the surrounding country. In the event of a jihad, the Imam can put 60,000 regulars and irregulars into the field. Rafik Bey has 2,000 regulars with him at Taiz, in addition to irregulars, whose number is not known. The Imam's force at present in Saafan, Jebel Bura and Jebel Reima consists of 500 regulars with an unknown number of irregulars. This force is officered by Arabs who have been educated and trained in Constantinople, as the Imam will not trust Turkish officers to command his

men in actual warfare. There are a few irregulars at Mawia. The Imam has over 100 guns of all sizes in his fortress at Sahara. If he requires any guns for an expedition they are always drawn from this fortress. The guns at Sana are never called upon. There are 15,000 rifles stored in this fortress. The guns at Sana, with the exception of the old immovable fortress guns, were given to the Imam by Mahomed Tewfiq, the late commander-in-chief of the Turkish forces in the Yemen, before he could get permission to surrender.

The guns at Taiz were given by Said Pasha to Sheikh Mahomed Nasir Mukbil of Mawia. They were at Mawia until the Imam sent down a force of 300 Zeidis, which forced Mahomed Nasir Mukbil to surrender them. There are also two mountain guns at Zabed and two at Menakha. The Imam has guns posted all over the country.

The Imam is not very anxious about the Idrisi, but was really anxious about Ibn Saud. However, the latter advanced against Saada in such a foolish way and by so difficult a road that the number of casualties he suffered has relieved the Imam's anxiety. Sickness broke out at Saada amongst Ibn Saud's men, and he has had to retire. In the opinion of the informants, with two aeroplanes and 10,000 men Ibn Saud could have taken Sana in half-an-hour.

The ammunition factory under the Austrian, George, is still turning out unlimited ammunition. The Commanding Royal Artillery at Sana is Lieutenant-Colonel Mahmoud Pasha.

A lance-corporal of the 1st Yemen Infantry in Aden, who had proceeded on leave to the Yemen, reports that men who are known to have served in the 1st Yemen Infantry are fined from 50 to 100 dollars, or in default have to suffer an imprisonment. Two deserters from the Yemen Infantry are said to be acting as informers and report the return of the Yemen Infantry men.

This same corporal states that while he was at Dhala on the 2nd December 600 Imam soldiers entered the place and that another force of 400 arrived at Kataba. On enquiry he learnt that these troops were sent for the invasion of the territory occupied by the Kotaibi, Haushabi and other tribes in the Aden Protectorate.

The lance-corporal states that Ibb is full of troops and that the Zeidis have taken possession of all the arms, ammunition, &c., which the people of Ibb had received from the Turks.

Aden Protectorate.

According to a report 150 Zeidis have arrived at Dhala and more are expected. The Imam's commander at Dhala intends to send a party of Zeidis to Al Agood and Radfan in the Aden Protectorate to enforce the payment of tithes, which the people of these places have refused.

An informant from Dhala states that small parties of Zeidis have been arriving for the past week or so, and that all approaches to Dhala are held by piquets of these men. He says that 100 men of the Dhala garrison are armed with new Italian magazine rifles.

A party of Mansuris and Makhdumis (Subehis) in our protectorate is reported to have raided the Somati section of the Subehis and carried away thirty-one camels after killing two Somatis. This raid appears to be in retaliation for a raid made by the Somatis some time ago, in which they had killed one Mansuri and one Makhdumi and carried away a flock of sheep and goats. The Abdali Sultan is trying to settle the dispute.

Mukbil Abdulla, referred to in the last letter, is now reported to have gone to Dhala, and I hear that he will not be permitted to leave until he has placed his son as a hostage.

The Imam's commander at Dhala is said to have tom-tomed a notice to the effect that all goods should pass through Dhala, where transit dues will be levied, and that goods going by other routes will be confiscated.

Aden, December 22, 1920.

T. E. SCOTT, Major-General.

[E 757/4/91]

No. 134.

Record of Conversation between Earl Curzon and the Emir Feisal.

THE Emir Feisal, who has for some time been engaged in conversations at the Foreign Office concerning the position in Arabia, having asked to see me, I received

him and General Haddar Pasha this morning. The following was the gist of the long conversation that ensued:—

The Emir began by protesting that he was a man of peace, and preferred to settle all disputes by conciliatory methods. He wanted to settle them in the present instance in co-operation with the British.

The situation that troubled him and his father, King Hussein, most was that which now existed in the Hejaz. Not merely the borders of that State, but even the Holy Cities were threatened by the menacing activities of the Wahabites, who, under the leadership of Ibn Saoud, were bent on a war of militant aggression, and might at any moment descend upon Mecca. In these circumstances, what were the British Government, who had guaranteed the frontiers of the Hejaz State, going to do? The responsibility was theirs.

I replied at once that I was aware of no such guarantee as peculiar to the British, and that I was astonished, if King Hussein attached so much value, as he naturally did, to preserving the integrity of his kingdom, that he did not at once ratify the Treaty of Versailles and take up his functions as a member of the League of Nations, to which he would then officially belong, and to whose protection—more valuable than that of a single Power only—he could then appeal.

Feisal did not dissent from this, but said that what he feared was an early, even an immediate, attack, which he could not himself get back to the Hejaz, presuming him to return at once to advise his father, in time to avert. I reminded him that our latest news, no doubt better known to him than to me, was that Hussein's forces had gained a victory over the invader, and that there was consequently much less cause for alarm. He admitted this, but said that the danger was recurrent, and could only be removed by the British Government assuming responsibility for the defence of the Hejaz, and letting Ibn Saoud know that if he attacked it would involve hostilities with Great Britain.

I replied that for nearly three years I had been trying to settle this dispute between the two rival chieftains, and had proposed conferences and meetings between the principals at every place that I could think of—Bombay, Aden, Jeddah, Cairo, &c. It was true that representatives of both parties had met and talked. But I had never been able to get the principals together. In these circumstances, what was the sense of throwing the responsibility on to His Majesty's Government? No one knew better than the Emir that we could not send troops to the Hejaz, and even if we were willing to do so, would not be asked. What was the meaning then of calling upon us to defend the inland frontiers of the State?

The Emir explained that what his father wanted was the present of a small fleet of aeroplanes and armed motor-cars, which he hoped we would supply. I said that I could hold out no such hope, because, firstly, this would at once provoke the very fighting which we desired to avoid, and, secondly, inasmuch as we were on friendly terms with both parties, and, indeed, were still subsidising Ibn Saoud, we could not provide the armament to one ally with which to attack another. Further, if only the two parties would meet and agree upon a frontier, there should be no need of active fighting in order to secure it.

Feisal then complained bitterly of the system under which, while his father now received no subsidy at all (the former payments having been withdrawn many months ago), Ibn Saoud was in receipt of a handsome subsidy, which he utilised to attack our ally, King Hussein. On behalf of the latter, he appealed both for the restoration of the subsidy to its old figure and for the payment of arrears.

I said at once that there could be no question of this. The subsidy that had been thought proper and reasonable during the war, when military operations were proceeding and before King Hussein had consolidated his authority, was now both unreasonable and excessive. Moreover, Feisal had been long enough in England to know that any Government now going to Parliament for a renewal of these exorbitant payments would receive very short shrift. His Majesty's Government had, however, come to the conclusion that the present arrangement of subsidies was illogical and far from fair, and they favoured a plan about which I would like to have the opinion of the Emir. It was this—that, recognising that the system of subsidies operated effectively in the maintenance of peace and order, we should assign a specific sum for this purpose in the entire Arabian peninsula. It would then be possible to pay a subsidy to King Hussein, not of course comparable with the war subsidy, but still handsome, with perhaps some payment to enable him to liquidate liabilities and start afresh. Ibn Saoud, who was now also in receipt of an extravagant allowance, would

[6668]

2 I 2

be brought down to a more reasonable level. The smaller chiefs—the Idrisi, the Imam, and others—would be on a lower scale still. By such an adjustment we should not only mark the relative degree of importance and the needs of the various chieftains, but—and I attached particular importance to this—we should thus be able at once to signify to Ibn Saoud our disapproval of militant tactics and by a threatened stoppage of all payment in the event of his attempting a descent upon the Holy Cities, to give to King Hussein and his kingdom a much better security than by any of the means suggested by Feisal.

The latter replied that both the principle and the manner of settlement appeared to him entirely just; but that before it could be brought into operation he feared that at any moment the blow might fall. Nothing that I could say could modify the Emir's apprehensions in this respect. He spoke of his house, his home, his wife, his family as being at the mercy of a truculent invader, and of himself as liable to be called away any day to fight for their defence.

Though my information was necessarily inferior to that of Feisal, I said that in my mind these apprehensions were exaggerated. What the Akhwan might do on their own account as an undisciplined body of religious fanatics, I could not pretend to say. But if they were, as Feisal assured me, under the control of Ibn Saoud, then I could hardly believe that, while they might raid and plunder at Taif or Taraba or elsewhere on or even inside the disputed frontier, they would really overrun the Hejaz and assault the Holy Places. I had given Ibn Saoud most clearly to understand that no such attack upon the Hejaz, proper and undisputed, could be tolerated, and that it would be regarded as a hostile act. I could not bring myself to believe that Ibn Saoud would think it worth while to defy us. The prospect of losing his subsidy altogether would surely have a very moderating influence upon him.

I could not be clear whether my remarks conveyed any real consolation to the Emir, whose inner thoughts were veiled in the traditional courtesy of the Oriental. But in one respect he gave me an assurance which I thought most valuable and which I promised to bear in mind.

Haddar Pasha had spoken of the unusual powers of conciliation of Feisal, of which he had seen many instances in the recent war and elsewhere; whereupon the Emir said that he was quite willing to offer his own services as mediator with Ibn Saoud. With his father's consent, which he had no doubt he would receive, he was willing at any time to meet the latter in conference to discuss and to settle the frontier question, which he did not doubt his ability to do.

Our interview then terminated. In the course of it no mention was made of Mesopotamia or Transjordan, or of any other questions than those to which I have referred.

January 13, 1921.

[E 853/455/91]

No. 135.

Major Batten to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 18, 1921.)

(Secret.)
My Lord,

Jeddah, December 31, 1920.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the Jeddah report for the period ending the 31st December, 1920.

Copies of this report and despatch have been sent to his Excellency the High Commissioner for Egypt and his Excellency the High Commissioner for Mesopotamia.

I have, &c.

W. BATTEN, Major, I.A.,
Acting British Agent.

Enclosure 1 in No. 135.

Jeddah Report for the Period December 21–31, 1920.

(Secret.)

1. *Ali Haidar Pasha and the Hedjaz.*—With reference to my telegram No. 433 of the 29th December last, King Hussein forwarded a long letter addressed to Emir Abdullah apparently from Constantinople, and opened by the King in the latter's absence, stating that the writer was aware of a conspiracy against his independence.

He had previously warned King Hussein in veiled terms against "weevils which had attached themselves to the pillars of the Quarrara house" (Ali Haidar Pasha's property in Mecca), in order to undermine his position in secret, but it having been recently decided to further the ends of the intrigue by sending to the Hedjaz Shereef Sharaf al Adwan and a certain Sheikh Mohamed al Etabi Marakshi, who would first visit Egypt and Palestine, and later Medina, the King should be on his guard against these persons.

Both arrived recently in the Hedjaz, being welcomed by King Hussein, who had been asked by the Shereef when the latter was in Constantinople if he might return to Mecca.

The writer, Mohamed Yassin, who is unknown to me, hints at the Harb being disaffected by "English gold, and not Turkish," and at an understanding between Ali Haidar Pasha and Ibn Saud.

King Hussein states he wished to draw my attention to the matter as an example of the attempts being made by self-seeking persons to disturb him and cause distrust, attempts which might be repeated with His Majesty's Government. He had also reliable information as to the intention of France to supplant him by a rival, but such reports were of little importance to him.

These reports, however, raised a most important point, namely, Great Britain's guarantee of support to himself in the event of external or internal intrigue until such time as a settled Arab Government had been established, laid down in the second article of his agreement with His Majesty's Government (as understood by him), in his letter and enclosure of the 28th August, 1918.

I thanked King Hussein for his frankness and made a non-committal reply as to the latter portion of his communication.

The King allows no opportunity to slip of obtaining confirmation in some form of the terms of his agreements with His Majesty's Government, as laid down by himself in the above letter.

2. *Insecurity on the Coast and Inland.*—A petition from certain Hodeidah merchants for indemnification for losses incurred owing to piracy near Lith was forwarded in the ordinary course from the political officer at Hodeidah through Aden and this agency. The matter was of no particular importance, but King Hussein has taken exception to the political officer at Hodeidah and the Resident at Aden having anything to do with the petition, and again quotes in full, with reference to Hodeidah, assurances as regards boundaries and the independence of the Arabs within certain spheres.

When Shereef of Mecca, he made good the loss occasioned to some merchants by piracy in the same neighbourhood, but on this occasion lays the blame for insecurity on the coast at our door, for not having provided him with the two small ships for which he asked. The King has before referred to the necessity of one or two small steamers for coastguard duties, and his difficulty in obtaining them is a sore point.

Should it be found possible to provide him with such a vessel and to make satisfactory arrangements for payment, there is no doubt the trouble and possible expense involved would be more than repaid by the effect on the King of one of his pet ambitions being fulfilled, and I venture to again submit the matter for consideration.

The King was privately negotiating the purchase of a large motor-launch in Port Soudan some months ago, but the matter fell through on the launch proving unseaworthy.

King Hussein again refers to the petition from Hodeidah at the end of my telegram No. 435, reporting Akhwan aggression near Taif. The connection is not apparent, but the meaning to be extracted from his recent letters and telegrams appears to be that, so long as the boundaries of the Hedjaz remain undefined, and so long as His Majesty's Government refuses him material help in the establishment of security and discourages him, more especially as regards the Akhwan, from taking counter-measures, he cannot be responsible for present conditions.

3. *Akhwan Aggression.*—Following on the rumours mentioned in the last report as to a concentration near Asheirah, King Hussein informs me that he received reliable information that Khalid Ibn Derwish was at El Rieh (? Ri es-Seil) with a large force, and had been joined by the Mamur of Taraba with his people, his intention being to attack the villages near Taif.

Emir Ali was expected in Mecca this week, having been summoned by the King to report on the situation at Taif. This visit was postponed at the last moment. Reinforcements have been sent from Mecca to Taif, together with a further quantity of supplies.

King Hussein cannot reconcile these movements and the encirclement of Mecca on the north threatened by the attacks on Sefeina and Mahani (on the direct Medina route) with the truce agreed upon until the result of Ibn Saud's deputation was settled, nor does he know what to say regarding our wish that he should avoid any open breach by precipitate action, in face of the dangers threatening him.

He has intimated that he will be forced to take measures to protect himself, however willing he may be to meet our wishes for the preservation of peace in Arabia, and asks His Majesty's Government to excuse him. The strain of waiting for the issue of the negotiations now proceeding in London, which he appears to consider are proceeding unfavourably for himself, while the danger of a collision with Ibn Saud draws daily nearer, coupled with our apparent refusal to allot sufficient supplies to the Hedjaz, is proving beyond his endurance.

King Hussein insists on treating the inability of India to increase the normal allotment of supplies, owing to shortage of stocks, as a deliberate attempt to coerce him, and continues to state that the Hedjaz should not be made to suffer for any shortcomings of his own. He even alleges that he has a document showing that the so-called stoppage of supplies is due to representations from Ibn Saud, to whom he ironically refers as "King."

A telegram received to-day from King Hussein states that Khalid has attacked Bisal, three hours to the south-east of Taif. He asks how Great Britain can allow him to be so dishonoured before the world by the mamurs of another of her Allies, after his repeated warnings, after his agreeing to a mutual truce, and even after his offer to abdicate in favour of Ibn Saud to extricate himself from his difficulties.

The latter allusion refers to various remarks which he has previously made, needless to say, in an ironical vein.

The telegram concludes with the reference to Hodeidah mentioned above, and a disclaimer of responsibility for further bloodshed.

In the absence of reliable information from other sources it is difficult to appreciate accurately the present situation.

On the one hand, it would certainly appear, from the rumours and reports in circulation recently, and from the statements of King Hussein, that the Akhwan have disregarded the admittedly very unsatisfactory agreement arrived at four months ago.

Whether those concerned are acting independently, or as King Hussein alleges, under orders from Ibn Saud, it is not possible to say.

The situation has been reported as restless since September, and the King's preparations at Taif, culminating in his sending Emir Ali to take command and prepare for a possible attack, prove at all events the genuineness of his fears.

On the other hand, his former exaggeration of minor incidents, and continued attempts to make capital out of them, have to be taken into consideration, and any statements as to Akhwan preparations or attacks discounted to a certain extent until checked independently.

The situation has so far developed since my telegram No. 373 of the 27th November that the employment of counter-measures by the King referred to has become practically a certainty should further incidents occur.

Should they continue, King Hussein would be fully justified in resisting attack on his own soil. He has neither the force nor the means, however, to indulge in anything beyond defence, and after the lesson of Taraba, it is not anticipated that he would be tempted to use any troops employed in resisting minor attacks for further enterprises.

Every endeavour has been made to impress on him that the use of troops, apart from the legitimate action of tribesmen in defending themselves against fortuitous attacks, would imperil the whole situation, precipitate a crisis, and destroy at a blow the hopes of a friendly settlement with Ibn Saud raised by the recent agreement.

King Hussein's invariable reply is to the effect that it is no longer a question of tribal incidents, but of preparations to attack him in earnest, and that should he continue to ignore such incidents, he not only dishonours himself, but endangers his existence, and that Great Britain shares the responsibility, owing to her refusal to keep Ibn Saud within bounds and to supply material help.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to persuade the King to understand the policy of keeping on friendly terms with all the rulers in Arabia while assisting in every way possible to establish friendly relations between them, and of non-interference with internal affairs, without his taking exception to what he considers is an abandonment of him by Great Britain, looking on himself as he does as in a

privileged position, which entitles him to our unconditional assistance and to ignore any views differing from his own.

King Hussein's present position is undoubtedly a difficult one, if not so desperate as he affirms, but he is incapable of seeing that he has only himself to blame for having persisted in refusing to accept any compromise short of his original ambitions, and to attempt to meet the views of His Majesty's Government in the slightest degree during the last year.

4. *Accusations against General Gouraud.*—The King has sent me the copy of a telegram sent to the Hedjaz representative in Cairo, for communication to his Excellency the High Commissioner, complaining of the treatment of prisoners from the Arab army by General Gouraud, and alleging that atrocities were committed by the French.

5. *Capitulations.*—An Italian subject practising law in Jeddah was ordered to be summarily arrested by the King and deported by the next steamer, as advice he had given in a divorce case was not in accordance with the King's judgment.

I understand the Italian envoy protested energetically, and informed the King he would if necessary personally have him released, and that any attempt to deport him would be prevented.

King Hussein agreed that if after due enquiry this man proved to be an Italian subject, he might be permitted to remain in Jeddah.

6. *Quarantine Quay Incident.*—While the apology requested from the Director of Customs, referred to in the last report, has not been directly forthcoming, I have received an ambiguously worded letter on the subject from Mecca which could be taken as satisfactory, to which I made a suitably friendly reply, and the matter can therefore be considered as closed.

7. *Supplies.*—With reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 23 of the 11th December, I mentioned to King Hussein, when informing him that I had telegraphed to India asking urgently for particulars of the supplies available for the Hedjaz, that while the matter had been fully represented, there was at present some difficulty in obtaining supplies in excess of the normal allotment owing to shortage in India and Burmah. King Hussein was pained at hearing this from a British official, and said that while he and his subjects could very well exist on dukhn and maize, we might be less avaricious if only in the interests of the many British Indians in the country, and that the "stoppage" of supplies to the Hedjaz would react unfavourably on British interests.

There is admittedly a shortage of the better grades of flour, chiefly due to the King having commandeered the major portion of the last supply for his own purposes.

The offer of surplus wheat from Alexandria has been refused, the samples which I obtained being stated by the Government to be unsuitable.

8. *Coastal Traffic.*—Messrs. Khandwani Brothers have started a local service to Yenbo with the A.S. "Vergamere." This small vessel has already made several successful trips, and the service may be extended to other ports.

The same firm imported a number of motors for service between Jeddah and Mecca, one of which was presented to the King, but their efforts to obtain his sanction have been so far no more successful than those of the Italian venture.

9. *Arms Traffic.*—With reference to a communication from his Excellency the High Commissioner in Egypt as to the possibility of arms being conveyed to Mesopotamia by means of Italian ships through some port on the Red Sea, I informed the Senior Naval Officer, Red Sea, during his recent visit, of the activities of the Italian steamer "Nilo." This vessel is apparently permitted to call at Kunfidah, among other places, while King Hussein objects to the Aden-Hodeidah service being extended to that port.

10. *Non-Moslem Cemetery.*—This cemetery, outside the Jeddah walls, has fallen into disrepair. Apart from other considerations, it is inadvisable that it should appear in any way to be no concern to the non-Moslem community.

At a meeting of the foreign representatives it was therefore agreed that each agency or consulate should contribute a fixed sum yearly for maintenance as from the 1st January, 1921, and take charge in turn for one year. A charge of 5*l.* on each was settled, and in addition some 70*l.* have been collected privately.

This item will be therefore submitted in forwarding the budget for the agency.

11. *Mecca Report.*—Beyond reports of Akhwan activity, and the situation at Taif, already dealt with, there is nothing of importance to report.

12. *Press.*—In view of the character of the views expressed, apart from the

unjustifiable use of Colonel Wilson's name, I requested that a notification be inserted prominently in "Al Qibla" and "Al Falah" that Colonel Wilson was not the author of the article quoted from the "National Review," and had no connection whatsoever with it. In reply I was informed that there was no doubt he was the author, owing to the special knowledge shown in the article.

I accordingly forwarded the name of the actual writer, and expressed the hope that it would not be necessary to have to use Colonel Wilson's personal letter to me to ensure the notification being inserted. It has not yet been published. King Hussein was perfectly aware that Colonel Wilson was not the author, who was prominently referred to as having been present at the victorious entry into Damascus.

"Al Qibla" No. 442 contains a eulogy of King Hussein from No. 397 of "Al Hawi," in which he and his sons are praised for pursuing no private advantage, but rather the good of the Arabs, and that the King cannot be blamed for the results of his revolt.

No. 443 under the heading of "The Hedjaz and the Arab Union" shows that, although it was the Hedjaz which rose against the Turks, the revolt was shared by all Arabs, and the King and his sons never intended it to apply only to the Hedjaz, but to all Arabia.

The receipts of the Hedjaz posts and telegraphs are given for the year 1338, over and above which the cable share is stated to be due.

"Al Qibla" No. 444 and "Al Falah" No. 19 contain complaints that subscribers abroad are not receiving copies regularly, and the editor of "Al Falah" cannot understand why his paper is being confiscated.

W. BATTEN, Major, I.A.,
Acting British Agent.

Enclosure 2 in No. 135.

Shipping Intelligence to December 30, 1920.

The following steamers arrived at, and departed from, Jeddah between the 21st and 30th December, 1920:—

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Cargo discharged.
Keneh	British ..	P. Soudan..	Suez ..	Dec. 21	Dec. 22	Packages. 1,611
Dakahlieh ..	" ..	Suez ..	P. Soudan..	" 25	" 25	836
Asmara	Italian ..	Massaua ..	Suez ..	" 25	" 25	3,176

[E 986/4/91]

No. 136.

Report of Conversation between Mr. R. C. Lindsay, C.V.O., representing the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and His Highness the Emir Feisal, representing the King of the Hedjaz. (Held at the Foreign Office, January 20, 1921.)

Present.

Mr. R. C. LINDSAY, C.V.O.	His Highness the EMIR FEISAL.
Major H. W. YOUNG, D.S.O.	Brigadier-General HADDAD PASHA.
Colonel K. CORNWALLIS, C.B.E., D.S.O.	RUSTUM HARDAR.

MR. LINDSAY referred to a conversation which had passed between the Secretary of State and the Emir on the 13th January. A letter had been received on the following day from the Emir which gave rise to the fear that the Emir had not correctly understood what had been said on the subject of the resumption of payments to the King of the Hedjaz. What Lord Curzon had said was that there could be no question of the retention of the subsidy at the old figure or of the payment of arrears. The subsidy that had been thought proper and reasonable during the war, when military operations were

proceeding, and before King Hussein had consolidated his authority, was now both unreasonable and excessive. His Majesty's Government had come to the conclusion that a specific sum should be assigned for the purpose of subsidies for the entire Arabian peninsula. It would then be possible to pay a subsidy to King Hussein, not, of course, comparable with the war subsidy, with some payment to enable him to liquidate his liabilities and start afresh, and to compensate him for having received no payment during the past few months. This was, of course, subject to the final approval of His Majesty's Government.

The Emir accepted the explanation, and mentioned that he had telegraphed to King Hussein informing him that the resumption of payments was approved in principle. He then referred to the conversation which had taken place at the Foreign Office on the 22nd December, which had resulted in a comparison of the texts in his possession and in that of the Foreign Office of the original correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon and King Hussein.

Mr. Lindsay said that he regretted the delay in resuming these conversations, which had been due to the fact that Sir John Tilley had left London and that he himself had not hitherto been able to find time to go into the questions which were being discussed. He understood that in the texts of the letters as compared a mistranslation had come to light to which some reference must be made. King Hussein had originally claimed certain boundaries within which he asked that Great Britain would recognise an Arab kingdom. Sir H. McMahon had replied accepting these boundaries with certain modifications, and promising to recognise and support the independence of the Arabs therein. The mistranslation had unfortunately obscured the meaning of one of these reservations.

The Emir replied that in the Arabic version of the correspondence—which was the only official communication which had induced his father to enter the war—Sir H. McMahon had made it clear that Cilicia and the coast of Syria to the west of the four towns of Damascus, Homs, Hama and Aleppo must be excluded from the proposed limits and boundaries. King Hussein had agreed that the question of the inclusion of the Syrian coast should be reserved for future discussion after the war. He fully realised that Great Britain were not pledged in respect of the Syrian coastal areas. They were, however, pledged in respect of Palestine and the four towns. The Arabs had always regarded both Palestine and the hinterland of Syria as being covered by the pledges given by Sir H. McMahon. Certain remarks made to himself by the British Prime Minister on the 19th September, 1919, and one passage in a letter addressed to him by Lord Curzon on the 9th October had confirmed them in this impression.

Mr. Lindsay said that he was not empowered to discuss the hinterland of Syria, in respect of which His Majesty's Government were pledged to the French. He suggested that the passage referred to by the Emir might be interpreted to mean that His Majesty's Government for their part were prepared to recognise an independent Arab State in the hinterland of Syria provided that the Arabs turned only to the French for assistance in that area. In any case he could not discuss the hinterland of Syria without further reference to the Secretary of State.

The Emir recognised that the question of Syria must be left on one side for the moment, but wished it recorded that his acceptance of this ruling did not in any way prejudice his claim that His Majesty's Government had entered into definite pledges to the Arabs about the future of this area. With regard to Palestine, he said that nothing in the original correspondence stated that Palestine should be excluded from the Arab boundaries.

Mr. Lindsay pointed out that Palestine had been expressly excluded from the boundaries in Sir H. McMahon's letter of the 20th October, 1915, lying as it did to the west of the vilayet of Damascus. The passage from Sir H. McMahon's letter was read aloud to the Emir in Arabic.

His Highness pointed out that if His Majesty's Government relied upon the strict interpretation of the word "vilayet," as applied to Damascus, they must also interpret the word to mean the same with regard to Homs and Hama. There was not, and never had been, a vilayet of Homs or Hama, while he was quite prepared to accept Mr. Lindsay's statement that it had been the original intention of His Majesty's Government to exclude Palestine. He represented that, as the Arabic stood, it would clearly be interpreted by any Arab, and had been so interpreted by King Hussein, to refer to the four towns and their immediate surroundings. Palestine did not lie to the west of the four towns, and was therefore, in his opinion, included in the area for which His Majesty's Government had given pledges to his father. He was acting in this

respect in strict accordance with the instructions received from his father. His father demanded that these pledges should now be fulfilled.

Mr. Lindsay said that the main difficulty in which His Majesty's Government found themselves at present was due to the fact that the King of the Hedjaz had not ratified the Treaty of Versailles. Until he had done this his right to discuss the disposal of the areas liberated from the Turks by the principal Allied Powers could not possibly be recognised by them. His Majesty's Government were anxious that the Emir should induce his father to place himself in a position to discuss the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres by ratifying the Treaty of Versailles. If there were difficulties in the way the Emir had only to explain them, and His Majesty's Government would do their best to remove them.

The Emir said that his father's difficulties were easy to define. The King of the Hedjaz would not accept a treaty which included provisions for the mandatory principle and the division between two European Powers of the countries for which the Arabs had fought and died.

Mr. Lindsay said that he could well understand that the King of the Hedjaz, who was far away, might be apprehensive about the meaning of the word "mandate" and about the mandatory principle. He would be glad to know whether the Emir shared these apprehensions.

The Emir replied that after his experience in Syria he did most certainly share them.

Mr. Lindsay again reminded His Highness that he was not empowered to discuss, and did not intend to discuss, the actions of the French Government. Was there anything in what Great Britain had done in the areas placed under their mandate to which either the Emir or his father objected?

The Emir replied that he was aware of nothing to which exception could be taken. He had the fullest confidence in the intentions of His Majesty's Government, but he would be glad to see the mandates for the British spheres, and to discuss them with His Majesty's Government. He reminded Mr. Lindsay that King Hussein, who had himself taken the initiative in the Arab revolt, had not only raised no objection to British assistance, but had made it a condition of his entering the war on the side of the Allies. There could be no stronger proof of his confidence in their sincerity. He was prepared to say nothing whatever for the present about the French sphere in view of Mr. Lindsay's instructions, and merely to enquire what His Majesty's Government proposed to do in their own zone.

Mr. Lindsay said that if King Hussein had ratified the Treaty of Versailles, and thus regularised his position as an original member of the League of Nations, copies of the different mandates which were now before the Council of the League would already have been communicated to him.

The Emir replied that he did not wish to discuss the mandates in their character of documents under consideration by the League of Nations, but merely from the point of view of the original British pledges given to his father, and with the object of discussing freely with His Majesty's Government to what extent their provisions fulfilled these pledges.

Mr. Lindsay returned to what the Emir had already said about King Hussein having stipulated that he should be assisted by His Majesty's Government. The provisions of the mandate were merely the definite formulation of the lines on which British assistance would be given, and their acceptance by the League of Nations was essential for His Majesty's Government to be in a position to give that assistance. King Hussein had not only asked for British help, but had stipulated that no other Power should concern itself with the future of the Arab countries. It was clearly necessary to obtain the consent of the other Allied Powers for the special position of His Majesty's Government in this respect, and this could only be done by obtaining their acceptance of the terms of the mandates.

The Emir said that, even so, his father wished to be consulted about the provisions of the mandates, not in his capacity as a member of the League of Nations, but in his prior capacity as the recognised spoke-man of the Arab peoples, with whom His Majesty's Government had entered into a definite agreement.

Mr. Lindsay said that, before accepting the right of the King of the Hedjaz to have a voice in the future of all the Arab peoples, it would be necessary to consider whether the Arabs themselves wished him to represent them. His Majesty's Government were already in treaty relations with a number of independent Arab rulers, and could not accept any modifications of these agreements except with the consent of the rulers concerned.

The Emir said that a promise had been made to his father that there should be an Arab kingdom. His father did not claim the right to modify any treaties which existed between His Majesty's Government and independent Arab rulers at the time when he entered the war. He only feared that if other reservations were now made about the various areas under mandates, His Majesty's Government had receded from their original position.

Mr. Lindsay pointed out that the words "Arab kingdom" had only been used by Sir Henry McMahon in reply to a letter from King Hussein, in which the latter had agreed to respect existing treaties between His Majesty's Government and certain sheikhs of Mesopotamia, in order to make it perfectly clear to King Hussein that his original reservation referred, not only to Mesopotamia, but to all the Arab countries. Sir Henry McMahon pointed out that it applied to the whole of the "Arab kingdom." At the same time, it must be remembered that his original undertaking had been that Great Britain would recognise and support the "independence of the Arabs." If King Hussein succeeded in obtaining the consent of all the Arabs within the areas in which His Majesty's Government were free to act to the constitution of a single Arab kingdom, His Majesty's Government would, he thought, offer no objection; but, so far as he could see, there was no prospect whatever of this concurrence being obtained in the near future. Certain of the independent rulers of Arabia being at the moment in actual conflict with King Hussein.

The Emir acknowledged that he had previously disclaimed any intention of discussing the original correspondence point by point, but it was clear from the present conversation that this was almost unavoidable. He suggested that it would facilitate further discussion if he were to submit a statement showing comprehensively what the Arabs regarded as the pledges of His Majesty's Government. He trusted that exception would not be taken to the inclusion in this statement of a reference to the four towns in the hinterland of Syria. In including these towns he was merely obeying his father's instructions.

Mr. Lindsay requested His Highness to furnish him with copies of this statement, and promised to lay it before the Secretary of State.

Foreign Office, January 20, 1921.

[E 1090/4/91]

No. 137.

Earl Curzon to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

(No. 244.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, January 24, 1921.

THE French Ambassador called on Sir Eyre Crowe on Friday, the 21st January, and, in the course of a general conversation dealing with unimportant matters connected with the forthcoming meeting of the Conference at Paris, asked him to allow him to say a few words about the Emir Feisal in an informal way. He said he had no instructions from his Government to raise the subject, but he was an intimate friend of General Gouraud, whose mind was much preoccupied with our attitude towards Feisal.

He said General Gouraud was the most popular general in France, and any opinion which he expressed or was known to hold would always find widespread support in French public opinion. General Gouraud was frankly alarmed at the possibility of Feisal being utilised by the British Government in Mesopotamia, and the Ambassador thought His Majesty's Government ought to realise how disastrously such an event would react on Anglo-French relations in general. No one in France was a more convinced supporter of the *Entente* than General Gouraud, and if he opposed the installation of Feisal in Mesopotamia he was doing it just as much in British as in French interests. He was convinced of the essential falseness of Feisal's character, and M. de Saint-Aulaire quoted the remark which, as already reported to His Majesty's Government, Feisal is stated to have made to General Gouraud to the effect that he was quite willing to join with him in turning out the English.

Apart from this, the Ambassador said he had much experience of Mahomedans, and, owing to his having been in Morocco with General Gouraud, he had the greatest confidence in the latter's way of treating natives. He said it was incredible to anyone acquainted with Orientals that a man like Feisal, whatever his original influence might have been in his own country, could continue to carry weight as an exponent of native opinion from the moment that he had not only thrown in his lot with a European

Power, but had actually visited European countries. M. de Saint-Aulaire consequently felt quite certain that if His Majesty's Government expected to derive support in Mesopotamia from the authority of Feisal they would be leaning on a broken reed. Therefore, from the point of view of their own special interests, and from the point of view of maintaining the friendship of France, it was alike desirable that His Majesty's Government should have nothing to do with Feisal.

Sir Eyre Crowe thanked the Ambassador for the frank way in which he had expressed his views, and said he felt at some disadvantage because, the treatment of all questions relating to these mandated territories having been transferred to another Government Department, he must naturally hesitate to express any opinion or make any statement that might involve their responsibility. He would observe, however, in the first place, that, so far as he was aware, the Emir Feisal had not up to now come forward as a candidate for the rulership of Mesopotamia. M. de Saint-Aulaire seemed to think that the British Government was free to make what choice it liked in imposing a ruler on Mesopotamia; this was certainly not so. His Majesty's Government were quite determined to carry out their promise to set up a native Arab State and to take into account the wishes of the population in the selection of a ruler; whether the natives of Mesopotamia would demand to have Feisal for their King or not, Sir E. Crowe could not say, but it was obvious that if such a demand were put forward it would not be easy for the British Government to turn a deaf ear to it. Sir E. Crowe repeated the well-known argument of His Majesty's Government being vitally interested in keeping the goodwill of the Arabs, which was more important to the British Empire than to any other country. His Majesty's Government had entered into definite obligations to King Hussein, and they simply could not afford to do anything which would entitle the Arabs to say that Great Britain had abandoned them after making use of them for the purpose of winning the war against Turkey.

As regards the personality of Feisal, he had to tell M. de Saint-Aulaire frankly that his estimate of his character entirely differed from that formed by General Gouraud. He would be the last person to set up his judgment against that of General Gouraud in a matter of this kind, but he asked himself on what the latter really rested. Apparently the greatest weight was being attached to Feisal's alleged duplicity and his offer to betray the British. He did not find it easy, in spite of the remark attributed to Feisal, to believe him capable of such falseness, and, as he believed that General Gouraud did not himself understand Arabic, and that therefore Feisal's remarks could only have reached him through an interpreter, he wondered whether it was not possible that some misunderstanding had arisen in the course of the inevitable translation. He told M. de Saint-Aulaire how His Majesty's Government, on their part, had drifted into a position of great delicacy towards King Hussein, and found themselves in the presence of a misunderstanding left unexplained until they accidentally discovered, years after the event, that a few words said in a conversation, which had been faultily rendered into Arabic, were the cause of all the trouble. Similar misunderstandings were known to have occurred on other occasions in analogous circumstances. Was it out of the question that something of this sort happened in the present case? He begged M. de Saint-Aulaire to believe that he was not impugning in any way the good faith either of General Gouraud or of whoever may have been the interpreter, but he could not altogether discard the possibility of a mistake having occurred.

In any case he assured the Ambassador that whatever decision His Majesty's Government might eventually have to take in this matter would be taken with due regard to their determined policy of preserving the good understanding with the French Government.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 1139/455/91]

No. 138.

Major Batten to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 25.)

(No. 4.)

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the Jeddah report for the period ending the 10th January, 1921.

Jeddah, January 10, 1921.

Copies of this report and despatch have been sent to his Excellency the High Commissioner for Egypt, his Excellency the High Commissioner for Mesopotamia and the Political Resident, Aden.

I have, &c.

W. BATTEN, Major, I. A.,
Acting British Agent.

Enclosure 1 in No. 138.

Jeddah Report for the period January 1-10, 1921.

GENERAL SITUATION.

SUBSEQUENT to the raid on Bisal, the villages in Wadi Liyah were attacked and reports were in circulation that the Mudayana were preparing to encircle Taif, one column being sent to cut the Yemen (southern) route, and a second up the Wadi Liyah, while a third was reported as advancing along the Wadi-el-Lemun towards Mecca.

King Hussein confirmed the news of the attacks in the Wadi Liyah, adding that the villages were able to hold their own, and that attacks nearer Taif had been repulsed with some loss in killed and wounded by his troops, who were instructed to reconnoitre and report on the further movements of the raiders.

He had, however, ordered Emir Ali to act on the defensive as far as possible, but could not say what might not arise subsequently, and awaited some definite pronouncement from His Majesty's Government with impatience.

The King expressed his regret and grief over the blood which had been shed and which he feared would be shed subsequently in Arabia, as a consequence of these attacks, and told me that he had received information that, following on the attack on Koweit, the Bani section of the Muteir had attacked a sheikh of the Shammar, to the south of Shebiyah (? Shabibiya), and inflicted great loss. Now there was further news of the Idrisi attacking the Imam with the intention of unlawfully taking possession of San'a. The prospects of Arabia were dark and further temporising with the trouble now brewing could not be continued indefinitely without its coming to a head.

The reports as to a force threatening Mecca appear to be unfounded, and such attacks as have taken place in the Taif district appear to be more in the nature of a series of raids than any concerted attack by a large force, as the King avers.

King Hussein's tribal policy of retaining control by keeping the Bedouin in a state of abject poverty, refusing them supplies except when in Mecca, and seeds for their farms, with his general harsh and tyrannical behaviour, has had the opposite effect to that intended, and there is little doubt that the feeling among the surrounding tribes is as bitter against him as that in Mecca and Jeddah.

Such raids may be expected to recur indefinitely, under present conditions, owing to the King's policy having estranged the Bedouin, who will lose no opportunity of revenging themselves as occasion offers, and who it may be safely conjectured would take advantage of any considerable success, or any weakening of his power, to rise against him *en masse*.

It has not been possible, with the scanty information at my disposal, to ascertain the exact composition of the parties engaged in the recent fighting, but apart from Emir Khalid's tribesmen, two independent reports state that certain of the Eastern Harb were involved and that this tribe in general has refused co-operation when called on by the King.

Khalid apparently took advantage of the present state of affairs to threaten Taif, gratify the Mudayana, wipe off old scores and involve King Hussein in difficulties by provoking reprisals.

The raids may have possibly been in the nature of a reconnaissance, as a prelude to the further action constantly referred to by King Hussein, but the situation appears to have become easier during the last week, and it is even reported that Emir Ali has arranged an informal truce for the present.

The King has not been able to afford me any further information.

Emir Zeid is to join his brother at Taif.

The King ordered Shereef Nasir-ibn-Ali (bin Hussein) to accompany him, owing to

his well-known popularity with the Bedouin, but the latter's intention is apparently to evade this order and return to join his brother in Medina.

2. It has been suggested that King Hussein's real object in continually overstating the case against the Akwan in general and Ibn Saud in particular, is to persuade His Majesty's Government that such raids as those reported are instigated by Ibn Saud, in order to obtain material aid against him.

Should His Majesty's Government intervene in his favour, difficulties will be created between ourselves and Ibn Saud by embroiling us in the dispute.

Should such a situation arise, Ibn Saud would not only be weakened and the King gain proportionately, but the latter would have the satisfaction of having endangered the relations between His Majesty's Government and Ibn Saud, whom he cordially detests and fears.

While King Hussein has been very loyal in the past, his present temper is such that it is not considered he would be deterred by any scruples from acting contrary to the interests of His Majesty's Government, should he hope to gain any advantage by so doing.

It is with regret that I have to record this opinion, but the King's behaviour during the last year, however justified in his own eyes, makes it difficult to arrive at any other conclusion.

3. Medina, from all reports, is now practically independent of the King, under Shereef Shahaat. One of the reasons for the return of Emir Ali is stated to have been the difficulty, if not the danger, of his position as Governor, while the real power lay with Shereef Shahaat, who is commonly credited with designs against King Hussein and his sons. He, and more especially Shereef Nasir, have great influence with the tribes, as well as in Medina itself, and King Hussein could do nothing against them should they revolt.

This branch (Hussein) of the Ashraf consider themselves as more important than the ruling house, and that King Hussein does not treat them with the consideration that is their due, and has not rewarded Shereef Nasir in particular sufficiently for his services in the revolt.

The King is well aware of these feelings, and has held the families of both Shereefs Shahaat and Nasir in turn as virtual hostages for their good behaviour.

It is stated that Shereef Nasir is so disgusted with the King's attitude that he would be willing to revolt, and even canvass the throne should an opportunity arise, aided by his popularity among the Bedouin as a military leader.

His intention, after his return from Syria, was to liquidate his property and reside in Egypt, but the King, having now permitted his family to return to Medina, wishes to retain him under his own eye in Mecca, or under Emir Ali's orders at Taif.

Reports as to Shereef Shahaat being virtually in revolt against the King have been current ever since Emir Ali's departure from Medina.

The above information is interesting in view of the fact that in a recent conversation with a partisan of Shereef Nasir he attempted very guardedly to sound me as to the attitude of His Majesty's Government should Ibn Saud attack King Hussein, or any other person revolt against him.

It appears to be generally believed that we are supplying the King with arms and money, and would support him against any form of external or internal attack.

There appears to be a tendency to lay some of the blame for the present unsatisfactory state of affairs in the Hedjaz at the door of the British, for having been the cause of King Hussein's exaggerated idea of his own importance, resulting in his assurance that he can do as he pleases with the certainty of support from His Majesty's Government.

GENERAL.

Ummlejh.—It is reported that after Shereef Mohsen's arrival the situation in this district improved considerably, and all is now quiet.

Capitulations.—The Italian consul stated in the course of conversation that King Hussein's change of attitude regarding the case of the Italian subject, mentioned in the last report, was due to his informing the King that not only did the Italian Government maintain that the procedure in force under the Turks held good until the formulation of some new agreement between the Allies and the Hedjaz, but that both the British and French Governments supported the Royal Government in this view.

Pilgrimage.—The last of the pilgrims bound for India, numbering some 200, were despatched by the steamship "Koweit" on the 9th January. They represented the

remainder of the Medina pilgrimage for the most part, and included a large number of destitutes who had accumulated since the departure of the last steamer. Passage for them was arranged with the Government of Bombay, as it was not considered fair on the company concerned, which had already granted free passage in a number of similar cases, to request them to take this additional number free.

Sadik-el-Kudari.—This officer left by the same steamer for India *en route* for Japan and Siberia. As his papers were unexceptionable, they were endorsed for the journey to Bombay. A report on his prolonged stay in Mecca and any information I was able to furnish have been sent as a measure of precaution to Bombay and Bagdad.

In the course of conversation he mentioned he had originally been proceeding to report to General Wrangel on the situation in Siberia, on behalf of Ataman Semenov. He later stated that he was not continuing his journey, as there was no object in his proceeding further after the collapse in the Crimea.

He appeared from his manner and conversation to be a soldier of fortune seeking employment rather than a political intriguer, but his journey from Siberia via Bagdad to Jeddah and Mecca, when there was a choice of direct steamers via Egypt, and return after a stay of some weeks in Mecca, cannot but appear strange.

He did not once visit the Haram while in Mecca, and was unwilling to talk about his stay there.

His only comment on King Hussein was that he was a sly old man.

Rouble Notes.—A number of notes of the Soviet Government have appeared in Jeddah, said to have arrived by way of Syria and Medina.

Prohibition against leaving the Hedjaz.—Two respectable British Indian traders were not permitted to see off their relatives on the last steamer until I had intervened in their favour, necessitating reference to Mecca.

All those desirous of going on board a steamer in port have first to sign a guarantee that they will return, and I was naively informed that this rule was necessary to prevent people leaving the country without authority.

Soudan Telegraph Account.—As anticipated, the promise to settle a certain amount of this rapidly accumulating account has been repudiated.

The Hachimite Government has further taken exception to the notification of increased cable rates by the Eastern Telegraph Company being sent through the Soudan Government, and does not apparently recognise the right of this company to alter its rates after due notification to the international bureau at Berne.

Export of Hair and Wool.—The Director of Bedouin Industries at Behig has been on a visit to Jeddah with a view to obtaining supplies for the Egyptian frontier districts Administration. King Hussein has very generously presented 1,000 okes of hair, including some wool, as a gift to the Administration, but efforts to arrange for a regular supply have so far not met with success.

Mecca Report.—An abstract of the current Mecca report is attached, together with a report by Captain Nasiruddin Ahmed on his return to Mecca.

The latter confirms the view taken above as to the present situation.

Press.—Nos. 445, 446 and 447 of "Al Qibla" are forwarded herewith.

No. 445, under the heading of "The Arabs and their Allies," discusses the reasons for the entry of the Arabs into the war, and the present state of Arabia as compared to the advantages enjoyed by other small countries after the war.

No. 446 contains a translation from the "Temps" of the 5th December, 1920, giving certain statements of Mr. Lloyd George as to the position in Ireland, including references to the actions of French press correspondents.

The "Qibla" compares the difference in the behaviour of Great Britain's French and Arab allies to the detriment of the former.

No. 447 quotes Mr. Lloyd George's speech on the subject of the French and Mustafa Kemal, and comments very appreciatively on his statements as to Smyrna, Aleppo and Damascus, and his mention of the Arab view of Great Britain's agreements with France.

The current number of "Al Falah" has not yet been received.

The notification asked for in the case of the article attributed to Colonel Wilson has not appeared, and King Hussein has evidently no intention of helping in the matter.

W. BATTEN, Major, I.A.

Enclosure 2 in No. 138.

Abstract of Mecca Report to January 9, 1921.

ATTACKS IN TAIF DISTRICT.

IT is stated that the villages in the Wadi Liyah had been previously in communication with the Mudayana. The property of the inhabitants was respected, but that of Shereef Hamza (a member of the Mejliss-es-Sheyukh) was looted.

In the raid on El Raiha, a village 16 miles from Taif, Shereef Fattan, ex-Kaimakam of Mecca, is reported to have been killed and his family abducted.

The Ghawanim tribesmen of Sheikh Hussein of Rabegh, who was lately killed in Mecca, are said to be awaiting an opportunity of joining in any raids which may be made in the direction of the Wadi Fatima.

Reports have been spread in Mecca that the Mudayana will guarantee the lives and property of the inhabitants, provided they keep to their houses and do not interfere in the event of fighting taking place in Mecca.

Fifteen machine guns, the majority of the regular troops, and some 300 men from Ayal-al-Hara are being sent to Taif, while Emir Zeid is to be put in command of the friendly tribesmen now being enlisted round Mecca.

The Government have taken over the flour mills, and a further 3,000 bags of flour have been sent to Taif for the troops.

Several Bedouin have been arrested in Mecca as spies, and a careful watch is being kept on the movements of known opponents of the King.

Emir Ali is said to have sent a message to the King stating that negotiations for a peaceful settlement are proceeding between him and the attacking tribes, but that failing a settlement the Shereefian troops will advance.

[This has also been reported from another source.]

A number of rifles belonging to tribesmen enlisted by the King had been mortgaged, but were purchased by the King and returned to their owners.

GENERAL.

Shereef al-Adwan.—Shereef Sharaf-al-Adwan has left for Constantinople. [This is the Shereef referred to in the first section of the last Jeddah Report.]

Sadik-al-Kudari.—The term "Soviet delegate" was commonly employed by the Kavass and other Government employees attached to this officer during his stay in Mecca. Nobody was permitted to visit him in his house, but he called at the palace daily.

NOTE.—I attach little importance to the above. The natural inference on the part of all who saw this officer in his Russian uniform which he habitually wore, would be that he was connected with the Bolsheviks.

Egyptian Aukaf Wheat.—The Government continue to misapply this Wakf (Jiraya), part being commandeered at a fixed price of 14 megidiehs the arded, and the remainder sold to merchants at 24 megidiehs or more.

Before the war this wheat used to be handed over to the Turkish authorities for distribution, but the position of the Hedjaz as regards Egypt being now changed, it is considered that the Egyptian Government should arrange for the distribution of this charity through properly accredited agents to prevent such abuses occurring.

Wireless.—A new wireless station is being erected in Mecca for communication with Taif.

Military Preparations.—The Government is purchasing all available arms and ammunition, and has already paid out a large amount of money to such tribesmen as have been enlisted, to retain their services.

Enclosure 3 in No. 138.

Report by Captain Nasiruddin Ahmed, Mecca, January 10, 1921.

ON my return to the Hedjaz after about six weeks' absence, I noticed that the public feeling against King Hussein had considerably increased, even his favourite officials were daily alienating themselves from his policy. No Moslem, Sunni or Shia likes to see the Wahabis in charge of the Ka'aba, but the present feeling is that even a Jew, let alone Ibn Saud, would be a relief, at least as a temporary measure. The King's policy has slowly but surely given strength to the latent pro-Turkish feelings of the country, and the townsmen and Bedouin, both for their own purposes and from different points of view, would welcome the "Turkish hell to the King's paradise." News about the Turkish successes in the north are received with great pleasure, and a very responsible Minister of the King informed me in an exultant tone that "Aleppo was now being besieged by the Turks, after they had retaken the whole country to the north and west of it, and propose to advance on Hama and Homs."

The British Government is being very adversely criticised for not taking advantage of the present opportunity to befriend the Turks and have the Treaty of Sèvres modified in their favour. Such an act will pacify the Moslems all over the world and bring peace to the East. France and Italy, they say, are favourable to the modification, but the British Government, and more especially Mr. Lloyd George, are against it, which proves that instead of being their friend, the British Government is the worst enemy of the Moslems. Another remark was about the mistake that the British Government made in putting up Shereef Hussein as king, and I was asked whether during my leave I had tried to impress on the authorities the need for rectifying the error.

2. Fighting round Taif is nothing but a Bedouin raid on a grand scale. The officer in charge of the Cadet School at Mecca told me that Ibn Saud had nothing to do with it. The King has been withholding supplies from reaching that country. Absence of rain, combined with the lust of loot, suggested the raid, and Shereef Kalid of Khurma, who is notoriously anti-Shereef and at the same time not a true Wahabi, but only a political one, fanned the flame of discontent and the result was the fight. Forces multiplied in the hope of booty. The King, however, is quietly making all preparations to inflict punishment on the raiders.

Enclosure 4 in No. 138.

Shipping Intelligence to the 10th January, 1921.

THE following steamers arrived at and departed from Jeddah between the 31st December, 1920, and the 10th January, 1921:—

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Pilgrims embarked.	Cargo discharged.
Dakahlieh ..	British ..	Port Soudan	Suez ..	31.12.20	1.1.21	..	Packages. 383
Koweit ..	" ..	Bombay ..	Bombay ..	2.1.21	9.1.21	204	29,037
Mansourah ..	" ..	Suez ..	Port Soudan	5.1.21	5.1.21	..	3,202

[E 1173/456/91]

No. 139.

Political Resident to Earl Curzon.—(Received January 25.)

(No. 2.)

My Lord,

Aden, January 12, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your Lordship's information, a copy of the First Aden News Letter, dated the 12th January, 1921.

I have, &c.

T. E. SCOTT, Major-General,
Political Resident, Aden.

Enclosure in No. 139.

First Aden News Letter.

(Secret.)

THE following is a summary of the news reported since the despatch of my last letter dated the 22nd December, 1920.

TIHAMA.

Our agents at Menakha and Bajil report that the greater part of Jebel Reima is now in the hands of the Imam, and that an attack on Jebel Bura is impending. The agents report a rumour that the Imam is preparing for a big attack on Tihama, as planned by the ex-Vali, Mahmud Nadhim, and has already despatched troops to Jebel Milhan for the capture of Zaydiya, the Idrisi's base for Bajil. An attack is expected to be made simultaneously on Obal and Jebel Bura. Six thousand soldiers with 100 cavalry, 200 mules, 20 big guns, and 6 machine guns are said to be concentrated at Menakha awaiting orders to advance.

The Menakha and Bajil agents state that the Tihama tribesmen are determined to fight the Zeidis to the last, and that Sheikh Ismail Baghawi of the Quhra is busily engaged in collecting his tribesmen for the purpose.

According to later reports, Hujjeila and some other places in the vicinity of Obal have been captured by the Imam after severe fighting, in which two of the Quhra leaders are reported to have been wounded and one to be missing.

Sheikh Mahomed Tahir, the Idrisi commandant at Bajil, and the Quhra Sheikh, Abu Hadi, are reported to be on indifferent terms with each other. Sheikh Abu Hadi is said to be at heart pro-Imamic and a great friend of Mahmud Nadhim, though he does not show his inclinations openly. Before the capture of the Jacob Mission, the Imam had named Sheikh Abu Hadi as his Qaimmaqam at Bajil. Public feeling at Bura is said to be tending in favour of the Imam as a result of Mahmud Nadhim's propaganda.

The Menakha and Bajil agents report the arrival of 700 Imamic soldiers at Menakha on the 6th December. They were despatched to Saafan and Wasil.

It is said that under orders received from the Imam, Sheikh Ali Salami attacked the fort of Al Hamala, in the vicinity of Madwal, on the 7th December. He was, however, forced to retire by the Idrisi-Quhra combination, and suffered many casualties, and was himself wounded.

The Imam is reported to have promised Sheikh Ali Mikdad of Anis the Amilship of Bura after he has conquered the place. The latter is said to have left for Jebel Bura with 600 men.

Sheikh Munassar Saghir Maruf, of the northern Zaraniq, is said to have written to the Imam openly declaring his loyalty to the Idrisi. His attitude is said to be due to a present he has received from Sayed Mustafa.

The ex-Vali, Mahmud Nadhim, continues his anti-Idrisi propaganda in correspondence with the Tihama Sayeds and the Sheikhs of Bura, Reima and Saafan. Yusuf Hassan, who is in the Idrisi employ at Bajil, is reported to be an agent of Mahmud Nadhim, and co-operates with Jamil Bey, resident at Marawa. The latter lives next to Saiyid Abdul Kadir, the Mansab of Marawa, and his duty is to keep an eye on the Sayed, who is the most influential man in the Tihama. Khalil Bey, who also resides in Marawa, is another agent of the ex-Vali, his duty being to travel between Marawa, Beit-el-Fakih, Zabeed, and the Zaraniq country, collecting intelligence. Mahmud Nadhim's agents in Hodeida are Omar Mizjaji, Arif Kharsa and Mirjan Harazi.

Our agent at Zabeed reports that the construction of barracks at Zabeed has commenced, as also the installation of a telegraph line between Zabeed and Hais and Zabeed and Taiz.

The agent also reports that Hamood Abdulrab and Hameed bin Ali, the notables of Hais, arrived at Zabeed with 500 armed men to submit their tenders for the revenues of Zabeed, Hais, &c. The Amil of Zabeed, however, refused permission for the armed men to enter the town and the party returned without submitting tenders after two days' stay outside the town.

The Idrisi troops are reported to have advanced on Beit-el-Fakih. This report is confirmed by Captain Fazluddin.

Our Sana agent reports that, in compliance with the ex-Vali's request, the Imam has despatched an additional force of 500 men to Menakha. The agent also

reports the despatch of 800 Zeidis to Reima via Bilad Anis and of 240 regulars with 2 guns, 1 machine gun, and 28 mules laden with ammunition, to Zabeed.

The agent further reports that the tribes of Beni Matar and Beni Hamadan, who were asked by the Imam to supply 2,000 men each, have expressed their willingness to do so provided arrangements as regards their rations and supply of ammunition are made to their satisfaction. Almost all the fighting men of the tribe of Arhab and of the tribes in the vicinity of Sana are said to have enlisted themselves. The agent says that the number of armed men in Sana at present is about 5,000.

YEMEN (UPPER AND LOWER).

A report states that Ibb is now quiet as the result of orders received from the Imam directing the Zeidis to cease all interference with the inhabitants.

Nakib Mahomed Husen As-Sufi, headman of Khaulan, who has written expressing his desire to befriend the British Government, states that Ibn Saud went against Waila, Yarn and Bilad Asir, but that he was repulsed, and that a large booty fell into the hands of the local inhabitants.

ADEN PROTECTORATE.

It is stated that the Imam's orders to Sayed Yahiya, the commander at Dhala, are that he should not go beyond Dhala, but that the Sayed has been interfering with tribes outside Dhala on his own responsibility.

Some Zeidi tax-collectors have undoubtedly advanced far into the Aden Protectorate, and I am unable to believe the report that their operations are directed by Sayed Yahiya contrary to the wishes of the Imam.

I have received numerous reports that unless the Koteibi Sheikh, Mahomed Saleh al Akram, makes his submission to the commander at Dhala, his country will be attacked. This rumour is probably given out by the Zeidis themselves, who have so far failed to induce Sheikh Mahomed Saleh to visit Dhala to make his submission.

A party of Zeidis is said to have been despatched to the Haushabi territory to collect tithes, which the Haushabi Sultan has promised to pay. I await confirmation of this report.

From reports received lately it appears that lawlessness is increasing in the Subehi country. In my last letter I referred to a raid made by the Mansuris and Makhdumis on the Somati section. It is now reported that the latter section have stealthily burnt the Makhdumi crops. Skirmishes are also reported between two other sections of the Subehis—the Masfari and Attawi—but the cause of this fighting is not known.

A long-standing dispute is said to exist between the Jorabis (Subehis) and the Humedis (a section of the Subehis outside our protectorate). Some six months ago a truce was arranged between them by the Abdali Sultan. This truce has expired and the Jorabis have attacked the Humedis and carried away their cattle, sheep and goats.

The Koteibi Sheikh writes that a party of fifteen Zeidis are collecting tithes in the Alawi territory. The Alawi Sheikh has appealed to me for protection, but this I am not in a position to accord.

Owing to reports having reached Aden regarding Imamic victories at Al Hujjailah and the suburbs of Obal and indicating a state of alarm at Bajil, I asked the Military Administrator, Hodeida, for a special report. His telegram, received this morning, states Quhra and Idrisi have expelled Imamic troops from territory previously occupied, according to the latest intelligence. Within Quhra limits there are no Imamic troops, and no baggage has come from Bajil into Hodeida.

Aden, January 12, 1921.

[E 1609/27/91]

No. 140.

Political Resident, Aden, to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 5. Confidential.)

My Lord,

IN continuation of my telegram No. 4, dated the 15th January, 1921, I have the honour to forward a copy of a letter dated the 24th December, 1920, from Captain

[6668]

Aden, January 20, 1921.

2 L 2

M. Fazluddin, I.M.S., liaison medical officer with the Idrisi, submitting his remarks on the present political situation in the Yemen and the desirability of evacuating the Turks still remaining there.

I have already expressed my views in the telegram referred to above, and venture to urge that the course suggested may be adopted with the least possible delay.

I have, &c.

T. E. SCOTT, Major-General.

Enclosure in No. 140.

Captain Fazluddin to Major-General Scott.

I BEG to submit the following remarks on the present political situation in the Yemen and the question of the evacuation of the Turks still remaining there.

As far as I can judge from a careful consideration of the conflicting mass of information before me and from watching the recent abortive attempts at peace from the side of the sons of the Imam and some of his mashaikhs, it appears that personally the Imam does want a peaceful settlement with the Idrisi as well as ourselves, but the following are the chief impediments in his way:—

1. The presence of Mahmud Nadhim and some other Turks in the Yemen, whose total number is not less than about 700. It is beyond question that Mahmud Nadhim is the evil genius of the Imam in nearly all the latter's plans and affairs. It is he who is responsible for an insidious, persistent and fearfully violent campaign of acrimony and misrepresentations against the Idrisi, who is considered by his party as an apostate of apostates on account of his alliance with us. It is he who has ever been spreading a wide anti-British propaganda by publishing utterly false news about ourselves, said always to have been derived from especially trustworthy sources (the Italians) via Massawa. It is he who is keeping up and prolonging the Imamic-Idrissian struggle, and finally it is he who is carrying on surreptitious negotiations with the Italian and other foreign Powers in the name of the Imam of Yemen.

2. The Imam is surrounded by a party of his own countrymen who are violently pro-Turk and wield a considerable influence among the people. The chief among this clique are:—

(a.) Syed Kasim Izzi, the principal sheikh of Beni Abdul Kadir.

(b.) Abu Naib.

(c.) Some of the mashaikhs of Rada, Anis, Khaulan and Arhab. These men are generally those who were the recipients of honours, titles, and handsome stipends from the Turkish Government, and naturally they have strong leanings towards them and wish for their return. They are the myrmidons of Mahmud Nadhim, who does his level best to keep up their hopes of the return of the Turkish rule by representing to them that, though by the exigencies of a lost war the Ottoman Government was obliged to sign an armistice according to which the military forces in Yemen had to surrender and evacuate, the civil Turkish Government was still there, and as soon as the peace is concluded the military will return and everything will be the same as before. Nor is it a wonder that these people should believe in these plausible statements as, according to an Arabic proverb, "Uqul ul Arab fi ainchum" (i.e., "the wisdom of the Arabs is in their eyes"), and, when they see the Turkish Vali (or Governor) is still in Yemen, they cannot help believing these statements and expecting that in the course of time the final peace will come and the things shall be restored to their original conditions.

3. Being notoriously parsimonious and greedy, the Imam desires the Turks back for the gratification of his avarice, as he expects to get thereby not only the arrears of his subsidy, but to be rewarded for his loyalty.

In view of the above facts it is apparent that, for the sake of peace and tranquillity in this land, it is essential that Mahmud Nadhim and the other remaining Turks in Yemen should be evacuated from here as soon as possible. As long as Mahmud Nadhim remains in Yemen tranquillity in this land is impossible.

This evacuation can be carried out easily. It is true that we have repeatedly

told the Turks that we are ready to defray their expenses to Constantinople if they come and surrender themselves to us, and they realise themselves that whoever comes to us is properly treated and duly repatriated to his country. But I am afraid this is not enough to draw them all out of Yemen at present. Their difficulties are genuine and their plight pitiable. Mahmud Nadhim's description of these people's condition, as set forth in his letters to his Government, sent through us as well as through the American consul at Aden, are no exaggerations of the actual distress amongst them. It is now more than a year since he wrote these epistles, but the non-receipt of their replies, due either to studied reticence of the Ottoman Government to his pathetic appeals or delay in the transmission of these appeals to the proper authorities, has made these unfortunate people sceptical of the actual affairs and driven them to despondency, despair and desperation. A desperate man in their condition is capable of doing anything.

May I therefore request you to kindly give your serious consideration to the importance of the question of the evacuation of the remaining Turks from Yemen at the earliest moment, and invite the immediate attention of the Ottoman Government to the appeals of Mahmud Nadhim mentioned above, and get the required assistance. About a year and a half back Mahmud Nadhim wanted £T. 20,000 for his relief. The necessity for the same is more than ever felt now, although, of course, a number of officers and men have surrendered and left since then, yet the distrust of the remaining portion has increased on account of the accumulation of their debts and other trouble. On receipt of this money, which will, of course, be properly distributed under our supervision, the work of evacuation can be easily carried out. I expect the following results from this evacuation:—

1. Tranquillity in the political affairs of the Yemen and peace in this part of Arabia.
2. Settlement between the Idrisi and the Imam and between ourselves and the Imam at an early date.
3. These settlements will lead—
 - (a.) To the immediate improvement in the financial condition of the Idrisi, and consequent facility in his task of the administration of his newly-acquired country.
 - (b.) To the doing away with the necessity of keeping a field force in our protectorate, and thus considerably curtailing our expenditure in this line.
4. It will put an immediate stop to the activities of the Italians and others.

In this connection I may mention the following news for your information:—

In June last, when I returned from here with Syed Mustapha-el-Idrisi, I heard from a fairly reliable source that Mahmud Nadhim had received from his Government £T. 300 in gold to defray the expenses of two representatives to be returned from Yemen to the Ottoman Parliament, and that two representatives were consequently sent to Constantinople via Mecca. Subsequently, however, the news was contradicted, but I have recently been able to verify the original report and learn that two Yemenite representatives reached Constantinople in the beginning of September last. They are said to have exhibited violent anti-British views, and are still at Constantinople.

M. FAZLUDDIN, Captain, I.M.S.

December 24, 1920.

[E 1605/455/91]

No. 141.

Major Batten to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 9. Secret.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, January 20, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the Jeddah report for the period ending the 20th January, 1921.

Copies of this report and despatch have been sent to his Excellency the High Commissioner for Egypt, his Excellency the High Commissioner for Mesopotamia and the Political Resident, Aden.

I have, &c.

W. BATTEN, Major, I.A.,
Acting British Agent.

Enclosure 1 in No. 141.

Jeddah Report, January 11-20, 1921.

(Secret.)

1. Situation in Taif District.

THE statement that negotiations were proceeding between Emir Ali and Khalid-ibn-Derwish was confirmed, and no further collisions have taken place since the submission of the last report.

His Highness is the only one of the Shereefian family on speaking terms with Khalid, and appears to have been successful in making a settlement.

The following is extracted from an account, dated the 13th January, received from a reliable informant:—

The Shereefian cavalry and delegates from the opposing forces met in the Wadi Liyah, the ensuing discussion being quite friendly.

On being questioned as to the presence of Khalid's forces so near Taif, the latter greeted the Emir's officer in the name of Shereef Hamza-el-Feir, Mansur and his tribe, and the Ateibah of Shereefs Shakir-ibn-Zeid and Amud, stating these tribes had written that they had of their own free will agreed to pay "zikat," which Khalid's forces had accordingly come to collect.

The Shereefian officer asked for an armistice of five days in order to convey this information to Emir Ali, and the parties separated.

Emir Ali informed the King of the allegations implied in the above against these Ashraf, and it is stated King Hussein summoned Shereef Hamza and accused him of dealings with Ibn Saud, which he stoutly denied. The King informed him that he was well aware of his intrigues and would take measures accordingly.

The King telegraphed to Emir Ali to occupy Shereef Hamza's property in the Wadi Liyah, and in the event of any attack, or a reverse of the Shereefian forces, to destroy it.

Preparations had been made for an advance to the mouth of the Wadi Liyah, and a large number of camels engaged to carry material from Taif.

Khalid's forces were reported to have occupied two posts established by the Shereefian troops two hours west of Asheirah.

A fight occurred between some Hedjaz tribesmen and a party alleged to be Mudayana, resulting in about eighty casualties on both sides. Four sheikhs from the former asked for a truce, which was granted, but two were detained as hostages, the remaining two proceeding to Taif to report and informing Emir Ali that unless he could arrange the matter satisfactorily himself, they would take the necessary steps themselves. The Emir is reported to have told them to be patient, as a steamer was expected with a large consignment of guns, machine guns and munitions, on the delivery of which the aggressors would be satisfactorily punished.

The above does not agree with the reported looting of Shereef Hamza's property by the raiders mentioned in the last Mecca report, but appears to confirm the statements as to the dissatisfaction of the border Ateibah and their readiness to join in any attack on King Hussein. Their sympathy with Ibn Saud is common knowledge, but I am still of the opinion that recent events have no wider significance at present.

Future events may depend on the issue of the attack reported against the Shammar.

2. King Hussein and France.

The King telephoned in a great state of agitation over a document received by him from the French consul-general requesting his views in reply to a notification of the adherence of the Spanish Government to certain clauses of the Treaty of Saint-Germain relating to the import of arms into Algeria, Lybia and elsewhere.

He stated he did not understand it and would have nothing to do with it, and only dealt with His Majesty's Government in such matters.

This notification appears to have been made by the French consul-general at the desire of his Government in the ordinary course, the Council of Ambassadors having requested the French Government to be the channel of communication to all concerned.

The King appeared to think that there was some implication against himself as to traffic in arms, and there was some difficulty in persuading him to change his mind and make a suitable reply.

I am unaware whether the above is an accurate representation of the facts submitted to the King by the French consul-general, but in view of the feelings entertained by King Hussein towards France, it is felt the communication of similar matter would be more desirable through the channel of this agency.

3. Claims of Indian Pilgrims.

Reminders are being received in relation to these claims, and reference is made to the robbery and ill-treatment of pilgrims, and the action taken to obtain redress, in a questionnaire on last year's pilgrimage received from Bombay.

Subsequent to the first submission to the King of the claims made to myself and the Mecca representative and to their repudiation, a further claim and statement of complaints was received from the Haj Committee of Karachi.

The King refuses in effect to consider any claims other than those submitted to him personally, which latter, however, he has always shown himself ready to meet in a sympathetic spirit.

He is exceedingly jealous of any action which may be taken to imply that he is not the sole protector of his temporary guests in the Hedjaz, and owing to the suspicion with which he views any participation on the part of the British agent in matters affecting the safety and welfare of the Indian pilgrims, the great majority of such cases obtain no redress.

It has been of no avail to point out that hundreds of pilgrims, particularly those who suffered most from extortions, robbery and violence, had no opportunity of submitting their complaints personally, and that in the case of many of the better educated they naturally brought their written claims to their representative in Jeddah for submission to the Government.

A large number of these claims represented the cost of the return railway-fare and camel-hire from Medina to Yenbo, the pilgrims having been ordered to return by another route, and having to bear the additional cost in full.

Representations to Emir Ali at Medina received no satisfaction, and the pilgrims were referred to Mecca, which, in the ordinary course, they would not again visit before their departure for India, when returning by the Rabegh route.

4. General.

H.M.S. "Cornflower" arrived from Suez, *en route* for the southern station, on the 11th January, and sailed on the 14th.

A certain financial stringency is evident at present, especially in Jeddah, where the arrival of the first pilgrim ships from Java is eagerly awaited.

Extracts from the Mecca report to the 19th January are attached.

Captain Nasiruddin's remarks on the present attitude of the King regarding his resignation are interesting.

I am inclined to discount the probability of an open rapprochement between the King and the Kemalists. It is reasonable to suppose it would have materialised sooner, had there been real grounds for it, at the time when King Hussein's attitude made any event possible.

This possibility must, however, be still kept in view.

5. Press.

Nos. 448, 449 and 450 of "Al Qibla" and No. 21 of "Al Falah" are forwarded herewith.

No. 20 of the latter paper is stated not to have been issued. It was more probably confiscated, as before, and a copy will be obtained if possible.

No. 448 of "Al Qibla," under the heading "The future will show you what you were ignorant of . . .," insinuates that the Jews in Palestine are there for no good purpose, and gives an instance of alleged Zionist pro-Bolshevik agitation, concluding with a statement of the prior claim, from long residence, of Arabs, whether Christians or Moslems, to Palestine.

No. 449 continues the above article and discusses the present position of the French in Syria, and the views expressed in France as to the advisability of remaining there.

No. 450 quotes an article on "English policy in the East," translated from "Le Temps" in No. 13,326 of "Al Ahram," also a translation of Mr. Lloyd George's speech in reply to suggestions for the revision of the Treaty of Sevres, and with reference to suggested negotiations with Mustapha Kemal.

No. 21 of "Al Falah" maintains that, in the present situation of Arab affairs, there are only two alternatives for the Arabs: complete independence or death.

As regards French negotiations with Mustapha Kemal, the only reason for such would be in order to safeguard the French position in Syria by separating the Nationalists and the Arabs, who together would be too strong for the French, the latter not being in a position to mobilise more troops.

Mr. Lloyd George's declarations are alluded to, and hopes for a brighter future expressed in consequence.

W. BATTEN, *Major, I.A.,*
Acting British Agent.

Enclosure 2 in No. 141.

Mecca Report to January 19, 1921.

(Extract.)

AS usual, the news of the week with regard to the trouble between the Hedjaz and Ibn Saud's followers has been very conflicting, and would cover several pages if given *in extenso*, from day to day. The King has not shown any outward signs of agitation, but there are grounds for believing that he is not quite easy at heart, and the situation is fairly serious, according to my agent, who overheard a conversation between Emir Ali and Qazi-ul-Quzza of Mecca. Constant summonses to his adherent Ashraf and sheikhs are evidence of this latter belief. The Wadi Seil was already closed to traffic, but as a result of a very recent fracas, the Jebel Kura route has also been closed to the public, who are prohibited from going to or coming from Taif. It has been stated that Shereefian forces reoccupied Liyah and have advanced eastwards to a new line of defence. Although the Shereefians lost heavily, they succeeded in routing the Mudayana in a battle in the Wadi Seil and capturing 100 prisoners. Eighty prisoners were also stated to have been taken near Jubbal Ashaish. Three Nejdīs (Mudayana) were caught at Taif, and have been sent here in irons. Izzet Effendi, one of the Shereefian officers, is said to have been killed.

2. The fidelity of the Ashraf of Taif and its neighbourhood is doubted, and with regard to the Shereef Hamza of Liyah, the King has given orders that if his troops ever have to fall back on Taif, they must first raze the houses of that gentleman before leaving Liyah. The transport of foodstuffs and material is by means of camels commandeered from the Bedouin.

3. His growing unpopularity is no secret to the King, and instead of threatening the British Government with his resignation, he has now since some time taken to calling leaders of the Mecca society, and lecturing them on his own disinterestedness, telling them that his revolt was in their interests, and offering to resign in favour of their nominee, whom he would assist in State affairs, if the public desired, or leave the country with his children. The last lecture on the subject was given on Friday last, and at the back of it was apparently his desire to justify some of his actions.

4. Usually the Mecca police parade before the King on a Friday on the lines of the Turkish Salamlik, but owing to the despatch of some of them to Taif during the period under report this ceremony was not observed last week. Two machine guns and a number of soldiers also left for Taif during last week.

5. A message is said to have come from Emir Abdullah, saying that he is now in direct touch with the Turkish Nationalists, and that Mustapha Kemal wishes the King to declare open hostilities against the Allied Powers, if he wants to prove his friendliness. The King is not yet certain whether his doing so would bring him the coveted honour of becoming the Khalifa of Islam, which is the bait offered by the Turkish leader. While he is still hesitating, I am convinced, that by throwing in his lot with Mustapha Kemal the King will most certainly improve his own position with the Moslem world, who, though they may not favour the idea of his becoming a Khalifa all at once, will be prepared to reconsider the question, in their present restive and discontented mood, and will overlook his past conduct in order to see Turkey strong again. The new outlook is well worth watching carefully.

The articles in "Al Qibla" are indirect indications of the feelings existing.

6. The exchange question here is causing great inconvenience to everybody. Money-changers are imprisoned, flogged or expelled from the country simply because they change a gold sovereign for more than seven medjidiehs, which is the Government rate. The amazing thing about it is that the Government itself changes gold at favourable rates in Turkish copper and nickel, and resells them to the money-changers at a dearer rate.

Enclosure 3 in No. 141.

Shipping Intelligence to January 20, 1921.

THE following steamers arrived at, and departed from, Jeddah between the 11th and 20th January, 1921:—

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Cargo discharged.
Mansourah ..	British ..	P. Soudan ..	Suez ..	Jan. 11	Jan. 12	826
Porto Maurizio ..	Italian ..	Suez ..	Massaua ..	" 14	" 14	"
Dakablieh ..	British ..	" ..	P. Soudan ..	" 15	" 15	411
Asmara ..	Italian ..	Massaua ..	Suez ..	" 18	" 18	1,127

H.M.S. "Cornflower" arrived on the 11th January and departed on the 14th January.

[E 1565/97/91]

No. 142.

Field-Marshal Viscount Allenby to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 4.)

(No. 66.)

My Lord,

Cairo, January 21, 1921.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 1282 of the 22nd November, 1920, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith copy of a letter from the Quarantine Board respecting Hedjaz pilgrimage and quarantine arrangements.

I have, &c.

ALLENBY, F.M.,
High Commissioner.

Enclosure 1 in No. 142.

President of the Quarantine Board to the High Commissioner.

Sir,

Alexandria, January 11, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 20th November, enclosing extracts from the report of Major Marshall.

I have to make the following observations:—

1. The board is quite aware that the authorities in Jeddah do not follow the international convention with regard to quarantine, and very much regret this irregularity. The neglect of the Hedjaz Government to conform to the international regulations has been discussed at the Office d'Hygiène publique in Paris.

2. Non-Egyptian pilgrims are not allowed to disembark at Egyptian ports on their return journey from the pilgrimage, except by special permission of the Ministry of Interior.

Owing to the lack of sufficient steamship accommodation, the foreign pilgrims had to wait till the last voyage of the "Keneh," as, on its previous journeys, it was fully taken up by Egyptian pilgrims.

I may mention that a heavy expenditure was incurred by the Egyptian Government to provide even this reduced accommodation for the pilgrims, and to ensure their transport to and from the Holy Places.

3. Pilgrims returning from the Hedjaz must undergo the regulation quarantine measures at Tor. It was found that some pilgrims were attempting to get round this regulation by booking as first or second-class passengers on the mail-boats of the Khedivial Line. This was an infringement of the regulations. The mail-boats call regularly at Tor, and the pilgrims therefore were disembarked there (whatever their class) and were subjected to the routine treatment for returning pilgrims. A copy of the official decision on this question is annexed.

4. Major Marshall justly remarks on the very long period that the Mahmal and other pilgrims had to remain at Tor. His criticism is quite correct, but the long

[6668]

2 M

period that the various parties were detained at Tor was due solely to want of ship accommodation to ferry them back to Egypt, and not to any extension or prolongation of quarantine measures.

The arrangements for shipping accommodation are not in the hands of the Quarantine Board.

5. The suggestion that "it would have been easier, less expensive and equally efficient to open a small quarantine camp at Suez and to leave Tor closed" is unacceptable. I think Major Marshall, in this critical suggestion, has exceeded the limit within which his position allows him to offer an opinion. Besides which, he is wrong.

(1.) The international regulations lay down that such measures must be carried out at Tor.

(2.) No accommodation for landing large bodies of pilgrims and no properly protected camp, nor the necessary offices, hospitals, water supply, electric lighting, laboratories, disinfection plant, &c., is in existence at Suez, nor could it be improvised, except at very large expenditure.

I have, &c.

ALEC GRANVILLE.

Enclosure 2 in No. 142.

Extract from Regulations respecting Quarantine Measures.

Conseil sanitaire, maritime et quarantenaire d'Egypte.

Séance du 21 septembre 1920.

L'ARTICLE 5 des Dispositions générales du Pèlerinage ayant donné lieu à diverses interprétations, dont les conséquences sont de diminuer la valeur des mesures de prophylaxie contre les maladies pestilentiellles, le conseil, dont le mandat est de protéger l'Égypte et l'Europe, a pris la résolution suivante dans sa séance du 21 courant :

"Les navires ayant à bord des pèlerins de la dernière classe en proportion moindre d'un pèlerin pour cent tonneaux de jauge brute ne sont pas considérés comme navires à pèlerins; mais les pèlerins de toutes les classes amenés par lesdits navires subiront les mesures générales imposées aux pèlerins.

"Les bateaux en question qui ne font pas escale à Tor débarqueront leurs pèlerins à Suez, au lieu de Tor, pour subir les mesures réglementaires."

[E 1967/456/91]

No. 143.

Political Resident, Aden, to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 14.)

(No. 6. Secret.)

My Lord,

Aden, January 27, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to forward, for your Lordship's information, a copy of the second Aden News Letter, dated the 27th January, 1921.

I have, &c.

T. E. SCOTT, Major-General.

Enclosure in No. 143.

Second Aden News Letter.

(Secret.)

THE following is a summary of the news reported since the despatch of my last letter, dated the 12th January, 1921:—

TIHAMA.

The latest reports from Hodeida indicate a temporary Imamic occupation of Hujjeila, which was subsequently reoccupied by the Idrisi. The report that certain

Quhra leaders were wounded and missing is now found to be incorrect. The Menakha-Bajil agent writes that the Idrisi and Quhra are fully prepared to check any Imamic advance on Tihama, strong rumours of which still continue. It would appear that the pro-Imamic Party in Hodeida is responsible for the circulation of much false news of Imamic victories. This party consists of Tahir Rajab and five other merchants who have been assisting Mahmud Nadhim in his propaganda work. They are said to have laid a scheme before the Imam, which has been strongly backed by the ex-Vali, for the occupation of the Tihama by the Imam pending the return of the Turks. The first step is stated to be the despatch by the Imam of a big expedition to drive the Idrisi out of the Tihama, as the latter, being our ally, is not considered by the schemers a fit ruler for Hodeida. The Imam has been assured that the British evacuation of Hodeida could easily be arranged once a big force entered the Tihama. It is said that under this scheme it is provided that the ex-Vali with his Turkish party should administer the whole of the Tihama with the exception of Hodeida, which is to be administered by the merchants themselves under the supervision of the Vali. The Imam is said to be sceptical about the scheme.

The Political Officer, Hodeida, states that with the exception of Tahir Rajab and party, all the people in Hodeida, as well as the Tihama tribesmen, are willing to accept the Idrisi rule in preference to that of the Imam.

Tahir Rajab and party are reported to have sent letters to Constantinople with a Turkish official who recently left for Constantinople via Aden. No particulars as to their contents are known.

The Political Officer, Hodeida, reports the death of Munassar Haghir Maruf, the sheikh of the northern Zaraniqs, at the end of last month.

One of our secret agents reports that Abdul Shakeer, the Italian agent at Khoka, has been buying land and houses at Khoka and Kataba, and exporting and importing goods to and from Italian ports by a weekly service of dhows.

The telegraph line between Zabeed and Hais is reported to have been completed. The line between Zabeed and Taiz is still under construction.

Our agent at Zabeed reports that the Imamic Inspector of Public Works, Sayed Abdulla Ibrahim, referred to in previous letters, has returned to Sana, and that during his stay at Khoka he built two military barracks at the public expense. The agent states that the revenue of Zabeed last year amounted to 7,500 dollars, whereas this year the people were forced to pay 25,000 dollars.

The Political Officer, Hodeida, reports that a dhow, which arrived from Massowah in the last week of December, brought letters to Tahir Rajab and party and the ex-Vali from Mahomed Amin, the sheikh of Jebel Reima, and Qadhi Hamood-al-Harazi, referred to in my letter dated the 25th November, 1920, and in my official letter, No. 55, dated the 30th November, 1920. The purport of the letters to Tahir Rajab and party is said to be that the writers were well treated by the Governor of Asmara, who informed them that no definite settlement had been arrived at between the Turks and the Allies; that the Turks had not renounced their claim to the Yemen; and that a Mixed Commission composed of representatives of the Allied and Turkish Governments would arrive at Hodeida shortly to negotiate with the Imam and the Idrisi.

The sheikh of Jebel Reima, however, states that nothing more than polite conversation passed between him and the Italian Governor, who asked if the British had taken no steps to protect him against the Imam, but made no statement as to the future.

The Jebel Reima sheikh and the Qadhi arrived at Aden from Massowah about three weeks ago to ask for British protection for their country and an immediate subsidy. I informed them that I could not accede to their request, as it was our policy to avoid any interference with the internal affairs of the Arabs. The Qadhi has returned to Hodeida, but the sheikh of Jebel Reima is still in Aden.

YEMEN (UPPER AND LOWER).

A Turkish officer, Captain Ahmed Kamal Ali Raza Pasha, late of the Sana gendarmerie and General Staff, officer II to the Imam, who lately arrived from the Yemen, gave information which in the main corroborates the statement of Mustapha Azim and Tewfik Mahomed, the substance of which was given in my News Letter of the 22nd December, 1920. Captain Ahmed Kamal states that the ex-Vali Mahmud Nadhim is employed by the Imam as Inspector-General on a salary of 200 dollars a month, that he was deputed by the Imam to go to Menakha and negotiate for peace with the

[6668]

2 M 2

Idrisi. Mahmud Nadhim failed in his mission and asked for forces to be sent to aid him. The Imam accordingly sent Sharif Abdulla Domain to Obal with 1,500 Zaidi regulars and 10,000 irregulars, and ordered the Vali to meet Sharif Abdulla Domain at Obal.

Captain Ahmed Kamal gives 2,000 as the strength of the Zaidi artillery regulars with 9 Turkish officers and 50 Turkish soldiers. According to him, the manager of the Imam's ammunition factory is an Italian (not Austrian), but his wife is Austrian. His pay is 120 dollars per mensem, with extras, which would bring his total monthly emoluments to over 500 dollars. The daily outturn of the factory is ten boxes of ammunition.

Captain Kamal says that an army examination is held annually at Sana, and that altogether about thirty-six Zeidis have passed the examination and are now officers in the Imam's army.

News reported by travellers is to the effect that the Imam's Amil at Taiz has 2,000 men under him, and that he has in addition conscripted some 600 Shafais, but the latter are continually deserting and coming to Lahej or Aden, as they do not wish to serve under the Imam. The Amil has been attempting to collect taxes from Ibn Abu Ras, sheikh of Saiani, near Taiz, but was met with the reply that he had never paid taxes to the Turks and did not propose to commence now. The report says that punitive action against Abu Ras is proposed.

Our Sana agent reports that the Imam is pressing his subjects to pay war contribution, and that large sums are coming into the Sana Treasury. The agent says that the people are discontented on account of frequent war contributions levied by the Imam, and that the Beni Matar tribe have actually revolted against him.

This agent gives the number of Imam's troops in Sana as 3,000. This figure agrees with that given by Mustapha Azim and Tewfik Mahomed (please see my letter dated the 22nd December, 1920).

The agent states that Omar Mizjaji of Hodeida, one of the party of Tahir Rajab, has petitioned the Imam asking to be exempted from the payment of duty on goods sent into the Imam's territory in consideration of the services rendered by him to the Imam and the ex-Vali in getting the Hodeida notables to espouse the Imam's cause. The request is said to have been refused, but the Imam has promised to consider it at a suitable opportunity.

Our news correspondent at Jabel Jihaf reports that the people of Ibb opposed the entry of Imam's soldiers, who were sent to that place. The Imam's commander thereupon applied to the Imam for reinforcements, but these were refused. The Imam, however, wrote to the Amil at Taiz directing him to appoint a mediator who could acquaint the soldiers with the customs of the country, and impress on them that they should not interfere with the people of the country. A compromise was effected by which Ibb is to be ruled by Abou Sallama, the local sheikh and a fakih appointed by the Imam.

ADEN PROTECTORATE.

The Abdali Sultan informs me that the Zeidis are collecting taxes in the Alawi and Kotaibi territories. I hear from another source that the Zeidis give out that they have received orders to proceed against the Koteibis and others, but they have not done so yet. This is probably a hint to the Koteibis as to what they must expect if they offer resistance to the Zaidi tax collectors.

A later report states that 200 Zeidis have arrived at Dhala, and that they will proceed against the Koteibi.

Our news correspondent at Jabel Jihaf writes that the 150 Zeidis, whose arrival at Dhala was recently reported, have relieved the present garrison.

A section of the Subehis is reported to have made a night raid on Lahej, killed two men and carried away a horse. This is said to be in retaliation for the seven men of the section killed by the Abdali Sultan some time ago for stealing camels from near our camp at Nobat Dakim.

Raids and counter-raids between the Makhdumis and Somati sections of the Subehi continue. It is now reported that in retaliation for the burning of Makhdumi crops, the latter have carried away three camels belonging to the Somatis.

Skirmishes are reported to have taken place between the Jorabis and Humaidis, referred to in my last letter.

The Kadi Atik of Behan has sent me a book, which, he says, was brought to him by a Sayed of Al Jawwan, named Ali-bin-As-Saqqaf. Al Jawwan is outside our protectorate. The kadi says that the book belonged to a party of three mullahs, who looked like Turks and who visited the remains of Al Marati. The party, he says, came

from Nejran, accompanied by an escort of Bedouins of Ar-Ramla, and is alleged to have been deputed by Bin Rashid. From the further account given by the kadi it appears that the party gave out that they were ordered by the Ottoman Government to take a copy of the Hymyaritic inscriptions on the stones there, which they did, after paying large sums of money to the surrounding Arabs. They also took with them small white marble stones and images. From Jawwan they visited Dathina in our protectorate, and were on their return journey to Nejran when they were all attacked by Bedouins, who killed them and looted their baggage. One of the murderers gave the book, which is vol. ii of the "History of Dynasties and Countries," by Jafar Mahomed-bin-Harir, at Tabari.

T. E. SCOTT, Major-General.

Aden, January 27, 1921.

[E 2042/4/91]

No. 144.

The Emir Feisal to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 16.)

My Lord,

12A, Berkeley Square, February 15, 1921.

FOLLOWING the announcement in the press that a conference is to be held in London for the discussions arising out of the settlement of the Near and Middle East, I am directed by my august father, His Majesty King Hussein, to request your Lordship to inform me of the date when I can attend such conference, as His Majesty wishes me to be present as his representative, to plead, as I did before the Peace Conference in Paris, the case of the Arabs.

I have, &c.
FEISAL.

[E 2126/1977/91]

No. 145.

Major Batten to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 13.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, January 29, 1921.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 9 of the 9th December last, relative to the status of British subjects resident in the Hedjaz, I have the honour to transmit herewith copies of a note on this subject by Mr. Vice-Consul Graffley Smith.

I have, &c.

W. BATTEN, Major, I.A.,
Acting British Agent.

Enclosure in No. 145.

British Subjects in the Hedjaz.

CAPTAIN NASIRUDDIN'S memorandum of the 14th October last on the status of British subjects in the Hedjaz has shown how essential to a study of this, and, one might add, of any other aspect of Hedjaz affairs, is an insistence upon the all-pervading personal influence in Mecca and in Jeddah of King Hussein.

His many years in the Constantinople of Abdul Hamid have borne fruit in an administration of creatures whose first consideration is their master's favour, and a civil population brought by the threads of an intricate informer-system into direct and personal dependence upon the same autocratic caprice. Peace treaties, international conventions and the League of Nations notwithstanding, it behoves any individual with a stake in the Hedjaz to remember that, under such absolute Government as that of King Hussein, the displeasure of the ruler means ruin.

All residents in the Hedjaz and all persons born in the Hedjaz, of whatever parentage, are presumed by King Hussein to be Hashimite subjects, until they can establish proof to the contrary. By recent regulations, passports of later date than 1914 are not admitted as evidence. Patni Indians, of whom there is a certain colony, are recognised as British subjects; the claims of other British or British-protected

residents—Somalis, Hadhramis, Egyptians, Indians, &c.—are vigorously contested. So long as capitulatory privileges are withheld from such persons, it is improbable that many will be found to assert a claim certain to prejudice their immediate interests and unlikely to result in any material advantage.

Mecca.

Captain Nasiruddin estimates the number of British and British-protected residents of Mecca at 20,000, excluding from this calculation those Indians of families long domiciled in the Hedjaz who have in the course of generations lost all touch with their mother-country. After excepting, also, the doubtless considerable number of persons whose claims, if submitted, would be properly disallowed (and one may recall in this context the importance attached by the Egyptian Government to a domicile, rather than to the accident of birth in Egypt, as a test of Egyptian nationality) there must remain some thousands of persons in Mecca whose original and continued connection with India, Aden, the Straits Settlements, Afghanistan and other treaty States and dependencies gives them a good title to British protection. It cannot be said that these persons have ever in the past been zealous to proclaim their status; in 1908, the latest year of which a complete record is available, only twenty-six inhabitants of Mecca were issued with certificates of registration; but their claim on us is good whenever they choose to present it. They hesitate now to do so from fear of the consequences of their action, should it become known to the King. They wish to be registered, but on condition that their registration be secret. So much may be gathered from the tentative overtures of leading Indians. They want certificates, in case of future trouble, but they are afraid lest the rumour of their application for these documents may accelerate the trouble they apprehend. They do not wish to parade their British nationality until they have cause to invoke British protection. In individual cases, there is a manifest intention to "have it both ways," to pose as a loyal subject of the Hashimite Government until circumstances make it expedient to produce, as a trump-card from the sleeve, a certificate of British nationality. The majority, however, are anxious only to escape the Royal attention. While they do not assert themselves as Hashimite subjects, they do not, on the other hand, wish to be credited with a desire to disclaim Hashimite subjection.

If the British agent were in a position to guarantee them full capitulatory privileges, they might take the decisive step; until he can do so they prefer to lie low.

The difficulties of their position are evident, and their anxiety to dissemble is comprehensible, but it is considered that certificates of registration should only be issued to those who make straightforward application for them. It is generally undesirable that the grant of such certificates should be attended by pledges to mutual secrecy, and the Hedjaz, where everything becomes known sooner or later, and where frankness and sincerity characterise our policy, seems of an atmosphere peculiarly unpropitious to the innovation.

Jeddah.

As with the colony in Mecca, the British and British-protected subjects in Jeddah are not disposed to court recognition. Some twenty certificates of registration only have been issued since October last by this agency, all to Indian residents of Jeddah and almost all to Patnis, who are, as stated above, recognised in any case as British subjects by the Hashimite Government. The Indian colony of Jeddah numbers 175 heads of family; sixty-eight were registered in 1908.

There are about fifty Egyptian residents in Jeddah; none are registered.

Medina.

Details of the British and British-protected residents of Medina are not available. A certain number of British Indians were deported thence during the war by the Turks. Some of these have since returned; others, having been sent back from internment to Mecca, have preferred to remain there rather than to brave the dangers of the Mecca-Medina road.

It is evident that dissatisfaction with the present régime has led many in Mecca and in Jeddah to regret their neglect of the formality of registration before the war. So long, however, as it is considered undesirable to enforce the Capitulations, they feel themselves to be without the full weight of our support, and they consider the attraction of identifying themselves with British interests less than the risk involved. But if and when His Majesty's Government obtain from the Hashimite Government

some measure of capitulatory privilege for British nationals in the Hedjaz, a rush of applicants for protection, proportionate to the privileges at issue, may quite certainly be anticipated.

Even at present, so soon as a man with a claim to British protection suffers at the hands of the Government, he breaks the discreet silence which he has hitherto observed, and invokes our aid. Hence frequent correspondence with the King, and laboured arguments, of birthplace, parentage and domicile, with discussion which could well have been summarised in a certificate of registration, had the man, before the blow fell, had the courage to take one out.

But even where papers have been taken out, the King is prepared to disregard them, as the Kabuli case, referred to in recent reports, has shown.

With no court of his own, the consul cannot punish his own nationals, and his rôle is limited to watching cases in the interests of British subjects, after due notification of the arrest of a British subject and the reason therefor has been made to him by the Government. In practice even this formality is neglected until the facts are discovered and a protest made by the agency.

Briefly, any intervention on behalf of British subjects is resented as an attempt to interfere with the sovereign rights of the Hedjaz, the most jealously cherished of these being the right to refuse to individuals rights accorded to them elsewhere.

Relations inter se.

The question of the relations of British subjects in the Hedjaz *inter se* is of importance and requires early settlement. At present, recourse is regularly had to the local courts, which administer the Sharia law. Disputes are also settled by the nomination of arbitrators, by whose decisions the parties pledge themselves to abide. This is generally desirable. But a case which has recently arisen between Patni Indians, and which has been referred by the King to this agency for settlement, shows the dangers of the present anomalous situation. The parties are two brothers, Abu Bekr Fazil and Mohamed Fazil, the former of whom managed for many years a business in Jeddah in which both brothers, with an uncle, were equal partners. Three years ago, Mohamed Fazil, who had hitherto lived with his uncle in Patan, recalled his brother on some pretext to India, came to Jeddah himself, and annexed the business, lock, stock and barrel, together with all personal property left on the premises by Abu Bekr and his wife. Abu Bekr returned to Jeddah, and the matter was referred to arbitrators, who found for Abu Bekr on every head, and ordered the brother to disgorge. The latter appealed against the decision to the court in Mecca, supported by a ruling purchased from the Grand Qadi. The King passed the whole case to this agency for action.

The facts of the case are clear, and I consider that Abu Bekr Fazil would win in any court of law. But, unless the procedure of the Capitulations be formally revived, this agency is powerless to punish the offender. There is no court to make an order, and no sanction of redress. The precedent of reference by the King to the agency is too valuable to ignore, for if the matter were referred back to Mecca with a *non possumus*, the authority of the agent and the delicate question of capitulatory rights would alike be prejudiced; incidentally the case, on the Fetwa of the Grand Qadi, might well go against Abu Bekr Fazil.

In the meantime, this unfortunate man is reduced to a state of destitution, and he daily petitions the agency for justice, which cannot apparently be done until a consular court is revived. All efforts towards a friendly settlement have failed, and Mohamed Fazil, prosperous on his ill-gotten wealth, resists all pressure not backed by legal sanction.

Were the Capitulations in force, Mohamed Fazil could be made to pay, or to suffer for a refusal. Were the Capitulations never in any form to be revived, the local authorities could be properly requested to take all necessary action. A ruling is urgently required as to the measures which should be taken to terminate a scandal and to ensure justice.

Comparative Treatment of British and Arab Subjects.

I am unable to add anything to Captain Nasiruddin's remarks under this head. The King's conduct of the Kabuli case, referred to in recent reports, bears out Captain Nasiruddin's statement that a claim to British nationality is a disability in litigation, as it is a disqualification for representation on the local councils or on the "Shirket-el-Wataniyyeh."

To summarise:—

1. There must be a considerable number of British subjects and British-protected persons in the Hedjaz who dare not, in present conditions, advertise their status. Of these very few, 100 on the average, registered themselves annually before the war.
2. If a sufficient measure of protection and of capitulatory privilege were assured them, they would present their claims to protection. The inaccessibility of Mecca and Medina will, however, always be an obstacle in the way of practical consular intervention on behalf of residents in the Holy Places.
3. It is desirable to avoid any appearance of "penetration" or "sheep-stealing," and certificates of registration are at present issued only to persons who, so far as can be judged, are not ashamed of them. No encouragement is given to non-British applicants for British protection.
4. The suspension of the Capitulations and the lack of a consular court make it impossible for the agent to assume any legal responsibility for his nationals, or to do more than protest in cases where injustice appears to have been done them by the local courts.
5. For the same reasons, the agent is not in a position to deal with cases between his nationals referred to him by the local authorities. In default of a decision either finally to denounce capitulatory rights or to revive the consular court, the agent is impotent to administer justice. This involves great hardship to individuals.
6. British and British-protected subjects in the Hedjaz labour under certain disabilities, as compared with Arab subjects, in litigation and in other respects.

It should be added that nothing in the above refers to British and British-protected pilgrims; the position of residents in the Hedjaz only has been examined.

[E 2127/455/91]

No. 146.

Major Batten to Earl Curzon.—(Received February 17.)

(No. 14.)
My Lord,

Jeddah, January 30, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the Jeddah report for the period ending the 30th January, 1921.

Copies of this report and despatch have been sent to Cairo, Bagdad, Jerusalem and Aden.

I have, &c.

W. BATTEN, Major, I.A.,
Acting British Agent.

Enclosure 1 in No. 146.

Jeddah Report for the period January 21–30, 1921.

Termination of Hostilities with Khalid.

EMIR ALI returned to Mecca on the 26th January in triumph, accompanied by the sheikhs of several recalcitrant tribes residing within the Hedjaz border, and of those whose loyalty had been in doubt.

The King summoned them to an audience the next day, and after a long discussion the sheikhs swore fidelity in the future. It is stated that hostages for their good behaviour are to be furnished to the King.

The only demand made in return was for more foodstuffs, the withholding of which by the King had been one of the contributory causes of the refractory behaviour of the Hedjaz Bedouin.

Emir Ali is said to have intervened with his father and obtained lenient treatment for the sheikhs, of whom the King wished to make an example.

An arrangement as regards supplies is stated to have been made for the future, and provided Khalid does not again take the field either on his own or Ibn Saud's

behalf, there is some prospect of affairs remaining quiescent on the border in the immediate future.

Khalid's followers are reported to have fallen out among themselves, and it is stated he received no encouragement from Ibn Saud, from whom he apparently anticipated some support. Taking advantage of this state of affairs, King Hussein is reported, from a reliable source, to have offered to confirm Khalid in the Emirship of Khurma and to give him a free hand there, in return for the former's acknowledgment of King Hussein as his suzerain and repudiation of Ibn Saud, and to let bygones be bygones.

It has not so far been possible to obtain confirmation of the above, but the course of recent events would appear to have provided the King with a favourable opportunity of reasserting himself in the disturbed region.

Khalid was last reported at Okheidir, where he was stated to be in communication with Emir Ali.

The last number of "Al Qibla," referred to later, contains a long article professing to give a history of the trouble from its inception. The hand of King Hussein is very evident in this article, which is, as to be expected, a condemnation of Ibn Saud and his policy and a justification of himself.

As in previous reference to me, the King makes much of events which concern Asir, Koweit and other parts of the Peninsula more immediately than the Hadjaz. His remarks on the policy and actions of the Idrisi lack nothing in acerbity, and are hardly likely to attain that mutual tolerance to which King Hussein does lip-service.

A translation from the King's latest communication on the subject of the recent troubles is attached to this report.

The letter from Sir Reginald Wingate, from which he quotes an extract apart from its context, was in reply to a message transmitted at the time through Mahomed Sherif-el-Faruki, then Hedjaz representative in Cairo.

The second reference given is the communication made by His Majesty's Government to both King Hussein and Ibn Saud stating that any action by either party calculated to provoke hostilities would be regarded with grave disfavour.

In replying, I have taken the opportunity of reassuring King Hussein on the doubts expressed by him, and expressing gratification at the speedy termination and peaceful issue of the recent situation.

Your Lordship will note that the deputation from Ibn Saud is represented as being composed of representatives sent by His Majesty's Government. The rôle of Khan Sahib Siddiq Hassan and Sheikh Farhan was made quite clear to him at the time.

General.

Visit of French Cruiser.

The cruiser "Montcalm" is expected on the 10th February. King Hussein was to have visited Jeddah this week, but has signified his intention of delaying his visit so as to be able to receive the French admiral in person, after the French consul-general had communicated with him on the subject.

Speculation is rife in Mecca as to the King's sudden change of attitude, and it is commonly believed the visit of this warship is of a political nature, and that France is considering the evacuation of part or all of Syria in order to improve relations with King Hussein and the Arabs.

Emirs Ali and Abdullah.

It is stated the Emir will shortly leave for Medina, possibly with a view to joining his brother at Maan.

Persistent reports as to the intention of the latter to visit Hail are still in circulation. The present moment would be favourable for strengthening relations between the Hedjaz and Ibn Rashid to the detriment of Ibn Saud.

Quarantine.

From communications made to a local shipping agent, it appears that the quarantine imposed at Kamaran may be disregarded locally, and that the full five days' detention of pilgrims of the Turkish regulations may be enforced.

A notification has, however, at last been obtained from the Government that the dues to be collected in Jeddah this year will amount to 32½ piastres, including entry fees of 25 piastres, which would make it appear that a detention of twenty-four hours only, for which the charge is 7½ piastres, is contemplated.

Preparations for the reception of pilgrims off the first steamer, due shortly, have been made at the quarantine islands.

Steamers arriving clean from Kamaran should under existing international regulations be given *libre pratique*.

The reason for King Hussein's refusal to consider separately the question of the amount of dues to be levied, and that of the period of detention, appears to be due to a fear on his part that, should the Jeddah quarantine station not be used, as would be the case with all clean ships, this would establish a precedent resulting eventually in the passing of all control from his hands.

Pilgrims are thus forced to undergo unnecessary quarantine up to the number of days for which the regulations as to local dues provide, in order to justify the existence of the Jeddah quarantine station.

The quarantine aspect of Jeddah, as the final bar to disease should cases occur after steamers have passed the outer gates of Kamaran and Tor and for local measures should they be necessary during and after the pilgrimage, is not one that the King is disposed to consider.

Suakin Cable.

The cable has been interrupted for some days, the break being apparently out at sea.

Press.

Nos. 451, 452 and 453 of "Al Qibla" and No. 23 of "Al Falah" are forwarded herewith.

No. 451 contains a statement of the activities of the Arab Palestine Congress, and mentions a protest from Buenos Ayres against the unlawful occupation of Syria, the Lebanon, Palestine and Irak.

The same number refers to the organisation by Emir Abdullah of new forces for the liberation of Syria, the Lebanon and all Arab countries, under the heading of "The Hedjaz Expeditionary Force."

"Al Falah" states, in contradiction to the rumours as to the Emir Feisal's alleged agreement with France and return to Syria, that on a shopkeeper exposing the Emir's portrait he was arrested and imprisoned by the French.

W. BATTEN, Major, I.A.,
Acting British Agent.

Enclosure 2 in No. 146.

King Hussein to the Acting British Agent, Jeddah.

Your Honour,

I ASK after your Excellency's health, and I beg to tell you that my son Ali came back to Mecca on Wednesday last.

Believing that it must have reached you, that is the result of the arrival of our friends, the Saudian rivals, to the valleys of Taif, and you must have been informed of their plunder and pillage and how they have retreated, which are matters requiring no discussion.

It is sufficient for us to send herewith copies of His Majesty's Government's communications regarding the same subject and its details, which are as follows:—

(A.)

"Cairo, April 19, 1917.

"As regards the agreement made some time ago between His Majesty's Government and His Highness Emir Ibn Saud you have referred to in your letter, I have already informed your Majesty of all the terms and conditions of the said agreement and the late one we made with El Sayed El Idrisi, and which is, in fact, only an appendix to our first agreement with him, do not contain anything which is against the interests of the Arabs or which hinders the progress of the Arab movement, or which contradicts the meaning of the context of the agreements made with your Majesty. I hereby must say that if you still have doubt in this matter and others, I hope that your Majesty will never forget that His Majesty's Government is the Government which does respect treaties and is the defender of faith and justice, and is the ally faithful to its promises and which does not break them.

REGINALD WINGATE, General,
His Britannic Majesty's High Commissioner, Egypt."

(B.)

Colonel Basset's Letter to me of the 26th July, 1918.

[Not printed.]

I beg to send you the above copies of communications which are like others containing the details of all our matters, not as a matter of protest or so, but only as a matter of reminder for fear they may have been forgotten.

The proof of this is that I have not discussed them, for fear it may be troublesome to His Majesty's Government, when Ibn Saud personally came with his troops to Taraba in the year 1337 (1919), transgressing against the country in an official manner, relying on and trusting in the perfect and high knowledge of His Majesty's Government who are more careful of their own policy and the honour of their principles than anybody. But if we consider with the least care the present situation in all the Arab countries, we will find it quite contrary to the contents of such communications above mentioned.

Here is the Honourable Ibn Saud transgressing against Ibn Sabah and Ibn Rashid in the countries, and against us and Asir. Here is also the Idrisi transgressing against the Imam. This is, in spite of the decision of the deputation, composed of Great Britain's representatives who came to us in the last pilgrim season to discuss the question of peace and to renew the relations with the Honourable Ibn Saud, and to stop any acts of transgression.

Therefore I cannot conceive or find anything to say except that I never hoped or expected that the country would be faced with the slightest part of such difficulties, relying on and trusting in the British honour, and I beg His Majesty's Government not to condemn the country for my offence if ever they have felt the same from me. For my ends and aims are to be grateful and faithful with everyone in the world.

May God grant success to all.

HUSSEIN.

January 28, 1921.

Enclosure 3 in No. 146.

Shipping Intelligence.

The following steamers arrived at, and departed from, Jeddah between the 21st and 30th January, 1921:—

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Cargo Discharged.
Dakahlieh ..	British ..	P. Soudan..	Suez ..	Jan. 21	Jan. 22	Packages. 3,072
Mansourah ..	" ..	Suez ..	P. Soudan..	" 26	" 26	2,629

[E 2042/4/91]

No. 147.

Foreign Office to the Emir Feisal.

Your Highness,

Foreign Office, February 18, 1921.

WITH reference to your letter of the 15th February on the subject of your attendance at the conference which is shortly to be held in London, I am directed by Earl Curzon of Kedleston to inform your Highness that, as the conference was summoned and the invitations to it were issued jointly by the Powers, the matter does not rest exclusively in the hands of His Majesty's Government.

2. The conference was summoned to consider possible modifications of the Turkish Treaty (which in passing has not been signed by His Majesty King Hussein) that may have been necessitated by the passage of events, and it seems unlikely that any such modifications will affect the Arab countries.

[6668]

2 N 2

3. Should however questions arise in the course of the discussions which may affect the interests of those countries, His Majesty's Government would willingly support a proposal that you should be heard.

I have, &c.

R. C. LINDSAY.

[E 2403/4/91]

No. 148.

Emir Feisal to Mr. Lloyd George. — (Received at Foreign Office, February 23.)

(Confidential.)

12a, Berkeley Square, London,

February 21, 1921.

Dear Mr. Lloyd George,

I HAVE written to the Foreign Office stating that my august father desires me to attend the forthcoming Conference as his representative, for reasons that I have given. I now write to you personally, as the President of the Conference, to inform you of my father's wishes, which are based on the following considerations:—

1. The Conference is to consider measures to secure peace in the Near and Middle East. His Majesty, as one of the Allies in the war against Turkey, is of opinion that he has an equal right with the other Allies to be represented, and that to exclude the Arabs would be unfair.

2. The Hedjaz is still at war with Turkey. That is a state of affairs which should not continue.

3. His Majesty King Hussein has certain points to bring up for discussion which have been neglected in the Treaty of Sèvres, especially those dealing with the responsibilities connected with religious questions that have devolved upon him.

4. His Majesty King Hussein refrained from signing the Treaty of Sèvres because he foresaw that, on the one hand, it would not meet the aspirations of the Arabs, and on the other would not secure peace in the Middle East. The object of the Conference being what it is, my father is insistent on the necessity of his Government being represented. The Allied Powers are aware of the present state of dissatisfaction among the Arabs; if they are represented and know that their case is being heard, their doubts will be set at rest pending the final settlement. This will facilitate the reaching of a good understanding between the various nations interested in the Middle East, to whom the establishment of peace is indubitably a principal consideration.

5. In order to give you an idea of the prevailing feeling in the Arab provinces, I enclose a copy of a telegram received on the 17th instant.

6. I am aware, as the Foreign Office has said, that this matter does not solely concern Great Britain, but I hope that the other Allies will regard the Hedjaz with the same benevolence as His Britannic Majesty's Government and allow me to attend the Conference, as I attended the Peace Conference at Paris, so that independent action on the part of the Hedjaz may be avoided.

I remain, &c.

IBN-UL-HUSSEIN.

Enclosure in No. 148.

Telegram received on February 17 by General Haddad Pasha.

STILL expecting your answer. Invitation of Mustapha Kemal to Eastern Conference to meet 21st February in London and neglect of Arabs has shown patriots that no confidence is placed in them. People's conviction of this has given impetus to Maan movement, and number of those joining this movement is steadily increasing.

Adhesion to movement of woman's mission has aroused feelings of young men, and certain young men who had taken refuge in Egypt and elsewhere have begun to join the movement.

In my opinion, if things go on like this and Arabs are prevented from defending their just rights at Eastern Conference and from attaining their just demands, important incidents may well occur in Syria which will give rise to the ruin of the country.

People are everywhere asking whether Arabs will have a delegate at this Conference or not. Decisions of this Conference will be barometer for Maan movement.

[E 2502/4/91]

No. 149.

Earl Curzon to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

(No. 588.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, February 25, 1921.

I TRANSMIT herewith, for your information, copy of a memorandum by Sir Eyre Crowe on a conversation which took place on the 9th February between the French Ambassador and himself regarding the relations of the French and the British with the Arabs.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

Enclosure in No. 149.

Record of Conversation with the French Ambassador respecting Arab Relations.

THE French Ambassador recurred in conversation with me to-day to the question of the Emir Feisal. He said he had had an opportunity of again speaking with General Gouraud, and had repeated to him the suggestion I had thrown out on a previous occasion as to the possibility of a misunderstanding between the general and the Emir Feisal having arisen owing to the fact that the conversation had to be carried on in Arabic through an interpreter.

General Gouraud had at once explained that this suggestion offered no solution because, as a matter of fact, the conversation had taken place in French. It had been a *tête-à-tête*, and General Gouraud said it was impossible that he should be under any misapprehension of what Feisal said. I gather that what he actually did say was not quite that he was willing to join the French in turning out the English, but that, if the French would support Feisal, he would be in a position, and willing, to let them have all they wanted in Mesopotamia in the matter of oil. I thanked Count de Saint-Aulaire for this information, but did not pursue the subject. I confess that even now it seems to me that Feisal's remark, whilst it may be interpreted as showing determined hostility to England, may in fact have had a much more innocent meaning; its real significance must clearly depend on the whole trend of the conversation.

In any case, Count de Saint-Aulaire made it very clear that the French Government remained determined in their opposition to Feisal. He said they could not understand what services the British Government thought Feisal could render. It had been shown that he had no authority in Syria; as regards Mesopotamia, a more or less representative Arab assembly at Damascus had declared for Abdullah. I replied that the British Government were not primarily actuated by a desire to extract services from Feisal. Their relations with the Emir were conditioned partly by the very great services which he had already rendered to the Allies in the war against Turkey and partly by their anxiety not to have Feisal as an enemy in future. In their view Feisal was not so powerless and without influence as the French seemed to believe. The British position in the Middle East would be seriously affected in a general way if Mecca were to become the centre of an anti-British movement, and the connection of Feisal with Mecca, already very close, might any day become closer still in the event of Feisal succeeding his father as the Shereef of Mecca and the King of the Hedjaz.

I repeated what I had already told Count de Saint-Aulaire, that the candidate for the rulership of Mesopotamia was for the present Abdullah. It was the intention of His Majesty's Government to proceed very shortly with the definite establishment of an indigenous Arab State in Mesopotamia in fulfilment of their undertaking and in accordance with their mandate. If Abdullah were the candidate chosen, His Majesty's Government would no doubt recognise him, assurances being exacted to guarantee ourselves and also the French against any hostile movement or propaganda. Similarly, before long we should set up an Arab ruler, probably of a Shereeffian family, in the Transjordan.

Count de Saint-Aulaire at once said that such an arrangement would meet with no objection on the part of France. They had no wish to oppose Abdullah; their objection was to Feisal personally. I said I understood this, and, if I might again refer to the danger of a discontented or hostile Feisal, I asked Count de Saint-Aulaire whether he had considered the effect on Feisal's position of a situation in which he would sit in Mecca and say that his brother had been welcomed by the

British in Mesopotamia, another member of his family had been established by the British in the Transjordan and that he himself had been driven out of Syria by the French.

The Emir Feisal was at present here in London, but he would shortly have to return to Mecca. Was it not worth while to consider what steps could be taken to mitigate Arab discontent as impersonated by Feisal? I suggested that one way of effecting this might be to do something to assure Feisal and the Arabs generally that the promises given by the Allies as to the setting up of native Arab States in the territories conquered from Turkey with Arab help were being practically fulfilled, or on the point of being fulfilled, not only in the British mandated territories, but also in Syria.

Count de Saint-Aulaire admitted at once that something would have to be done before long in that direction. The present moment was not very favourable, because the check recently inflicted upon the French at Aintab by the Kemalists made it undesirable for the French to talk openly of withdrawal: this might have the appearance of running away from the Turk. But French public opinion, like public opinion in England, was complaining of the sacrifices, pecuniary and other, of the continued occupation of the mandated territories, and it was quite certain that the French military garrisons, not only in Cilicia but also in Syria, would have to be reduced very materially. The condition of Syria, however, was not entirely similar to that of Mesopotamia; there were several divergent interests and different nationalities: there were the Syrians of the coast, there were the Catholic Maronites, the Druses of the Lebanon and the Arabs of Damascus. Count de Saint-Aulaire thought that for this reason the French Government would be unlikely to favour the setting up of one ruler over the whole of Syria. They would prefer the creation of a number of federated smaller units.

I said that if this were so, would it not be judicious in the present circumstances to begin with the Damascus region, bearing in mind that the four Arab towns in that region were specially mentioned in the Sykes-Picot Agreement as destined to remain purely Arab. If it were possible to arrive rapidly at an understanding between England and France which would enable them to inform Feisal that, in accordance with the pledges given by them, native rulers were about to be set up in Mesopotamia, in the Transjordan and in Damascus, then, even if Feisal himself were excluded, it would be impossible for him to get up an agitation on the ground that the Allied promises to the Arabs had not been fulfilled. It seemed to me that there was a great advantage, for many obvious reasons, in arriving at a definite understanding between our two Governments covering their policy in the whole of these regions, and that, as we were about to enter a Conference with the Kemalists, I hoped advantage would be taken of this opportunity to effect a general settlement.

Count de Saint-Aulaire was loud in his thanks to me for explaining so frankly the way in which I looked at the situation. I told him that what I had said was my own opinion: I had received no instructions or authority from Lord Curzon to speak to him on the matter at all, and I did not wish my remarks to be taken as formal proposals or suggestions of my Government. Count de Saint-Aulaire said that he would nevertheless reflect on what I had said, and expressed the hope that it would bear fruit if more formal negotiations were to be authorised later on.

E. A. C.

February 9, 1921.

[E 3882/35/88]

No. 150.

Report on the Political Situation in Palestine and Transjordan for the month of February 1921.—(Received March 1.)

THOUGH the text of the draft mandate (prematurely published in the "Jewish Chronicle") was reproduced in some of the local papers, yet the situation has been little, if at all, affected.

Moslems and Christians found in the text nothing either to allay or to increase their apprehensions.

There are some who hesitate to regard the published text as a final version of the instrument destined to control the fate of Palestine in the immediate future. There are those who hope that the policy of the British Government may yet undergo a change, and others who anticipate that the League of Nations, at any rate, will introduce important modifications.

The approaching conference of the Allies for the reconsideration of the conditions imposed by the Treaty of Sèvres has attracted attention, particularly among those who are opposed to the political dismemberment of the territories situated between the Taurus Mountains and the Sinai Peninsula.

Efforts are being made to collect signatures to a protest against the separation of Palestine from the rest of a region to which, it is contended, that country belongs geographically as well as ethnographically and historically. This protest is believed to emanate from Cairo, and demands the recognition of the "principe de nationalités solennellement proclamé par les Alliés." Propaganda in the form of a leaflet containing arguments in a similar sense have been received from the Unión Sirio de Torren, Coah, Mexico, and copies have been distributed in Palestine and in Transjordan.

There has also been a good deal of coming and going on the part of Arab Nationalists. Two members of the Syrian Congress, Auni Abdel-Hadi, late Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs in the Amir Feisal's Government, and Kamel Qassab, recently arrived in Jerusalem from Egypt. They have since proceeded to Maan to see the Amir Abdullah. During his stay in Jerusalem Auni Abdel-Hadi had an interview with his Excellency the High Commissioner. An account of this interview was forwarded in despatch No. 83 of the 12th February, 1921. Riad Bay Es Sulh has come from Damascus to Haifa.

These journeys seem to show a renewed effort on the part of Arab Nationalists in Egypt, in Palestine and in Syria to achieve their ends by co-operation.

Disappointment is expressed that the Amir Feisal has not been summoned to the Near East Conference, although representatives of the Kemal Party, which since the armistice has vigorously opposed the Powers of Europe, are admitted to the Conference.

There is a tendency among some Christians in Haifa to entertain and discuss the idea of the fusion of Palestine with Syria. Haifa is always a centre for political discussion and for a frank expression both by Moslems and Christians of their thoughts, which, particularly among the merchants and some of the richer people, are apt to reflect rather sharply an apprehensive and, at times, even a bitter state of mind. But time and experience of a just administration will, it is confidently anticipated, succeed in dispelling present doubts and fears.

His Excellency the High Commissioner presided on the 23rd February at a meeting of delegates of the Chambers of Commerce in Palestine and heads of Departments in the Administration. The meeting lasted all day, and a great variety of subjects were discussed. It gave much satisfaction to all present, as indicating a desire on the part of the Government to hear at first hand the views of business men and as an important step towards a form of representation in respect of business interests.

In Galilee the recent Haifa Congress and the subsequent attempts to gain voices in support of the resolutions decided upon have caused an increased interest in the question of Jewish immigration, and, in the sub-district of Jenin, some excitement has arisen as well as indignation against the Mayor of Jenin because one of several new shops that are being constructed by the municipality is being let to a Jew.

In the neighbourhood of Beisan some anxiety and apprehension have recently been expressed by the Arab population owing to an unfortunate and unfounded impression having gained ground that the Government intends to further the settlement of Jews in a manner detrimental to the interests of the Arab population. A large proportion of the latter, on both sides of the Jordan, claim that, though the land formed part of the Imperial domain (Jiftlik), yet it was unjustly taken from them and is theirs in equity, while others consider that, although they can produce no title to possession, yet long usage has given them prescriptive rights as cultivators. Any such rights will, of course, be respected.

In Samaria, and particularly in Nablus, the age-long dislike by the inhabitants to any ingress of Jews still continues. Though this hostility to the Jews must be admitted to be a sentiment common to this part of the country, yet its organised and effective expression is the work of only a few of the more eager and energetic individuals.

In the Jaffa district, where Jewish politics play an almost greater part than those of any other section, there are increasing signs of somewhat acute differences between the members of the Maflage Poale Socialim (the advanced Communist part, styled by some Bolshevik) and other Jewish parties; on the 17th a meeting of advanced Communists was held in Petach Tikvah. The Jewish inhabitants of the colony desired to raid the place of the meeting, but were prevented by the police.

On the 19th a fight, resulting, however, in no serious casualties, took place between the members of the Maflage Poale Socialim and those of the Hapoel Hazair (a Liberal

labour society established about fourteen years ago), representatives of both groups being engaged upon irrigation work near Yebna. On the same day another encounter between the Maflage Poale Socialim and other Jews occurred. The situation calls rather for attention than anxiety.

The Beersheba district is, as usual, quiet. The population are anticipating a rich harvest due to the unexpectedly plentiful rainfall.

In the Gaza district the situation is also satisfactory on the whole, though there is not in this area the same almost complete detachment from political questions as at present appears to characterise the Beersheba district.

In Jerusalem the month has passed quietly. The Mufti is seriously ill, and is not expected to recover. The question of his successor is one that touches many interests, and is consequently preoccupying many minds.

Both the French and Italian detachments have now been withdrawn from Palestine. Before leaving they were each inspected by his Excellency the High Commissioner, and a farewell interview of a cordial character took place between his Excellency and the officers of the detachments.

During the month a general Awkaf meeting was held under the presidency of the High Commissioner to discuss questions relating to Moslem Awkaf and religious courts. Among the points discussed was whether the Wakf budget should be submitted for sanction to the High Commissioner. The Mufti of Haifa was the chief objector. It was pointed out to him that his attitude was not in harmony with the decision taken by the first general Awkaf meeting held on the 9th November, 1920.

It became evident that the present hesitation to give effect to this decision was due to a fear that the Moslems might find themselves permanently tied to an agreement which, although acceptable under present conditions, might prove the reverse in the future. They frankly stated that they had no fear whatever so long as the present High Commissioner held office; but, they asked, what guarantee have we for the future?

The High Commissioner stated that he appreciated their view, but thought their fears groundless. His Excellency suggested that, if they so desired, the agreement might be concluded for a period of five years only. After further discussion in private the committee stated that their confidence in the High Commissioner had induced them to abandon opposition to the clause, and they did not ask for any time limit.

In Transjordan the arrival at Es-Salt of Shereef Ali during the month still further impaired the authority of the Local Government. Some of the tribes in the neighbourhood have ceased paying taxes, and this again has placed the Local Government of the Belka (the best organised of all the Transjordanian Governments) in financial difficulties.

Letters have been received by local notables from Amir Abdullah saying that he hoped shortly to be among them. The Town Amman has been decorated in anticipation of his arrival. The Amir Abdullah has always emphasised the importance of maintaining good relations with the British representatives, and that Great Britain is the friend of the Arab cause and that France alone is the enemy. One (perhaps the main) object of his projected visit is no doubt to seek to establish and to make publicly evident a cordial personal relationship between himself and the British representatives, and thereby increase the impression (already sufficiently strong in Transjordan despite all efforts to the contrary) that Great Britain really sympathises with his anti-French intentions. To succeed in more firmly implanting such a conviction in the minds not only of his immediate and avowed followers, but also in those of waverers in Transjordan, would give him the moral backing which he is in danger of losing owing to his lack of resources in money and equipment. His presence in Amman will strengthen the Shereefian cause in Transjordan and will correspondingly decrease the authority of the Local Government. It is hoped that the Amir's visit will not unduly increase the impression held locally by the French in respect of the unfavourable effect on French interests of our methods in Transjordan.

Refeifin Pasha, of Kerak, has now been in Jerusalem for a month. He recently declared he would resign, and has only recently been persuaded to agree to continue in his post.

Recent reports from his district indicate a recommencement of tribal quarrels due to the absence of any effective authority.

Further deputations have been received from the people of Tafil beggins for assistance in setting up a form of Government. Neither the inhabitants of Kerak nor those of Tafil are at present inclined to abandon hope of ultimate assistance from His Majesty's Government.

In Ajloun the jealousies of the local sheikhs and the absence of any central authority prevent the formation of an efficient Administration. The people as a whole are orderly and more interested in agriculture than in politics, so that the Shereefian agents, though active, have not hitherto succeeded in rousing much enthusiasm.

[E 2965/455/91]

No. 151.

Major Batten to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 7.)

(No. 15. Secret.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, February 20, 1921.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the Jeddah report for the period ending the 20th February, 1921.

Copies of this report and despatch have been sent to Cairo, Bagdad, Jerusalem and Aden.

I have, &c.

W. BATTEN,

Acting British Agent.

Enclosure 1 in No. 151.

Jeddah Report for the Period February 1-20, 1921.

(Secret.)

Visit of King Hussein to Jeddah.

HIS Majesty arrived on horseback on the morning of the 9th February, at the head of an imposing escort of Bedouin with streaming banners, an impressive and dignified figure.

His sons had preceded him the previous evening by car, a form of conveyance which King Hussein with characteristic energy seldom employs.

He slept the evening prior to his arrival as simply as his followers, on a carpet under the stars. The King carries his years remarkably well and appeared to be in robust health and spirits.

In general conversation that morning during the course of my first visit, he showed that charming side of his personality which so impresses all who meet him on such occasions, but on turning for an instant after taking leave, I noticed the mask had fallen, and it was a different man, brooding and sullen, who stood in the place of the kindly and genial patriarch of a moment before.

The French consul-general's visit coincided with mine. His Majesty entertained us with anecdotes of Jeddah in the past, and talk of camels and horses. On my enquiring as to the progress of the water-supply scheme for Jeddah, he sketched a grandiose plan for pumping-stations and reservoirs near Jebel Hadda, where, however, it appears that the supply is entirely dependent on rainfall in the hills. As anticipated, despite the promises held out of fresh water for Jeddah independent of the condenser, there appears to be no prospect of water reaching the town this year.

The King has been busy for some time sinking new wells and cleaning old ones, and supervising the work of a few Bedouin, under no skilled direction, in attempts to repair the old Turkish aqueduct. Although much has been made of the scheme, the townspeople of Jeddah have been very sceptical as to any benefit resulting, and general fears, which are only too well founded, have been expressed of the danger of a water-famine this hot weather. The failure of the rains in this district has accentuated this danger, the reservoirs being empty, and the condenser in such a state that a complete breakdown may well occur.

In addition, the King has resolutely refused all my offers to help in obtaining a supply of coal, depending on what he has been able to extract from the wrecks at Kufidah, amounting to some sixty tons only.

On my mentioning the difficulty of obtaining coal, he remarked that nothing was easier than to substitute the use of oil-fuel. The idea of converting the already decrepit condenser at a moment's notice by a royal wave of the hand appears to have no difficulties for King Hussein, and meanwhile the prospect of a failure of the water supply is seriously disturbing the population, already on very short commons as regards water.

[6668]

2 O

The British Government is generally blamed by the Jeddais for this shortage of coal, and I have recently heard some illuminating remarks on the subject of conditions under Arab independence and Turkish rule, and frank admissions of inability to understand the licence allowed King Hussein to misgovern his people and mismanage the country, resulting in conditions worse than in the time of their subjection to the easy-going, if corrupt Turkish Administration.

The French consul-general mentioned that he expected the "Montcalm" to arrive the next morning, an announcement which the King received with marked frigidity, probability for my benefit.

The former's mention of the latest news in Reuter's telegrams caused King Hussein laughingly to stop his ears, exclaiming that all the news from the outside world was bad, and that he wished to hear none of it.

Emirs Ali and Zeid were present, but remained in the background in accordance with Arab custom.

I called again in the afternoon, and presented Mr. Grafftey-Smith, who conveyed a personal message from the Viscount Allenby which the King received with gratification.

King Hussein, who had with him Mazhar, son of Ahmed Nedim Pasha, a pleasant looking young Turk who speaks French and English with equal fluency and whom he treated as a great favourite, received us at his ease in his private apartments. During the ensuing interview, lasting about two hours, the King touched but lightly on current questions mentioned by myself, affecting a hearty and humorous mood, and adopting the attitude that, having done all that was possible, he did not wish to cause mutual embarrassment by entering into serious discussions.

Beyond saying that he had just received a telegram from the Emir Feisal, which he would show me later (but has not done so far), and that he was well, he made no mention of London except to express a wish to pay a visit there in person. He appeared to be anxious about Emir Abdullah, who, he stated, had been in communication with British officers at Amman, but was unwilling to pursue the conversation further in this direction.

His Majesty referred several times to Syria and Damascus sadly, but without heat.

In reference to the collection of a proportion of the Quarantine Dues from pilgrims direct, the necessity of which had been explained as due to the Government's delay in deciding on the amount, still liable to revision, King Hussein naïvely gave as his reason for being unwilling to agree to this, that he could not ask pilgrims to pay what would appear to them as an extra charge, in view of the present lack of special arrangements for their comfort and health.

Were the hospitals and hostels in Jeddah and Mecca, and on the road between, the fountains of water and similar facilities, which it was his intention to provide, in existence, they could have no objection to being charged a small amount in return for his care, but under present circumstances, being ignorant, they would be liable to complain at being charged dues with no visible return.

I explained that the dues would have been collected with their tickets in any case had sufficient notice been given, and that the upkeep of the Jeddah Quarantine Station against eventualities justified the levy of a suitable sum, apart from the purely sanitary question of the actual period of detention, whereupon His Majesty remarked that the pilgrims did not understand such matters, and that he would not do anything which might cause them to feel they were badly treated.

He went on to discuss grandiose schemes for the amelioration of pilgrimage conditions, and especially for the provision of a proper water supply. The desire of his heart was to carry out all such schemes, but their execution would take time, and where could he find either the necessary materials, water-raising machinery, cement for tanks, sanitary appliances, hospital equipment, and so forth?

To my offer, already previously conveyed to the Government as regards water-raising plant, together with suitable catalogues and information, to place the fullest information, and, if he so desired it, technical assistance at his disposal, he replied that this was precisely the difficulty—nothing that was made in Europe was suitable for the Hedjaz, which in material as in political matters was a country apart.

He laughed away suggestions that adaptations could easily be made to suit the special conditions of the country, and that there were many parts of our Empire where similar difficulties had been successfully met and overcome, repeating that nothing which applied elsewhere could possibly be suitable for the Hedjaz.

The King is fond of indulging in visions of improvements in the country, but always, it is well understood, under his own direction and to be carried out without outside help in the way of technical advice or assistance. Hence, to take a small instance, the pitiful spectacle of a Syrian "engineer," so-called, with a monthly salary of 50*l.*, continuing to pump salt water for many weeks from a boring made in Jeddah, and assuring His Majesty that fresh water would soon appear, with the help of God. The competent engineer employed last year at the condenser was dismissed because he was not an Arab.

Referring to the question of a railway to Mecca, His Majesty stated it was all very well for pilgrims from countries where conditions were different to ask for a railway, but what would become of the 52,000 Bedouin who depended for their livelihood on the camel-hire? I remarked that such objections had always been raised to similar projects, and instanced the Hedjaz Railway.

King Hussein remarked that if the Turks, with whom he well knew his own poor Government was unfavourably compared, had not been able to build a railway, he certainly could not be expected to do so.

This led him to discuss the general question of the attitude of pilgrims towards the conditions in the Hedjaz.

Some echo of the complaints made must have reached him, for him to discuss the question at all, as King Hussein has always rigidly adhered to the view, which he went on to express, that the harder the conditions of the pilgrimage the greater was the merit.

The Hedjaz was a barren land, whose own inhabitants had the greatest difficulty in supporting a precarious existence. The Prophet had found it so, had said it was good, and if rocks, sand and hardship had been sufficient for Him, who were we in modern times to think that water should flow and gardens bloom in a land which God had sanctified as it was in its original state?

This was hardly in accordance with previous remarks, but to prove the point of the moment, King Hussein is apt to conveniently forget what is inconsistent in conversation as in larger issues.

To this land of desert and scarcity there came from all quarters of the world, where conditions of life were easier and men more soft, a vast army of the faithful, it was true, but drawn from the most part from among the poor, the lowly, and the ignorant, who were apt to be unreasonable in comparing Hedjaz conditions with those of their own land. Moreover, the vast majority brought nothing with which to help improve the lot of their successors by adding to the prosperity of the country. On the contrary, they were rather a burden to it, although the task of providing for them was a duty laid on him by God, and he willingly did what was possible to maintain his guests.

Here the King laughingly enquired why the rich merchants of Calcutta and similar places did not perform the haj and help mitigate out of their superfluity the lot of their less fortunate but more pious brethren. It was suggested that riches and piety were not synonymous, whereupon King Hussein said that such people should be made to come, and not only those who far from being of assistance to their Holy Land were frequently a source of anxiety and loss. Last year he himself had supported over 4,000 destitutes who would otherwise have died. In making this statement it is feared His Majesty was drawing somewhat largely on his imagination.

Why did India only send beggars to the Hedjaz, and knowing the inability of the country to provide for their needs, why did not the Indian Government permit enough supplies for their support to be exported?

There followed a discussion on the supply question. I had great difficulty in persuading the King that any delay in shipment of the allotment in no way implied a stoppage of supplies, and again carefully explained the position, assuring him of the efforts made to expedite the despatch of wheat and flour, but it was quite obvious that he was unwilling to modify his belief that such supplies have been restricted as a form of pressure on himself.

The present scarcity, he affirmed, had reacted unfavourably against ourselves, and did not affect him as his people could not understand how it was that in time of war supplies were readily obtainable, whereas they were unaccountably withheld two years after the cessation of hostilities.

He knew quite well that the Indian Government could let him have the comparatively small quantity of supplies required by the Hedjaz if it so chose—this despite renewed assurances as to the shortage and current conditions in India—but he was well aware that the reason was to be found in the dislike of that Government for

himself. His Majesty's Government and the Government of India might agree in larger matters, but it by no means followed that they saw eye to eye in everything, and he quite understood the feelings of India in this matter.

However, nothing he could say or we could do could alter the position, and remarking genially that he knew of another person on whom India looked with a more favourable eye—Ibn Saud—King Hussein dismissed the subject.

He then asked with some appearance of anxiety if I had any inkling of the real reason for the visit of the French admiral. He could not imagine why he had been "specially sent," as he had been informed, and such a point made of impressing on him the importance of the visit, and he had been in doubt as to the proper course to take.

He would not have taken any notice of the last French warship to call had I not pressed him so strongly, and only did so in this instance on account of the rank of the officer making the visit. I again explained that the "Montcalm" on her way to the Far East was calling at ports of importance *en route*, and was paying him the compliment of a visit in the usual way of international courtesy.

His Majesty said that whatever the reasons might be he could hardly call the visit opportune, but would do his best against his personal inclination to give the admiral a fitting reception in return for his courtesy. It could, however, be readily understood that anybody would be averse to meeting at the same table those who shared the odium of "killing his brothers," and who had treated his son as they had done, and he only trusted that beyond the official banquet on shore, and possibly a return visit, he would not be expected to accept hospitality on board.

He proposed sending the Kaimakam and the officer commanding Jeddah on board, and Emir Zeid with a guard of honour to meet the admiral on landing, and asked if that would be considered sufficient.

Taking into consideration the usual courtesies exchanged in foreign ports, I replied that I fully fell in with his views, and that while anything more would be unnecessary, less might be considered unfriendly in view of the obvious importance attached to the visit, and commending his good feeling in deputing the Emir Zeid to greet the admiral personally on his behalf.

The King mentioned that the visit had caused a great deal of comment, and he himself wondered if it had any political significance. In any case, the departure of Emir Ali coinciding with the visit of the warship, and his previous intention of visiting Jeddah, had enabled him to fulfil the courtesies expected of him without straining his forbearance too far.

King Hussein was very bitter on the subject of the Madrassat-al-Falah, referred to in your Lordship's telegram to Beirut No. 27 of the 14th December, 1920, stating that the staff and the orphans had been expelled by the French authorities, and had all since made their way south and were now in the care of the Emir Abdullah. He asked how such actions could be reconciled with common justice, let alone the conditions of the so-called mandate, a mere excuse for penetration and colonisation for the benefit of a foreign race.

His Majesty was approaching delicate ground, and the conversation was turned into other channels, as any reminder that such questions cannot now be discussed with profit, or any hint that he only makes his own position increasingly difficult by adhering rigidly to ideas outside the sphere of practical politics, or that he is less concerned with Syria and other places than the proper settlement of affairs affecting his own kingdom, merely having the effect of enraging His Majesty and rendering it impossible to deal with him. I am well aware that his complaints against France have their counterpart in similar statements to the French as to Palestine and Irak, so that King Hussein's unceasing complaints on this subject may to a certain extent be discounted as an attempt, natural under the circumstances, possibly to profit by creating distrust between the two Allies.

On being asked for any news of Khalid's activities, the King informed me he had been driven away and that all was quiet for the moment, and that he had taken measures to protect the Taif district from any repetition of such raids, but whispered that he had some papers to show me later.

A typical example of King Hussein's tyrannical methods occurred the same evening. Wandering round the town unaccompanied after dark, as is often his habit in Mecca, a habit which has resulted in many entertaining incidents, the King noticed that the water-front was cumbered by a number of boats drawn up for repair. The next morning he gave orders that as the view of Jeddah from the sea was spoilt, and that he wished the French admiral to have an unobstructed view of the town, all boats

so drawn up not in harbour by a certain hour that afternoon would be burnt to the ground. Among these were the launch of the local agent of Messrs. Holt, and several boats under construction. The former, which was not in a fit state to take the water, was excepted from the order through the personal intervention of Emir Zeid, on it being pointed out that, the launch being of steel, the cost of burning it would be prohibitive. Feverish activity resulted in the front being cleared, and a number of unfinished boats now repose under water, to the rage and mortification of their owners. The Emir al Bahr was sent for, dismissed and hurried off to Mecca under arrest.

Such are the methods mistakenly employed by King Hussein apparently with the idea of parading his authority, and which only result in his being regarded with fear and hatred, and it is small wonder that his periodical visits to Jeddah are anticipated by the local officials and inhabitants alike with consternation.

Emir Ali called at the agency on the morning of the 10th. He stated he intended to proceed to Medina via El Ula as he had never visited the tribes on that route, and also to investigate the possibilities of the railway from Wejh originally contemplated by the Turks. He would return to Mecca before the haj. His real reason for choosing this route was more probably the fear of difficulties with the Jubeina.

As regards recent events, there had been no question of negotiations between himself and Khalid, whose adherents, drawn for the most part from the Ateibah and "some others" (probably the recalcitrant Hedjazis mentioned in previous reports), had made a series of rapid raids and then vanished.

He would have followed the raiders up and punished them, but for the instructions from his father that he was to abstain from any appearance of aggression, following the truce agreed on in September, but broken by Ibn Saud.

I remarked that Khalid was not Ibn Saud, and took the opportunity of drawing attention to the fact that events elsewhere in Arabia produced as infractions of this agreement were hardly connected with an agreement not to attack the Hedjaz, but His Highness assured me that they possessed proofs that Ibn Saud was the instigator of the whole affair, and that his adventures in Asir, Koweit and Shammar were but preludes to a combination against the Hedjaz.

He informed me he had established a chain of advanced posts south and south-east of the Wadi Liyah on the exposed approach to the Taif district, and taken measures for their support in the event of further raids.

The most serious fighting had occurred in the Wadi Liyah, his troops arriving just in time to prevent the crossing of the Wadi, and driving the raiders back on Kilikh (? Aklak) to the east, where he had established an outpost.

Khalid after spending some time at Okheidhir had proceeded to Riyadh, and he anticipated that trouble would recur, and feared an attack under the guidance of Ibn Saud himself before long unless His Majesty's Government took steps to ensure that some settlement were reached, or future negotiations agreed on before the pilgrimage. It was most important that something should be settled during the next few months, as it was essential to ensure peaceful conditions in the country for the haj.

The Hedjaz Bedouin had been menaced with extermination if they resisted—nay, more, if they did not openly support Khalid, and such military preparations as had been made were purely to make them feel more secure and be in a position to maintain their fealty to the King.

I informed His Highness that all developments had been reported in the proper quarter.

The "Montcalm" arrived at midday and salutes were exchanged, Contre-Amiral Thomine calling subsequently on the King. I asked leave to visit the King when convenient, but he announced his intention of calling at the Agency in the evening.

The King sent Emir Ali to announce his arrival, while he was calling at the Italian Consulate, and arrived shortly afterwards with Emir Zeid. A short general conversation ensued.

King Hussein with one of his inimitable touches of courtesy, although of course a non-smoker, asked for "an English cigarette," as a compliment to his hosts and politely puffed at a virginia, remarking that he had last smoked with Colonel Wilson two years ago, but from familiar indications I surmised that his visit was not entirely one of courtesy or to continue the pleasant conversation of the previous day.

King Hussein, taking the Union and Hedjaz flags hanging together in the room as a suitable opening, retailed at great length all his troubles until nearly 11 P.M.

He had apparently come primed with a list of every grievance, great and small, and was determined to again unburden himself.

It would be idle to recapitulate in detail what is by now a well-known theme, but there was a certain amount which was new in his statements. The King was querulous and impatient, but, possibly owing to the presence of others, restrained himself from the outburst on the verge of which he more than once appeared to be.

He went further than usual in his accusations against Ibn Saud and almost stated in so many words that Great Britain was encouraging him, for some obscure purpose which he could not fathom.

How could Ibn Saud, he declared, to whom he himself had lent money and arms before the war, carry out his present adventures, necessitating lavish outlay, without receiving money from somewhere? The inference was obvious, but I had no wish to be drawn into a discussion which would lead nowhere and confined my efforts to keeping the King in as tractable a mood as possible. The very fact of Ibn Saud's existence is by now a grievance with King Hussein, and the fact that His Majesty's Government does not immediately comply with his desire to adjudicate without question in his own favour but adds to his sense of injury.

The King could not understand our attitude towards Ibn Saud, and laid the blame on Mr. Philby, on which subject he grew rapidly excited, muttering the name repeatedly.

The King was particularly bitter over the manner in which His Majesty's Government made the payment of the 300,000 rupees conditional on his meeting certain of their views, and affirmed it was an insult to expect him to do anything for money.

This question had already been worn threadbare, and has been the subject of previous reports, but His Majesty was evidently determined not to leave until he had concluded his programme. Correspondence on the subject of this payment was produced, and then in rapid succession a series of letters he held ready prepared for the occasion, discussing each and the subjects relevant and irrelevant to which they gave rise, until even the patience of Emir Ali, who sat next to me, and occasionally whispered not to mind too much what his father said, appeared to be reaching an end. He even ventured once or twice to support my interruptions and remarks, but the King rambled on, brooking no interruption, and providing a study of every phase of emotion from extreme affection to bitter irony and repressed anger, before finally commending himself and his unhappy country to God and taking his leave.

One of the letters produced drew attention to the use in the "Qibla" last year of the title "King of Arab Kings," against which he triumphantly placed the letter of the 30th August, 1915, from Sir Henry MacMahon, on the question of the eventual independence of the "Arab Countries" and the possible revival of the Arab Khalifat.

King Hussein asked how it was that His Majesty's representative in Egypt was empowered to promise the independence of an Arab kingdom from the Mediterranean to the Persian Gulf (which incidentally were not mentioned in this letter), and to "promise" the revival of the Arab Khalifat, while another representative at Jeddah curtly ordered him to discontinue the title of King, which Great Britain had herself approved, and which was far inferior to that of Khalifa.

Needless to say, the fact to which I drew his attention, that the Arabic translation of this particular letter was as explicit as the original in referring to the independence of the "Arab Countries" and in referring only to the possibility of the renewal, if so desired by the Moslem world, of the Arab Khalifat, was quite lost on the King, as also the distinction between the two titles.

The mention of the eleventh-hour refusal to accept the Indian Pilgrim Hospital in a message from his Excellency the High Commissioner in Egypt was enlarged on by the King, who made the astonishing statement that he had been explicitly informed that it would consist of only one tent, whereas it was large enough to need 1,100 camels for transport. The facts of the case were, that King Hussein on being notified of the composition of the hospital refused to accept more than one small tent, and that on 200 camels being asked for to send a small unit purely for Indian pilgrims, this request was refused. I pointed out that he was mistaken, and that in any case it was difficult to see how the size of the hospital—in this case an ordinary field-hospital unit—affected the matter, and that I should have thought that once he had agreed in principle to the despatch of a hospital he would have been only too pleased in view of his well-known solicitude for the comfort and health of pilgrims that it should be adequate for their needs.

The King angrily replied that he had been deceived, and could never allow interference (as he termed it) with the pilgrims on such a scale, and that the pilgrims themselves would be the first to resent it.

The above is sufficient comment on the real extent of the genuineness of King Hussein's desire, expressed whenever it suits him to pose as an enlightened Monarch, to improve the conditions of the pilgrimage.

Other letters were produced with the object of proving the sinister designs of Ibn Saud against himself, but only one, a short note to a certain Hadi Abu Raqaba (? of Munjahah, Birk Tihamah) with Ibn Saud's seal, implicated Ibn Saud in any way directly. It was, moreover, dated 1337, and was couched in general terms, stating that all who wished to be safe would be under the protection of God if they relied on him.

Certain letters showed that Khalid had been in communication last November with the notoriously turbulent Beni Harith north of Ebha and tribes of the Urdiyah district, also that attempts had been made, apparently without success, to cause a combination between the Ghamid and Zahran, who were asked to meet Khalid at Aklak with the object of capturing Taif and cutting off the water of Ain Zubeida from Mecca.

Another letter of recent date was from Mohamed ibn Abdul Aziz of Ebha, reporting that Ibn Muffarih, the rival of Ibn Aidh of Ebha, and other minor Asir chiefs from the Tihamah had been in Riyadh, but apparently in connection with further designs against Asir, and not against the Hedjaz. King Hussein forwarded me a similar letter some time ago from the same writer complaining of Ibn Saud's aggression, but whatever truth there may be in the belief that Ibn Saud is contemplating an attack on King Hussein, the latter insists on treating any aggression elsewhere as equally directed against himself, and as a violation of the truce arranged last September, which referred purely to the Hedjaz. Hassan ibn Aidh is at present in Mecca, and the recent frequent reference to events in Asir tend to show that King Hussein is meddling in affairs outside his proper sphere, although it is only fair to take into consideration that he is justified to a certain extent in attempting to take measures to counter intrigues possibly aimed eventually at himself, and that intrigue and counter-intrigue are normal to the politics of the country.

Ali ibn Abdu, the Sheikh of Birk, having held up dhows proceeding north from Kunfidah, King Hussein referred the matter to me, remarking ironically that this man was a partisan of the Idrissi, the "Ally of Great Britain."

His Majesty repeated earnestly the substance of what Emir Ali had said in the morning on the importance for arranging for negotiations with Ibn Saud before the pilgrimage, and said his own good intentions had been proved by his correct attitude under provocation, and his confining military measures purely to defence when finally forced to take action against those who had disregarded the truce.

Referring to his refusal to sign the Peace Treaty, he said he could not be expected to affix his name to a document assigning Palestine to the Zionists and Syria to foreigners, and that in any case his refusal had been of no consequence, as the treaty would soon be radically altered.

If he had not been a good Moslem he would have committed suicide long ago, as he could expect nothing in a world where force apparently was the sole arbiter. "Had the Arab nation possessed a navy like Great Britain," he bitterly remarked, "things would have been very different," and went on to say that had Great Britain not wasted money over the Archangel expedition and the Dardanelles, this would have been better expended in continuing to support the Hedjaz, but for which Turkey could never have been beaten, but it was too late now, and all the early promise of the revolt had been falsified and the good effect lost.

The King, as usual at such interviews, again offered his resignation, employing the somewhat strange argument that if the British Government allowed its Secretary for War and others to resign there could be no difficulty in accepting his own resignation.

King Hussein's wide superficial knowledge of events in the outside world, which he is fond of airing and woefully misapplies, is one of the many bars to any reasonable discussion with him.

He again expressed, however, his great desire to visit London, and made indirectly some surprisingly frank admissions of his jealousy of Emir Feisal. His Majesty's Government obviously would not let him (the King) visit England now, but why Feisal had been chosen before to attend the Peace Conference, and not himself, he could never understand. Feisal was no better than a gramophone, repeating the last words he had heard, and had no claim to speak with authority. I reminded His Majesty that the Emir was his own chosen representative, but this merely drew from him a snort of contempt.

The King asked me to keep the letters for careful consideration, and concluded with an apology for detaining me so long. I was not to think he was complaining—he had merely wished to present facts which were evident to everybody, and to leave me to draw my own conclusions.

With this parting shot King Hussein took leave courteously and even affectionately at the gate of the agency.

In connection with certain subjects raised at this interview, the translation of a letter received some days previously from King Hussein is attached to this report. The substance of this letter was communicated to your Lordship in my telegram No. 16 of the 6th February.

I called on Emir Ali the next morning. His Highness trusted the interview of the previous night would not be taken too seriously, and said he could not but feel embarrassed at certain of the remarks dropped by his father in the heat of the moment, which he knew he did not really intend. The question of Akhwan aggression was again discussed, the Emir repeating his warnings and appeals.

The King sent for the Khedivial agent that morning, in order to arrange for the mail steamer to call at Rabegh for the Emir on his way to Wejh, and flew into a rage on being told that on the Emir's request being made a telegram had been sent to Alexandria asking urgently for permission to arrange this. King Hussein said he was King of the country, and that foreign firms established in Jeddah had to obey his orders without reference elsewhere, or leave, and refused to listen to explanations.

The position of the agent was not enviable, and I accordingly supported his cable by one from the agency, informing Emir Ali and the King that the call would be arranged, and that the agent had not only been quite correct, but had no option but to refer such a request to his principals, while being, as always, ready to help in any matter desired by the King as far as his responsibility extended.

I paid an official call with the officers of the agency on Contre-Amiral Thomine that afternoon at the French consulate.

A banquet was given in the evening at the Baladia in his honour, to which all officers of the "Montcalm" not on duty were also invited. The arrangements were on a lavish scale, financed it is stated by a leading Indian merchant who is anxious to placate King Hussein, and the assemblage of Bedouin sheikhs in full panoply under the two Emirs particularly impressive.

The only national anthems played were the British, which was twice repeated, and the Hedjaz, but any embarrassment was avoided owing to the arrival somewhat earlier than the other guests of the agency staff.

King Hussein was most cordial to all, and the reception and banquet passed off very satisfactorily. In a somewhat embarrassing stage-whisper the King remarked to me once, however, that this had all been arranged in order not to offend the British, and that we were the real hosts.

His Majesty visited the "Montcalm" on the morning of the 12th, when he inspected the ship and showed great interest in the crew, addressing a few words through his interpreter to each peloton in turn, and making a speech which is referred to later.

I called to bid farewell to Emir Ali, and later on Il Cavaliere Bernabei who was proceeding on leave and on whom the King also called on board the Italian mail steamer. The "Montcalm" sailed in the afternoon *en route* for Jibuti.

The King spent most of the following day in a visit to the islands, inspecting the quarantine arrangements and talking to the Javanese pilgrims landed from the first steamer.

Emir Zeid called in the morning, showing me at the King's request yet another anonymous letter from the "Egyptian Nation" differing only from former similar communications in stating that King Hussein would shortly find the punishment for his misdeeds in the return of the Turks, who after the expected revision of the Treaty of Sevres would be reinstated in Arabia.

I visited the King in the evening. He had the grace to apologise for his remarks at the previous interview, and reiterated his unswerving loyalty to and dependence on Great Britain.

I showed him a telegram received from India, from which it appeared that supplies might very shortly be expected. The King attempted to conceal his satisfaction, but expressed his thanks for the efforts made, remarking that it was a very small matter, that there was in reality no great shortage, and that in any case Allah knew how to look after his people.

An interesting discussion on the animals and birds of the country, the methods of hunting them, and general conversation then ensued for about an hour.

The King informed me he had given orders for the pilgrims to be released from quarantine early next day, which was satisfactory.

The agency staff were received very cordially the next morning at the barracks. Agricultural questions were discussed, and some interesting information obtained as to the needs of the country in the way of agricultural and water-raising machinery. The King laid particular stress on the importance of making a very gradual start in all such matters, and announced his intention of educating a number of young men in the agricultural school with a view to further developments later.

Mr. Graffitey-Smith was introduced to Aref Bey, the last survivor of the Syrian Agricultural Mission, and pursued the subject further with him.

The King was most anxious that we should take an airing in his two cars, but changed his mind as to accompanying me. He sent his confidant Mazhar Nedim as cicerone instead, with the officer commanding Jeddah, and the former's anxiety unduly to lengthen the subsequent pleasant drive was partly explained, on my insisting on returning to take leave and not keep His Majesty waiting, by finding that he had left the barracks and was closeted with the French consul-general at the Palace, where, after waiting a considerable time until the latter's departure, I took leave after a short interview, during which the King was not in the best of humours.

His Majesty's parting words, after announcing his intention of returning in a week or ten days, were to the effect that while he appreciated the offers made to get anything he might require for the needs of the country, I knew quite well what was the most important matter in which we could be of assistance.

King Hussein left with Emir Zeid shortly afterwards for Mecca.

His visit was a source of not unjust apprehension to the officials and townspeople.

Three of the former were dismissed summarily, with no reason given and sent to Mecca, and the Kaimakam, who appeared to be in a state of abject fear and had grown visibly thinner, narrowly escaped a like fate, which he anticipates on the occasion of the next Royal visitation. He has been again warned that he should avoid becoming too familiar with foreigners. He has visited the agency not more than half-a-dozen times in nearly a year.

The King summoned all the local merchants, and told them that while he well knew that they prayed daily for his death, this was unjust to him, but for whom they could not make such handsome profits over the supplies which he caused to be imported, concluding with a tearful exhortation to his "children" to pray rather for his long life. He omitted to mention when some of these same merchants might expect a refund of their "loans," which are extracted on the ingenious principle of giving in exchange, for Jeddah merchants, a note on the local customs cancelling customs dues up to the amount borrowed when enough goods have been entered to cover the loan.

As such loans amount singly to anything between 1,000–10,000*l.*, this scheme is not appreciated. In addition, a number of the merchants he addressed are still his creditors for the wheat commandeered last autumn.

The loan system as operated in Medina is even simpler, the unfortunate donor being given an order on the Jeddah Customs, which has been honoured so far in only one case—that of a British Indian who threatened to take the matter up with the agency unless the 1,000*l.* forcibly borrowed from him in Medina was returned by a certain date.

This same merchant had commandeered from him a portion of a consignment of rice for Medina, costing 4*l.* per sack, being subsequently repaid by a corresponding number of sacks of bad flour of practically no value.

King Hussein's expected return in a few days is reported to be in connection with the imposition of a new scale of taxes. Dissatisfaction in the town is widespread, and were it not for the King's stringent regulations, there is little doubt that a large number of his subjects would emigrate.

Intense indignation is expressed at one of the latest examples of King Hussein's tyranny—the case of a local merchant and dhow owner, who sent a consignment of goods purchased in Jeddah to Birk, where they were sold, the money obtained there in payment being despatched to Massowa, where he has an agent.

The receipt for this having been seen by the Director-General of Quarantine, who is also King Hussein's chief spy, the latter reported the transaction to Mecca.

The merchant has been fined 3,060*l.*—the amount of the transaction, and the bulk

of this wretched man's capital—for exporting gold from the Hedjaz. Proof that the money was obtained in Birk and not sent from Jeddah was unavailing, and the defence that Birk was not in the Hedjaz resulted in King Hussein flying into a passion, despatching the suppliant to Mecca, and ordering the confiscation and sale of his property.

Quarantine.

Acting under orders from Mecca, the Director-General of Quarantine is insisting on the payment of the full amount of the dues, which have been altered three times, and which still remain undecided, either by the agent or by the captain, failing which he has threatened that ships will not be given *libre pratique*.

I am in communication with King Hussein on this subject. He persists in confusing the issue, and it is feared that further difficulties may arise after the opening of Kamaran for fully loaded ships owing to the precedent set by the Jeddah Quarantine Station being employed for the first steamers to arrive this season.

An official notification states that under no circumstances will notes be accepted from pilgrims, who should bring gold or silver. This order appears to be unjustifiable, rupee notes being legal tender in the country.

A further notification announces the imposition of a quarantine tax of P.T. 5 on every person leaving Jeddah.

Shipping agents were characteristically informed that they were forbidden to issue any tickets without assuring themselves first that the applicants had paid the above tax.

Status of British Subjects.

The Hashimite Government insist on reserving the whole question of national status for further discussion, and, meanwhile, have definitely refused to acknowledge the brothers Kabuli as British subjects.

Consular Fees.

On the Government being notified that the usual fees would henceforth be levied for passport, legal and shipping services on resumption of the normal consular work of the agency, King Hussein replied that the vice-consul would be permitted to levy such fees as were in force under Turkish rule, until the Hashimite Government had arrived at a decision with the Allied Governments.

He further took strong exception to the notification intended for the information of private persons, and in no way affecting the Government, that refusal to pay these fees might entail the withholding of service.

This notification was considered advisable, in view of the fact that for a considerable period all such services have been provided without collecting any fee.

Care was taken to make it quite clear that the levy of such fee was on the same scale as elsewhere and in accordance with the normal procedure in all countries, and any discussion on the subject, such as mentioned above, appears to be superfluous.

Hedjaz Railway.

The section of line between Medina and Maan is reported to be in a bad state, with most of the bridges and culverts broken. Emir Ali informed me, however, that the two most important ones had been temporarily repaired, but otherwise confirmed the report.

Medina.

Shereef Shahaat has had conferred on him the 2nd class of the Order of El Nahda, presumably in order to obtain his goodwill.

Mecca.

Extracts of interest from a recent report of Captain Nasiruddin Ahmed are attached as an appendix to this report.

Press.

(“*Al Qibla*.”)—No. 454 refers to articles appearing in Nos. 13,328 and 13,332 of the “*Ahram*” on the relations between King Hussein and Ibn Saud, quoting from both.

The reference in the second extract, quoted in turn from the “*Temps*,” to the manner of Ibn Saud's aggrandisement is interesting.

In the same number appear the usual allegations against the Allies for their breach of faith with the Arabs, with the further addition that the Allies now despise the Arabs and think them unworthy of note and base, after using them as their tool.

No. 456 contains the notification of quarantine dues for this year, announced under the guise of a notice to pilgrims to prevent them being cheated by shipping companies, also further references to the duplicity of the Allies towards the Arabs, with an illustration of alleged similar conduct towards Greece in Asia Minor.

Great Britain is stated to have been opposed to the Hedjaz being represented at Geneva in order to force acceptance of the Treaty of Sèvres.

No. 458 quotes the speech delivered on board the “*Montcalm*” by King Hussein. A passage in which the King stated that Great Britain's excuse for occupying Irak and Palestine was that France took Syria: was omitted, but subsequently inserted in No. 459, after the reference to France's similar excuse for occupying Syria.

The King's use of the launch presented to him by the French Government was a characteristic touch.

(“*Al Falah*.”)—King Hussein personally asked me to facilitate the journey to Egypt of an engineer whom he was sending to Cairo to inspect machinery. The engineer turned out to be Omer Shakir, the editor of this paper, who showed no interest in the letter of introduction with which he was furnished in pursuance of the alleged object of his journey.

No. 20 quotes Indian opinion on the Arab question, including a reference by Sirdar Ali Khan to France as the only possible protector of Moslems in the East, giving rise to the usual diatribe against the French.

No. 23 alleges that the French in Damascus defied Moslem sentiment in obtaining possession of a mosque under false pretences.

No. 26 discusses the attitude of Mustapha Kemal towards the modification of the Treaty of Sèvres, and comments favourably upon his support of the Arab case.

W. BATTEN.

Enclosure 2 in No. 151.

Mecca Report to January 29, 1921.

AN officer of the shereefian cavalry named Emin Effendi resigned his service, and while on the point of embarkation for Syria was recalled to Mecca and put in the “*Gabboo*” (under-ground prison) without enquiry. This was about September last. Emir Zeid on his return from Europe found him there and was approached by the officer's Syrian friends to intercede with his father. His mother was also employed as a medium with the King, who, loth to show mercy or weakness, and at the same time anxious to please his favourite wife and child, transferred the man from the underground to the ordinary prison. After six weeks' detention in the latter place, the victim was released on Thursday the 27th January. The story he told me of the sufferings of the unfortunate victims rotting either in the “*Gabboo*” or the ordinary prison is a very heartrending tale. There are eight more prisoners in the black dungeon, one of whom has been there for over five, another nearly four, while yet another about two-and-a-half years. The narrator was the latest victim. Three of the above eight are condemned to a sitting and lying-down position only, having their feet in a wooden bar all the time, and have been like that ever since they were put in the place. Those not so encumbered have now hit upon a scheme of relieving the distress of the sufferers, and as soon as the gaoler turns his back on them and locks the door behind them, out come the feet of the sufferers from the bar. They go back to their position, however, as soon as any sound is heard outside. Three of the above eight are a father, his son and a cousin. Appeals from their friends fall upon deaf ears.

In the prison there are five military officers, one shereef and a number of others. They are all fed by their own friends or relatives, and friendless prisoners have to starve. A Yemani officer who has been there for over a year now, having no friends, actually starved for several days and was only kept going through the generosity of

his fellow prisoners. After several petitions he got two loaves of millet per diem. He is said to be practically naked if not actually naked, as he has got nothing to wear.

The prisoners or their friends continually submit petitions to the King for mercy, which are in most cases returned in original to the applicants. Emin Effendi tells me that in almost every instance the returned petition bears an enquiry in the King's own hand asking about the petitioner and his fault, with the Kaimakam's detailed answer and the King's order "pending." The Kaimakam's answers are never clear enough to show to the poor victim the real reason of his imprisonment, and most of them, therefore, do not know of what they are accused. After hearing such stories one cannot help feeling that it is due to us indirectly that so much injustice is being done. During the Turkish régime, either through the personal jealousy between the Vali or the Grand Shereef, or to some other cause, such glaring injustice was never perpetrated. Now there is no appeal, no redress.

2. In one of the previous reports it was stated that the King was carrying out the very desirable improvement of widening the main street of the town. Needless to say, not only is no compensation paid, but, on the other hand, the owners have to pay for the demolition and rebuilding of their premises on given lines. This activity is now encompassing some side streets also. Two instances happened during the period under reference, where houses under construction on plans and site approved by the local municipality had to be pulled down to a depth of nearly 4 ft., involving heavy monetary loss to their owners.

Another case, but of a different kind, occurred on the 25th when the King got a platform on the Jebel Abu Kubais pulled down. The platform was being made by Sheikh Abdul Kadir Shebi, at a height of over 150 ft. above the street level. The King saw the construction from his palace through his binoculars, and ordered his slaves to fetch the workmen, who were promptly put in jail. Shebi went and explained the matter to the King, and stated that if there was any fault it was his and not that of the workmen. The King released the workmen, and Shebi, believing that everything was in order, started the work again. The head workman was again apprehended and imprisoned, and the platform demolished through municipal agency. No explanation was vouchsafed to Shebi, whose family it may be said, is second only to that of the King himself in importance, as bearers of the "Key of the Holy Ka'ba," entrusted to them by the Prophet himself under Divine instructions. The Shebi, however, refused to go to the King a second time for the purpose.

3. There is practically no news of Emir Abdullah and his activities. I only know of one telegram, in poetry, received here about three days back, in which the Emir complained of his father's silence and signed himself as the "Forgotten." It has been reported to me from several sources that Emir Abdullah is well supplied with foodstuffs and cash. He has stopped Medinites entering his camp, and sent those who had opened temporary booths at Maan and elsewhere to Medina.

4. There is just a rumour that Emir Ali may proceed to Medina shortly. Emir Zeid is already tired of his life here, and has given out that he will shortly proceed to England to prosecute his studies there.

5. An Indian applied for permission to bring two Hakims and two midwives from India and start a regular dispensary here. On applying to the King he was told that permission for such an enterprise can only be given if all the members of his establishment became Arab subjects. This the applicant could not agree to and he told the King that he cannot break his relations with India, and although he has been here for some time yet he is a British subject still. The scheme has, therefore, fallen through. It is a great pity that any suggestion for the amelioration of the local conditions is met with a rebuff, and I have reason to believe that Khandwani* is also mistrusted for having ulterior motives against the Arab State, and this is the reason given me, by one who ought to be in the know, for Khandwani's requests having so far been received coldly.

* The head of a prosperous Indian firm trading with Jeddah, who has been absent for over two years, and who, on his return recently, was welcomed in the "Qibla" as a Hashimite subject returning to the fold.

Enclosure 3 in No. 151.

King Hussein to Acting British Agent, Jeddah.

(Translation.)

Your Honour,

(After respects.)

February 2, 1921.

YOUR Excellency's letter of the 30th January, 1921, has been received. Anyhow Great Britain will find us in the place in which she leaves us, because I have no personal object or private aim to be pleased at getting or to be angry at losing. Great Britain invited me and I found her invitation does not affect my after-life and serves us all in our worldly affairs, and anyhow it happened as it happened. And now it appears to her as it may be known from the contents of your letter of the 24th August, 1920, and from the contents of the copies of his Excellency the High Commissioner's telegram therein, in which he says, "It is not necessary to recount the various matters in which the wishes of His Majesty's Government were not accepted lately, but I note with surprise and regret that the refusal of allowing the Indian hospital was added to them, &c." This is also proved by your letter of the 4th August, 1920, in which you state that his Excellency the High Commissioner approves the course you are following as regards the Nejd pilgrims, and also by what is understood from the three points regarding them, and that if I do not act with you in this matter, he cannot obtain sanction for the payment of the 300,000 rupees.

Though I replied to those letters at the time, I am mentioning them now to point out this difficulty which I think is important as it disagrees with the intended principle, and there is no reason why the lowest official of Great Britain should worry about it, and it is not necessary for your sincere friend to bear the least suffering of its trouble and difficulty, nor is it necessary for this miserable country to have its comfort and tranquillity disturbed by such attacks from an ally of Great Britain whose worth and value to her are proved by her allowing him something and depriving others of the same.

This time I firstly beg to draw the attention of Great Britain to how Ibn Saud has transgressed and attacked Ibn Sabah in his country, while the latter has favours on those who are living from the Saud descendants, and he is the cause of their life and happiness, and he has saved them from destruction.

This very simple matter of transgression proves my innocence in anything which may be attributed to me. Besides this, if you bear it in mind and compare it with his Excellency the High Commissioner's statement communicated by you in your letter of the 4th August, 1920, "The only object of His Majesty's Government is for peace in Arabia" you will see what Great Britain's official should say and do.

Secondly, I beg to request that the contents of my letter of 21.11.36 to his Excellency the High Commissioner should be reconsidered and executed quite urgently because the material and mental inability necessitates same, and the old date of that request removes every doubt or hesitation.

It is true, your Excellency, that nobody is ignorant that patience is necessary in many matters, but what will the case be with things that are not on the same line like other countries to suffer from what is happening in them, as you pointed out.

I beg to conclude by confirming my assurance in the views of one of my known letters referred to above (of 21.11.36), for the pilgrim season is approaching, and in asking you to deeply and carefully consider the matter in all respects in order that you may see at least that the Government is still in case of war by all means while it is in its course of growth. This, of course, clearly shows you what we are suffering. God is the best help.

HUSSEIN.

Enclosure 4 in No. 151.

Shipping Intelligence to February 20, 1921.

THE following steamers arrived at and departed from Jeddah between the 31st January and 20th February, 1921:—

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Pilgrims disembarked.	Cargo discharged.
Mansourah	British	Port Soudan	Suez	Jan. 31	Feb. 1	..	Packages. 1,403
Khosrou	"	Bombay	Bombay	" "	" 5	..	15,805
Dakahlieh	"	Suez	Port Soudan	Feb. 5	" 5	..	1,991
Alcinous	"	Singapore	Liverpool	" 10	" 10	162	..
Dakahlieh	"	Port Soudan	Suez	" 11	" 12	..	1,648
Asmara	Italian	Suez	Massaua	" 12	" 12	..	4
Porto Maurizio	"	Massaua	Suez	" 13	" 13	..	325
Vergemere	British	Suakin	..	" 14	1,269
Mansourah	"	Suez	Port Soudan	" 15	" 15	..	196

The French cruiser "Montcalm" arrived on the 10th and left on the 12th February, 1921.

[E 2967/455/91]

No. 152.

Major Batten to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 7).

(No. 19.)

My Lord,

Jeddah, February 21, 1921.

IN accordance with your Lordship's telegram No. 18 of the 19th February, 1921, I have the honour to forward a copy of the Summary furnished to Jerusalem, Bagdad, Aden and Nairobi, to supplement the last issue of "Notes on the Middle East."

I have, &c.

W. BATTEN, Major, I.A.,
Acting British Agent.

Enclosure in No. 152

Summary of Events in the Hedjaz for the period July–December 1920.

(Secret.)

JULY.

King Hussein Ibn Saud and the Nejd Pilgrimage.

KING HUSSEIN refused to allow Nejd pilgrims to come to Mecca pending settlement of the dispute between him and Ibn Saud, and made difficulties over meeting the latter with a view to discussions.

On Ibn Saud's guarantees as to the behaviour of his followers should they perform the Haj in large numbers and his promise to refrain from hostile acts being shown to the King, he produced letters from Ebha forecasting a combination between Ibn Saud and the Idrisi as a proof of Ibn Saud's double-dealing in such matters.

Quarantine.

In spite of the apology tendered for the treatment of the Agency Medical Officer and his promise to dismiss the Husseini brothers for their behaviour, the King remained obdurate over the question of control.

Major Marshall, R.A.M.C., after his arrival, was allowed to inspect the arrangements and submit recommendations, but control still remained entirely under the Hachimite Government.

Visit of King Hussein to Jeddah.

The King spent ten days in Jeddah, from the 9th to the 19th July.

At an interview with the British agent, he raised the question of the right of France to occupy Syria. He did not wish Syria to be annexed to the Hedjaz, but Great Britain should assist the inhabitants to be free in choosing their own form of Government without necessarily coming into conflict with France. All he asked was to be treated as an ally, as well as France, who had no right to territorial acquisitions in Syria, where the whole burden had fallen on Great Britain and the Arabs.

The King also invited the Allied representatives to a joint meeting to inform them that he could not accept the ultimatum from the French Government to Feisal. In accordance with the promises of the Allies, the Hedjaz, Syria, Palestine and Irak should be entirely independent, and they were one and indivisible. Should any be under foreign control he would be false to his promises to the Arabs as to the eventual independence of all parts of Arabia.

He referred to the overtures made to him by Jemal Pasha, on behalf of Germany, who promised the Arabs independence if they deserted the Allies, and concluded by stating that as Great Britain was the first ally with whom he had entered into agreement, he would refer all such matters through the British Government.

The general impression locally and in Mecca at the time of the visit was that the King had been summoned to abdicate, and would have left in one of the warships then in harbour.

Help for Syria.

Some troops were despatched northwards from Medina, and it was generally believed that British diplomacy would be successful in arresting the advance of the French, and that they would in any case be unable to defeat the Arab-Syrian army.

Medina.

A deputation left to congratulate Ibn Rashid on his succession. Conditions in and around the town were gradually becoming more insecure.

Ummlejh.

The town was attacked by the Juhana, and the kaïmakam and Government employees driven out, the former kaïmakam, who had been dismissed by the King, reinstating himself. A small expedition was despatched from Yenbo to evict him.

AUGUST.

Syria.

Events in Syria caused great excitement in Mecca, the British Government being criticised for not preventing the capture of Damascus. In Jeddah the effect was somewhat different, owing to the general fear and hatred with which the King is regarded, and the consequent unpopularity of the present ruling family.

Subsidy.

King Hussein again proffered a request to be allowed to abdicate, his position being now impossible.

His refusal to meet the views of His Majesty's Government on the question of the Nejd pilgrimage, to meet Ibn Saud, to sign the Peace Treaty, and some fear that he might use the subsidy improperly, had led to its issue being suspended until there should be some change in King Hussein's attitude.

Pilgrimage.

Some 58,000 pilgrims came by sea, and the total at Arafat was variously estimated, but did not probably exceed 80,000.

Owing to the abnormal heat and the hardships which, as usual, had to be borne by the pilgrims, the death-rate was very high.

No infectious epidemic, fortunately, broke out, and on the whole the pilgrimage may be said to have been a success. Although the hardships, extortions and ill-treatment to which the pilgrims were subjected, and their miserable state under insanitary and congested conditions after their return, reflected very unfavourably on present conditions in the Hedjaz.

King Hussein, after first giving permission, refused at the last moment to allow the field hospital sent from India to be used, except in Jeddah. Many hundreds of lives would have been saved had this hospital accompanied the pilgrimage, as intended.

Visit of Emirs Abdullah and Ali.

His Highness the Emir Abdullah, who came to Jeddah to meet his brother on the latter's arrival from Medina, at an interview with the British agent referred at length, on behalf of the King, to Syria and the danger apprehended from Ibn Saud and the Akhwan, concluding by referring to the dishonour of the subsidy being withheld as a threat or offered as a bribe. It is difficult to persuade the King of the justice of the hope that in return for financial help he should do his best to meet the views of His Majesty's Government as far as possible.

Deputation from Riyadh.

Ahmed bin Thanayan, accompanied by Khan Sahib Sidiq Hassan from Bahrein, was sent by Ibn Saud with a letter to King Hussein, with a view to arranging some settlement preliminary to a more lasting agreement. The party was well received in Mecca on the 22nd August and performed the Haj with the King.

Several meetings took place, at which Emir Abdullah showed a conciliatory spirit and endeavoured to persuade the King to meet the deputation half-way, but largely owing to King Hussein's obstinacy, the best that could be obtained was a somewhat unsatisfactory agreement for a mutual truce for a short period until the return of the deputation to Riyadh and pending arrangements being made for arbitration by His Majesty's Government. The reason given in the document finally drawn up, and signed by the King after repeated refusals, for not carrying negotiations further, was the insufficiency of the powers accorded by Ibn Saud to his representative.

King Hussein sent a sealed autograph letter to Ibn Saud, the contents of which are not known.

SEPTEMBER.

Indian Soldiers' Pilgrimage.

The Indian soldiers' Pilgrimage party expressed dissatisfaction at their reception this year, and one or two unpleasant incidents occurred between them and the Bedouin on the return march from Mecca.

General Attitude of King Hussein.

Repeated efforts were made to bring King Hussein into a more reasonable frame of mind over the signature of the Treaty of Peace with Turkey and other matters, but with no success.

Relations between him and the French representative grew somewhat strained and the visit of a French warship did not improve matters.

Capitulations.

The question of the validity of the Capitulations was raised by the King with the French. He refused to acknowledge them in any form, although bound to abide by the rules in force under the Turks as to foreign rights until the conclusion of some further separate agreement between the Hedjaz and the Allies.

Supplies from India.

The King commandeered the major portion of the cheap supplies specially shipped from India for the Pilgrimage, but which arrived too late to be used for the purpose intended.

The bulk of these supplies were sent to Taif, where military preparations were now reported.

Reported Intrigues with Mustapha Kemal.

Reports of communications between Mustapha Kemal and the King became increasingly frequent, but no confirmation could be obtained of their truth.

Departure of Emir Abdullah for Medina.

Much ado was made about the despatch of help to the Arabs in Syria. Emir Abdullah left hurriedly, ostensibly to take his brother's place in Medina, with a large following, but it was generally understood his destination was Syria.

Recruiting, which had been very active, fell off considerably on the truth about the alleged sweeping victories over the French becoming known.

OCTOBER.

Press.

The tone of the local press about this period became increasingly anti-European. The paper "Al Falah," restarted in Mecca after the flight of its editor from Damascus, was suspended by the King for publishing an article practically amounting to a threat of jihad, in connection with events in Irak, but was allowed to resume publication.

Departure of Emir Abdullah for Maan.

Emir Abdullah left for Maan, it being given out that he was proceeding on a tour of inspection.

Precautions against Akhwan.

In consequence of rumours as to recrudescence of Akhwan activity, Emir Ali was sent to take command at Taif as a precautionary measure.

NOVEMBER.

Akhwan Aggression.

King Hussein complained repeatedly of alleged acts of Akhwan aggression, but these were either unfounded or exaggerated in the hope of impressing His Majesty's Government with the imminence of an attack by Ibn Saud, with a view to obtaining our active intervention.

British Mecca Representative.

The position of the British Moslem representative at Mecca, which had long been a difficult one, became virtually impossible, his activities being circumscribed in every possible way and the King seizing every opportunity of showing his disapproval of the appointment.

Disregard of Foreign Rights.

Incidents had occurred of British subjects being arrested without reference or justification, but these had been so far satisfactorily settled without direct reference to the King.

An ambiguous letter from him on the subject of passports and his refusal to reconsider the case of two British Indians who had been unjustly imprisoned, foreshadowed his raising the question of foreign rights with us as he had done with the French.

This question became acute shortly afterwards on his persisting in refusing to release the above, his issue of secret orders that no foreign subjects would be allowed to leave the Hedjaz unless in possession of pre-war passports, and his refusal to recognise the validity of any papers whatsoever issued since the beginning of the war.

Visit of King Hussein to Jeddah.

The King visited Jeddah on the 24th of November to welcome Emir Zeid home from Europe. In a long interview, he recapitulated all his grievances, and his warnings as to the intentions of Ibn Saud, concluding with a tearful prayer to be relieved of his unbearable responsibility to the Arabs, whom he was held to have betrayed owing to unfulfilment of promises made by the Allies, and again laid the responsibility for future events on His Majesty's Government, but reaffirmed his loyalty whatever might happen.

Refusal of King Hussein to Recognise Passports issued since 1914 and interference with Travel of Foreign Subjects.

While he was in Jeddah, certain British subjects were prevented from returning to Singapore by the last available steamer, and imprisoned for appealing to the British agent. Their instant release was obtained, but on the same day another British subject was prevented for the second time from returning by the mail steamer to the Soudan. The King's orders were now officially published. All efforts were made to point out to him the unwisdom and illegality of his action, and to obtain a revision or arrive at some satisfactory compromise, but without avail.

DECEMBER.

(Continued.) The tone of communications on this subject from the Government became such that further conciliation was inadvisable, and after a categorical repudiation by the King of one of his own letters written a few days previously, on which some compromise seemed possible, a formal protest was lodged against the action of the Hachimite Government and all liberty of action reserved.

Orders that the police were to stop the above British subjects being taken off in the Agency launch, if necessary by force, were accidentally overheard, and the position had become such that the presence of a warship was deemed advisable.

The action of the King had aroused great interest and some excitement, and renewed rumours were in circulation that he intended to break relations with the Allies and was seeking for a convenient excuse, with their natural corollary that warships were assembling at Alexandria preparatory to a demonstration, and that the King would be invited to leave in one of them.

Various otherwise petty incidents which occurred led to the conclusion that King Hussein was repeating the tactics employed at the time of the Quarantine controversy, and deliberately attempting to force an unpleasant situation on the Agency.

The news of a forthcoming visit of H.M.S. "Clematis" was received *en clair*. The same day the Soudanese in question was permitted to leave without any trouble, and although no satisfaction was obtained as regards their case, the release of the two British Indians was obtained.

The position as regards foreign rights remains the same, but, as anticipated, happily no further incidents have since arisen, it having been borne in on the King that he had gone somewhat too far in his high-handed treatment of this question.

Akhwan Aggression.

The many current rumours as to intended Akhwan aggression increased towards the end of the month, Khalid of Khurma being reported as having assembled near Asheirah with a large force in company with the Mamur of Taraba, with the alleged intention of encircling Taif and threatening Mecca.

Khalid with his adherents and certain disaffected elements of the Harb raided villages in the Taif district, and reinforcements were despatched hurriedly from Mecca.

King Hussein intimated he could no longer hold his hand in deference to the wishes of His Majesty's Government and would take counter-measures, insisting again that it was no longer a question of tribal incidents and raids, but that this aggression was the prelude to a general attack on the Hedjaz under the orders of Ibn Saud.

Information received pointed, however, to these attacks being a raid on a larger scale than usual, and largely a consequence of the resentment caused by the harshness of King Hussein's tribal policy, rather than any such preliminary movement of the Akhwan as reported by him.

The danger of a general conflagration being caused by any collision, in the present delicate state of relations both between King Hussein and Ibn Saud and the majority of his own subjects, had nevertheless to be borne in mind.

[E 3206/4/91]

No. 153.

Earl Curzon to Major Batten (Jeddah).

(No. 24.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, March 17, 1921.

I HAVE to inform you that General Haddad Pasha called at the Foreign Office on the 10th March and was received by Mr. Lindsay. To General Haddad's enquiry regarding the prospects of his being able to appear before the Inter-Allied Conference then taking place in London Mr. Lindsay replied that, so far as he knew, the Conference had not discussed Arab questions, their attention having been almost entirely taken up with other sides of the problem.

2. General Haddad then made two points. Firstly, that the French were dealing separately with the Turks for the cession to the latter of Aintab and Urfa, which were Arab or Kurdish, and not Turkish, towns; that a mandatory had no right to alienate mandated areas, and that if the French did so it would materially affect the prospects of Mesopotamia. The second point was that the appearance before the Conference of King Hussein's representative would have an admirable and pacifying effect in Arabia. He had already prepared the speech which he intended to make if summoned to appear before the Conference, and his statement would be most moderate and impartial, being a plea, not anti-French in tone, for Arab self-government. It appeared, in fact, that every blow to France in the speech would be off-set by at least a considerable knock at Great Britain. The principal result, he maintained, of an Arab appearance before the Conference would be the strengthening effect it would have on the Emir Feisal's position in Arabia, and as, in General Haddad's words, Feisal was to be "our man," it was in our interest that he should have as much influence at home as possible.

3. General Haddad continued that the Emir Feisal wished to discuss the question of the representation of the Hedjaz in Europe and especially in London. His own view, although Mr. Lindsay gathered that someone else's view, either the Emir Feisal's or King Hussein's, was wider, was that one man should suffice for all Europe. Mr. Lindsay stated that his view—a purely personal one—was that diplomatic representation abroad was the new toy of a newly created State, and that there was a tendency to attach exaggerated importance to it. Intrinsically, too, though it would entail heavy expenditure, it would be of little actual utility, for there would be no use in having a Minister abroad if there was not an organised foreign office in Mecca, nor would such a representative be used by any foreign Power for business purposes, which would continue to be conducted as hitherto through their representatives at Jeddah. Mr. Lindsay, in fact, gave the general little encouragement on this point, and the latter said that he would revert to this question later on.

4. Finally, General Haddad stated that he had seen in the "Times" that the Emir Abdullah was said to have taken Deraa, but he felt sure that the statement was not true, and he was telegraphing for a report about it. Mr. Lindsay agreed that he did not believe the statement to be correct.

5. I would add that since this interview took place General Haddad has been received by the Conference and made his statement, but the proceedings amounted to no more than an altercation between M. Briand and himself in which no approximation to unity was made.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 3359/4/91]

No. 154.

Earl Curzon to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

(No. 818.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, March 19, 1921.

I HAVE to inform you that towards the close of the recent Inter-Allied Conferences here General Haddad Pasha was allowed an opportunity of expressing the Emir Feisal's views in the course of a conversation with the Prime Minister, M. Briand and myself.

2. On this occasion M. Briand promised to put Haddad Pasha in communication with M. Berthelot, and undertook that either here or in Paris the latter should see him. Following on this promise General Haddad wrote to request an interview, but I am

informed that the receipt of his letter was not even acknowledged by M. Berthelot before he left London.

3. I should be glad therefore if your Excellency would take an opportunity of suggesting to the Quai d'Orsay, without appearing either to advise or admonish, that this sort of treatment of the Emir Feisal and General Haddad is not wise, since it must not only irritate the Arabs, but also render more difficult our task of restraining the latter from anti-French aggression on the south-eastern frontier of Syria.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON

[E 3749/31/88]

No. 155.

Note by Sir E. Crouce respecting the Emir Abdullah's reported Anti-French Activity.

THE French Ambassador called on me to-day and repeated what he had written in his official note of yesterday on the subject of Abdullah's reported anti-French activity. Although he spoke at considerable length, he practically added nothing fresh, except that he suggested the advisability of some joint pronouncement on the spot by the British and French authorities, declaring that the two Governments continued to act together in the pursuit of an identical allied policy.

I said our experience showed that such declarations lost much of their value so long as the French inspired local press remained the source of a constant and systematic anti-British propaganda.

The Ambassador thought that perhaps in any case the press was not the best vehicle for the suggested pronouncement. He told me that when he was in Morocco the French authorities had found it much more useful to get some imam, or other ecclesiastical officer, to make public statements in the mosques which both attracted more attention and added greater weight to a message. He suggested that when Mr. Churchill met General Gouraud the possibility of adopting a similar procedure might be considered.

I am informing Mr. Forbes Adam, in connection with the telegram which it is proposed, on a message from Kedleston, to address to Mr. Churchill.

E. A. C.

March 26, 1921.

[E 3703/8/91]

No. 156.

Earl Curzon to Major Batten (Jeddah).

(No. 28.)

(Telegraphic.) R.

Foreign Office, March 28, 1921.

FOLLOWING for King Hussein from Feisal:—

"Received following telegram from Lawrence, Cairo, through Mr. Churchill: 'Things have gone exactly as hoped. Please start at once for Mecca by quickest possible route, leaving Haddad temporarily in London as Hedjaz representative. I will meet you on the way and explain details. Say only that you are going to see your father, and on no account put anything in the press.'

"Things referred to as having gone exactly as hoped are those mentioned in my report to you, dated 1st March. Leaving London by first boat to submit personally the case to your Majesty, and if approved by you action thereon will begin. This is strictly confidential. I said here I am leaving to confer with your Majesty on different subjects. Leaving General Haddad temporarily to represent me officially in name of your Majesty. My best congratulations to your Majesty on return of confidence between Great Britain and your Majesty as it was during most critical circumstances. Will wire later date departure."

[E 3859/455/91]

No. 157.

Major Batten to Earl Curzon.—(Received March 31.)

(No. 21. Secret.)

Jeddah, March 11, 1921.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith the Jeddah reports for the periods ending the 2nd and 11th March, 1921, respectively.

Copies of this despatch and reports have been sent to Cairo, Bagdad, Jerusalem and Aden.

I have, &c.

W. BATTEN, Major, I.A.,
Acting British Agent.

Enclosure 1 in No. 157.

Jeddah Report for the period February 21–March 2, 1921.

Quarantine Dues.

The progress of negotiations over the settlement of the amount and method of collection of the dues for this year has been further reported to your Lordship in my telegrams Nos. 23, 24, 28 and 29.

It is regretted that all efforts to induce King Hussein to adopt the simple solution of fixing an inclusive rate were fruitless, and considerable difficulty was experienced in finally persuading him even to adopt the compromise suggested, an admittedly unsatisfactory arrangement which leaves the door open for further complications to arise from his adherence to a scale of charges depending on a period of detention in quarantine on the Jeddah islands, which under the international convention would in practice be meaningless.

At an interview with the King on the 28th February, at which I further pressed for his agreement to an inclusive charge, not only from the point of view of simplicity, but in the interests of the pilgrims themselves and those of his own Administration, King Hussein refused absolutely to consider the matter, giving his reasons at length.

The gist of his objections was that firstly, on religious and personal grounds, as the host of those who were his guests in the Holy Land, it was impossible for him owing to his peculiar relation to Moslems to charge a lump sum which would in effect appear as a tax on such a sacred business as the pilgrimage. He could not take advantage in a material way of a spiritual duty. He would only be prepared to do this, as he had pointed out during the previous visit, when he could offer the pilgrims corresponding material advantages. I pointed out that any sum so collected which might actually exceed the expenditure on quarantine facilities would furnish funds for precisely those purposes which he had mentioned, but in vain.

Secondly, as the period spent in quarantine by different parties of pilgrims was dependent on sanitary reasons and therefore variable, an inclusive tax would result in some pilgrims paying proportionately more than others. "I would like to be able to say to each pilgrim," he stated, "you have been charged so much, because for sanitary reasons it has been necessary to detain you for so long." He could not levy a charge on one batch of arrivals, who might land direct, for sanitary services enjoyed by others who might be detained in quarantine. I pointed out that pilgrims could hardly be expected to look upon quarantine detention as a boon, so that it by no means followed that if they paid a tax they must in effect be forced to undergo quarantine as a return for their money, which led the King to the disclosure of the real reason underlying his objection, namely, the fear of losing all hold on the quarantine through disuse of the Jeddah station.

After stating with every appearance of marked sincerity that he intended to follow the international convention line by line, he immediately took the strongest exception to my pointing out that, after the proper opening of Kamaran, clean ships would disembark their pilgrims direct, and that suspected or infected ships

would have to return to Kamaran. This would mean, on the arrangements presumably made in anticipation of a certain average of detention at Jeddah, that the administration under his present rules would in practice be unable to claim more than the fixed proportion of P.T. 37½ and possibly suffer a loss of anticipated dues, and that the notification of this sum again as partly representing a period of one day's detention gave rise to those very objections he had mentioned, in that the first day's quarantine, which he took as a matter course, was in itself contrary to the convention.

After a lengthy discussion, during which the sanitary aspect of Kamaran, Tor and Jeddah was again explained, King Hussein finally appeared to understand the position of the two former as guardians of the Hedjaz against infection, and outwardly acquiesced, but it remains to be seen how far he will carry his words into effect when the question arises.

After further discussion and persuasion, the King again flatly refusing to consider a lump sum, he finally definitely agreed that shipping companies would only be asked to pay the fixed proportion announced, and that further dues, if any, would be collected from the pilgrims direct.

I was only able to persuade him to adopt this compromise, by pointing out that he had repeatedly accused shipping companies, both in official letters and public announcements, of collecting more on tickets than the amount notified, and that it was impossible for a business concern to legislate for a variable sum on a minimum scale, and that even if a system of refunds of any excess were arranged, as was done in certain cases last year, the latter system was complicated and in practice difficult to operate owing to the vast number of pilgrims and the inevitable difficulty of tracing individual cases. I further pointed out that part of the excess complained of was represented by the normal commercial commission for service and the difference on the gold exchange, in fairness to the companies whom he had publicly accused of wholesale extortion, and finally that the rules as they stood practically forced companies to the very action of which he complained.

King Hussein's complaints, however, serve to accentuate that portion of Messrs. R. J. Farrer's and W. H. Lee-Warner's memorandum dealing with the amount collected by shipping companies from pilgrims in excess of the actual dues and after allowing for all expenses. Any excess in such charges is much to be deprecated, if only from the consideration that it gives a handle to those who are ever on the look out for means of discrediting the arrangements made for the pilgrimage, and of making political capital out of any such circumstance.

The King stoutly denied that the Director-General of Quarantine had ever tried to collect dues in excess of the official notification, or had threatened to refuse to allow pilgrims to disembark, unless he were paid at once, but on being informed that I had the proof that he had first charged at the rate of P.T. 77½, then 66½, and finally 52½, and that his threat had been in the form of an official notification, His Majesty said it had all been a mistake, and nothing of the sort had been intended. He further agreed that the companies concerned would naturally not be called on to produce the difference of P.T. 5 per head for those ships which had already arrived, or had sailed before the telegraphic notification of the final arrangement had been received, promising that no further misunderstandings would be allowed to arise, but as this report is being closed, I have before me a letter from the director-general again demanding the payment of the new total in full in arrears.

Such are the methods which have to be contended with in the settlement of even the simplest matters with King Hussein and his officials.

His wilful misconception of the nature of these discussions, which beginning four months ago show no apparent sign of being ever satisfactorily terminated, is well illustrated by his fervid offer to let me send anybody I pleased to the islands to see that only the correct amount of dues was collected from the pilgrims.

Underlying Causes of King Hussein's Attitude.

As is generally the case with despotic monarchs of King Hussein's calibre, he is apt to be very much the tool of those surrounding him, if they can win his ear by arguments pleasing to himself.

In addition to the reasons already mentioned, self-seeking persons with an axe to grind, notably the Hussein brothers, continually insinuated to the King that pilgrims much preferred not to be quarantined at Kamaran, outside the limit of

their sacred land, but desired rather that all such measures should be taken within its borders and not under alien, and especially Christian, control.

A spurious agitation was even engineered last year attempting to discredit the efficiency of the measures taken at Kamaran.

This idea, pleasing to King Hussein for obvious reasons, having once taken root in his mind, is one of the bases on which all his subsequent attempts to cling to entire control of quarantine have rested.

Once King Hussein has formed a fixed idea of this nature, anything to the contrary but serves to confirm it. He has apparently convinced himself, and is never weary of stating, that quarantine detention must be carried out at Jeddah, in order to please not himself, but the pilgrims—that their detention on the inadequately equipped and congested islands of Abu Saad and Wasta is in the nature of a privilege, of which they are only too glad to avail themselves, and that his rules as to the period of detention, his anxiety to add quarantine at Jeddah to that at Kamaran, are in favour of the pilgrims themselves; and that he cannot charge them for this privilege, unless he gives them the opportunity of availing themselves of its attractions.

In King Hussein's eyes any measures, sanitary or otherwise, connected with the pilgrimage, are the peculiar prerogative of the sacred land of the Hedjaz, and as such to be jealously safeguarded. He considers it not only his duty to uphold this prerogative, but that he would be false to the desires and interests of the pilgrims themselves in allowing it to be shared in any degree by foreigners and non-Moslems.

The practical consideration that the pilgrims, however wrongly, prefer the comparative amenities of detention at Kamaran to being overcrowded, short of water, under a pitiless sun, bareheaded and clad only in the scanty Ihram, on the confined space of coral sand which constitutes the Jeddah quarantine station, carries no weight with him.

Interested parties further pander to the King's own conviction that the Hedjaz is capable of producing a staff and the necessary adjuncts of such a station fully equal in efficiency to any that could be found elsewhere, and he has even asked why Kamaran should not be under his control, as so much importance was attached to the necessary sanitary measures being carried out at that place.

The basis of his tenacious adherence to the outward form of quarantine control is thus both religious and political, arising out of his continually repeated desire to carry out his duties to the pilgrims as completely as possible, influenced by the insidious suggestions of interested parties, and from his jealousy of any interference, however shadowy, with his prerogative as the sole arbiter of all questions affecting the pilgrimage, strengthened by his exaggerated sense of the capabilities of himself and his officials.

It need hardly be said that the political aspect of King Hussein's opposition is one which he studiously keeps in the background in such discussions as arise, but an interesting light on his real intentions is furnished by his statement to a certain (Christian) member of Prince Habib Lotfallah's staff, that he would resist to the utmost any foreign control of the pilgrims while on their way to the Hedjaz, or while in the Hedjaz. "Until," in the words he is stated to have used, "I have said good-bye to them on the beach at Jeddah, when they can do what they like, and detain them at Kamaran and Tor for twelve months, as far as I am concerned."

Mecca Representative.

The Mecca office was closed on the 23rd February, and Captain Nasiruddin Ahmed sailed for India on the 1st March.

King Hussein's answer to the observations of His Majesty's Government on the abolition of the appointment is attached to this report.

On Captain Nasiruddin paying his farewell visit before the King's departure for Jeddah, the latter explained his reasons for his hostile attitude.

He maintained that British policy towards all Eastern questions had been, and still was, mistaken as a whole, and particularly so as regards himself. He failed to understand how it was that His Majesty's Government did not realise the difficulties of his position. He considered himself, in his relations with Great Britain, to be much in the same position as a responsible Minister, as much entitled to a proper consideration of his views and suggestions as any such Minister, and free to resign in the event of his views not being accepted.

The British Government had entrusted to him a ship without rudder or sails, and expected him to navigate her safely through dangerous waters into harbour.

He was being asked to accomplish the impossible, and the question of a British representative at Mecca was a case in point. As to his own attitude, he instanced his loyalty and dependence on Great Britain by stating that he had even asked His Majesty's Government to undertake the representation of his interests in foreign countries, an arrangement obviously advantageous to Great Britain, the refusal of which puzzled him.

He was only too willing to rule under British protection, but for obvious reasons this should not be outwardly apparent to the Moslem world.

The presence of a British representative in any guise at Mecca would be prejudicial not only to himself, and lead to similar pretensions on the part of others, but also to the best interests of His Majesty's Government, and it was as much in the latter's interest as his own that he could not, and would not, agree to any such appointment.

King Hussein added that, as it was, Moslems were only too ready to listen to the allegations as to the Holy Places being virtually under British control, and accused him of being a traitor to his religion. His acceptance of a representative at Mecca would but confirm their fears.

The King wished Captain Nasiruddin to understand clearly that he was not in any way influenced by personal motives, and offered him an assurance to this effect in writing, if required, calling on Emir Zeid to bear witness and remember his reasons in the future.

The impression left on Captain Nasiruddin by this and previous interviews was that if a sufficient number of British Moslem subjects supported the appointment in their own interests, and made this unmistakably clear themselves to King Hussein, he would be prepared to modify his attitude, but that at present he is genuinely nervous of opinion outside the Hedjaz, though not prepared to acknowledge his fear.

I am, however, not disposed to agree entirely with Captain Nasiruddin, and consider that the real motive of the King's attitude is to be found rather in his fear of the thin end of the wedge of foreign penetration in any form, and that any such demand by Indian Moslems would meet with scant consideration so long as a Moslem representative held an official position under the agency. If the Indian vice-consul is to be deputed to Mecca, as suggested, he is likely to meet with even stronger opposition from the King than hitherto encountered, from the very fact of his being one of the agency staff. As regards protecting the interests of Indian pilgrims, the appointment of an unofficial delegate by representative bodies in India would appear to be the only practicable solution under present conditions, but this again would require careful handling and be open to objection.

King Hussein took particular pains to impress Captain Nasiruddin with the sincerity of his regard for Great Britain and of his desire to be virtually under her protection, while avoiding its outward appearance, and with his anxiety to remove any misunderstanding as to the true motives for his opposition to the Mecca appointment and in other matters.

He commented at the same time bitterly on our treatment of himself as compared with Ibn Saud and the Idrisi, who, he remarked, appeared to be put up by Great Britain against himself and the Imam. This was but a repetition in another form of his claim to be the only ruler in Arabia entitled to our consideration and support.

King Hussein has long since persuaded himself that any divergence of his views from those of His Majesty's Government is in the larger interests of Great Britain, as a convenient excuse for his attitude in many matters and as an added proof of his loyalty and disinterestedness. Any hint that His Majesty's Government is possibly competent to judge of its own interests better merely tends to confirm him in his attitude and to add fuel to the flame of his discontent.

While fond of repeating deprecatingly that he is but a simple Bedu, King Hussein prides himself on his grasp of world-politics, and while adopting the pose of candid friend, reserves to himself the right of dictating his own opinion, considering himself justly aggrieved should it not be accepted.

Visit of Emir Habib Lotfallah to Jeddah.

The Emir arrived at Jeddah on the 25th February, accompanied by Malouf Bey and Sirkis Effendi, King Hussein arriving the next day from Mecca to welcome him and thank him for his services. A banquet was given in his honour on the 1st March, and several visits and invitations were exchanged with the agency. The ex-Vali, Ahmed Nedim Pasha, was also in Jeddah during the visit.

The Emir discoursed on many current questions at great length both with myself and in the presence of the King, who appeared to be very much impressed by his arguments, and more than once quoted Prince Habib as an authority who fully bore out his own statements. Much was made of the desirability of the creation of a strong Arab State, friendly with and allied to Great Britain, both as a means of satisfying Arab aspirations and as a bulwark against the disruptive tendencies now operating against her interests and in defence of her Imperial communications.

The question of the presence of the French in Syria was naturally brought to the fore during these informal conversations, and King Hussein has apparently absorbed further ideas on the trend of present politics and movements, one of the least of which being that it would be simple to induce the French to leave Syria by offering them compensation elsewhere, failing their removal by the threat of force.

The King, taking his cue from the Emir, had a great deal to say on the subject of Bolshevism and the rôle of an Arab nation in combating its advance in the East, affirming not for the first time that had the emissaries he had provided in 1916 not been mistakenly restrained from proceeding further than Egypt, the whole current of events in Eastern Asia Minor, the Caucasus and further afield up to the limits of Persia and Bokhara would have been altered.

In a conversation at which I was not present the King is reported as stating that the help of the Arabs—and by Arabs he meant an Arab nation, loosely knit, but nevertheless under one titular head, not necessarily himself—was vital to Great Britain to resist the coming attack against India through Persia, both because of the strategic value of the geographical position of the peninsula and because of the material help which would be afforded by friendly Arab forces, especially in Northern and Eastern Irak. Therefore it would be wiser for Great Britain to conciliate the Arabs as much as possible, help them to fulfil their aspirations, and thus make sure of faithful allies for the future, instead of further embittering them by disowning agreements already made, and allowing France, also a so-called ally of the Arabs, to overrun and colonise Syria under pretext of a mandate, and to do the same herself in Palestine and Irak. A disunited and dismembered Arabia would always be a source of embarrassment and weakness; a reconstituted Arab Empire from the Persian Gulf to the Taurus, closely allied to Great Britain and assured of her guidance and material help, would, on the contrary, form the strongest link in the chain of her Eastern communications.

In this connection, King Hussein has often expressed his firm belief in the inevitable fusion of the present discordant elements in Arabia and the formation of an Arab State. While now with but little hope of seeing this in his time, and disclaiming always any desire to obtain the titular headship of such a State himself, he maintains that all theories to the contrary will be falsified, and that while such a consummation of the reborn ideal of a reconstituted Arab nation, and of the hopes raised by the revolt, may be delayed by the present apparent disinclination of the Allies to further any such ideal from without, it will surely be attained from within, and that within at the most twenty years.

On this he bases his arguments as to the advantage to Great Britain in now promoting rather than retarding the formation of an autonomous Arab State under her ægis, passing naturally to demands for material aid in helping to forward this ideal, and to the aggrandisement of the Hedjaz at the expense of others, who, he claims, had no share in the revolt and were even inimical to the pan-Arab ideas, as shown by their conduct during the war.

An interesting light on the manifesto published in India in King Hussein's name, though it has not so far been possible to establish with what degree of authority, as to Bagdad being the political and Mecca and Jerusalem the religious centres of such a State, is possibly furnished by a remark dropped by Prince Habib Lotfallah, after an interview with the King, that the time would come when the British representative would be, not at Jeddah, which was bound by ties religious rather than political with Mecca, but at Bagdad, or even possibly Damascus, as the future political capital.

Interviews with King Hussein.

Arising from a further discussion on the quarantine question, the pilgrimage and the mutual interest of himself and Great Britain in promoting the welfare of Islam, King Hussein laid stress on the present condition of the Moslem world after the disintegration of the Turkish Empire.

Somebody had to take Turkey's place—and who but the Arabs? But, it must be understood, an Arab nation not to be split up into Irak, Syria for the French and Palestine for the Zionists.

As to conflicting interests in "other parts" of Arabia, once the principle of an Arab State was conceded, such difficulties could easily be overcome.

Great Britain, as the predominant Moslem Power, had made a grave mistake in neglecting, after the dissolution of the Turkish Empire, to replace Turkey by an equivalent which would stabilise the Moslem world, now in a great state of ferment owing to the collapse of its traditional head.

It was essential that Great Britain and the Arabs should stand together, in a relation closer than that existing between her and the Porte before the rise of the Young Turks.

As soon as Turkey forsook Great Britain, its doom had been sealed, and as had been the case with the Turks, so with the Arabs—they could only prosper with the goodwill and support of Great Britain, hence it was to the Arab interest to support the British Government as it was in the British interest to make certain of Arab goodwill. The British Government, however, apparently did not consider the question in this light, or it would never have countenanced the sub-division of what he knew would one day, and that soon, become the Arab nation, notwithstanding present scepticism and opposition.

In making much the same remarks to me as he had to Captain Nasiruddin, the King added, regarding the representation of Hedjaz interests abroad, that he had reluctantly to contemplate asking Italy to undertake this for him through her consulates, in places where he had no agents of his own.

The King again referred on more than one occasion to the Emir Feisal in much the same manner as before, and I distinctly gathered the impression that he fears the latter has not been sufficiently firm. He is reported to have stated that Feisal is too obviously anxious to please the British and is only a tool in their hands, and that he will not accept any settlement arrived at by him unless it embodies the last letter of his own claims.

It has been suggested that the Italian envoy (now the Italian consul) at Jeddah is at the bottom of King Hussein's present patent distrust of the Emir.

The King at different times showed me various telegrams from London, including the one expressing strong hopes of a satisfactory termination of the discussions, and in connection with another on the subject of operations south of Damascus, assured me that he had again instructed Emir Abdullah not to take any action which might be misconstrued. He had received assurances from the Emir that there was no truth in the allegations as to warlike operations, and that all that had occurred was a certain amount of purely local trouble, normal to Transjordan.

W. BATTEN, Major, I.A.,
Acting British Agent.

Annex to Enclosure 1.

King Hussein to Major Batten.

(Translation.)
Your Honour,

February 19, 1921 (11.6.39).

AFTER respects, I have received your letter of the 19th February, 1921, and noted about the return of Captain Nasiruddin to India. May God grant him safety wherever he may be.

As regards your statement that you are directed to inform me that "this was done in deference to your Majesty's unconcealed objection, &c," most proudly, and as loud as I can, I boast of this objection, giving no attention to whether His Majesty's Government will take this as a matter of faithfulness and true sincerity, or as opposition and contradiction, begging her to consider my opposition on the decision of Greece occupying Smyrna, when I was informed of same in time by your Excellency's office in a special way.

I am satisfied by drawing her attention to what the newspapers say and openly attribute to me. Anyhow, is it not better and more preferable that somebody may be appointed to take over the country to attain two important results: to safeguard the rest of my rights, and that she will make the arrangements and get the wishes which I am opposing and do not assist in carrying out. Nothing is more impressive than

attributing bribe to me in the matter of the Nejd pilgrims, and that if I did not assist them I should not be given the 300,000 rupees.

I conclude by repeating my statement in my letter of 24.5.39, that I accepted the invitation of Great Britain not for a private object or a personal wish so that I will be contented on getting it or excited on losing it, but it is for the general good, and this assures the necessity of this only means which nothing will prevent, especially because of the approach of the pilgrim season, which will be the cause of such discussions and their consequences. God is the best help.

HUSSEIN.

Enclosure 2 in No. 157.

Jeddah Report for the Period March 3 to 11, 1921.

(Secret.)

Local Stamps and Currency.

DURING a visit to King Hussein on the 3rd, he produced three proofs of revenue stamps made in Mecca, and for which he had procured the necessary materials from Egypt. The dies were evidently very creditable pieces of work, and the stamps should shortly be in use. No more postage stamps have been imported for some months, and I am informed the King intends to issue his own when the present supply is exhausted.

I had previously seen a specimen of a coin of the face value of 1 piastre, recently made locally, but dated 1334.

The workmanship was very crude and the metal soft, and it is stated the cost of production of such as had been made was prohibitive. On my asking the King whether he contemplated minting new currency of his own, he replied that he was making a start with $\frac{1}{2}$ and 1 piastre pieces, of which 1,500l. worth had been already minted. When the amount reached 2,000l., he would gradually redeem the corresponding small Turkish coinage, at present a source of embarrassment to the merchants. As the King has for some months been forcibly exchanging sacks of "halalas," of which quantities have found their way from the north, against gold and silver, their embarrassment can be well understood.

The above coins are stated to be the work of two coiners, imprisoned in Mecca for uttering false money, sent for by the King, and subsequently released on proving their ability to serve his own purpose.

While an informal call was being paid subsequently on the Emir Lotfallah, the King was announced, and further enthusiastic elaborations of the theories advanced at previous interviews were indulged in. The venue was Persia, and the occasion the production of a Reuter's telegram announcing the refusal of Riza Khan to accept the present Anglo-Persian Agreement. The alleged traditional British policy of occupation, followed by withdrawal, only leading to inevitable reoccupation, was prophesied for Persia, leading inevitably to the same vicious circle of Syria, Palestine and Irak.

The King was in his element, laying down broad lines of policy before a receptive and adulatory audience, and conclusively proving how Arab forces could guarantee the integrity of Persia, safeguard the approach to India through Baluchistan, and remove a burden of anxiety and undesired commitments from Great Britain, and I left him indulging this vein to the utmost as soon as politeness permitted.

Further Difficulties over Quarantine.

Mazhar Nedim was sent round on the evening of the 4th March by the King to say that the Holt agent, apparently on instructions from the agency, had refused to pay any quarantine dues. I immediately pointed out that this was incorrect, and that the King was probably referring to the difference of P.T. 5, which he himself had agreed should not be demanded, as it had not been collected on the tickets.

Mazhar Bey said he was instructed to show me the regulations on the subject, and produced the Turkish Regulations, marked at the article enjoining the production of all such dues by the masters of pilgrim ships. I conveyed my astonishment and regret that the King should have apparently forgotten his own assurances of a few days previously, explained the matter again, and requested him to inform His Majesty that, incidentally, the director-general was apparently using as his guide

regulations which were void, and which the King himself had recognised as such, and asked for an interview in the morning.

The production of the Turkish Regulations so soon was somewhat of a surprise, as I had not anticipated that the King would bring the matter to a head until he was once more ensconced at Mecca, and until the first steamer from Kamaran had arrived.

The subsequent interview was a stormy one, the King tearing his beard and indulging in a diatribe against the interference of foreigners in the pilgrimage, the support by the British Government of exactions against pilgrims and similar heroics.

When King Hussein had become sufficiently calm to listen seriously to what I had to say, I mentioned the production of the Turkish Regulations. He affirmed that none others existed for him, and that until a new international board was established, on which he would be represented, he would carry out none other than the Turkish Regulations and disregard all innovations made without his approval.

I reminded him of his recent assurances, explained the relation of the Turkish Regulations to the 1903 and 1912 conventions, which had not only been made clear last year, but again recently, and after showing him that the convention, a copy of which I had brought with me, had been signed by the Turkish Government, I eventually obtained from him renewed assurances that in that case he would follow its provisions. Although I was aware that Thabit Bey, who was present during part of the interview, and the King had copies of the convention, the King ingenuously asked for my copy to compare with the Turkish Regulations.

As regards his renewed claim against the Holt agent for the difference of P.T. 5, after a further diatribe against the exactions of shipping companies, during which the King affected to be wrung with grief at the sufferings of the pilgrims, he first denied the demand of the director-general, until informed again that I had seen the letter, whereupon he reaffirmed it in his own name.

The King sent for a 1920 ticket, on which 8 dollars was shown as the charge, tore it in half and threw it on the floor, affirming that he insisted on the difference of P.T. 5 being paid as retribution for the excessive charges made by Messrs. Holt last year in the name of the Hashimite Government. It took some time to persuade him that two wrongs do not make a right, and that his insistence on this course would but place his Government in the wrong, and lead to payment under protest and the inevitable raising of further difficulties which it was to our mutual interest to avoid. On his proving obdurate, I said that his decision was much to be regretted, but that if he insisted the agent would be instructed to pay, leaving the responsibility for whatever ensued on the Government, whereupon the King changed his tone and gave way, remarking that he only did so on my assurance that the question of excessive charges would be investigated, and trusting in the British sense of justice to obtain refund in full for all who had been overcharged, and in taking steps to prevent a recurrence of such abuses.

I pointed out that there would have been no need for any of these difficulties, discussions and disagreements had the Government decided on its quarantine dues in time. I again drew the moral of the advisability of a fixed sum, and explained the difficulties of the shipping companies and the measures taken to refund excess charges, which were directly due to the uncertainty of the amount caused by continual changes in the rate, both last year and this.

King Hussein heatedly affirmed that there had been no delay, and that the truth of the whole matter was that nothing he could do was right, that his last director-general had been bad, his present one was apparently worse and he himself and the Arabs generally were looked upon with deliberate disfavour by the British Government, after which outburst he fervently embraced me, and the interview was terminated.

Thabit Bey accompanied me to the agency, when in less difficult company the whole question of quarantine was amicably discussed.

The fact that the mail-steamer then at Jeddah was undergoing disinfection under his orders, owing to a case of plague taken off at Port Soudan, considerably helped this amiable Turk to take a rosy view of the situation, and as far as possible all reasons for misunderstanding were removed. As regards dues, he remarked ingenuously enough that a round sum of P.T. 50 even was nothing—that P.T. 100 or more would be quite legitimate, but that the King was unfortunately averse to charging pilgrims unless they were actually quarantined. He reaffirmed the King's assurances as to following the International Convention, and hinted broadly at his own inability to do more than follow the strict letter of his master's instructions.

Thabit Bey is an ill-instructed, incapable and subservient Turk of a very ordinary kind, assisted by the King's reputed secret adviser in quarantine matters, Constantine Effendi, at present in great favour, and, like Thabit Bey, one of King Hussein's principal spies, fervently anti-European, and the lieutenant of Mohamed Hussein last year.

The director-general supports his actions by quoting the King, while the latter in turn either repudiates all responsibility, until driven into a corner, or affects ignorance of technical details, referring all such to the competency of his quarantine officials.

After King Hussein's departure, Thabit Bey triumphantly showed me a letter from the master of the last pilgrim ship to the agent, requesting the latter to pay P.T. 62½, as evidence of the manner in which pilgrims were being cheated. As the steamer in question was Dutch, I told him it would be more to the point if he took the matter up with the Netherlands consul, who had just returned from leave, and that obviously there had been a mistake.

The manner in which this document was obtained is instructive.

Thabit Bey, on first boarding the steamer, asked the master for an order on the agent for the necessary dues, and on the master appearing doubtful of the correct amount, but finally stating that, as far as he knew, they were P.T. 62½, as at the beginning of last year, representing five days' quarantine, exclusive of Kamaran dues, he agreed, and obtained the master's signature to the order at that rate.

The agent naturally could not agree to this order, and a race between him and the director-general in their respective launches occurred the next day, the agent getting in the first word in Dutch through a megaphone. The master asked for the document and tore it up, informing the director-general that in any case it was valueless, as he had given it in ignorance and that the director-general should have corrected him, being himself aware of the correct amount.

Had the letter not been destroyed, it would probably have served, although quite valueless, as quite sufficient evidence for King Hussein in the prosecution of his propaganda among pilgrims as to the way in which they are treated by others in comparison to his own care for their interests.

As regards his allegations against Messrs. Holt, I have telegraphed to Singapore requesting early and full information as to the exact composition in detail of last year's charges, and this season's charge of 7 dollars at the equivalent local exchange rate in rupees, in order that King Hussein may be effectually answered without delay. Though he has not presumed to say so officially, his intention is apparently to claim from companies the payment of any refund to himself for distribution, in order to pose as the protector of pilgrims against foreign extortion.

During the last interview reported above, the King asked me how long those steamers which had already arrived had spent at Kamaran, and he demanded that the Kamaran charge of 5 rupees, which he had just previously claimed was not included in the total stamped on the tickets, must be refunded by the British Government. I regretted that the arrangements at Kamaran could not be discussed on the basis of any decisions of his own regarding dues at Jeddah, and that it yet remained to be proved whether this sum had been paid out or not, but the King remained convinced that he had further proved his point as to the unjust treatment of pilgrims.

After further formal and informal meetings, of a more pleasant nature, King Hussein left Jeddah on the afternoon of the 7th March, immediately after the departure of Emir Lotfallah and his party. The latter was promoted to the rank of General in the Shereefian army and made chief aide-de-camp to the King.

Pilgrimage Conditions.

During a conversation before breakfast, to which the agency was invited, he talked of his caravan arrangements for this year's pilgrimage, especially to Medina, and stated that by sending a small number of large caravans, suitably escorted, the troubles of last year would be avoided. If the camelmen made any difficulties, he would threaten to send all Medina pilgrims by sea. The King complained that the reports of robbery and violence were either untrue or much exaggerated, and that in any case the pilgrims were themselves to blame for not obeying orders and straggling. He said it was all very well for wholesale complaints to be made, but the difficulty of adequately providing for and looking after a horde of obstinate people of the poorest and most ignorant classes was not sufficiently realised.

The cause of difficulties, and the persistence of dangers, lay, in his opinion, in

the increased facilities for the Haj due to modern conditions of transport to the Hedjaz. Formerly, ships only came once a year, and on the whole only those who were fairly well-to-do and well able to take care of themselves could perform the Haj. Now, owing to modern facilities, the country was flooded by a mass of indigent, ignorant and helpless creatures who were only a burden to it. He even went so far as to add that the Haj was not obligatory unless the intending pilgrim was well able to perform it.

King Hussein's complaints on this score, which refer principally to Indian pilgrims, are surprisingly frank, and considerably at variance with his more familiar rôle of protector and willing host of the Faithful.

The course of a pleasant conversation after breakfast was interrupted by Prince Habib producing a letter from the American Syrian Committee, offering volunteers to join Emir Abdullah, and stating that while Syrians everywhere were ardently desirous of doing what they could for their country, apparently King Hussein was content to leave them in the lurch.

The King was moved to tears, and drawing me aside later, made a further earnest appeal either for support from His Majesty's Government, or for release from his difficulties. It was all very well, he said, replying to my remarks on the letter attached to this report, in the course of which I continued his simile and reminded him of the traditional duties of a captain to his ship, for the Prime Minister and His Majesty's Government to put him off with fair words, but what he desired was some proof of their protestations.

At a farewell visit after the departure of the Emir, the Netherlands consul was present, with a complaint against Thabit Bey for not allowing him or his doctor on board the Dutch steamer to investigate a case of poisoning, until the last of the pilgrims had been disembarked. The King told him to forward anything he had to say through the usual channels, and said he could listen to no complaints connected with pilgrims or quarantine from the consul for Holland, a Government which he roundly accused of encouraging frauds on pilgrims.

Mr. Gobe (the Netherlands consul) concurs in the view, expressed in my report ending the 20th February, that owing to the unfortunate precedent set by the utilisation of the Jeddah quarantine station due to Kamaran not being opened in time to deal with the first pilgrim steamers as arranged, difficulties may very probably arise when the time comes for pilgrims to be disembarked direct, despite King Hussein's protestations to all the representatives in Jeddah.

Should such difficulties occur, the question will not be partly, as last year, the imposition of undue charges for the benefit of corrupt officials, but wholly one of unnecessary detention in excess of sanitary necessity, the question of the method of collection of dues having finally been settled.

In that case, it is submitted that the threat of publication of a notice in the vernacular papers of the countries concerned, that any quarantine detention in excess of that undergone at Kamaran and Tor was entirely unnecessary for sanitary reasons and would be purely on the responsibility of the Hashimite Government, might have more effect on the King than any attempt at interference, or even a combined protest. The consuls here have privately informed me that they agree, the French consul-general stating, however, that he is further prepared to request his Government to advise French Moslem subjects not to undertake the Haj this year in view of the difficulties caused by the local authorities and the insecurity of the country.

Regarding the reason given in the King's letter for the despatch of Emir Zeid to Taif, and also announced in "Al Qibla," the true reason is stated to be not unconnected with the visit of a lady from Egypt, who has now been twice to Jeddah.

The Emir, talking to me over the telephone, was not enthusiastic over his exile, and expressed himself forcibly in English on the subject.

Press.

"Al Qibla."—Number 460 contains a circular to all Syrians abroad from the Syrian Union in Mexico on the usual lines. Nothing of particular importance appears in the other copies, beyond articles and quotations on the present general conditions of the world.

"Al Falah."—The missing No. 24 has been obtained, and contains under the heading "The Arab position to-day" somewhat inflammatory matter on the collapse of the alleged plans of Great Britain and others to profit by the policy of "divide et

impera," caused by the reported reverses of the Greeks in Asia Minor, and the failure of the hopes of dissension between Mustapha Kemal and the Bolsheviks, concluding with an assurance of the participation of the Arabs in the attempts of Eastern nations such as India, Algeria, Egypt, Morocco and Tunis to win their independence, and promising them material help.

A telegraphic warning was circulated on receipt of the paper.

W. BATTEN, Major, I.A.,
Acting British Agent.

Annex to Enclosure 2.

King Hussein to Major Batten.

(Translation.)

Your Honour,

March 1, 1921 (21.6.39).

After respects. I have received your Excellency's letter of the 1st March, 1921, communicating the message from his Excellency the great Prime Minister. In short, I beg to repeat the expression of my previous feelings which are the trust in, and the reliance on, the British honour and dignity which are well-known throughout the world; and that Great Britain will find me with whoever is joining me in the position in which she will leave us, whatever sort of desertion this may be. Great Britain has given us the command of a great ship to sail with it on the ocean of these terrible things, but then she has taken away from me its map, its instruments and its compass. Are there any means left after that to ensure safety from being drowned and certainly lost, except to get out of this ship? The Almighty God alone knows how strong our relations with Great Britain are, and how firmly we are adhering to them. Having sent my son Zeid, under the circumstances, to the villages of Taif is the simplest proof of what is to be said in respect of the recommendations for calmness and tranquillity which you pointed out.

May God grant success to everybody.

HUSSEIN.

Enclosure 3 in No. 157.

Shipping Intelligence to March 10, 1921.

THE following steamers arrived at and departed from Jeddah between the 21st February and the 10th March, 1921:—

Steamship.	Flag.	From—	To—	Arrived.	Left.	Pilgrims disembarked.	Cargo discharged.
				1921.	1921.		Packages.
Mansourah ..	British	P. Soudan ..	Suez ..	Feb. 21	Feb. 22	..	3,069
Porto Maurizio ..	Italian	Suez ..	Massana ..	" 22	" 22	..	75
Bellerophon ..	British	Singapore ..	Liverpool ..	" 23	" 23	277	General
Dakahlieh ..	"	Suez ..	P. Soudan ..	" 25	" 25	..	350
Pak Ling ..	"	Java ..	Liverpool ..	" 26	" 26	562	80
							(tea)
Porto Maurizio ..	Italian	Massana ..	Suez ..	" 27	" 27	..	476
Koweit ..	British	Bombay and Aden ..	Bombay ..	" 28	Mar. 2	..	2,552
Dakahlieh ..	"	P. Soudan ..	Suez ..	Mar. 4	" 7	..	7,205
Vergemero ..	"	Suakim	" 5	1,740
Mansourah ..	"	Suez ..	P. Soudan ..	" 5	Mar. 5	..	289
Kambangan ..	Dutch	Java ..	P. Said ..	" 7	" 8	1,284	..
Serpentara ..	Italian	Massana ..	Suez ..	" 8	" 10	..	1,282
Djoeja ..	Dutch	Java ..	Rotterdam ..	" 9	" 10
Iran ..	British	Bombay and Aden	" 9	24,993

CHAPTER VI.—GENERAL.

[C 3148/2754/22]

No. 158.

Earl Curzon to Sir G. Buchanan (Rome).

(No. 154.)

Sir,

Foreign Office, February 12, 1921.

THE Italian Ambassador asked to see me this afternoon, in order to communicate to me the tenor of the conversation which Count Sforza had held at Paris with the Prime Minister, and to supplement it with some further observations. He had had instructions in this sense at Paris, but had been unable to act upon them owing to my departure immediately after the break-up of the Conference.

What Count Sforza had proposed and held in view was a revival of the understanding between Italy and Great Britain which had, in his opinion, been the decisive factor in the Mediterranean situation before the war. Negotiations had, he said, taken place between the two Governments in 1912-13 with a view to putting this understanding on a definite basis, and the Ambassador thought therefore that there ought to be no difficulty in returning to the point at which they had been suspended. I pointed out to Signor de Martino that, while I knew nothing of the pourparlers to which he referred, the European situation had entirely changed in the last seven years, that there was a different orientation of the Mediterranean States and peoples, and that the solutions or understandings of 1913 might not be equally applicable to 1921, and I asked him exactly what the new policy or resuscitated old policy was to be. As to this he was becomingly vague, but when I hinted to him that what Count Sforza had in view was probably a pro-Turk and anti-Greek policy to be jointly pursued by the two Powers, he did not dissent, but rather indicated that Italian support in other matters might be easily purchased by an accommodating attitude in this. While reciprocating the friendly intentions of Count Sforza, I told the Ambassador that it was quite impossible for either of us to ignore the position which Greece had won in the Mediterranean as the result of the war, and I said that I thought we had better await the results of the impending London Conference before we made any fresh dispositions. Much the best policy for the moment seemed to me to be to get the Treaty of Sèvres ratified, subject to such modifications as might be agreed upon, and then to determine the Mediterranean relations of the future.

Knowing from long experience that an interview with an Italian representative cannot take place without eventuating in some petition, appeal or request, I felt no surprise when the Ambassador, after repeating the familiar, but eminently disputable, complaint that Italy alone of the Allies had got nothing out of the war, proceeded to formulate a definite demand. This was that the Tripartite Agreement should be definitely incorporated in the revised treaty.

His Excellency arrived at this end by an ingenious line of approach. He reminded me that the Italian Government had made certain reserves at San Remo about the British mandates for Mesopotamia and Palestine. In their present mood of complaisance they were willing not to persist in these reservations, but thought it very desirable that the question of mandates should not be decided until after the London Conference had completed its labours.

Never having regarded the Italian reservations as possessing any but a tactical *raison d'être* (and that of the slightest), I displayed no emotion on hearing of the proffered withdrawal, but pointed out that the matter was no longer in our hands, but in that of the Council of the League of Nations. They had fixed the date of meeting, not we. We had no intention of asking for its further postponement. On the contrary, if we could we should hurry it on, in order to regularise our mandatory position. But even if there was to be further delay it could make no difference to us, since we were already exercising mandatory powers in anticipation of sanction, and must continue to do so. What the Ambassador really wanted, of course, was to be sure of the Tripartite Agreement for Italy before agreeing to the mandates for Great Britain.

As regards the Tripartite Agreement, of the exact form of which I had been the author in London a year ago, I pointed out to his Excellency what he did not appear to know, namely, that it had been deliberately decided not to include it in the treaty because (1) of the criticism that it would be sure to excite and (2) of the difficulty in obtaining the signature of Turkey to any treaty that contained it. I had therefore

proposed, and the Supreme Council had accepted, the idea of a self-denying ordinance between the three Powers, to be communicated to the Turkish Government simultaneously with the signature of the treaty. This had been done, and we could not recede from or reverse this procedure now. If we did there would be a good-bye to the Treaty of Sèvres and to the Tripartite Agreement at the same time.

I then alluded to the despatch of the Angora delegation to the London Conference, and explained quite clearly to his Excellency that, while we did not wish to object to the Italians bringing them over from Adalia to Brindisi if his Government wished to do so, we had no intention either of postponing the date of meeting, which had been settled to meet the general convenience, in order to humour the pretensions of Mustapha Kemal, or of admitting the delegation to the conference as an independent Government, or as the *de facto* Government of Turkey. They must either be incorporated with the Turkish delegation or not be admitted at all. I hoped that the Italian Government would use their influence to bring about the desired result.

The Ambassador undertook to communicate my views to his Government.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[E 2184/1/44]

No. 159.

Earl Curzon to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

(No. 515.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, February 16, 1921.

THE French Ambassador called upon me this afternoon and raised the following points in the course of our conversation:—

Firstly, he presented an urgent request from M. Briand that we should not, in deference either to the convenience of the Turkish Nationalist Party or to the representations of the Italian Government, agree to postpone the date of the meeting of the conference on the Treaty of Sèvres summoned to begin on Monday next.

I assured the Ambassador that we had no such intention, and that I had formally communicated our views to the Italian Ambassador. Even if the Angora delegation had not arrived or had not made up its differences with the Constantinople delegation, there would be plenty of business to occupy the Conference in the first day or two of its sittings.

The Ambassador assured me that M. Briand would be greatly relieved by this declaration.

Secondly, he desired to bring to my notice that the French military detachment, like the Italian, was about to leave Palestine.

Thirdly, he asked me whether it might not be a good thing, with a view to producing a favourable atmosphere among the Turks before their arrival in London, to release the Turkish prisoners of war detained since the war at Malta.

I replied that I could not for the moment and without reference remember how many they were or what were the offences for which they had been confined; but I was under the impression that some, though perhaps not the majority of them, had either been guilty of cruel acts during the war or had been embittered opponents of the Allied cause. I would look into the matter, but even supposing release were practicable it would seem to me to be better policy to hold the concession in reserve until we saw how the Turkish representatives were going to act, instead of giving it away in advance.

His Excellency next informed me that his Government was strongly of opinion that the total figure of German reparation, which under the Treaty of Versailles had to be fixed before the 1st May, should be determined at once by the members of the Reparation Commission sitting in Paris. It would not of course be possible to arrive at more than an approximate figure, but it was essential that this should be done, and he begged that instructions should be given to Sir John Bradbury to the same effect.

Lastly, he enquired whether I had any information as to an impending advance by the Greek forces in Asia Minor.

I replied that we had more than once heard that such a movement was in contemplation, but that it was not viewed favourably by our military authorities either here or at Constantinople, partly because they were doubtful of its success and partly because it was really a political move intended to prejudge the issues before the coming Conference. At the same time, I said, we could not actually prevent the Greeks from

undertaking it if they chose. My own inclination was to think that if any real risk were to be attached to it they would shy off at the last moment.

The Ambassador shared this view, but suggested that the real object of the movement, if undertaken, might be to revive the waning spirit of the Greek soldiery.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.

[C 6247/2740/18]

No. 160.

Earl Curzon to Lord Hardinge (Paris).

(No. 887.)

My Lord,

Foreign Office, March 23, 1921.

THE French Ambassador asked to see me this afternoon and raised at once the question, as to which there appears to be some misunderstanding between the French and British Governments, of the new customs arrangement being set up, as one of the agreed sanctions, in the territory beyond the Rhine. This misapprehension related to two points. In the first place, the French had offered to assist the British and the Americans with soldiers to constitute the necessary cordon along the new customs line. This, the Ambassador assured me, had not been done with the slightest intention of encroaching upon the spheres of occupation, either of America or of Great Britain, in which they had no right or desire to interfere, but solely because their superior local force would enable them without difficulty to produce the men whom the Allied Powers, owing to their greatly decreased effectives, might find it difficult to supply. It was, in fact, an act of courtesy on the part of the French Commander-in-chief.

I gladly accepted this explanation, and had indeed, as I said, entertained no other view.

The second misunderstanding had arisen in connection with the arrangements to be made on the customs line. At the Ambassadors' Conference in Paris your Excellency, he understood, had raised some objection to the French proposals, but in reality these referred not to the new line on the eastern side of the occupied territory, but to the old line that separated the French and Belgian territory from the occupied areas. The proposals made by the French Government related to this older line, and they realised quite well that the new trans-Rhenish customs barrier could only be set up as a result of agreement between the Allied Powers.

I said that the telegrams which I had received from Paris as to the Allied Conference yesterday did not seem to me quite to bear out this contention, for it was clear to me that the French Government had there been speaking of the new customs frontier, and had reproached His Majesty's Government for their slowness in carrying it into effect; M. Jules Cambon having actually used the word "tergiversation" in connection with the British attitude—a phrase which your Lordship had naturally and properly resented. There was real reason for thinking that the French were desirous of moving with unreasonable precipitation in the matter. What had, in fact, been the procedure laid down? The Supreme Conference had instructed the Rhineland Commission to prepare a report, which should contain proposals for the organisation of the area and the institution of the tariffs to be imposed therein. This report had only reached His Majesty's Government through the Ambassadors' Conference a few days before. It had been examined in the Cabinet only yesterday; it was found to raise questions of a very difficult and technical character. For my own part, I could not but regret the haste with which, in our desire to satisfy the French, we had, almost without investigation, accepted this particular sanction at the recent London Conference. The more I looked into it the more did it seem to be fraught with great difficulties and perils, not the least of which was that, in our desire to hit Germany, we might injure and even ruin the occupied territories themselves.

The question was emphatically one for experts to thrash out, and at the Cabinet yesterday a committee of experts had been set up with instructions to examine the report and to report upon it to His Majesty's Government with all possible expedition. Further, we were sending out a technical adviser to Coblenz to assist our representative there, and although it was nothing like as easy for us to find a staff of customs officials as it was for the French, who had a great organisation almost upon the spot, yet we

should do our best to supply what was necessary in this respect. All this, however, meant a little delay. It was out of the question that the French Government, however sensitive they were on the point, should risk a decision or endeavour to force upon the Allies a scheme, of the wisdom of which they were not convinced.

From your Lordship's telegram I gathered that Mr. Robertson was being summoned to Paris before the next meeting of the Ambassadors' Conference on Friday, and in reply to the Ambassador, who admitted the force of my arguments and pressed only for a rapid decision, I said that we would do our best, only I could not promise to give instructions to your Lordship before that date.

His Excellency then turned the conversation to the East, and enquired whether our own information bore out that which had been received by the French Government, to the effect that at Constantinople there was a stiffening of the attitude of the Turkish Government, the two parties—those in the capital and those from Angora—having mutually agreed to stand out for better terms than those which had been offered in London.

I said that our information, though not full, was much to the same effect, but that personally I feared that the prospects of an agreement would be retarded, not so much by anything done at Constantinople, as by the anticipated resumption of hostilities between the Turks and the Greeks. There seemed to be no doubt that the Greeks were going to resume the offensive, and although I thought myself that from the larger point of view this was a mistaken policy, it could not be denied that, in view of the large reinforcements which Mustapha Kemal was alleged to have secured by his recent agreement with the French Government over Cilicia, their attitude was an intelligible one and dictated by motives of self-preservation.

The Ambassador stated that his information agreed with ours, namely, that the attack was to begin to-day, and he then gave me his prognostication of the results of such an occurrence.

Mustapha Kemal did not, he said, propose to fight the Greeks at Eski-shehr or in that neighbourhood. They would thus gain a bloodless victory at the start. He would retire to Angora, mass his forces there, and would then harass the Greeks by guerilla warfare. In this way the conflict would be protracted for months, with consequences for the prospects of a settlement which could not but be deplored.

From Anatolia it was an easy transition to Syria, and the Comte de Saint-Aulaire proceeded once more to give me, with great fulness and no small emphasis, the French view of the situation that would be created by the reappearance of the Emir Feisal in Eastern parts. He told me that the British consul at Damascus had been saying some foolish things about the desirability of the French making terms with Abdullah and setting him up as King in Syria, and that the rumour was widely believed that the British Government were about to make Feisal King of Mesopotamia, Abdullah Emir of Transjordan and the other brother, Ali, Emir of Abu Kemal.

As regards Abdullah, I remarked that it was quite true that this son of King Hussein was, and had for some time been, in Transjordan, but he had gone there, not at our instigation, nor with our knowledge, and the whole of our efforts had been devoted since his arrival to preventing him from indulging in intrigue or hostility against the French across the Syrian border, an object for which it was more than likely that he had entered the country. We had brought the strongest pressure to bear upon King Hussein through Feisal to suspend any such activities, and it was entirely due to our influence and loyalty to the French that they had not assumed a more serious form.

As to the future, I had no means of knowing whether Abdullah wanted or would consent to be Emir in Transjordan, or what were his ambitions. As he was upon the spot it might be difficult to get rid of him, and if the people of Transjordan wanted him, I could see no reason why they should not have him.

As to Ali and Abu Kemal, this was the first that I had heard of such a project, and I had not seen his name mentioned in that connection. The plan of setting up a separate emirate in the north under him was one which had not originated with us, and of which I now heard for the first time.

The Ambassador might rest assured that we knew nothing about it.

His Excellency then reiterated the familiar French arguments against the adoption of Feisal by the British. He said that not only had he been a traitor to the French, but he had also been a traitor to us. In his conversation with General Gouraud he had offered to side with the French against the British and in return to give the former the complete exploitation of the oil wells of Mosul.

Sir Eyre Crowe had suggested that there might have been a misunderstanding owing to the inability of General Gouraud to understand Arabic, but this explanation could not be accepted, inasmuch as the conversation was conducted in French, of which Feisal had a good mastery, and General Gouraud was most explicit as to the words which had been employed.

To this I replied that I did not of course desire to contest the veracity of General Gouraud, but that if the Emir Feisal had used such language, which was conceivable, the circumstances must be taken into account, and it must be remembered that he was only using the traditional weapons of every Oriental in an anxious position, who invariably offered his services alternately to both sides in order to see what were the best terms that he could get. In the East we must expect such tactics, and if any Government were to decline to deal with an Oriental chieftain because he had at some time intrigued against them, or offered to side with another party, no transactions would ever take place. We did not, therefore, consider ourselves debarred from treating with Feisal by any such reports, which were further, I believed, entirely denied by him. However, as the Ambassador had raised the question of Feisal and Mesopotamia, I wished to take the opportunity of making quite clear to him, in language which could not possibly be misunderstood, the attitude which His Majesty's Government felt bound to adopt.

Since Feisal came to England the Foreign Office had had no official communication with him with regard to Mesopotamia, and he had had no communication with us. He had never mentioned the word "Mesopotamia," and had never asked us to support his candidature, or indeed hinted that he desired or intended to become a candidate. This did not mean that he might not conceivably do so; but it did mean that no plot existed between us on the matter.

The position in Mesopotamia was this:—

Just as the French had found themselves involved in enormous difficulties in Cilicia and in Syria, difficulties from which they had only been able to extricate themselves in Cilicia by wholesale retirement, and from which it was more than probable that they would only find release in Syria by a somewhat similar expedient in the future, so the British Government had encountered difficulties in Mesopotamia which had involved them in overwhelming responsibilities, in constant and fierce criticism in Parliament and in the press, and in the expenditure of money, which was altogether out of reason to expect that we could continue to bear.

In these circumstances, we had publicly announced our intention, which was indeed in strict accordance with the declaration of policy, affirmed by the French as well as ourselves in November 1918, to let the Arabs of Mesopotamia set up their own Government. They had been engaged for some time past in taking the necessary steps. The time must shortly arrive when the people of Mesopotamia would tell us whether they desired a single ruler, and if so, whom. When that moment arrived, should they be sufficiently united in favour of any candidate who could give us good reason to suppose that he would be able to set up a stable government in that country, we should accept him. There were, I believed, several candidates in the field. There were two local candidates, both of whom were pressing their claims. Supposing one or other of them was asked for by a united Mesopotamia, then we should take him. Supposing, on the other hand, they asked for Abdullah, who at one time had been mentioned as a possible candidate, but who, so far as I knew, had not yet put forward his claim, we should take him. Supposing they asked for Feisal, we should take him. I wished there to be no misunderstanding on this point. We should have to make our decision in the interests both of ourselves and of Mesopotamia.

We had, since the mandate was given to France for Syria, and since their position in Cilicia had been recognised by the Powers, never lifted a little finger to interfere with their political arrangements there. Personally, I thought that many of these were gravely mistaken, and I anticipated that the French would soon be driven to the solution to which we were being forced in Mesopotamia; but when that day arrived, or if it had arrived earlier, and if they had been called upon to nominate a single ruler for Syria, whether they had chosen Feisal, Abdullah or Ali, or anybody else, we should not have objected. We should have regarded it as their affair, and not ours. In the same way, I could not admit that they had any right to interfere with our choice in a similar case in respect of Mesopotamia. We certainly should not arrive at a decision with any desire to embarrass the French, or act in a manner unfair or disloyal to them, but the interests both of expediency and of honour would compel us to take a candidate who represented the unfettered choice of the people.

The Ambassador, who had listened to these remarks with attention, said that he did not dispute our perfect right to act in the manner that I had foreshadowed. What he did say was that whatever justification we might have, or whatever explanation might be given, nothing would alter the conviction of the French people that this was a deliberate plan on our part, which could have no other result than to render their position in Syria more difficult. It was a matter of sentiment rather than of reason, and he did not want to be open to the reproach of not having warned us fully in advance of the impression that would be produced upon his country.

I said in reply that I was fully aware of the existence of this sentiment, having been repeatedly reminded of it by M. Berthelot, General Gouraud, M. Millerand, M. Briand and others.

On the other hand, I desired to be equally free from reproach of any lack of candour, and it would be impossible for the French Government at a later date, should things take the form of the appearance and adoption of Feisal as a candidate, to remain in any doubt as to what the attitude of the British Government might have to be.

We should make the greatest mistake if we were to quarrel about such matters. The problems which confronted us in the East were much the same, and in the long run we should probably both be driven to almost identical solutions.

I am, &c.

CURZON OF KEDLESTON.